Marshall v. Suntrust Bank, Savannah N.A. (In Re Marshall)
This text of 204 B.R. 838 (Marshall v. Suntrust Bank, Savannah N.A. (In Re Marshall)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
ORDER
Murray S. Marshall (“Debtor”) filed this motion to avoid the judgment lien of Sun-trust Bank, Savannah, N.A. fik/a Trust Company of Georgia Bank of Savannah, N.A (“Suntrust”) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) 1 , a core matter within the Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) & (2)(A)(K) & (0) and 28 U.S.C. § 1334.
Suntrust holds a pre-bankruptcy filing judgment hen against the Debtor’s property. The Debtor moved to avoid Suntrust’s hen against his current property as well as any property he may acquire post-petition. The parties have stipulated that Suntrust’s hen against the Debtor’s assets as of his filing this case under Chapter 7 is avoided pursuant to § 522(f). However, Suntrust contends that § 522(f) does not affect its hen which will attach to any property the Debtor acquires after his bankruptcy filing. Suntrust argues that the Debtor’s discharge affects only the Debtor’s personal liability, and that after the discharge is granted and the § 362(a) stay lifted, Suntrust may collect its claim via in rem actions against the Debtor’s post bankruptcy filing acquired property. Although the provisions of § 522(f) do not include post bankruptcy filing acquired property, the prefiling judicial lien does not survive a debtor’s bankruptcy filing and discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) and the discharge injunction of § 524.
In support of its argument, Sun-trust cites 11 U.S.C. § 524 contending that the effect of the Debtor’s discharge relieves his personal liability without affecting Sun-trust’s lien rights in his after-acquired property. 2 A discharge relieves a debtor of all debts (with certain exceptions not applicable to this case) that arose prior to the bankruptcy filing, without affecting a creditor’s lien rights against the debtor’s property. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) 3 ; Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 2154, *840 115 L.Ed.2d 66 (1991) (A discharge eliminates a debtor’s personal liability on a mortgage but does not eliminate the secured creditor’s lien rights against the underlying real estate.) However, Johnson dealt with a pre-bankruptcy lien, a mortgage, that had affixed to the prebankruptey property of the debtor. As of the filing of the instant Chapter 7 case and the approval of the § 522(f) motion to avoid the lien as to the prefiling assets, the lien no longer affixed to any property.
The affixing of a creditor’s lien against a debtor’s property is based upon the existence of a debt as the personal liability of the debtor. In order for Suntrust to enforce its lien after the discharge, the Debtor must first acquire property and Suntrust must then seek to enforce its unsatisfied debt against that property which is “an act to collect ... such [discharged] debt as a personal liability of the debtor ...” prohibited by the discharge injunction of § 524. In re Paeplow, 972 F.2d 730, 735 (7th Cir.1992) (Although a discharge will generally not affect a pre-petition lien, creditors may not create post-petition liens based upon discharged debts nor may they institute post-discharge in rem collection actions against after-acquired property if they hold no surviving lien after the discharge). The discharge issued pursuant to § 524 extinguishes that personal liability. Therefore, the lien, as it pertains to any after acquired property of the Debtor, does not survive the discharge, does not affix and cannot affect the after acquired property. Id.
Additionally, upon the filing of the Debtor’s bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 and the granting of the motion to avoid Suntrust’s judicial lien as it pertains to the prefiling assets of the Debtor, Suntrust no longer has an allowed secured claim in this case and its lien is therefore void pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). 4 “[T]he words ‘allowed secured’ claim in § 506(d) need not be read as an indivisible term of art defined by reference to § 506(a), which by its terms is not a definitional provision. Rather, the words should be read term by term to refer to any claim that is, first, allowed, and, second, secured.” Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 415, 112 S.Ct. 773, 777 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992). In Dewsnup, the Supreme Court found that a prepetition consensual lien securing a debt evidenced by an allowed claim passed through the debtor’s bankruptcy unaffected and remained with the real property to which it had affixed prepetition. The Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he voidness language [of § 506(d) ] sensibly applies only to the security aspect of the lien and then only to the real deficiency in the security.” Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417, 112 S.Ct. at 778. In this case, Suntrust has an allowed claim. However, by virtue of the Debtor’s motion to avoid Suntrust’s lien under § 522(f), there remains no prebankruptey property to which the lien attaches, and the claim is therefore unsecured. As the allowed claim of Suntrust is not a secured claim, the lien is void, the real deficiency in the security being the full amount of the debt.
This result is consistent with Congressional intent to cleanse a debtor’s property of certain pre-petition liens in an effort to promote the debtor’s fresh start. In legislating the formula by which the court should determine whether a lien is avoided as impairing a debtor’s exemptions, Congress clarified its intent to protect the debtor’s interest in the future appreciation of property which was subject to pre-petition liens exceeding the property’s value on the petition date. 140 Cong.Rec H10, 764 (daily ed. October 4, 1994); H.R.Rep. No. 103-835, 35-37 (1994); U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1994, p. 3340; 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2). Under § 522(f), a debtor may not only avoid a creditor’s lien impairing the debtor’s present equity in the *841 property, but he may also extinguish the lien to prevent it from attaching to future equity the debtor may accumulate. In re Thomsen, 181 B.R. 1013 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1995).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
204 B.R. 838, 37 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 898, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 110, 1997 WL 50541, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marshall-v-suntrust-bank-savannah-na-in-re-marshall-gasb-1997.