Martin Cruz v. City of Huntington Beach

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedNovember 15, 2019
Docket8:19-cv-01449
StatusUnknown

This text of Martin Cruz v. City of Huntington Beach (Martin Cruz v. City of Huntington Beach) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Martin Cruz v. City of Huntington Beach, (C.D. Cal. 2019).

Opinion

1 || MICHAEL E. GATES, City Attorney (SBN 258446) BRIAN L. WILLIAMS, Chief Trial Counsel (SBN 227948) 2 \IDANIEL S. CHA, Sr. Deputy City Attorney (SBN 260256) 3, || 2000 Main Street, P.O. Box 190 Huntington Beach, CA 92648 4 (714) 536-5555 5 FAX (714) 374-1590 Email: Brian. Williams@surfcity-hb.org 6 Daniel.Cha@surfcity-hb.org 7 || Attorneys for Defendant g || CITY OF HUNTINGTON BEACH 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1] CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 |} MARTIN CRUZ, ANA CRUZ, and Case No. 8:19-cv-01449-DOC-ADS 14 N.B.C., a minor, Plaintiffs, and as Successors-in-Interest for Decedent [Discovery Document: Referred to 15 || BRYAN CRUZ, Magistrate Judge Autumn D. Spaeth] 16 Plaintiffs, STIPULATED PROTECTIVE M7 vs. ORDER 18 || CITY OF HUNTINGTON BEACH and 19 || DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, 20 Defendants. 21.4] 22 |I1. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 23 54 A. Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, 25 proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public 26 disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation 27 28 may be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition

1 the Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all

4 disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from 5 public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that

are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. 8 The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section XIII(C), below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential

11 information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the Court to file material under seal. 13 GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT A. Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need 18 for a protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace officer personnel file records and associated investigative or

confidential records for the following reasons. 22 First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy 25 therein that is underscored, specified, and heightened by the statutory Pitchess protective procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police

28 Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton,

1 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based discovery disputes involving 4 federal claims,” the “state privilege law which is consistent with its federal 5 equivalent significantly assists in applying [federal] privilege law to discover disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 8 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based “privacy rights [that] are no inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code §§ 11 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Defendants further contend that uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can threaten the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. 15 Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official 18 information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in

the personnel files of their peace officers — particularly as to those portions of 22 peace officer personnel files that contain critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or evaluation/analysis, or communications for 25 the purposes of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis — potentially including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of officer involved

28 shooting investigations, internal affairs-type records or reports,

1 evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or

4 rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa 5 Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 8 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176- 177 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. 11 Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants further contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public entity’s custodian of 15 records pursuant to applicable California law and that uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer and third party privacy; 18 impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements and related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests; and a chilling of open and honest discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged 22 misconduct that can erode a public entity’s ability to identify and/or implement any remedial measures that may be required. 25 Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the same rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it

28 is contrary to the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled

1 release of officers’ compelled statements. See generally, Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V.

4 Finally, recent amendments to state law enacted by Senate Bill 1421, 5 do not diminish the fundamental privacy interests in the categories of material described above. The information required to be released pursuant to Senate 8 Bill 1421 is subject to strict redaction requirements, whereby the information available under Senate Bill 1421 is not coextensive with the information

11 available through a Pitchess motion for discovery. See Cal. Pen. Code § 832.7(b)(5). Moreover, the statute expressly provides that it “does not affect the discovery of disclosure of information” pursuant to the statutory Pitchess 15 procedure for discovery. Accordingly, Defendants contend that, without a protective order 18 preventing such, dissemination of confidential records in the case can and will likely substantially impair and harm defendant public entity’s interests in

candid self-critical analysis, frank internal deliberations, obtaining candid 22 information from witnesses, preserving the safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers and peace officers’ families and associates, protecting 25 the privacy officers of peace officers, and preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally undermined by publication of private, sensitive, or

28 confidential information — as can and often does result in litigation.

1 Plaintiff does not agree or concede to Defendants’ contentions herein above. However, Plaintiff agrees that there is Good Cause for a Protective

4 Order so as to preserve the respective interests of the parties without the need 5 to further burden the Court with such issues.

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Related

Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles
710 P.2d 329 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu
447 F.3d 1172 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Soto v. City of Concord
162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. California, 1995)
Tuite v. Henry
181 F.R.D. 175 (District of Columbia, 1998)

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Martin Cruz v. City of Huntington Beach, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/martin-cruz-v-city-of-huntington-beach-cacd-2019.