Marshall v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Marshall v. State

522 So. 2d 100, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 747, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 1165, 1988 WL 23460

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMarch 22, 1988

DocketNo. 87-1786

StatusPublished

This text of 522 So. 2d 100 (Marshall v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Marshall v. State, 522 So. 2d 100, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 747, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 1165, 1988 WL 23460 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The defendant appeals his conviction of involuntary sexual battery committed upon a minor female. His claims here focus upon the admission at trial of inculpatory statements made by him to detectives after having received his Miranda rights and, in particular, to such a statement made to one of the examining psychiatrists appointed by the court to evaluate his competence to stand trial. Contrary to appellant’s claims of incompetence, his behavior appeared normal when the inculpatory statements were made, and we can find no evidence to support the claim of any police coercion or overreaching so as to render those statements other than the product of his rational, free will. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). Unlike the situation in Rickard v. State, 508 So.2d 736 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), relied upon by the appellant, the defendant’s emotional condition in the present case at the time the inculpatory statements were made was fully explored and assessed by the trial judge prior to his determination of the defendant’s competency to stand trial and the eventual admission of those statements at trial.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

The defendant appeals his conviction of involuntary sexual battery committed upon a minor female. His claims here focus upon the admission at trial of inculpatory statements made by him to detectives after having received his Miranda rights and, in particular, to such a statement made to one of the examining psychiatrists appointed by the court to evaluate his competence to stand trial. Contrary to appellant’s claims of incompetence, his behavior appeared normal when the inculpatory statements were made, and we can find no evidence to support the claim of any police coercion or overreaching so as to render those statements other than the product of his rational, free will. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). Unlike the situation in Rickard v. State, 508 So.2d 736 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), relied upon by the appellant, the defendant’s emotional condition in the present case at the time the inculpatory statements were made was fully explored and assessed by the trial judge prior to his determination of the defendant’s competency to stand trial and the eventual admission of those statements at trial.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

522 So. 2d 100, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 747, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 1165, 1988 WL 23460, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marshall-v-state-fladistctapp-1988.

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