Martin v. Bristol Associates

577 A.2d 1138, 22 Conn. App. 625, 1990 Conn. App. LEXIS 281
CourtConnecticut Appellate Court
DecidedAugust 14, 1990
Docket8717
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 577 A.2d 1138 (Martin v. Bristol Associates) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Appellate Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Martin v. Bristol Associates, 577 A.2d 1138, 22 Conn. App. 625, 1990 Conn. App. LEXIS 281 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).

Opinion

Landau, J.

The plaintiffs1 appeal from the trial court’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that they had failed to bring their [626]*626action within the one year limitation period pursuant to either General Statutes §§ 52-592 or 52-593. They claim that their action was timely filed, and, therefore, the defendant’s motion should have been denied. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

The plaintiffs commenced a series of three negligence actions against various entities, all of which were named Bristol Associates. The dispositive fact is that the third action was brought more than one year after termination of the second action.

General Statutes § 52-592 (a)2 permits a plaintiff, under certain circumstances, to commence a new action within one year after the determination of the original action. General Statutes § 52-593 (a)3 permits a plaintiff to bring a new action, regardless of the statute of limitations, if service of process in the new action is made within one year after the termination of the original action. Both statutes clearly require that the new action be commenced within one year after the [627]*627determination or termination of the original action. Even if we were to assume that the plaintiffs’ second action was the “original” action or a continuation of the original action, they nevertheless failed to commence their third action within the one year period set forth under both General Statutes §§ 52-592 and 52-593.

The plaintiffs’ second action was terminated on June 17, 1988. The third action was commenced pursuant to General Statutes § 52-45a4 on June 27,1989, the date on which the defendant’s agent received service of process. Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to file their action timely under either statute.5

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

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789 A.2d 1142 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 2002)
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Nelson v. Hartford Housing Authority, No. Cv 99-0594-855 (Feb. 15, 2000)
2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 2032 (Connecticut Superior Court, 2000)
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580 A.2d 1244 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1990)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
577 A.2d 1138, 22 Conn. App. 625, 1990 Conn. App. LEXIS 281, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/martin-v-bristol-associates-connappct-1990.