1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Martin Raul Soto-Fong, No. CV-21-00337-TUC-SHR
10 Petitioner, Order Adopting R&R
11 v.
12 David Shinn,
13 Respondent. 14 15 16 Pending before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 34) 17 issued by United States Magistrate Judge Jacqueline M. Rateau recommending the Court 18 deny Respondent’s “Motion to Lift Stay” (Doc. 32). Respondent has filed an Objection 19 (Doc. 35). For the following reasons, the Court will adopt the R&R. 20 I. Background 21 The Court accepts the following unobjected-to facts as set forth in the R&R (Doc. 22 34). Following a trial in Pima County Superior Court, Petitioner was found guilty of three 23 counts of first-degree murder and other offenses committed when he was 17 years old and 24 was initially sentenced to death. Petitioner’s sentence was later vacated pursuant to Roper 25 v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and he was subsequently re-sentenced to various 26 consecutive terms totaling at least 109 years of imprisonment. 27 In 2013, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, arguing his sentence violates 28 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d 392 (Ariz. 2016), 1 which require the superior court to determine whether his crimes reflect “irreparable 2 corruption” prior to sentencing him—a juvenile—to life in prison without the possibility 3 of parole. In October 2020, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled Petitioner was not entitled 4 to relief. State v. Soto-Fong, 474 P.3d 34, ¶ 50 (Ariz. 2020). 5 In March 2021, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 6 asserting the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision was contrary to United States Supreme 7 Court precedent and based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. On September 8 22, 2021, Respondent filed a limited answer arguing the Petition was untimely and should 9 be dismissed. The same day, Petitioner filed a motion asking the Court to stay the case 10 pending review of Petitioner’s underlying state criminal conviction by the Pima County 11 Attorney’s Office (“PCAO”), the original prosecuting agency. In the Motion to Stay, 12 Petitioner asserted PCAO’s review of his “conviction and sentence” would “promote 13 efficiency and judicial economy by avoiding potentially unnecessary litigation.” Petitioner 14 further asserted a stay pending review by PCAO would be “consistent with the principles 15 of comity and federalism underlying habeas review.” Respondent did not object to the 16 Motion to Stay. On October 7, 2021, the Court granted Petitioner’s unopposed motion and 17 stayed the case pending PCAO’s review. (Doc. 24.) 18 On June 25, 2025, Respondent filed a Motion to Lift Stay, requesting the Court lift 19 the stay prior to completion of PCAO’s review and dismiss Petitioner’s Petition for Writ 20 of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 32.) On September 15, 2025, Magistrate Judge Rateau issued an 21 R&R recommending the Court deny Respondent’s Motion (Doc. 34), and Respondent 22 timely objected (Doc. 35). 23 II. Standard of Review 24 When reviewing a magistrate judge’s R&R, the Court “may accept, reject, or 25 modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate 26 judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If an objection is made to the R&R, the Court “shall make 27 a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or 28 recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. Objections to R&Rs “are not to be 1 construed as a second opportunity to present the arguments already considered by the 2 Magistrate Judge.” Betancourt v. Ace Ins. Co. of P.R., 313 F. Supp. 2d 32, 34 (D.P.R. 3 2004); see also Camardo v. Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate Emps. Pension Plan, 806 F. Supp. 4 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act is to relieve courts 5 of unnecessary work,” and “[t]here is no increase in efficiency, and much extra work, when 6 a party attempts to relitigate every argument which it presented to the Magistrate Judge.” 7 (citation omitted)). 8 III. Relevant Law 9 “The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its 10 power to control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) (citing Landis 11 v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). In determining whether to grant a motion to 12 stay, the Court weighs “the competing interests which will be affected by the granting or 13 refusal to grant a stay.” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) 14 (quoting CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962). Those interests include 15 “the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity 16 which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly course of justice 17 measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law 18 which could be expected to result from a stay.” Id. Additionally, “[a] trial court may, with 19 propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the parties to enter 20 a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear 21 upon the case.” Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979). 22 “The standard for determining whether an existing stay should remain in place is 23 the same as the standard for determining whether a Court should impose a stay in the first 24 place.” MasterObjects, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., No. 16-CV-06824-JSW, 2018 WL 11353751, at 25 *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2018); see United States v. Fallbrook Public Util. Dist., No. 51-CV- 26 1247-GPC(RBB), 2017 WL 1281915, at *2 (“The corollary to th[e] power [to grant a stay] 27 is the ability to lift a stay previously imposed.” (quoting Boyle v. County of Kern, No. 1:03- 28 CV-05162-OWW-GSA, 2008 WL 220413, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2008)). “[T]he court 1 may abandon its imposed stay of litigation if the circumstances that persuaded the court to 2 impose the stay in the first place have changed significantly.” Canady v. Erbe 3 Elektromedizin GMBH, 271 F. Supp. 2d 64, 75 (D.D.C. 2002) (“The same court that 4 imposes a stay of litigation has the inherent power and discretion to lift the stay.”). 5 IV. Discussion 6 In its Objection, Respondent argues the stay should be lifted because Petitioner’s 7 habeas claim is “plainly meritless” and “continuing the stay . . . frustrates both the right of 8 the victims to be free from unreasonable delay . . . as well as the State’s right to be spared 9 from unnecessary delays.” (Doc. 35.) However, Respondent did not initially object to the 10 stay and has not shown any changed circumstances warranting a lift of the stay. As 11 discussed, the Court granted Petitioner’s unopposed Motion to Stay to allow PCAO to 12 review Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Doc. 24.) Respondent does not assert 13 PCAO’s review has concluded, and Petitioner asserts the review “remains ongoing.” (Doc.
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Martin Raul Soto-Fong, No. CV-21-00337-TUC-SHR
10 Petitioner, Order Adopting R&R
11 v.
12 David Shinn,
13 Respondent. 14 15 16 Pending before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 34) 17 issued by United States Magistrate Judge Jacqueline M. Rateau recommending the Court 18 deny Respondent’s “Motion to Lift Stay” (Doc. 32). Respondent has filed an Objection 19 (Doc. 35). For the following reasons, the Court will adopt the R&R. 20 I. Background 21 The Court accepts the following unobjected-to facts as set forth in the R&R (Doc. 22 34). Following a trial in Pima County Superior Court, Petitioner was found guilty of three 23 counts of first-degree murder and other offenses committed when he was 17 years old and 24 was initially sentenced to death. Petitioner’s sentence was later vacated pursuant to Roper 25 v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and he was subsequently re-sentenced to various 26 consecutive terms totaling at least 109 years of imprisonment. 27 In 2013, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, arguing his sentence violates 28 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d 392 (Ariz. 2016), 1 which require the superior court to determine whether his crimes reflect “irreparable 2 corruption” prior to sentencing him—a juvenile—to life in prison without the possibility 3 of parole. In October 2020, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled Petitioner was not entitled 4 to relief. State v. Soto-Fong, 474 P.3d 34, ¶ 50 (Ariz. 2020). 5 In March 2021, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 6 asserting the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision was contrary to United States Supreme 7 Court precedent and based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. On September 8 22, 2021, Respondent filed a limited answer arguing the Petition was untimely and should 9 be dismissed. The same day, Petitioner filed a motion asking the Court to stay the case 10 pending review of Petitioner’s underlying state criminal conviction by the Pima County 11 Attorney’s Office (“PCAO”), the original prosecuting agency. In the Motion to Stay, 12 Petitioner asserted PCAO’s review of his “conviction and sentence” would “promote 13 efficiency and judicial economy by avoiding potentially unnecessary litigation.” Petitioner 14 further asserted a stay pending review by PCAO would be “consistent with the principles 15 of comity and federalism underlying habeas review.” Respondent did not object to the 16 Motion to Stay. On October 7, 2021, the Court granted Petitioner’s unopposed motion and 17 stayed the case pending PCAO’s review. (Doc. 24.) 18 On June 25, 2025, Respondent filed a Motion to Lift Stay, requesting the Court lift 19 the stay prior to completion of PCAO’s review and dismiss Petitioner’s Petition for Writ 20 of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 32.) On September 15, 2025, Magistrate Judge Rateau issued an 21 R&R recommending the Court deny Respondent’s Motion (Doc. 34), and Respondent 22 timely objected (Doc. 35). 23 II. Standard of Review 24 When reviewing a magistrate judge’s R&R, the Court “may accept, reject, or 25 modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate 26 judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If an objection is made to the R&R, the Court “shall make 27 a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or 28 recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. Objections to R&Rs “are not to be 1 construed as a second opportunity to present the arguments already considered by the 2 Magistrate Judge.” Betancourt v. Ace Ins. Co. of P.R., 313 F. Supp. 2d 32, 34 (D.P.R. 3 2004); see also Camardo v. Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate Emps. Pension Plan, 806 F. Supp. 4 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act is to relieve courts 5 of unnecessary work,” and “[t]here is no increase in efficiency, and much extra work, when 6 a party attempts to relitigate every argument which it presented to the Magistrate Judge.” 7 (citation omitted)). 8 III. Relevant Law 9 “The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its 10 power to control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) (citing Landis 11 v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). In determining whether to grant a motion to 12 stay, the Court weighs “the competing interests which will be affected by the granting or 13 refusal to grant a stay.” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) 14 (quoting CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962). Those interests include 15 “the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity 16 which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly course of justice 17 measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law 18 which could be expected to result from a stay.” Id. Additionally, “[a] trial court may, with 19 propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the parties to enter 20 a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear 21 upon the case.” Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979). 22 “The standard for determining whether an existing stay should remain in place is 23 the same as the standard for determining whether a Court should impose a stay in the first 24 place.” MasterObjects, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., No. 16-CV-06824-JSW, 2018 WL 11353751, at 25 *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2018); see United States v. Fallbrook Public Util. Dist., No. 51-CV- 26 1247-GPC(RBB), 2017 WL 1281915, at *2 (“The corollary to th[e] power [to grant a stay] 27 is the ability to lift a stay previously imposed.” (quoting Boyle v. County of Kern, No. 1:03- 28 CV-05162-OWW-GSA, 2008 WL 220413, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2008)). “[T]he court 1 may abandon its imposed stay of litigation if the circumstances that persuaded the court to 2 impose the stay in the first place have changed significantly.” Canady v. Erbe 3 Elektromedizin GMBH, 271 F. Supp. 2d 64, 75 (D.D.C. 2002) (“The same court that 4 imposes a stay of litigation has the inherent power and discretion to lift the stay.”). 5 IV. Discussion 6 In its Objection, Respondent argues the stay should be lifted because Petitioner’s 7 habeas claim is “plainly meritless” and “continuing the stay . . . frustrates both the right of 8 the victims to be free from unreasonable delay . . . as well as the State’s right to be spared 9 from unnecessary delays.” (Doc. 35.) However, Respondent did not initially object to the 10 stay and has not shown any changed circumstances warranting a lift of the stay. As 11 discussed, the Court granted Petitioner’s unopposed Motion to Stay to allow PCAO to 12 review Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Doc. 24.) Respondent does not assert 13 PCAO’s review has concluded, and Petitioner asserts the review “remains ongoing.” (Doc. 14 31 at 2.) Therefore, the circumstances underlying the Court’s decision to stay these 15 proceedings have not significantly changed. See Canady, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 75; see also 16 Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., No. 3:17-CV-2186 JLS-RBB, 2021 17 WL 22553, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2021) (refusing to lift stay “when Plaintiffs had the 18 opportunity to file an opposition to Defendant’s motion for a stay . . . and chose not to do 19 so” and “[t]he circumstances under which the Court granted the stay ha[d] not changed 20 significantly.”) 21 Respondent additionally argues Magistrate Judge Rateau erred by “fail[ing] to 22 consider the potential merit of Petitioner’s Miller claim.” (Doc. 35.) However, as Judge 23 Rateau stated, determining Petitioner’s habeas claim is meritless upon consideration of a 24 procedural issue, without full briefing from the parties, would be inequitable to Petitioner. 25 (Doc. 34 at 4.) Further, the resolution of PCAO’s review could render Petitioner’s habeas 26 petition moot should PCAO vacate his convictions or reduce his sentence. As stated in the 27 R&R, “[r]equiring the parties to fully brief a habeas claim—in not only this Court but 28 invariably in the Ninth Circuit as well—that may ultimately prove moot would 1 || unnecessarily invite a waste of the time and resources of this Court and the parties.” (/d. 2|| (quoting Doc. 33 at 4).) 3 Having conducted a de novo review, see § 636(b)(1), the Court finds Petitioner’s 4|| interests in staying the proceedings outweigh Respondent’s interests in lifting the stay, see || Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1110. Accordingly, the Court will adopt the R&R’s reasoning and || conclusion and deny Respondent’s Motion to Lift Stay (Doc. 32). 7 V. Conclusion 8 IT IS ORDERED Magistrate Judge Rateau's R&R (Doc. 34) is ADOPTED in its entirety. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Respondent's Motion to Lift Stay (Doc. 32) 1s |) DENTED. 12 Dated this 5th day of February, 2026. 13 14 (|
16 Honorable Scott H, Rash _/ United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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