AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed October 31, 2012.
In The Quiirt nf Ai.i1i fifth Htrirt nf ixa tt Oa1hi No. 05-11-01444-CR No. 05-I 1-01445-CR
MARIO TERRELL MARTIN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 382 Judicial l)istrict Court Rockwall County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. 2-10-405 and 2-10-406
OPINION Before Justices Bridges, Richter, and Lang Opinion By Justice Lang
Mario Terrell Martin appeals the trial court’s judgments convicting him of burglary of a
building. In both cases, the jury found Martin guilty. Martin pleaded true to the enhancements, and
the jury found the enhancements true and assessed his punishment at ten years ofimprisonment. In
his sole issue on appeal, Martin argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support his convictions.
We conclude the evidence is sufficient. The trial court’s judgments are affinned.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Martin left his girlfriend’s home with Quintaveus Williams, Lakendrie Minter, and Rashad
Harris. They drove to Royse City where Williams had burglarized a building the previous night. After driving to the Charles Grocery, they drove around the block to check the area. They parked
the vehicle behind the store and all four men left the car, stationing themselves in different locations.
l3ecause they saw a police car, they went back to the car and drove away, returning when they were
satisfied the police were gone. Martin told the others that he did not feel comfortable participating
any longer, but agreed to “watch out.” Williams and Minter broke a window and entered the grocery
store while Martin and Harris “watched out” After the alarm went ofZ Williams and Minter left the
grocery store carrying cigars and other tobacco products.
Later that night while continuing to drive around, they saw a sign for Rockwall Pawn. At
the pawnshop, Williams and Minter got out of the car to look for rocks, Williams threw a rock
through the front window of the pawnshop, and returned to the car. The four drove to the back of
the pawnshop. All four men left the car and positioned themselves to “watch out” Then, Martin,
Williams, and Minter approached the broken window. Williams climbed through the window into
the pawnshop. About that time, the police arrived causing Martin and Minter to flee into a nearby
wooded are where Martin was apprehended by the police.
11. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his sole issue on appeal, Martin argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support his
convictions. He claims that his action as a “lookout” does not place him within the statutory
definition ofa party to the burglaries. The State responds the evidence included the fact that Martin
was present at both burglaries, he admitted acting as a “lookout,” he wore a ski mask to conceal his
identity. and he ran from the police while at the burglary of Rockwall Pawn. According to the State,
this evidence is sufficient to show Martin attempted to aid in the commission ofthe burglaries and
is criminally responsible for the burglaries committed by Williams, Minter, and Harris.
—2— A. Standard oJRevww
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court considers all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether the jury was rationally
justified in findmg guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson i. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 3 18—19
(1979); Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d
893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). Appellate courts are required to determine whether
any rational juror could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
ee Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks, 323 S.W.3c1 at 902 n.19. An appellate court is required to
defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the
witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 3 19,
326; Merritt, 36$ S.W.3d at 525; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. All evidence, whether properly or
improperly admitted, will be considered when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. See
McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 130 S,Ct. 665, 672 (2010) (per curiam); Lockhart v. Nelson, 488
U.S. 33, 41—42 (198$); .Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
B. Applicable Lan’
A person commits the offense of burglary if without the effective consent of the owner, he
enters a building not then open to the public, with the intent to commit theft. See TE..x. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 30.02(a)(l) (West 2011). Under the law of parties, a person may be convicted as a party to
the offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he
is criminally responsible, or both. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.0 1(a) (West 2011). A person is criminally responsible for an offense “committed by the conduct of another” if, acting with the intent
to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts
to aid the other person to commit the offense. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (West 2011). To determine if a person acted as a party to an offense, the trier of fact may look to events
occurring before, during, and after the offense. Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 739—40 (Ta.
Crim. App. 2005). However, there must be evidence of a common purpose or design prior to, or
contemporaneous with the criminal event. Uriado it. State, 605 S.W.2d 907,911 (Tex. Crim. App.
[Panel Opj 1980). Tn a burglary, the criminal event is complete once unlawful entry is made,
regardless of whether or not the intended theft is actually completed. Richardvon it. State, 888 S.W.2d 822,823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). An individual may be guilty of burglary even though he
does not personally enter the burglarized premises if he is acting together with another in the
commission of the offense. See Powell it. State. 194 S.W.3d 503.506—07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Participation in the offense may be inferred from circumstantial evidence and need not be
shown by direct evidence. Beardslev it. State, 738 S.W.2d 681,684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Mere
presence of the defendant at the scene of an offense will not support a conviction under the law of
parties, but it is a circumstance which, combined with other facts, may show that the accused was
a participant. Patterson it. State, 950 S.W.2d 196,202 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. retd). Even
if a defendant was only a “lookout” he may still be guilty of the offense of burglary because all
participants in a burglary are criminallyresponsible under the law ofparties. See Rollerson it. State,
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AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed October 31, 2012.
In The Quiirt nf Ai.i1i fifth Htrirt nf ixa tt Oa1hi No. 05-11-01444-CR No. 05-I 1-01445-CR
MARIO TERRELL MARTIN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 382 Judicial l)istrict Court Rockwall County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. 2-10-405 and 2-10-406
OPINION Before Justices Bridges, Richter, and Lang Opinion By Justice Lang
Mario Terrell Martin appeals the trial court’s judgments convicting him of burglary of a
building. In both cases, the jury found Martin guilty. Martin pleaded true to the enhancements, and
the jury found the enhancements true and assessed his punishment at ten years ofimprisonment. In
his sole issue on appeal, Martin argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support his convictions.
We conclude the evidence is sufficient. The trial court’s judgments are affinned.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Martin left his girlfriend’s home with Quintaveus Williams, Lakendrie Minter, and Rashad
Harris. They drove to Royse City where Williams had burglarized a building the previous night. After driving to the Charles Grocery, they drove around the block to check the area. They parked
the vehicle behind the store and all four men left the car, stationing themselves in different locations.
l3ecause they saw a police car, they went back to the car and drove away, returning when they were
satisfied the police were gone. Martin told the others that he did not feel comfortable participating
any longer, but agreed to “watch out.” Williams and Minter broke a window and entered the grocery
store while Martin and Harris “watched out” After the alarm went ofZ Williams and Minter left the
grocery store carrying cigars and other tobacco products.
Later that night while continuing to drive around, they saw a sign for Rockwall Pawn. At
the pawnshop, Williams and Minter got out of the car to look for rocks, Williams threw a rock
through the front window of the pawnshop, and returned to the car. The four drove to the back of
the pawnshop. All four men left the car and positioned themselves to “watch out” Then, Martin,
Williams, and Minter approached the broken window. Williams climbed through the window into
the pawnshop. About that time, the police arrived causing Martin and Minter to flee into a nearby
wooded are where Martin was apprehended by the police.
11. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his sole issue on appeal, Martin argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support his
convictions. He claims that his action as a “lookout” does not place him within the statutory
definition ofa party to the burglaries. The State responds the evidence included the fact that Martin
was present at both burglaries, he admitted acting as a “lookout,” he wore a ski mask to conceal his
identity. and he ran from the police while at the burglary of Rockwall Pawn. According to the State,
this evidence is sufficient to show Martin attempted to aid in the commission ofthe burglaries and
is criminally responsible for the burglaries committed by Williams, Minter, and Harris.
—2— A. Standard oJRevww
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court considers all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether the jury was rationally
justified in findmg guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson i. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 3 18—19
(1979); Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d
893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). Appellate courts are required to determine whether
any rational juror could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
ee Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks, 323 S.W.3c1 at 902 n.19. An appellate court is required to
defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the
witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 3 19,
326; Merritt, 36$ S.W.3d at 525; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. All evidence, whether properly or
improperly admitted, will be considered when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. See
McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 130 S,Ct. 665, 672 (2010) (per curiam); Lockhart v. Nelson, 488
U.S. 33, 41—42 (198$); .Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
B. Applicable Lan’
A person commits the offense of burglary if without the effective consent of the owner, he
enters a building not then open to the public, with the intent to commit theft. See TE..x. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 30.02(a)(l) (West 2011). Under the law of parties, a person may be convicted as a party to
the offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he
is criminally responsible, or both. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.0 1(a) (West 2011). A person is criminally responsible for an offense “committed by the conduct of another” if, acting with the intent
to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts
to aid the other person to commit the offense. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (West 2011). To determine if a person acted as a party to an offense, the trier of fact may look to events
occurring before, during, and after the offense. Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 739—40 (Ta.
Crim. App. 2005). However, there must be evidence of a common purpose or design prior to, or
contemporaneous with the criminal event. Uriado it. State, 605 S.W.2d 907,911 (Tex. Crim. App.
[Panel Opj 1980). Tn a burglary, the criminal event is complete once unlawful entry is made,
regardless of whether or not the intended theft is actually completed. Richardvon it. State, 888 S.W.2d 822,823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). An individual may be guilty of burglary even though he
does not personally enter the burglarized premises if he is acting together with another in the
commission of the offense. See Powell it. State. 194 S.W.3d 503.506—07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Participation in the offense may be inferred from circumstantial evidence and need not be
shown by direct evidence. Beardslev it. State, 738 S.W.2d 681,684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Mere
presence of the defendant at the scene of an offense will not support a conviction under the law of
parties, but it is a circumstance which, combined with other facts, may show that the accused was
a participant. Patterson it. State, 950 S.W.2d 196,202 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. retd). Even
if a defendant was only a “lookout” he may still be guilty of the offense of burglary because all
participants in a burglary are criminallyresponsible under the law ofparties. See Rollerson it. State,
227 S.W.3d 718,726 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also Johnson it. State, 6 S.W.3d 709,711 (Ta.
App.—Houston [1st Dia] 1999, pet. refd) (reconnaissance); Cumpian it. State, 812 S.W.2d 88,90
(Ta. App.—San Antonio 1991, no pet.) (lookout). Also, a fact-finder may draw an inference of
guilt from the circumstance of flight See Clayton it. State, 235 S.W.3d 772,780 (Ta. Crim. App.
2007).
lfthejuiycharge provides that the jurymay find the defendant guiltyas eitheraprincipal or
a party to the offense, the evidence is sufficient if it supports either theory. See Sorto it. State, 173
-4- S.W.3d 46k). 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
C Apphcation of the Law to the Fact.’,
The trial courts jury charge instructed the jury to lind Martin guilty if they found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Martin “acting alone or as a party. . . with intent to commit theft, enter[ed] a
building or a portion of a building not then open to the public, without effective consent of ... the
owner.” On appeal, Martin addresses the sufficiency of the evidence only to show that he was a
party to the offense ol burglary. He does not challenge the other basis for the jury’s verdicts.
Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to support that Martin was a party to the offense of
burglary.
Martin’s written statement was admitted into evidence. With regard to the burglary of the
store, Martin stated, “[Williams] and [Minter] told us to wake up cause ‘its time to do the sting,”
“We came up to a little corner store and I along with [1-larris], [Williams], and [Minter] made a block
around to check the area.” “We then jumped out of the car and went in different locations.
[Williams] and [Minter] went to the back of the store to bust a smaller window while I walked
around the []yard next to the store, and [Harris] walked to some near by [sic] trees to hide himself
from on coming [sic] cars,” “From the moment I saw the police station, I didn’t feel comfortable
with participating anymore,” and “1 agreed to continue watching out. Once that was understood,
we rolled around again.” Martin also stated, “[Williams] and [Minter] entered the store while me
and [Harris] watched out.” With regard to the burglary of the pawnshop, Martin stated that after
Williams threw the rock through the window, “We all got out [sic] the car to position oneself [sic]
to watch out and me, [Williams], and [Minter] walked up to the already broke window. . . once
1 Main’s statement is handwritten. The first part oIthis word is illegible. lliamsj cot n, a iolice [sic] shortly pulled up and me and Minteri lied towards the lields and
golf course while [Williamsi was still in there.”
Reviewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude
a rational jury could have found that Martin was a party to the burglary offenses. issue one is
decided against Martin.
Ill. CONCLUSION
The evidence is sufficient to support Martin’s convictions for burglary.
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
//7/ f I
DOUGLASS. LANG JUSTlQ /
Do Not Publish TEx. R. App. P. 47 1 1 l444F.U05 (Cnurt tif iiii:ahi FiftIi )istrirt nf ixa at 1at1a
JUDGMENT MARIo TERRELL MARTIN. Appellant Appeal from the 382nd .Judicial District Court of Rockwall County, Texas. No. 05-1 1-01444-CR V. (Tr.Ct.No. 2-10-405), Opinion delivered by Justice Lang. Justices THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellec Bridges and Richter participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered October31, 2012.
V 1. - /
OUGLAS . LANG // JUSTi%/ Qnitrt ni :pprth .FiftI! Diatrirt uf rxx at tHai;
JUDGMENT MARK) TERRELL MARTiN, Appellant Appeal from the 382nd Judicial District Court of Rockwail County. Texas. No. 05-1 1-01445-CR (TrCt.No. 2—10—406). Opinion delivered by Justice Lang, Justices THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appeilec Bridges and Richter participating.
Based on the Courts opinion of this (late, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgmcnt entered October 3 I 201 2
-
DOU(LAS S LANG .JUSTWE