Martin v. Andrews

59 Misc. 298, 111 N.Y.S. 40
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMay 15, 1908
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 59 Misc. 298 (Martin v. Andrews) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Martin v. Andrews, 59 Misc. 298, 111 N.Y.S. 40 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1908).

Opinion

Morschauser, J.

This action is brought by the residuary legatees to obtain a construction of the last will and testament of their grandfather, Gen. John Watts de Peyster, deceased, and the questions presented to the court for determination are:

First. Have the corporations named in testator’s will, all of which are defendants herein, the legal right to take and hold the legacies and devises given to them respectively in the will?

It appears from the evidence that each of said corporations has been organized under and in conformity with the laws of this State; that each of them is authorized by law to take real and personal property devised to it; and that each of them has the legal right to take and hold the legacy and devise given it respectively in this will. The legacies and devises are valid and should be paid to said corporations by the executors.

[302]*302Second. The next inquiry relates to the trust created hy item 14 of said will, which item this court is asked to interpret and advise said executors in relation to the stock to he purchased for said trust, hy whom it shall he purchased. and whether it shall be purchased at the market value, if such value is below or above par ?

It seems quite clear from the language of the will that the testator intended that his executors should take from his estate the sum of $100,000' in cash, deduct from that sum the transfer tax thereon, and with the balance purchase as much dividend paying railway first preferred stock as they may be able to obtain for that sum at the market value thereof, either above or below par, and that the stock so purchased by said executors shall be delivered by them to the defendant Hew York Life Insurance and Trust Company to constitute the corpus of the trust created in and by" said item 14 of said will.

The last question relates to the authority given by the testator to his executors in regard to the sale by them of his real and personal estate.

The executors admit that after all legacies and debts and expenses are paid there will be, at least, $1,000,000 of personal property left in their hands to go to the residuary legatees without selling the real estate. Why then should the executors insist upon selling the real estate against the protests of testator’s granddaughters, to whom he expressly devised it in and by the residuary clause of his will ? IJpon the trial of this action the learned counsel for the executors admitted on the argument that the reason why the executors desired to sell the real estate was to obtain commissions on the proceeds thereof, and that they believed the interests of the persons interested in the estate would be promoted if the executors were allowed to sell it. Inasmuch as the residuary devisees protest against the sale by the executors of this real estate, it is quite evident why they decline to permit a transaction in which they would lose and the executors gain about $8,000. In his will the testator says that he has lost $2,000,000, through acting on unfortu[303]*303nate legal and financial advice. Having this knowledge it may explain the reason why his granddaughters decline the offer of the executors. As these devisees are the only persons to he injured by a sale of the real estate against their objections, a sale sought to be made for no other purpose than to pay the executors about $8,000 commissions out of the proceeds thereof, the legal right of the executors to do so must be very clear or it cannot receive the sanction of a court of equity. The executors claim that the will confers upon them the unqualified power to sell all of the real and personal estate of the testator. The will gives them no such power or authority. On the contrary their authority to sell the real and personal estate depends, first, upon the necessity for the sale thereof, and second, the amount to be sold is only so much as may be necessary to pay legacies, debts and expenses of the administration of the estate. .The wisdom of this limitation to the power of the executors to sell the property of the testator is disclosed by the fact that when he was about to make his will he considered with great care the amount and value of the different parcels which constituted his real estate. These appear to have been worth about $260,000. The securities which made up his personal estate, and the aggregate value thereof, at that time, exceeded $2,000,000. The care he exhibited in keeping his money securely invested in what may well be considered the safest securities to be had; his desire to have- all his money, or nearly all of it, drawing interest, is shown by the fact that there was not to exceed $12,000 uninvested and on deposit in bank. According to the evidence all the foregoing matters were considered by him at the time he made his will. He was an aged man, with his mental faculties well preserved. His nearest relatives were his three granddaughters, for whom he had great affection, and one grandson. When he sat down to write the instrument which was to pass to his descendants what remained of the large property he had inherited from his ancestors or accumulated himself, he realized that real estate in the city of Hew York would be a valuable asset to give his three [304]*304granddaughters, especially in view of the large personal estate they were to receive hy his will. The only parcel of real estate that he gave to any one outside of his family was the Engine House at Madalin. This he specifically devised to the trustees of the Lealte and Watts Orphan House in the city of Hew York. His Helensdale farm he devised to his granddaughter Mrs. Martin. He then expressly devised all the rest, residue and remainder of his real estate to his three granddaughters, knowing, as he did, the amount and extent of his personal estate and the amount of the legacies he had given, which did not exceed the sum of $380,000, and that the debts, legacies and expenses of administration would have to he paid out of his personal property before his real estate could be resorted to for that purpose. It is clear that (under the will) he did not intend to give his executors the power to sell his real estate unless his personal estate proved insufficient for that purpose. Ho reason can he found in the will to lead one to believe that the testator intended that his executors should depart-from the ordinary rule of marshaling assets for the payment of debts, legacies and expenses of administration. The law is well settled that, before the personal estate is relieved from the payment of debts, legacies and the expenses of settling the estate, it must clearly appear that the testator intended that it should be. There is nothing in testator’s will' to show that he intended that his real estate should be sold to relieve his personal estate from the payment of his debts and legacies- and the expenses of the administration of his estate. On the contrary, it is evident that he would not have devised the rest, residue and remainder of his real estate to his granddaughters if he intended that it should be used to pay his legacies which exceeded the value of his real estate by at least $100,000. The devisees, being of full age and competent, caused to he served upon defendant-executors, before the commencement of this action, a notice that they elected to take the real estate in its unconverted form, notwithstanding such election the executors claim the right to sell the real estate.

[305]*305Even if the power of sale was mandatory the residuary devisees have the right to take the real estate as such, and to defeat the power of sale.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
59 Misc. 298, 111 N.Y.S. 40, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/martin-v-andrews-nysupct-1908.