Martin Guerrero, Jr. v. Dr. George J. Beto, Director, Texas Department of Corrections

Fifth Circuit

Martin Guerrero, Jr. v. Dr. George J. Beto, Director, Texas Department of Corrections

384 F.2d 886, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4605

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedNovember 7, 1967

Docket24419_1

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 384 F.2d 886 (Martin Guerrero, Jr. v. Dr. George J. Beto, Director, Texas Department of Corrections) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Martin Guerrero, Jr. v. Dr. George J. Beto, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, 384 F.2d 886, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4605 (5th Cir. 1967).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Appellant sought a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, where he alleged that his conviction of murder in the 175th District Court of Bexar County, Texas, was the result of the prosecution withholding evidence favorable to his defense, and further was the result of the knowing use of perjured testimony. The writ was denied without a hearing, and this appeal was brought.

Petitioner has alleged that an eyewitness, important to the case against him, initially had failed to identify petitioner in a police line-up, and that the State suppressed this information at the trial. He further alleged that that witness’ subsequent identification of petitioner was the result of “prompting” from the State’s attorney. The petitioner also asserted that the State had withheld tape recordings of conflicting statements made by prosecution witnesses, as well as expert opinion that would have favored the defense. There is no recorded transcript of the trial. Petitioner previously has been unsuccessful in seeking habeas corpus in the courts of Texas.

The deliberate suppression by the State of evidence favorable to a defendant would constitute a denial of due process. Alcorta v. State of Texas, 1957, 355 U.S. 28, 78 S.Ct. 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 9; Ashley v. State of Texas, 5 Cir. 1963, 319 F.2d 80; United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 3 Cir. 1955, 221 F.2d 763. *887 Similarly, the knowing use of perjured testimony would be a denial of due process. Alcorta v. State of Texas, supra; Ashley v. State of Texas, supra; United States v. Rutkin, 3 Cir. 1954, 212 F.2d 641.

Petitioner’s allegations, if proven, would entitle him to release from his present custody. Mooney v. Holohan, 1935, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791. He must be given the opportunity to establish the truth of the circumstances alleged. This case, therefore, must be remanded for a plenary hearing in the district court.

Reversed and remanded.

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PER CURIAM:

Appellant sought a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, where he alleged that his conviction of murder in the 175th District Court of Bexar County, Texas, was the result of the prosecution withholding evidence favorable to his defense, and further was the result of the knowing use of perjured testimony. The writ was denied without a hearing, and this appeal was brought.

Petitioner has alleged that an eyewitness, important to the case against him, initially had failed to identify petitioner in a police line-up, and that the State suppressed this information at the trial. He further alleged that that witness’ subsequent identification of petitioner was the result of “prompting” from the State’s attorney. The petitioner also asserted that the State had withheld tape recordings of conflicting statements made by prosecution witnesses, as well as expert opinion that would have favored the defense. There is no recorded transcript of the trial. Petitioner previously has been unsuccessful in seeking habeas corpus in the courts of Texas.

The deliberate suppression by the State of evidence favorable to a defendant would constitute a denial of due process. Alcorta v. State of Texas, 1957, 355 U.S. 28, 78 S.Ct. 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 9; Ashley v. State of Texas, 5 Cir. 1963, 319 F.2d 80; United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 3 Cir. 1955, 221 F.2d 763. *887 Similarly, the knowing use of perjured testimony would be a denial of due process. Alcorta v. State of Texas, supra; Ashley v. State of Texas, supra; United States v. Rutkin, 3 Cir. 1954, 212 F.2d 641.

Petitioner’s allegations, if proven, would entitle him to release from his present custody. Mooney v. Holohan, 1935, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791. He must be given the opportunity to establish the truth of the circumstances alleged. This case, therefore, must be remanded for a plenary hearing in the district court.

Reversed and remanded.

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384 F.2d 886, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4605, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/martin-guerrero-jr-v-dr-george-j-beto-director-texas-department-of-ca5-1967.

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