Martin v. LexisNexis

2025 Ohio 864

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 14, 2025
• Docket: 30265
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Martin v. LexisNexis, 2025-Ohio-864.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

TRAMAINE E. MARTIN : : Appellant : C.A. No. 30265 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2023 CV 06243 : LEXISNEXIS : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellee : :

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OPINION

Rendered on March 14, 2025

TRAMAINE E. MARTIN, Appellant, Pro Se

ERIN E. RHINEHART and JASON W. PALMER, Attorneys for Appellee

.............

HANSEMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Tramaine E. Martin, appeals pro se from an order of the

Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas denying his Civ.R. 60(B)(5) motion for relief

from judgment. For the reasons outlined below, the judgment of the trial court will be -2-

affirmed.

Facts and Course of Proceedings

{¶ 2} On November 21, 2023, Martin filed a pro se civil complaint in the

Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas that asserted claims for defamation and

telecommunications harassment against Appellee LexisNexis. Martin’s claims arose from

his allegation that LexisNexis had included a false statement in a case summary that it

published online with regard to his criminal appeal in State v. Martin, 2023-Ohio-3153 (8th

Dist.).

{¶ 3} The appeal in Martin concerned the denial of Martin’s petition for post-

conviction relief from convictions in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas for

attempted rape, gross sexual imposition, and kidnapping. When the appeal in Martin was

filed (from denial of the petition for postconviction relief), the Eighth District Court of

Appeals had previously affirmed Martin’s convictions on direct appeal. The Eighth District

had also affirmed the denial of a petition for post-conviction relief that Martin filed a year

after his direct appeal. The appeal in Martin concerned the trial court’s denial of a second

application for postconviction DNA testing that Martin had filed in an effort to have the

victim’s underwear retested for DNA. The Eighth District affirmed the trial court’s denial

of the application and issued a written opinion that LexisNexis published on its online

legal research platform. The case summary that LexisNexis published stated, in relevant

part:

HOLDINGS:[1]-The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying -3-

defendant’s application for postconviction DNA testing under R.C.

2953.74(A) because the prior DNA test clearly established that biological

material from the perpetrator of the crime of rape was recovered from

underwear and that the biological material was from defendant.

(Emphasis added.) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 2.

{¶ 4} Martin’s defamation and telecommunications harassment claims were based

on the italicized portion of LexisNexis’s case summary. Specifically, Martin claimed that

the italicized portion of the case summary falsely indicated that he was found guilty of

rape as opposed to attempted rape. Martin claimed that the alleged false statement

caused him to suffer verbal and physical abuse by fellow prison inmates and has resulted

in emotional distress. As a result, Martin requested LexisNexis to pay him $250,000 in

compensatory damages and to correct the information in the case summary.

{¶ 5} On December 20, 2023, LexisNexis filed a motion to dismiss Martin’s

complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). In its motion, LexisNexis argued that Martin’s

defamation claim failed as a matter of law because its case summary was not defamatory

in that it did not state that Martin had been convicted of rape. LexisNexis also argued that

the appellate court’s opinion immediately following the case summary accurately stated

that Martin had been convicted of attempted rape. LexisNexis further argued that, even if

the case summary were considered defamatory, Ohio’s fair report privilege codified under

R.C. 2317.05 protected it from liability for defamation.

{¶ 6} With regard to Martin’s telecommunications harassment claim, LexisNexis

argued that the claim failed as a matter of law because Martin made no factual allegation -4-

indicating that the case summary was made with the purpose to abuse, threaten, or

harass him. LexisNexis claimed that its case summary was instead made for legal

research purposes and, therefore, did not satisfy the elements of a telecommunications

harassment claim under R.C. 2917.21(B)(1).

{¶ 7} On January 8, 2024, the trial court granted LexisNexis’s motion to dismiss

and ordered the dismissal of Martin’s complaint with prejudice. Three days later, on

January 11, 2024, Martin filed an opposing memorandum wherein he argued that his

complaint alleged sufficient operative facts to survive a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal. The

certificate of service on Martin’s opposing memorandum indicated that it had been mailed

on January 8, 2024, after the 14-day response deadline per Civ.R. 6(C)(1) had elapsed.

The trial court did not act on Martin’s opposing memorandum after its late receipt.

{¶ 8} On January 30, 2024, Martin filed a Civ.R. 60(B)(5) motion for relief from

judgment. In the motion, Martin argued that the trial court’s January 8th order dismissing

his complaint should be vacated because: (1) his complaint alleged sufficient operative

facts to survive a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal; and (2) the trial court prematurely granted

LexisNexis’s motion to dismiss without considering his opposing memorandum. Although

Martin admitted that the filing of his opposing memorandum had been delayed due to the

mail process being slow in prison, he nevertheless claimed that his opposing

memorandum had been timely because he placed it in the mail on the filing deadline.

{¶ 9} In response, LexisNexis argued that Martin had not satisfied the

requirements for obtaining relief under Civ.R. 60(B). The trial court agreed with

LexisNexis and found that Martin’s motion for relief from judgment lacked merit. -5-

Specifically, the trial court found that Martin had failed to demonstrate that he had a

meritorious claim to present if the requested relief was granted. The trial court also found

that Martin had failed to demonstrate grounds for relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5).

Accordingly, the trial court denied Martin’s Civ.R. 60(B)(5) motion.

{¶ 10} Martin now appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Civ.R. 60(B)(5) motion

for relief from judgment, raising two assignments of error for review. Because Martin’s

assignments of error are interrelated, we will address them together.

First and Second Assignments of Error

{¶ 11} Under his first assignment of error, Martin argues that he was denied due

process as a result of the trial court’s prematurely granting LexisNexis’s motion to dismiss.

Martin claims that, under Civ.R. 6(C) and (D), he had 17 days (14 days plus a three-day

grace period for mail service) from the date of LexisNexis’s December 20, 2023 motion

to file his opposing memorandum. Since the 17th day fell on a Saturday, Martin argues

that, under Civ.R. 6(A), the deadline to file his opposing memorandum fell on Monday,

January 8, 2024. According to Martin, the trial court prejudiced him by granting

LexisNexis’s motion to dismiss on the day of the deadline before considering his opposing

memorandum. Although Martin’s opposing memorandum was filed three days after the

January 8th deadline, Martin nevertheless claims that his opposing memorandum was

timely and should have been considered before the trial court granted LexisNexis’s

motion to dismiss.

{¶ 12} Under his second assignment of error, Martin claims that the trial court’s -6-

denial of his Civ.R. 60(B)(5) motion was an abuse of discretion because: (1) his motion

alleged a meritorious claim, i.e., that his complaint alleged sufficient operative facts to

survive a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal; and (2) he was prejudiced by the trial court’s granting

the dismissal of his complaint before considering his opposing memorandum.

{¶ 13} As a preliminary matter, we stress that Martin did not appeal from the

dismissal of his complaint, but from the denial of his Civ.R. 60(B)(5) motion. “This court

reviews a decision denying a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for an abuse of discretion.” State ex rel.

Hatfield v. Miller, 2023-Ohio-429, ¶ 8, citing Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams, 36 Ohio St.3d

17, 21 (1988) and Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 174 (1994). “A trial court abuses

its discretion when it makes a decision that is unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.”

(Citation omitted.) State v. Darmond, 2013-Ohio-966, ¶ 34; AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River

Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990).

{¶ 14} “To prevail on a motion brought under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must

demonstrate that (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is

granted, (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B),

and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time.” GMAC Mtge., L.L.C. v. Herring,

2010-Ohio-3650, ¶ 30 (2d Dist.), citing GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Indus., Inc., 47

Ohio St.2d 146 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus. “All of these requirements must be

satisfied, and the motion should be denied if any one of the requirements is not met.” Id.,

citing Pelton at 174. (Other citations omitted.)

{¶ 15} Importantly, “[a] Civ.R. 60(B) motion may not be used as a substitute for

direct appeal.” Beyoglides v. Elmore, 2012-Ohio-3979, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), citing Key v. -7-

Mitchell, 81 Ohio St.3d 89, 90-91 (1998) and Doe v. Trumbull Cty. Child. Servs. Bd., 28

Ohio St.3d 128, 131 (1986). “The use of Civ. R. 60(B) is generally reserved to issues that

cannot be raised on appeal.” (Citation omitted.) Burgess v. Safe Auto, 2005-Ohio-6829,

¶ 32 (2d Dist.). “Where the defect of the judgment is apparent from the record, an appeal

will lie; where it is not, relief must be sought under Civ.R. 60(B), because error cannot be

demonstrated from the record.” (Citation omitted.) Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Ziegler,

2015-Ohio-1586, ¶ 56 (2d Dist.). “Therefore, when a party merely repeats arguments that

concern the merits of the case and that could have been raised on appeal, relief under

Civ.R. 60(B) is not available.” (Citation omitted.) Beyoglides at ¶ 17. Civ.R. 60(B) “does

not exist to allow a party to obtain relief from his or her own choice to forgo an appeal

from an adverse decision.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 15, citing

Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950).

{¶ 16} In Upkins v. Brosh, 2018-Ohio-2971 (2d Dist.), the plaintiff, Upkins, filed a

pro se civil complaint alleging malicious prosecution against a Miami County prosecutor

and a Miami County deputy sheriff. Id. at ¶ 1-2. The defendant prosecutor and deputy

sheriff thereafter filed a motion to dismiss Upkins’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction, which

the trial court granted. Id. at ¶ 3-5. Thereafter, Upkins filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion

requesting relief from the judgment dismissing his complaint. Id. at ¶ 6. In his Civ.R. 60(B)

motion, Upkins argued that he had been unable to oppose the defendants’ motion to

dismiss because he was not served with a copy of the motion. Id. Upkins also argued that

the trial court had failed to provide any rational for the dismissal of his complaint, as the

dismissal entry simply provided that the complaint was dismissed “for good cause shown.” -8-

Id. at ¶ 5-6. Upon review, the trial court found that Upkins had failed to demonstrate that

he was entitled to relief under any of the grounds set forth under Civ.R. 60(B) and denied

his Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Id. at ¶ 9-10. Upkins thereafter appealed from that decision. Id.

at ¶ 1.

{¶ 17} On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Upkins’s Civ.R. 60(B)

motion. Id. at ¶ 27. In doing so, we cited language from Beyoglides explaining that a

Civ.R. 60(B) motion cannot be used as a substitute for a direct appeal. Id. at ¶ 26.

Applying that principle, we found that “the propriety of the dismissal of Upkins’s complaint

should have been raised on direct appeal” as opposed to in a Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Id. at

¶ 27. In a concurring opinion, Judge Froelich further noted that Civ.R. 60(B) relief was not

available to Upkins because the errors raised in his Civ.R. 60(B) motion were apparent

from the record and could have been appealed. Id. at ¶ 28.

{¶ 18} The present case is analogous to Upkins. Like the plaintiff in Upkins, Martin

raised arguments in his Civ.R. 60(B)(5) motion that were apparent from the record, i.e.,

that the trial court had prematurely ruled on LexisNexis’s motion to dismiss his complaint

and that his complaint contained sufficient operative facts to survive a Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

dismissal. Because these alleged errors were apparent from the record, they could have

been raised in a direct appeal from the dismissal of Martin’s complaint rather than by way

of a Civ.R. 60(B)(5) motion. Although Martin was acting pro se in this matter, it is well

established that “ ‘[l]itigants who choose to proceed pro se are presumed to know the law

and correct procedure, and are held to the same standards as other litigants.’ ” Preston

v. Shutway, 2013-Ohio-185, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), quoting Yocum v. Means, 2002-Ohio-3803, -9-

¶ 20 (2d Dist.). Therefore, like any other party, Martin cannot use his Civ.R. 60(B)(5)

motion as a substitute for a direct appeal from the dismissal of his complaint. Accordingly,

the trial court correctly denied Martin’s Civ.R. 60(B)(5) motion, albeit for different reasons.

See Rodefer v. Colbert, 2015-Ohio-1982, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.) (“an appellate court must ‘ “affirm

the judgment if it is legally correct on other grounds, that is, it achieves the right result for

the wrong reason, because such an error is not prejudicial” ’ ”), quoting Reid v. Wallaby’s

Inc., 2012-Ohio-1437, ¶ 52 (2d Dist.), quoting Reynolds v. Budzik, 134 Ohio App.3d 844,

846, fn. 3 (6th Dist. 1999).

{¶ 19} Martin’s assignments of error are overruled.

Conclusion

{¶ 20} Having overruled Martin’s assignments of error, the judgment of the trial

court denying Martin’s Civ.R. 60(B)(5) motion for relief from judgment is affirmed.

EPLEY, P.J. and LEWIS, J., concur.