Marshall v. State of Nevada

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided July 5, 2022·No. 2:21-cv-00726·Unknown

Opinion

1 PatriciaLee (8287) ShelbyA.Dahl (13856) 2 HUTCHISON& STEFFEN,PLLC 10080W.AltaDr.,Suite 200 3 Las Vegas, NV89145 4 Telephone: (702)385-2500 Facsimile: (702)385-2086 5 sdahl@hutchlegal.com 6 Attorneys for Plaintiff 7 UNITEDSTATES DISTRICT COURT 8 DISTRICT OFNEVADA 9 10 RODNEYL.MARSHALL, CaseNo.: 2:21-cv-00726-JAD-BNW 11 Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONTO EXTEND 12 v. TIME TO SERVE DEFENDANT 13 STATEOFNEVADA, et al 14 Defendant. 15 16 RodneyMarshall (“Plaintiff”),byandthroughhis counsel ofrecord,Hutchison & 17 Steffen,LLC,moves this Court foranorderenlargingthetimetowhichtoservetheSummons 18 andComplaint onDefendant Dr.GregoryBryan (“Defendant”)(erroneouslysuedas “Dr. 19 GregoryBryant”). 20 Plaintiff’s complaint seeks damages andinjunctiverelief against theDefendant for 21 deliberateindifference,inviolationofPlaintiff’s EighthAmendment rights. Plaintiffwas unable 22 toaccess Defendant’s last knownaddress tocompleteservicebecausethis address was filed 23 24 underseal withthis Court. TheOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral of Nevada has onlyrecently 25 agreedto accept service onDefendant’s behalf. Accordingly,Plaintiffmoves this Court foran 26 ordertoextendthetimetoserveDefendant. 27 This motionis basedonthefollowingPoints andAuthorities, theDeclarationofShelby 1 POINTS ANDAUTHORITIES 2 Federal RuleofCivil Procedure4(m)requires aPlaintifftoserve acopyof theSummons 3 andComplaint within90days offilingtheComplaint. However,ifserviceis not effectuatedand 4 “theplaintiffshowsgood causeforthefailure,the court must extendtimeforservice foran 5 appropriateperiod.” Id.(emphasis added). The90-dayperiodforservice containedinRule 6 7 4(m)“operates not as an outerlimit subject toreduction,but as anirreducibleallowance.” 8 Hendersonv.UnitedStates, 517U.S.654,661(1996). Adistrict court has broaddiscretionto 9 extendtimeforserviceunderRule4(m). Efaw v. Williams,473F.3d1038,1041(9thCir.2007). 10 Adistrict court mayalso extendtimeforserviceretroactivelyaftertheperiodhas expired. 11 UnitedStates v.2,164Watches, Moreor Less,BearingaRegisteredTrademarkof Guess,Inc., 12 366F.3d767,772(9thCir.2004). Seealso Mann v.Am.Airlines,324F.3d1088,1090(9thCir. 13 2003)(holdingthat thedistrict court didnot abuse its discretioninextendingtimetoserve 14 15 process evenafterthedeadlinetoservehadpassed). 16 Todemonstrategoodcause,aplaintiffmaybe requiredtodemonstratea)whetherthe 17 partytobeservedpersonallyreceivedactual noticeofthelawsuit; b)thedefendant wouldnot 18 sufferprejudice; and c)plaintiffwouldbeseverelyprejudicedifhis complaint weredismissed. 19 Boudettev.Barnette,923 F.2d754,756(9thCir.1991). Aplaintiffneednot assert that the 20 statuteoflimitations hasexpiredorwill soon expireinordertoshowsevereprejudice. SeeTsai- 21 LuShenv.Lacour,No.2:19-cv-01564-JAD-VCF, 2020WL9439142,at *2(D.Nev.July16, 22 23 2020)(findinggoodcausetoextendtimetoserve because, whilethestatute oflimitations had 24 not yet expired,allowing theplaintiffadditional timewouldsavejudicial resources). 25 If a court does not find good cause, the court still may extend time for service upon a 26 showing of excusable neglect. Lemoge v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1198 (9th Cir. 2009). 27 See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (stating that Rule 1 4(m) “authorizes the court to relieve a plaintiff of the consequences” of a violation of the time 2 limit toserve“evenifthereis nogoodcauseshown.”). 3 Under Federal RuleofCivil Procedure6(b)(1)(B), courts mayextendtime “onmotion 4 madeafterthetimehas expirediftheparty failed toact becauseof excusableneglect.” 5 Excusableneglect is anequitablestandard,requiringcourts toconsiderthe totalityofa 6 7 circumstances surroundingaparty’s omission. Pioneer Inv.Servs. Co.v.BrunswickAssocs. Ltd. 8 P’ship,507U.S.380,395(1993). Thefactors courts usetoanalyze excusableneglect are “(1) 9 thedangerofprejudicetothenon-movingparty, (2)thelengthofdelayandits potential impact 10 onjudicial proceedings, (3)thereason forthedelay,includingwhetherit was withinthe 11 reasonablecontrol ofthe movant,and(4)whether themovingparty's conduct was ingoodfaith.” 12 Pincayv.Andrews,389 F.3d853,855(9thCir.2004)(citingPioneer Inv. Servs. Co.,507U.S.at 13 395). 14 15 Theinstant actionwas commencedonJune7,2021,andthe90-dayperiod forserviceof 16 theSummons andComplaint endedonNovember 15,2021. SeeECFNo.8; ECFNo.19at 17 2:11-12. At thetimePlaintifffiledhis pro seComplaint,hedidnot haveaccess toDefendant’s 18 last knownaddress. See Exhibit 1,Declarationof ShelbyA.Dahl. TheOfficeoftheNevada 19 AttorneyGeneral (“AttorneyGeneral”)didnot accept serviceonbehalfof Defendant upon 20 receipt ofPlaintiff’s Complaint. SeeECFNo.25. Instead,theAttorney General filedaNotice 21 statingthat Defendant’s address hadbeenfiledunderseal. SeeECF No.26. At that time, 22 23 Plaintiffwas not representedbycounsel,andneverreceived access toDefendant’s last known 24 address. SeeExhibit 1at ¶¶9–11. 25 In April of2022,attorneyShelbyA.Dahl (“Ms. Dahl”)beganrepresentingPlaintiffin 26 this matter. Id.at ¶3. However,becauseMs.Dahl hadnot yet begunrepresentingPlaintiffat the 27 timeoftheAttorneyGeneral’s filingofDefendant’s last knownaddress underseal,shenever 1 receivedaccess toDefendant’s address. Id.at ¶11. This furtherstalledserviceofPlaintiff’s 2 Summons andComplaints. Id. 3 OnMay17,2022,Ms.Dahl contactedopposingcounsel toinquireabout thestatus of 4 Defendant’s last knownaddress. Id.at ¶12; seeExhibit 2. OnMay19,2022,opposingcounsel 5 statedthat hehadnot yet receivedarequest for representationfrom Defendant andwouldreach 6 7 out toseeifDefendant wantedtorequest representation. Id.at ¶13. OnJune22,2022,opposing 8 counsel statedthat he couldaccept serviceonbehalfoftheDefendant. Id. at ¶14. Plaintiffneeds 9 anextensionofthestatutory90-daydeadlinetoaccommodateopposingcounsel’s efforts to 10 accept serviceonbehalf ofDefendant. 11 I. This Courtshould grantPlaintiff’s Motion toExtend TimetoServe. 12 This Court shouldgrant Plaintiff’s MotiontoExtendTimetoServe. Plaintiffhas 13 demonstratedgoodcause inhis inabilitytocompleteserviceuponDefendant withintheoriginal 14 15 90days. As apro seplaintiffincarceratedinfederal prison, Plaintifflacked theresources to 16 locateDefendant’s last knownaddress onhis own. SeeExhibit 1at ¶10. Plaintiff’s counsel, 17 onceattained,has was not abletoattainaccess toDefendant’s last knownaddress,as the 18 informationis filedunderseal. Id.at ¶11. However,Plaintiff’s counsel diligentlyattemptedto 19 completeservicebyothermeans, includingcollaboratingwithopposingcounsel toeither 20 completeserviceviaproxyorarrangeforthedisclosureofDefendant’s last knownaddress. Id. 21 at ¶¶12–14. 22 23 Plaintiff’s attempts also satisfythedefinitionofgoodcauseunderBoudette v.Barnette, 24 923F.2d754(9thCir.1991). First,theNoticeof UnderSeal SubmissionforDefendant’s 25 Address suggests that Defendant had actual notice ofthis lawsuit months ago. SeeECFNo.27. 26 Second,becausenoresponsivepleadings haveyet beenfiled,Defendant wouldnot beprejudiced 27 upontheCourt’s grantingofthis Motion. SeeHolmes v.AndreAgassi Coll.PrepAcad.,No. 1 2:12–cv–00273–KJD–VCF,2012WL2838604,at *3(D.Nev.July10.2012)(findingthat 2 defendants wouldnot be prejudiceduponan extensionoftimetoservebecausenoresponsive 3 pleadings havebeenfiled). Third,Plaintiffwouldexperiencesevereprejudiceshouldthis action 4 bedismissed. Plaintiffhas sufficientlypleadedthat hehas commencedthis actiontoreceive 5 treatment forthe cancer activelygrowinginsidehim. SeeECFNo.8 at 9. Shouldthis Court 6 7 requirePlaintifftorefile his claim against Defendant,Plaintiffwill losevaluabletimeinhis 8 effort toseekthemedical treatment hedesperatelyneeds. 9 Evenifthis didnot constitutegoodcause,it is withinthis Court’s authorityandinterest 10 toretroactivelyextendPlaintiff’s timetoserve.

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Marshall v. State of Nevada, (D. Nev. 2022).

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