IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
PATRICK E. MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO. 25-3049-JWL
DAN SCHNURR, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Patrick E. Martin, a prisoner at the Ellsworth Correctional Facility in Ellsworth, Kansas at the time of filing, brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. On April 25, 2025, the Court entered a Memorandum and Order to Show Cause (Doc. 7; “MOSC”) ordering Plaintiff to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim. In response, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 8; “AC”). This matter is before the Court for screening of the AC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). I. Nature of the Matter before the Court Plaintiff’s AC is based on events that occurred when Plaintiff was incarcerated at Hutchinson Correctional Facility in Hutchinson, Kansas (“HCF”). The AC alleges HCF officials failed to protect him from attack by another inmate. Plaintiff states he was attacked by inmate Dawson Slater on March 26, 2023, at approximately 6:05 a.m. Id. at 3. Slater stabbed him 16 times in his upper body, left shoulder, and right leg. Id. The AC describes the attack as unprovoked. Id. at 6. According to Plaintiff, Slater had stabbed two other inmates on two separate occasions within two months prior to his attack on Plaintiff. Id. at 3. Slater was released back into the general population after each of the prior incidents. Id. at 3, 5. In Plaintiff’s original Complaint (Doc. 1), which was not on the court-approved form, Plaintiff includes more factual allegations. Plaintiff states that he was exiting the dining hall after having eaten breakfast when the attack occurred. (Doc. 1, at 3.) He asserts that he and Slater had
“no prior associations, affiliations or dealings with one another before Plaintiff was attacked.” Id. Plaintiff was taken to the hospital where his wounds were stitched and glued closed. Id. He was returned to HCF later that day and remained in the infirmary for an additional three days. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the defendants failed to classify Slater as Other Security Risk or Continuous Bad Behavior pursuant to KDOC policy, which could have protected Plaintiff from being Slater’s next victim. Id. at 4. Plaintiff states that Warden Schnurr is responsible for the placement of inmates in long-term restrictive housing if the inmate has shown consistent bad behavior or behavior which has threatened the maintenance, security, or control of HCF. Id. at 5. He further alleges that Defendants Bell and Allen are members of the HCF Restrictive Housing
Review Board, which is responsible for reviewing the status of inmates in restrictive housing and retaining them, returning them to general population, or recommending they be transferred. Id. The Board’s recommendation must then be approved by Schnurr or Kroeker. Id. Plaintiff therefore alleges that each defendant “either recommended or approved inmate Dawson Slater’s removal from Administrative Restrictive Housing after his violent attacks (stabbings) of two other residents prior to his vicious attack on the plaintiff.” Id. The AC brings one count for deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 6. Plaintiff names the following defendants: Dan Schnurr, Warden of HCF; Misty Kroeker, Deputy Warden; Elizabeth Allen, EAI SAS; and Jeremy Bell, Major/Chief of Security. The Complaint seeks relief in the form of compensatory damages of $300,000 from each defendant and punitive damages of $100,000 from each defendant. II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of such entity to determine whether summary
dismissal is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Additionally, with any litigant, such as Plaintiff, who is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court has a duty to screen the complaint to determine its sufficiency. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Upon completion of this screening, the Court must dismiss any claim that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2)(B). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally
construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well- pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
PATRICK E. MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO. 25-3049-JWL
DAN SCHNURR, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Patrick E. Martin, a prisoner at the Ellsworth Correctional Facility in Ellsworth, Kansas at the time of filing, brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. On April 25, 2025, the Court entered a Memorandum and Order to Show Cause (Doc. 7; “MOSC”) ordering Plaintiff to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim. In response, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 8; “AC”). This matter is before the Court for screening of the AC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). I. Nature of the Matter before the Court Plaintiff’s AC is based on events that occurred when Plaintiff was incarcerated at Hutchinson Correctional Facility in Hutchinson, Kansas (“HCF”). The AC alleges HCF officials failed to protect him from attack by another inmate. Plaintiff states he was attacked by inmate Dawson Slater on March 26, 2023, at approximately 6:05 a.m. Id. at 3. Slater stabbed him 16 times in his upper body, left shoulder, and right leg. Id. The AC describes the attack as unprovoked. Id. at 6. According to Plaintiff, Slater had stabbed two other inmates on two separate occasions within two months prior to his attack on Plaintiff. Id. at 3. Slater was released back into the general population after each of the prior incidents. Id. at 3, 5. In Plaintiff’s original Complaint (Doc. 1), which was not on the court-approved form, Plaintiff includes more factual allegations. Plaintiff states that he was exiting the dining hall after having eaten breakfast when the attack occurred. (Doc. 1, at 3.) He asserts that he and Slater had
“no prior associations, affiliations or dealings with one another before Plaintiff was attacked.” Id. Plaintiff was taken to the hospital where his wounds were stitched and glued closed. Id. He was returned to HCF later that day and remained in the infirmary for an additional three days. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the defendants failed to classify Slater as Other Security Risk or Continuous Bad Behavior pursuant to KDOC policy, which could have protected Plaintiff from being Slater’s next victim. Id. at 4. Plaintiff states that Warden Schnurr is responsible for the placement of inmates in long-term restrictive housing if the inmate has shown consistent bad behavior or behavior which has threatened the maintenance, security, or control of HCF. Id. at 5. He further alleges that Defendants Bell and Allen are members of the HCF Restrictive Housing
Review Board, which is responsible for reviewing the status of inmates in restrictive housing and retaining them, returning them to general population, or recommending they be transferred. Id. The Board’s recommendation must then be approved by Schnurr or Kroeker. Id. Plaintiff therefore alleges that each defendant “either recommended or approved inmate Dawson Slater’s removal from Administrative Restrictive Housing after his violent attacks (stabbings) of two other residents prior to his vicious attack on the plaintiff.” Id. The AC brings one count for deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 6. Plaintiff names the following defendants: Dan Schnurr, Warden of HCF; Misty Kroeker, Deputy Warden; Elizabeth Allen, EAI SAS; and Jeremy Bell, Major/Chief of Security. The Complaint seeks relief in the form of compensatory damages of $300,000 from each defendant and punitive damages of $100,000 from each defendant. II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of such entity to determine whether summary
dismissal is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Additionally, with any litigant, such as Plaintiff, who is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court has a duty to screen the complaint to determine its sufficiency. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Upon completion of this screening, the Court must dismiss any claim that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2)(B). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally
construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well- pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States,
561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). III. Discussion The United States Supreme Court has made clear that prison and jail officials have a duty to ensure the safety and protection of inmates:
[P]rison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. . . . Having incarcerated persons [with] demonstrated proclivit[ies] for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct, having stripped them of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course. Prison conditions may be restrictive and even harsh, but gratuitously allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by another serves no legitimate penological objective any more than it squares with evolving standards of decency. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833–34 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984). However, not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison official may be held to have violated the Eighth Amendment only when two components are satisfied: an objective component requiring the inmate show he was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm;” and a subjective component requiring that defendants acted with the culpable state of mind referred to as “deliberate indifference.” Id.; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991). Deliberate indifference exists when an official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“[T]the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”); Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 987 (10th Cir. 2020) (claim of deliberate indifference requires a plaintiff to allege “that an official acted (or failed to act) in an objectively unreasonable manner and with subjective awareness of the risk.”). Deliberate indifference requires “a higher degree of fault than negligence.” Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir. 1993) (other citations omitted); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. A prison official’s “failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not” does not amount to the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. Id. It follows that Plaintiff must allege facts indicating that Defendants actually knew of but
disregarded a serious risk to him, rather than that they should have been aware of possible danger. Id. However, Defendants need not have been aware of a substantial risk to Plaintiff in particular. Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2008). The mere fact that an assault occurred does not establish the requisite deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Hovater, 1 F.3d at 1068. “The unfortunate reality is that threats between inmates are common and do not, under all circumstances, serve to impute actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm.” Turner v. Okla. Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 804 F. App’x 921, 926 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (citing Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Prater v. Dahm, 89 F.3d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1996) (same)). “[S]ubjective awareness of only some risk of harm to a prisoner is insufficient for a deliberate-indifference claim.” Id. (citing Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1238). Rather, “officials must possess enough details about a threat to enable them to conclude that it presents a strong likelihood of injury, not a mere possibility.” Id. (citing Marbury, 936 at 1236 (internal quotation marks omitted)). A prison official may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk. See Hooks, 983 F.3d at 1205 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (explaining that “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted”)). “[P]rison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845). IV. Additional Information Needed The Court finds that the proper processing of Plaintiff’s claims cannot be achieved without additional information from appropriate Kansas Department of Corrections (“KDOC”) officials. See Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978); see also Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106
(10th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the Court orders the appropriate KDOC officials to prepare and file a Martinez Report. Once the Report has been received, the Court can properly screen Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that:
(1) The KDOC officials shall submit the Martinez Report by August 18, 2025. Upon the filing of that Report, the Court will screen Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. If the Amended Complaint survives screening, the Court will enter a separate order serving Defendants and setting an answer deadline. (2) KDOC officials are directed to undertake a review of the subject matter of the Amended Complaint: a. To ascertain the facts and circumstances;
b. To consider whether any action can and should be taken by the institution to resolve the subject matter of the Amended Complaint; and c. To determine whether other like complaints, whether pending in this Court or elsewhere, are related to this Amended Complaint and should be considered together. (3) Upon completion of the review, a written report shall be compiled which shall be filed with the Court and served on Plaintiff. If the KDOC officials wish to file any exhibits or portions of the report under seal or without service on Plaintiff, they must file such portions separately from the public report and provisionally under seal, to be followed immediately by a Motion to Seal or Redact Document(s). The KDOC officials are exempt from filing the Notice of Proposed Sealed Record under D. Kan. Rule 5.4.2(b).
(4) Statements of all witnesses shall be in affidavit form. Copies of pertinent rules, regulations, official documents, and, wherever appropriate, the reports of medical or psychiatric examinations shall be included in the written report. Any recordings related to Plaintiff’s claims shall also be included. (5) Authorization is granted to the KDOC officials to interview all witnesses having knowledge of the facts, including Plaintiff. (6) No motion addressed to the Amended Complaint shall be filed until the Martinez Report required herein has been prepared. (7) Discovery by Plaintiff shall not commence until Plaintiff has received and reviewed
any Court-ordered answer or response to the Amended Complaint. This action is exempted from the requirements imposed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) and 26(f). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter the KDOC as an interested party on the docket for the limited purpose of preparing the Martinez Report ordered herein. Upon the filing of that report, the KDOC may move for termination from this action. Copies of this order shall be transmitted to Plaintiff, counsel for the KDOC, and to the
Attorney General for the State of Kansas. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated June 18, 2025, at Kansas City, Kansas. S/ John W. Lungstrum JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE