Martha Baches Lucas, Administrator of the Estate of Nicholas Baches v. Charles Schwab & Company, Inc. Ira Account No. Xxxx-2410

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: March 13, 2020
• Docket: A19A1991
• Status: Published

Opinion

FIFTH DIVISION MCFADDEN, C. J., MCMILLIAN, P. J., and SENIOR APPELLATE JUDGE PHIPPS

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. http://www.gaappeals.us/rules

March 13, 2020

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A19A1991. LUCAS v. CHARLES SCHWAB & COMPANY INC. IRA ACCOUNT NO. XXXX-2410 et al.

MCFADDEN, Chief Judge.

This is a dispute about the ownership of Nicholas Baches’ IRA. After Baches

died, his sister, Martha Baches Lucas, filed this action seeking a declaration that

Baches’ estate, not the named beneficiary, owns the account. The named beneficiary

is his former wife, Sharon Baches.

The case went to trial. The jury returned a special verdict, upon which the trial

court entered judgment, holding that the named beneficiary owns the account. Lucas

appeals the denial of her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. She argues

that no evidence supports the judgment. Because some evidence does support the

judgment, we affirm. 1. Trial evidence and procedural posture.

“The denial of a motion for [judgment notwithstanding the verdict] will be

upheld if there is any evidence to support the jury’s verdict when the evidence is

construed in a light most favorable to the verdict.” Lillard v. Owens, 281 Ga. 619, 620

(1) (641 SE2d 511) (2007).

So viewed, the evidence at trial showed that Nicholas Baches and Sharon

Baches were married for 12 years. They remained friends after they divorced, and

Nicholas Baches made a bequest to Sharon Baches in his will.

Nicholas Baches had multiple sclerosis which limited his physical but not his

mental abilities. He was unable to walk, was wheelchair bound, and had around-the-

clock, live-in care.

His personal assistant was Norma Wages — who is Sharon Baches’ sister.

From 2010 until mid-2013, she worked two or three days a week in that capacity. She

ran errands for him, drove him to appointments, cared for his cats, retrieved his mail

from the mail box, opened and answered his mail, wrote checks to pay his bills and

to pay wages for herself and the other people that cared for him, and did whatever

else he needed her to do.

2 In June 2012, Nicholas Baches transferred his IRA from Ameriprise Financial

to Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. Wages completed the application to transfer the

account. She listed Sharon Baches as the account’s primary beneficiary.

Wages testified that Nicholas Baches instructed her to list Sharon Baches as

the primary beneficiary and authorized her to sign the application. Nicholas Baches

received statements from Schwab and spoke with Schwab representatives over the

telephone about the account.

After Nicholas Baches’ death, Lucas filed this action seeking a declaration that

the proceeds from the IRA belonged to Nicholas Baches’ estate. After a two-day trial,

the jury returned a special verdict. They found that Nicholas Baches did not authorize

Wages to act as his agent when she completed the account application on his behalf,

but that he later ratified that action.

The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict, directing that the IRA be

distributed to Sharon Baches in whatever manner she elected. Lucas filed a motion

for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court denied. This appeal

followed.

2. Some evidence supports the judgment.

3 Lucas argues that there was no evidence that Nicholas Baches knew that Wages

had listed Sharon Baches as the beneficiary of the IRA, so, contrary to the jury’s

special verdict, he was legally incapable of ratifying that action. We disagree.

“The relation of principal and agent arises wherever one person, expressly or

by implication, authorizes another to act for him or subsequently ratifies the acts of

another in his behalf.” OCGA § 10-6-1. But “in order for a ratification to be binding,

the principal must have had full knowledge of all material facts.” McKean v. GGNSC

Atlanta, LLC, 329 Ga. App. 507, 511 (1) (b) (765 SE2d 681) (2014) (citation

omitted). Wages testified that Nicholas Baches instructed her to list her sister as the

primary beneficiary. From this evidence, the jury could conclude that Nicholas

Baches knew that Sharon Baches was listed as the beneficiary and thus ratified

Wages’ listing Sharon Baches as the account beneficiary. See Allen & Bean, Inc. v.

American Bankers Ins. Co., 153 Ga. App. 617, 619 (266 SE2d 295) (1980) (if there

is evidence of knowledge, whether there is a ratification is a jury question).

Lucas argues that implicit in the jury’s finding that Nicholas Baches did not

authorize Wages to act as his agent is a finding that he “could not know how [Wages]

filled out the [a]ccount [a]pplication. This lack of knowledge included, specifically,

that [Wages] named Sharon [Baches] beneficiary on the [a]ccount [a]pplication.” We

4 reject the argument that implicit in the jury’s verdict is a finding that Nicholas Baches

did not know how Wages completed the account application.

[U]nder OCGA § 9-12-4, verdicts shall have a reasonable intendment and shall receive a reasonable construction. They shall not be avoided unless from necessity. Thus, the presumptions are in favor of the validity of verdicts, and if possible[,] a construction will be given which will uphold them. Even if the verdict is ambiguous and susceptible of two constructions, one of which would uphold it and one of which would defeat it, that which would uphold it is to be applied. Furthermore, in determining the proper interpretation of a jury verdict and to remove any ambiguity, the trial court may question the jury prior to disbursal in order to clarify the jury’s intent.

Anthony v. Gator Cochran Constr., 288 Ga. 79, 80-81 (702 SE2d 139) (2010)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

As Sharon Baches argues, we are not privy to the reasons the jury rejected her

claim that Nicholas Baches authorized Wages to complete the form yet found that he

ratified Wages’ actions. But the trial court had instructed the jury that “[w]hen agency

is sought to be proved by ratification, it must appear that the principal had full

knowledge of all material facts in connection with the transaction in question, and

that with that knowledge, he or she accepted or received the benefits of the allegedly

unauthorized act.” Perhaps the jury concluded that Wages and Nicholas Baches

5 completed the application together with Wages actually writing in the answers in the

blank spaces, that Wages did not have specific authority to sign Nicholas Baches’

name, yet that by using the account, Nicholas Baches ratified Wages’ actions in

signing his name. “Although a verdict that is contradictory is void, verdicts are to be

reasonably construed and not avoided unless from necessity.” Hewitt Assocs., LLC

v. Rollins, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 848, 854 (5) (708 SE2d 697) (2011) (citations and

punctuation omitted). The jury’s verdict may be reasonably construed in a way that

upholds it. Thus we reject Lucas’ argument, which would negate a portion of the

verdict.

Judgment affirmed. McMillian, P. J., and Senior Appellate Judge Herbert E.

Phipps concur.