Marshall Wexler v. Regents University of California, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: February 11, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00377
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MARSHALL WEXLER, Case No. 25-cv-00377-EMC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 9 v. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS; AND DENYING IN PART 10 REGENTS UNIVERSITY OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND CALIFORNIA, et al., 11 Defendants. Docket Nos. 29, 37 12 13 14 Plaintiff Marshall A. Wexler is a pro se litigant.1 He has sued the Regents of the 15 University of California (erroneously named as UCSF Dental) and three individuals who worked 16 at UCSF Dental at the time he received treatment.2 Previously, Judge Breyer granted the Regents’ 17 motion to dismiss. See Docket No. 18 (order). He also issued two orders denying Mr. Wexler’s 18 motion for leave to amend. See Docket Nos. 22, 28 (orders). Now pending before the Court is (1) 19 the individual defendants’ motion to dismiss and strike and (2) a third motion to amend filed by 20 Mr. Wexler. Having considered the parties’ briefs, the Court finds this matter suitable for 21 resolution without oral argument. The motion to dismiss and strike is GRANTED in part, and the 22 motion to amend is DENIED in part. 23 / / / 24 / / / 25

26 1 Although proceeding pro se, Mr. Wexler is an attorney licensed by the state of California. See Defs.’ RJN. 27 1 I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 A. Complaint 3 In the operative complaint, Mr. Wexler alleges as follows. 4 On July 9, 2024, Mr. Wexler went to UCSF Dental for a routine cleaning, examination, 5 and x-rays. See Compl. at 3 (¶ 5). Dr. Komarisetty, a student dentist, treated him, and Dr. 6 Abusharar, another student dentist, acted as an assistant. See Compl. at 1 (¶¶ 4-5); Compl. at 3 (¶ 7 6). But see Compl. at 3 (¶ 10) (also suggesting that Dr. Abusharar supervised Ms. Komarisetty). 8 The clinical supervisor was Ms. Abrahamsen. See Compl. at 1 (¶ 3). 9 Although Mr. Wexler was scheduled for only a routine cleaning, examination, and x-rays, 10 he “was subjected [instead] to a . . . D0180 periodontal exam.” Compl. at 3 (¶ 8). The providers 11 did not explain the periodontal exam to him prior to conducting it, and Mr. Wexler did not consent 12 to the periodontal exam. See Compl. at 3 (¶ 8); see also Compl. at 4 (¶ 13) (alleging that he was 13 “not adequately informed about its purpose or potential risks”). In addition, the periodontal exam 14 was painful (e.g., it involved “excessive probing of [his] gums” and use of a bite plate) and further 15 was unnecessary (e.g., it involved 19 x-rays). Compl. at 3-4 (¶¶ 9-11, 13); see also Compl. at 9 (¶ 16 16). The providers deliberately made the treatment painful. See Compl. at 4 (¶ 13). The 17 appointment lasted approximately three hours. See Compl. at 4 (¶ 12). 18 In addition, during the treatment, Dr. Komarisetty made an offensive statement (“white 19 people don’t have anxiety”) and further made an inappropriate remark (calling Mr. Wexler 20 “attractive”). See Compl. at 5 (¶ 17). According to Mr. Wexler, the offensive statement – made 21 after he told Dr. Komarisetty that he is Jewish – reflected animus on the basis of his Jewish 22 identity. See Compl. at 8 (¶ 8); Compl. at 15 (¶ 10). 23 Mr. Wexler also claims that he was subjected to the painful and unnecessary periodontal 24 exam because of the providers’ animus against Jewish persons. See Compl. at 12 (¶ 30); see also 25 Opp’n at 11 (asserting that “Abusharar” is an Arabic name). As alleged in the complaint:

26 30. [Mr. Wexler] believes these procedures were part of an informal or unacknowledged experimental protocol intended 27 to test the limits of patient tolerance[3] or to replicate alleged 1 practices attributed to a deceased Jewish dentist in El Cajon, California, [Ben Harouni] who was reportedly murdered for 2 mistreatment of the murderer [his patient], so that [Defendants] can help bolster their own theory between 3 fellow students, and the murderer[’]s family and community supporters that the murder of the Jewish Dentist, Ben 4 Harouni, in San Diego by a former patient Mohammed Abdulkareem, was not terrorism motivated by Anti 5 Semitism, because Abdulkareem was merely a disgruntled patient. 6 31. This event was surely in the minds of the Islamic student 7 dentists at the California Dentist school, because Plaintiff, who is not a dentist, was aware of it because he identifies as 8 Jewish. 9 Compl. at 12 (¶ 30). 10 Based on, inter alia, the above allegations, Mr. Wexler has asserted both federal and state 11 law causes of action. They are as follows: 12 (1) Intentional infliction of emotional distress. 13 (2) Discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and religion in violation of the Unruh 14 Civil Rights Act. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (providing that “[a]ll persons with 15 the jurisdiction of [California] are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, 16 race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, [etc.] are entitled to the full and 17 equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all 18 business establishments of every kind whatsoever”). 19 (3) Assault and battery. 20 (4) Breach of contract (in bad faith). 21 (5) Unfair business practices in violation of California Business & Professions 22 Code § 17200. 23 (6) “Medical experimentation and lack of informed consent.”4 24 3 See also Prop. FAC ¶ 43 (alleging that Ms. Komarisetty took his blood pressure before 25 conducting the examination – “a medically unnecessary step for a routine cleaning” – because she wanted to “determine whether [he] could physically withstand the calculated torture from the 26 deliberate puncturing of Plaintiff’s cranial nerves in his mouth with her dental probe for no medical purpose but for her own gratification to inflict pain that followed”). 27 1 (7) Discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and religion in violation of the Civil 2 Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (providing that “[a]ll persons shall be 3 entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 4 privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public 5 accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or 6 segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin”). 7 (8) Violent act motivated by discrimination (based on race, ethnicity, and race) in 8 violation of the Ralph Act. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7(b)(1) (providing that 9 “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from 10 any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their 11 persons or property because of political affiliation, or on account of any 12 characteristic listed or defined in subdivision (b) or (e) of Section 51”); id. § 13 51(b) (providing that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free 14 and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national 15 origin, [etc.] are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, 16 facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind 17 whatsoever”). 18 (9) Interference with civil rights (the “right to receive equitable and 19 nondiscriminatory healthcare”) by threats, intimidation, or coercion in violation 20 of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (providing for a cause of action 21 where “two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . . for the 22 purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of 23 persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and 24 immunities under the laws”). 25 (10) Retaliation in violation of the First Amendment (after Mr. Wexler “assert[ed] 26 his rights to equitable healthcare and express[ed] his concerns about 27 discrimination”). 1 B. Procedural History 2 After Mr. Wexler filed his suit, the Regents moved to dismiss the complaint. Judge Breyer 3 granted that motion, holding that the Regents were protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. 4 See Docket No. 18 (order). 5 Mr. Wexler subsequently moved to amend his complaint. Because the proposed amended 6 complaint continued to name UCSF Dental (i.e., the Regents) as a defendant, Judge Breyer denied 7 the motion to amend. See Docket No. 22 (order). Mr. Wexler responded by filing a second 8 motion for leave to amend, but Judge Breyer found the motion “procedurally deficient because he 9 has not attached to his motion a proposed amended complaint.” Docket No. 28 (Order at 1). 10 Judge Breyer acknowledged Mr. Wexler’s assertion that the Regents had waived sovereign 11 immunity because they received ACA funds but stated that he could not “evaluate the adequacy of 12 such an assertion in a vacuum.” Docket No. 28 (Order at 1). The denial of the motion to amend 13 was without prejudice. 14 The instant action was thereafter reassigned from Judge Breyer to Judge Thompson, and 15 then to the undersigned. The Court now has before it (1) the individual defendants’ motion to 16 dismiss and strike and (2) Mr. Wexler’s third motion for leave to amend. 17 II. DISCUSSION 18 A. Motion to Dismiss and Strike 19 1. Legal Standard 20 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss a cause 21 of action for failure to state a claim for relief. To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion after the 22 Supreme Court’s decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 23 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), a plaintiff’s “factual allegations [in the complaint] ‘must . . . 24 suggest that the claim has at least a plausible chance of success.’” Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 25 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014). The court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and 26 construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. 27 Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). But “allegations in a 1 allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself 2 effectively.” Levitt, 765 F.3d at 1135 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial 3 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 4 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The 5 plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer 6 possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 While Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move to dismiss based on failure to state a 8 claim for relief, Rule 12(f) provides that a defendant may move to strike from a pleading “any 9 redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The Ninth 10 Circuit, however, has held that where a defendant moves to strike a remedy such as punitive 11 damages on the basis that it is precluded as a matter of law, the motion is properly construed as a 12 12(b)(6), and not a 12(f), motion. See Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 971, 13 974 (9th Cir. 2010) (“hold[ing] that Rule 12(f) . . . does not authorize a district court to strike a 14 claim for damages on the ground that such damages are precluded as a matter of law”; stating that 15 an argument of that nature is better raised through a 12(b)(6) or summary judgment motion). 16 2. Federal Claims 17 In the pending motion to dismiss and strike, the individual defendants challenge each of 18 the causes of action asserted by Mr. Wexler, as well as some of the remedies he seeks (i.e., 19 punitive damages, injunctive relief, restitution/disgorgement, and attorneys’ fees). As indicated 20 above, the bulk of Mr. Wexler’s claims are predicated on state law. There are only three federal 21 causes of action pled. However, the Court begins its analysis with the federal claims as they give 22 rise to subject matter jurisdiction in this Court. If Mr. Wexler fails to state a claim for relief for all 23 federal causes of action, then the Court has the discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over 24 the state law claims. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 25 a. Seventh Cause of Action: Discrimination in Violation of § 2000a 26 Section 2000a provides in relevant part as follows: “All persons shall be entitled to the full 27 and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations 1 segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). Mr. 2 Wexler alleges that the individual defendants violated § 2000a because they discriminated against 3 him on the basis of his race, ethnicity, or religion by making disparaging comments (“white people 4 don’t have anxiety”) and by subjecting him to painful and unnecessary procedures without 5 informed consent. See, e.g., Compl. at 14 (¶¶ 3-4). 6 As an initial matter, the Court agrees with the individual defendants that the claim as to Dr. 7 Abusharar and Ms. Abrahamsen must be dismissed because Mr. Wexler has failed to clearly allege 8 that either individual engaged in the alleged misconduct identified above. Dr. Komarisetty alone 9 is alleged to have made the statement that “white people don’t have anxiety.” And although there 10 are general and conclusory allegations that Dr. Abusharar assisted Dr. Komarisetty, the nature of 11 that assistance is never clarified. There do not appear to be any allegations at all about Ms. 12 Abrahamsen. 13 In addition, even if all three individuals were alleged to have engaged in all or some of the 14 alleged misconduct, Mr. Wexler has still failed to state a claim for relief. The single comment that 15 “white people don’t have anxiety” does not, as a matter of law, give rise to a hostile environment 16 on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion. See Bradley v. Blue Chip Casino, No. 2:09-CV-154 17 JVB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89316, at *5-6 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 25, 2009) (dismissing § 2000a claim 18 because, inter alia, even if a statement could be attributed to the defendant, “one comment does 19 not rise to the level of racial discrimination”); cf. Fried v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 18 F.4th 643, 20 648 (9th Cir. 2021) (in discussing a hostile work environment under Title VII, noting that “‘[n]ot 21 every insult or harassing comment will constitute a hostile work environment’” and that the 22 “‘ordinary tribulations of the workplace [include] the sporadic use of abusive language, gender- 23 related jokes, and occasional teasing’”; adding that, for a single incident to give to a hostile work 24 environment, “it ‘must be extremely severe’”). 25 Furthermore, the allegations that the individual defendants intentionally subjected Mr. 26 Wexler to painful and unnecessary procedures because of his race, ethnicity, or religion are 27 entirely speculative. The single comment that “white people don’t have anxiety” is not enough to 1 supported by any concrete factual allegations. More important, even if the individual defendants 2 are Islamic, that fact in and of itself is not sufficient to give rise to a plausible claim that the 3 individual defendants are thereby anti-Semitic. In addition, Mr. Wexler’s contention that the 4 individual defendants must have known about the incident where a Jewish dentist, Mr. Harouni, 5 was killed in El Cajon, California, is also unsupported by any concrete factual allegations. Nor is 6 there any plausible nexus to the El Cajon incident and the defendants in this case. Thus, any 7 assertion that the individual defendants’ conduct was some kind of “payback” for what happened 8 to Mr. Harouni is speculation. 9 Finally, Mr. Wexler’s § 2000a claim fails because, even if he did sufficiently plead a 10 plausible claim for relief, the only remedy available would be injunctive-type relief. See Jones v. 11 Brouwers, 859 Fed. Appx. 793, 793 (9th Cir. 2021) (stating that “damages are not available for 12 violations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq.”); Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1120 n.6 (9th 13 Cir. 2000) (stating that, under Title II of the Civil Rights Act, “a private individual can only obtain 14 ‘preventive relief,’ which means injunctions and temporary restraining orders[;] damages are not 15 available”); see also Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (stating that, 16 “[w]hen a plaintiff brings an action under [Title II of the Civil Rights Act], he cannot recover 17 damages”). Although Mr. Wexler’s complaint states that he seeks injunctive relief to “prohibit[] 18 Defendants from engaging in discriminatory and unethical conduct,” Compl., Prayer for Relief ¶ 19 G, he fails to allege that he has standing to seek prospective injunctive relief. See Perdomo v. 20 Noem, 148 F.4th 656, 673 (9th Cir. 2025) (“To have standing to seek an injunction against future 21 unlawful conduct, a plaintiff must show a ‘sufficient likelihood’ that they will suffer a similar 22 injury in the future.”). 23 b. Ninth Cause of Action: Interference with Civil Rights in Violation of § 24 1985 25 Section 1985 prohibits a conspiracy to interfere with a person’s civil rights. It provides, 26 for example, for a cause of action where “two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . 27 . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the 1 1985(3). In his complaint, Mr. Wexler alleges that the individual defendants violated § 1985 by 2 violently acting “to prevent him from exercising his right to receive equitable and 3 nondiscriminatory healthcare and to retaliate against [him] for having attempted to exercise such a 4 right, and for being a Jew.” Compl. at 16 (¶ 18). As reflected by this allegation, the crux of the § 5 1985 claim is (similar to above) discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion. 6 Accordingly, for much of the same reasons that the § 2000a claim fails, the § 1985 claim fails. 7 Moreover, the § 1985 claim is deficient because Mr. Wexler has alleged, in only 8 conclusory terms, that the individual defendants conspired against him. See Strickland v. United 9 States, 32 F.4th 311, 362 (4th Cir. 2022) (“‘reject[ing] section 1985 claims whenever the 10 purported conspiracy is alleged in a merely conclusory manner, in the absence of concrete 11 supporting facts’”); King v. San Francisco Cmty. College Dist., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128531, at 12 *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2011) (dismissing § 1985 claim because plaintiff offered “only conclusory 13 allegations that various groups of the individual defendants ‘conspired to suppress rights’”). 14 There are no specific allegations that give rise to a plausible claim of conspiracy. 15 c. Tenth Cause of Action: Retaliation in Violation of First Amendment 16 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may assert a cause of action for retaliation in violation 17 of the First Amendment. The elements of such a claim are as follows: (1) the plaintiff engaged in 18 constitutionally protected activity; (2) he was subjected to adverse action by the defendant that 19 would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity; and 20 (3) there was a substantial causal relationship between the constitutionally protected activity and 21 the adverse action. See Boquist v. Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 775 (9th Cir. 2022); see also Ariz. 22 Students' Ass'n v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir. 2016). 23 In his complaint, Mr. Wexler indicates that the protected activity in which he engaged was 24 “expressing concerns about discriminatory treatment based on his Jewish identity and advocating 25 for his right to equitable healthcare.” Compl. at 19 (¶ 32). The adverse action, as alleged, was one 26 or more of the individual defendants making “discriminatory and intimidating remarks . . . such as 27 ‘white people don’t have anxiety’” and subjecting him to painful and unnecessary procedures. See 1 that the individual defendants engaged in the adverse action because of his protected activity. 2 Indeed, based on the allegations in the complaint, it appears that Mr. Wexler complained about the 3 alleged discriminatory treatment after the discriminatory remarks were made, or that he 4 complained about the inequitable treatment after it was provided. To state a retaliation claim, 5 logically the protected activity must precede that alleged retaliation. 6 3. Leave to Amend 7 For the foregoing reasons, all of the federal causes of action pled by Mr. Wexler are 8 dismissed. The only issue remaining is whether Mr. Wexler should be allowed to amend the 9 federal claims. The Court shall not permit amendment because it would be futile. See Bonin v. 10 Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the 11 denial of a motion for leave to amend.”); see also Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood of L.A., 759 12 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014). 13 In his opposition, Mr. Wexler had an opportunity to address why his claims are not futile, 14 and he failed to demonstrate such. Mr. Wexler also could have demonstrated that his claims are 15 not futile in his proposed first amended complaint (“FAC”), but again he failed to establish such. 16 As noted above, his claims are fundamentally flawed because it is sheer speculation that the 17 individual defendants intentionally subjected Mr. Wexler to painful and unnecessary procedures 18 because of his race, ethnicity, or religion. Without some specific evidence supporting the claims, 19 they are implausible. 20 B. Motion to Amend 21 For the reasons stated above, the Court is not giving Mr. Wexler leave to amend the three 22 federal claims discussed above. However, it recognizes that Mr. Wexler has also filed a motion 23 for leave to amend in which he seeks to add new defendants to the case (Mona Bajestan and an 24 unidentified x-ray technician) and to add new federal and state law claims.5 In addition, he seeks 25 to add new factual allegations to substantiate his claims, both those already asserted and those he 26 seeks to add. 27 1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs amendments to pleadings. It provides that 2 “leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In 3 deciding whether to give leave to amend, a court considers the following factors: "(1) bad faith; 4 (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) whether 5 the plaintiff has previously amended its complaint." Western Shoshone Nat'l Council v. Molini, 6 951 F.2d 200, 204 (9th Cir. 1991). As noted above, “[f]utility of amendment can, by itself, justify 7 the denial of a motion for leave to amend.” Bonin, 59 F.3d at 845. 8 The Court has reviewed the proposed first amended complaint (“FAC”) – focusing in 9 particular on the proposed new federal claims which are violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 10 (interference with the making/enforcement of contract), violation of § 1983 (torture under 11 international treaties and/or the Constitution), and violation of the Affordable Care Act 12 (discrimination). The proposed new federal claims are largely dependent on theories of 13 discrimination and conspiracy already alleged. In his proposed FAC, Mr. Wexler still fails to 14 plausibly plead either discrimination or conspiracy. He cites no specific evidence pushing his 15 claims into the zone of plausibility. 16 The Court acknowledges that, arguably, the new proposed § 1983 claim (for torture in 17 violation of international treaties and the U.S. Constitution) is not necessarily predicated on 18 discrimination. However, that claim also lacks merit for independent reasons. 19 For instance, Mr. Wexler’s suggestion that there was a plan to torture is speculative and 20 borders on the fanciful. See, e.g., Prop. FAC at 5 (¶¶ 35-38) (alleging that Dr. Komarisetty told 21 Mr. Wexler that her husband works at Tesla but that, “[b]ased on the timing and context,” he 22 actually works at Neuralink, a biotechnology company that was founded by Elon Musk and that 23 “has conducted controversial and invasive experiments on animals and humans, some of which 24 have occurred by University of California facilities”; Dr. Komarisetty “exploited this connection 25 to create an atmosphere of power and fear”); Prop. FAC at 7 (¶ 43) (alleging that Dr. Komarisetty 26 did not need to take his blood pressure but did so “to determine whether Plaintiff could physically 27 withstand the calculated torture from the deliberate puncturing of Plaintiff’s cranial nerves in his ] that followed”). 2 In addition, not all international treaties can serve as the basis for a § 1983 action, and Mr. 3 Wexler has failed to show that the one he mentions (the Rome Statute) is such a treaty. See Curtis 4 || v. Inslee, 154 F 4th 678, 688 (9th Cir. 2025) (noting that only treaties that are “either self- 5 executing or legislatively implemented . . . can confer enforceable rights under Section 1983”). 6 || To the extent Mr. Wexler has referred to the U.S. Constitution, he has not identified any specific 7 || provision as the basis for his claim, and the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual 8 || punishment, sets a high bar. Cf Coston v. Nangalama, 13 F 4th 729, 732 n.1 (9th Cir. 2021) 9 || (noting that, in the prison context, a “prisoner suffers cruel and unusual punishment when prison 10 || officials act with deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s serious medical needs”). Again, any 11 claim of wrongful conduct by the defendants sufficient to give rise to such a constitutional 12 || violation lacks a concrete factual basis and is instead fanciful and speculative. 13 Til. CONCLUSION 14 For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the individual defendants’ motion to dismiss 3 || the three federal claims pled in his original complaint and also denies the motion to amend to the a 16 || extent Mr. Wexler seeks to add new federal claims. The Court does not adjudicate any of the state 2 17 || law claims, whether those pled in the original or proposed FAC, because it declines to exercise Z 18 supplemental jurisdiction. If Mr. Wexler wishes to pursue his state law claims, he has the option 19 || of filing a new suit in state court. 20 The Court instructs the Clerk of the Court to enter a final judgment in accordance with the 21 above and close the file in the case. 22 This order disposes of Dockets Nos. 29 and 37. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 25 || Dated: February 11, 2026 26 27 EDWA EN 28 United States District Judge