Martin, Mario Terrell v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided October 31, 2012·No. 05-11-01444-CR·Published

Opinion

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed October 31, 2012.

In The

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fifth Htrirt nf ixa tt Oa1hi No. 05-11-01444-CR

No. 05-I 1-01445-CR

MARIO TERRELL MARTIN, Appellant V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 382 Judicial l)istrict Court Rockwall County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 2-10-405 and 2-10-406

OPINION

Before Justices Bridges, Richter, and Lang Opinion By Justice Lang

Mario Terrell Martin appeals the trial court’s judgments convicting him of burglary of a building. In both cases, the jury found Martin guilty. Martin pleaded true to the enhancements, and the jury found the enhancements true and assessed his punishment at ten years ofimprisonment. In his sole issue on appeal, Martin argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support his convictions. We conclude the evidence is sufficient. The trial court’s judgments are affinned.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Martin left his girlfriend’s home with Quintaveus Williams, Lakendrie Minter, and Rashad Harris. They drove to Royse City where Williams had burglarized a building the previous night.

After driving to the Charles Grocery, they drove around the block to check the area. They parked the vehicle behind the store and all four men left the car, stationing themselves in different locations. l3ecause they saw a police car, they went back to the car and drove away, returning when they were satisfied the police were gone. Martin told the others that he did not feel comfortable participating any longer, but agreed to “watch out.” Williams and Minter broke a window and entered the grocery store while Martin and Harris “watched out” After the alarm went ofZ Williams and Minter left the grocery store carrying cigars and other tobacco products.

Later that night while continuing to drive around, they saw a sign for Rockwall Pawn. At the pawnshop, Williams and Minter got out of the car to look for rocks, Williams threw a rock through the front window of the pawnshop, and returned to the car. The four drove to the back of the pawnshop. All four men left the car and positioned themselves to “watch out” Then, Martin, Williams, and Minter approached the broken window. Williams climbed through the window into the pawnshop. About that time, the police arrived causing Martin and Minter to flee into a nearby wooded are where Martin was apprehended by the police.

11. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE In his sole issue on appeal, Martin argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support his convictions. He claims that his action as a “lookout” does not place him within the statutory definition ofa party to the burglaries. The State responds the evidence included the fact that Martin was present at both burglaries, he admitted acting as a “lookout,” he wore a ski mask to conceal his identity. and he ran from the police while at the burglary of Rockwall Pawn. According to the State, this evidence is sufficient to show Martin attempted to aid in the commission ofthe burglaries and is criminally responsible for the burglaries committed by Williams, Minter, and Harris.

A. Standard oJRevww

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court considers all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether the jury was rationally justified in findmg guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson i. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 3 18—19 (1979); Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). Appellate courts are required to determine whether any rational juror could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. ee Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks, 323 S.W.3c1 at 902 n.19. An appellate court is required to defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 3 19, 326; Merritt, 36$ S.W.3d at 525; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. All evidence, whether properly or improperly admitted, will be considered when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. See McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 130 S,Ct. 665, 672 (2010) (per curiam); Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 41—42 (198$); .Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.

B. Applicable Lan’

A person commits the offense of burglary if without the effective consent of the owner, he enters a building not then open to the public, with the intent to commit theft. See TE..x. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(l) (West 2011). Under the law of parties, a person may be convicted as a party to the offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he

is criminally responsible, or both. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.0 1(a) (West 2011). A person is criminally responsible for an offense “committed by the conduct of another” if, acting with the intent

to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (West 2011).

To determine if a person acted as a party to an offense, the trier of fact may look to events occurring before, during, and after the offense. Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 739—40 (Ta. Crim. App. 2005). However, there must be evidence of a common purpose or design prior to, or contemporaneous with the criminal event. Uriado it. State, 605 S.W.2d 907,911 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Opj 1980). Tn a burglary, the criminal event is complete once unlawful entry is made,

regardless of whether or not the intended theft is actually completed. Richardvon it. State, 888 S.W.2d 822,823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). An individual may be guilty of burglary even though he

does not personally enter the burglarized premises if he is acting together with another in the commission of the offense. See Powell it. State. 194 S.W.3d 503.506—07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

Participation in the offense may be inferred from circumstantial evidence and need not be shown by direct evidence. Beardslev it. State, 738 S.W.2d 681,684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Mere presence of the defendant at the scene of an offense will not support a conviction under the law of parties, but it is a circumstance which, combined with other facts, may show that the accused was a participant. Patterson it. State, 950 S.W.2d 196,202 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. retd). Even if a defendant was only a “lookout” he may still be guilty of the offense of burglary because all participants in a burglary are criminallyresponsible under the law ofparties. See Rollerson it. State, 227 S.W.3d 718,726 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also Johnson it. State, 6 S.W.3d 709,711 (Ta. App.—Houston [1st Dia] 1999, pet. refd) (reconnaissance); Cumpian it. State, 812 S.W.2d 88,90 (Ta. App.—San Antonio 1991, no pet.) (lookout). Also, a fact-finder may draw an inference of guilt from the circumstance of flight See Clayton it. State, 235 S.W.3d 772,780 (Ta. Crim. App. 2007).

lfthejuiycharge provides that the jurymay find the defendant guiltyas eitheraprincipal or a party to the offense, the evidence is sufficient if it supports either theory. See Sorto it. State, 173

S.W.3d 46k). 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

C Apphcation of the Law to the Fact.’, The trial courts jury charge instructed the jury to lind Martin guilty if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that Martin “acting alone or as a party. . . with intent to commit theft, enter[ed] a building or a portion of a building not then open to the public, without effective consent of ... the owner.” On appeal, Martin addresses the sufficiency of the evidence only to show that he was a party to the offense ol burglary. He does not challenge the other basis for the jury’s verdicts. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to support that Martin was a party to the offense of burglary.

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Related

McDaniel v. Brown
558 U.S. 120 (Supreme Court, 2010)
Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Lockhart v. Nelson
488 U.S. 33 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Clayton v. State
235 S.W.3d 772 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2007)
Richardson v. State
888 S.W.2d 822 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1994)
Urtado v. State
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Cumpian v. State
812 S.W.2d 88 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1991)
Patterson v. State
950 S.W.2d 196 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1997)
Beardsley v. State
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Salinas v. State
163 S.W.3d 734 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2005)
Rollerson v. State
227 S.W.3d 718 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2007)
Powell v. State
194 S.W.3d 503 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2006)
Johnson v. State
6 S.W.3d 709 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1999)
Brooks v. State
323 S.W.3d 893 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2010)
Merritt, Ryan Rashad
368 S.W.3d 516 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2012)