Marta Deleon v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 9, 2017
• Docket: 49A02-1705-CR-1146
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Nov 09 2017, 8:31 am this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court

the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Barbara J. Simmons Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

J.T. Whitehead Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Marta Deleon, November 9, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1705-CR-1146 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Annie Christ- Appellee-Plaintiff Garcia, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49G24-1612-F6-46155

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-CR-1146 | November 9, 2017 Page 1 of 5 [1] Marta Deleon appeals her conviction for criminal trespass, a Class A

misdemeanor. She contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to

support the conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] The Wheeler Mission Ministry Center for Women and Children (the Mission)

in Indianapolis follows a winter contingency policy when the facility does not

have enough beds during the winter months. Pursuant to this policy, guests

who arrive early enough are allowed to have dinner, stay the night, and have

breakfast the next morning. They then must leave the Mission.

[4] Deleon arrived at the Mission on November 30, 2016. Deleon filled out the

intake form for the overnight stay and reviewed the rules with a staff member.

The next morning, when she was asked by a staff member to leave, Deleon

refused. Deleon continued to ask about additional resources available at the

Mission and questioned, “why did I have to give them my ID and information

if they weren’t going to help me.” Transcript at 46.

[5] Amanda Craig, the case manager on duty that day, eventually intervened and

also asked Deleon to leave the Mission. Deleon would not leave. Craig

attempted to negotiate with Deleon. For example, Deleon indicated that she

needed to retrieve her razor, so Craig said she would get it and give it to her

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-CR-1146 | November 9, 2017 Page 2 of 5 once she left the Mission. Craig then asked again for Deleon to leave and

warned that she would have to call the police if Deleon chose not to leave.

[6] The front desk staff member called the police because Deleon would not leave.

When the responding officer arrived, Deleon continued to forestall leaving. At

one point, Deleon sat on a couch and leaned back as she kicked and yelled at

the officer. Backup officers were called to the scene, and the officers eventually

had to take Deleon to the ground to place handcuffs on her before removing her

from the Mission.

[7] At a bench trial on May 3, 2017, Deleon was convicted of criminal trespass.

The trial court imposed a sentence of eighty-two days in jail, which amounted

to time served. Deleon appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.

Discussion & Decision

[8] When we consider a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither

reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses. Suggs v. State,

51 N.E.3d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2016). Instead, we consider only the evidence and

reasonable inferences supporting the conviction. Id. We will affirm the

conviction if there is probative evidence from which a reasonable finder of fact

could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[9] Deleon was convicted of criminal trespass pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-43-2-

2(b)(2), which provides that a person who, “not having a contractual interest in

the property, knowingly or intentionally refuses to leave the real property of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-CR-1146 | November 9, 2017 Page 3 of 5 another person after having been asked to leave by the other person or that

person’s agent…commits criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor.” Under

this statute, the element of communication of a request to leave the property

“implies a reasonable period of time for the person receiving that

communication to leave of her/his own volition.” Curtis v. State, 58 N.E.3d

992, 994 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Lemon v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1190, 1196-

97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). If the person is not given a reasonable period of time

to comply with the request to leave, then there is no trespass. Id.

[10] Deleon concedes that she did not have a contractual interest in the property and

that she was asked to leave the property by staff members. Deleon argues,

however, that the State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she

knowingly or intentionally refused to leave. In this regard, Deleon notes that

she asked for additional services and also for her razor and that she was in the

process of packing up her belongings when the police officer arrived. Deleon

also contends that she was never informed that she had to leave immediately.

[11] We reject Deleon’s invitation to reweigh the evidence. The evidence establishes

that Deleon was provided ample time to comply with the request to leave. Two

separate staff members asked Deleon to leave, but Deleon refused. Craig even

attempted to engage in negotiations with Deleon to encourage her to comply.

Deleon was then warned by Craig that the police would be called if she did not

leave as requested. Ultimately, the police were called and the responding

officer found Deleon still inside the Mission. She sat on a couch and kicked

and yelled as the officer attempted to remove her from the property. The officer

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-CR-1146 | November 9, 2017 Page 4 of 5 had to call for backup before Deleon could be forcibly removed. This evidence

sufficiently supports Deleon’s conviction for criminal trespass.

[12] Judgment affirmed.

[13] Baker, J. and Bailey, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-CR-1146 | November 9, 2017 Page 5 of 5