Marstaller v. Phair

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: October 30, 2020
• Docket: ANDap-20-003
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN, ss DOCKET NO. AP-20-003

.Terry Marstaller, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) V. ) Order on Appeal and ) Pending Motions Robert L. Phair, Jr. and, ) Marie A. Phair ) ) Defendants. )

This case is before the court on appeal by Defendant/Appellant Robert Phair1 pursuant to

M.R. Civ. P. 80D(f)(l), on a question of law.

Factual and Procedural Histmy

There is no dispute that Plaintiff is the record owner of the property at issue on Federal

Road in Livermore. On November 18, 2007, the parties entered into a "Lease to Purchase

Property" regarding the Federal Road property. It is this document which is the basis of the

dispute between the parties. Defendants asserted in the District Court and continue to assert here

that this contract was a land sale installment contract and that they completed the purchase.

On October 16, 2019, Plaintiff filed this forcible entry and detainer matter in order to

evict Defendants, alleging they are tenants at will and were behind in rent. Defendants answered

and claimed title in the premises, either outright or pursuant to a land installment contract. Trial

was held on January 13, 2020. On February 13, 2020, the court issued an order rejecting the

defenses and entered judgment for Plaintiff. Specifically, the court found that Defendants' claim

of title was not supported by the evidence, and that the original 2007 contract between the parties

1The notice of appeal and transcript order were signed only by Robert Phair. Marie Phair did not file her own appeal, although she signed the briefs. Mr. Phair cannot represent Ms. Phair in this action. See 4 M.R.S. § 807(1), (3). Given the outcome of Mr. Phair's appeal, the issue of her status is moot.

I was not a land installment contract. The court held that Defendants were tenants at will and were

duly served with a Notice to Quit that complied with statute. As a resnlt, the court entered

judgment for Plaintiff.

Specifically, the District Court found that the "Lease to Purchase" required the purchase

to be completed within 12 months. The Court further found that before November 18, 2008,

Plaintiff notified Defendants that if they failed to complete the purchase within 12 months, the

agreement would be terminated and they would become tenants at will, with the rent increasing

to $400 per month. The purchase was not completed, and Defendants did begin to pay $400 per

month the following month. There was also no dispute that Defendants had stopped paying in

2019 for some months prior to the filing of the complaint.

Following the final judgment in February 2020, Defendant Robert Phair timely filed an

appeal to this court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80D(f)(l).

On July I, 2020, Plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that Defendants

had failed to comply with 14 M.R.S. § 6008(2). Since then, it appears that Defendants have paid

some rent into escrow with the court, although it is not clear to this court that it is the full

amount. Given the disposition of the appeal, however, the motion to dismiss is denied as moot.

Analysis

A party may appeal a judgment of the District Court to the Superior Court. M.R. Civ. P.

76D. When the appeal is from a judgment of forcible entry and detainer, a "party may appeal ...

on questions of law." M.R. Civ. P. 80D(f)(l). Defendants have not sought a jury trial on any

issues of fact, see M.R. Civ. P. 80D(f)(2), and thus the appeal is limited to questions of law. On

appeal, then, this court will ove1turn any findings of the District Court only if thery are clearly

erroneous. Town ofPownal v. Anderson, 1999 ME 70 if 6,728 A.2d 1254, 1256.

2 Preliminarily, Defendant asks that this case be stayed pending the ontcome of the

separate Superior Court original action between the parties, AND-RE-19-15. That request is

denied in this summary process, particularly in light of the Superior Court's denial of

preliminary injunctive relief by Order dated October 18, 2019.

In his brief on appeal, Defendant essentially restates and reargues the facts from his point

of view. The legal question he raises appears to be that the District Court erred when it

interpreted the "Lease to Purchase" contract and/or that the factual findings are not supported by

evidence. Regardless whether one could have found differently, the findings of the District

Comt are amply supported by the evidence, and no error occurred.

For these reasons, the appeal is denied, and the judgment affirmed.

Defendant has paid some monies to the District Court which are being held in an escrow

account for rent. It is unclear to this court how much has been paid, whether Defendants are still

occupying the premises, and how much of the escrow is due to Plaintiff. Pursuant to 14 M.R.S.

§6008(2)(A), if Defendant believes that Plaintiff is not entitled to any or all of the escrow fund,

given the court findings that Defendant was a tenant obligated to pay $400 monthly during his

occupancy, then Defendant shall file any objection to disbursing the money to Plaintiff on or

before November 16, 2020. Otherwise, the sums held in escrow shall be paid to Plaintiff for the

rent owed.

The entry is: Appeal denied, and Judgment affirmed. This order may be incorporated on

the docket of the case by reference pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 79(a).

Dated: Valerie Stanfill Justice, Maine Superior Court