Marson Construction Corp. v. Illinois Union Insurance
Opinion
Appeal from order, Supreme Court, New York County (Louise Gruner Gans, J.), entered July 23, 1999, which, upon plaintiffs default, granted the motion of defendants F.J. Wilkes & Company and Steven Marshall to dismiss the complaint as against them as time-barred and for lack of privity, unanimously dismissed, without costs.
The purportedly appealed order, entered upon plaintiffs default in responding to defendants-respondents’ motion to dismiss the complaint, is nonappealable (CPLR 5511; Batra v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 205 AD2d 480). In any event, were the order appealable, we would find that the complaint was properly dismissed as time-barred because plaintiff’s action was commenced more than six years after defendants-respondents insurance brokers provided plaintiff with a certificate of insurance naming it as an additional insured (see, Santiago v 1370 Broadway Assocs., 264 AD2d 624), and also because there was no privity between plaintiff general contractor and defendants-respondents, the insurance broker and agent for the subcontractor (St. George v Barney Corp., 270 AD2d 171). Concur — Sullivan, P. J., Tom, Ellerin, Rubin and Andrias, JJ.
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276 A.D.2d 294 (Marson Construction Corp. v. Illinois Union Insurance) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.