Martha Gallien McGlothen and Marla Gallien Davis v. Martha Williams

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
• Decided: April 28, 2026
• Docket: 01-24-00844-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued April 28, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00844-CV ——————————— MARTHA GALLIEN MCGLOTHEN AND MARLA GALLIEN DAVIS, Appellants

v.

MARTHA WILLIAMS, Appellee

On Appeal from Probate Court No. 1 Harris County, Texas Cause No. 505, 347

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a will contest for lack of standing.

Martha Williams, named beneficiary and executor, applied to probate the decedent’s

last will and testament as a muniment of title. The decedent’s niece, Marla Davis, and the decedent’s daughter, Martha McGlothen, contested the will. In the contest,

Davis proceeded pro se and also purported to represent McGlothen even though she

was not an attorney. Williams moved to dismiss the contest based on Davis’s lack

of standing, and to strike her pleadings and sanction Davis for her unauthorized

practice of law. The trial court dismissed the contest and struck the pleadings, noting

that McGlothen had standing and could replead.

In three issues, the appellants contend that the trial court erred in determining

standing.1

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Background

The decedent, Stephen Gallien, had two daughters who survived him, Belinda

White and Martha McGlothen. Marla Davis is the daughter of Stephen’s brother,

James Gallien.

Martha Williams, Stephen’s niece and the will’s proponent, discovered his

alleged last will and testament in some of his papers and applied to probate the will

as muniment of title. The will disinherited White and McGlothen and bequeathed

Stephen’s estate entirely to Williams.

Davis and McGlothen (the “contestants”) contested the will, asserting that the

will was not authentic, it was obtained by fraud, duress, or undue influence, and

1 The appellants’ fourth issue does not allege that the trial court erred. 2 Williams’ application was untimely. They also alleged that certain real property was

not part of Stephen’s estate. Davis admitted that she was not an heir of Stephen’s

estate but argued that she was a necessary party because she had an interest in

property allegedly held by the estate.

Williams moved to dismiss the contest, contending that it had no legal basis,

Davis lacked standing, and the statute of limitations barred the fraud claim. Williams

also asserted that Davis was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and

requested sanctions, attorney’s fees, and expenses.

After the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court abated the case for

thirty days to give the contestants time to hire an attorney. After two months of

inaction, the trial court dismissed the contest for lack of jurisdiction. Still without

legal representation, Davis moved for new trial on behalf of herself and, purportedly,

McGlothen. The trial court struck the pleadings filed by Davis based on her

unauthorized practice of law and clarified that McGlothen had standing to pursue a

contest and would be able to replead. McGlothen did not replead.

Analysis

The contestants contend that the trial court erred by dismissing their contest

based on Davis’s lack of standing. But there is no contest for this Court to review

because the trial court struck their pleadings. They did not replead or challenge that

ruling. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. “Except for fundamental error, appellate courts are

3 not authorized to consider issues not properly raised by the parties.” Mack Trucks,

Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 577 (Tex. 2006). Fundamental error exists only

where the error directly and adversely affects public interest, as declared by Texas

law, or where the record affirmatively and conclusively shows that the ruling court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See id. There is no fundamental error here, as

Texas law forbids a non-attorney from practicing law, which includes filing

documents on behalf of another party. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 81.101–.102,

83.001–006; see, e.g., McCrimmon v. Taylor, No. 01-08-00644-CV, 2009 WL

417278, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 19, 2009, pet. denied) (holding

trial court properly dismissed suit because non-attorneys may not represent others).

For these reasons, the will contest is a nullity, and the record thus presents nothing

for review.

Conclusion

Clint Morgan Justice

Panel consists of Justices Gunn, Caughey, and Morgan.