Marshall v. Russell

93 Tenn. 261
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 31, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 93 Tenn. 261 (Marshall v. Russell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marshall v. Russell, 93 Tenn. 261 (Tenn. 1893).

Opinion

McAlister, J.

This is an appeal from the Chancery Court ' of Greene County, and the contest presented in the record is in respect to the ownership of a-certain note. The’note in controversy was executed by one T. D. Russell to Patrick Marshall, for the sum of ’$1,040, for a loan of money, and was secured by a deed, of trust on land. The title to this note is claimed by the defendant, Horace Brumley, and by A. N. Shown, the administrator of Patrick Marshall, and also by Bridget Marshall, the widow of the 'intestate. The original bill was filed by Bridget Marshall against A. N. Shown, administrator, T. D. Russell, and Horace Brumley, in which she alleged that her husband, the said Patrick Marshall, departed this life on July 22, 1890, and that A. N. Shown is his administrator; that on July 5, 1890,'the said Patrick Marshall gave to complainant said note, and delivered the same, with others, to said Shown, for collection for her benefit, or renewal in her name, as he sh.ould deem best, and that said note is her property. Complainant further alleges that, after said gift was complete, the said Shown, to whom the note had been delivered for complainant, allowed said Patrick Marshall, at his request, to have possession of said note for a short time; that, while in said Patrick’s possession, said note was lost or mislaid, or in some other manner passed out of his possession, and was not found until after his death, when it was discovered in the possession of defendant, Horace Brumley. - The [263]*263bill further alleges that the said Brumley now claims the note as his own, and denies complainant’s right thereto. A. 1ST.' Shown, the administrator, answered the bill, admitting that the said Patrick Marshall, on July 5, 1890, delivered said note, with other notes, to respondent, for collection or renewal, but averred that, soon thereafter, he reclaimed the note in controversy, and the same was returned to him before renewal or the- collection of any part thereof. Defendant avers that, if it was the intention of said Patrick Marshall to make a gift of this note to complainant, that said gift was not consummated, and the title to the same remained in said Patrick Marshall, aud has passed to defendant as ■ assets to be administered.

The administrator filed his answer as a cross-bill, in which he states that said note was then in the possession of Horace Brumley, who claimed the same as a gift from the intestate. He then charges that said Brumley was not related to' Patrick Marshall, nor was said Marshall under any obligation, legal or moral, to make him such a benefaction. Respondent further averred that the said Patrick,' at the time of the alleged gift to Brumley was old, feeble in body, impaired in intellect, and incapable of. making a valid gift of his property.

The administrator denied, in the first place, that any such gift had been made to Brumley, and, in the second place, if such a gift had been made, it was invalid for want of mental capacity on the [264]*264part of the intestate. The defendant, Horace Brumley, answered the bill and set up his title to the note. The answer states that on July 5, 1890, Patrick Marshall gave and delivered to Defendant Brumley the note in controversy on T. D. Bussell for $1,040. Defendant further states that said gift was made without solicitation on his part, and freely and voluntarily on the part of deceased. Defendant denies that the said" Patrick Marshall was of unsound mind at the time said gift was made, hut avers that his mind was clear, and that he fully understood and comprehended the transaction. The cause went to proof, and the Chancellor decreed that Horace Brumley had acquired a valid title to said note by gift from the said Patrick Marshall, and accordingly the original bill of Bridget Marshall, as well as the cross-hill of A. N. Shown, administrator, were both dismissed. From this decree the administrator and widow appealed, and have assigned errors. The first error assigned on behalf of the administrator is that at the time of the alleged gift Patrick Marshall did not have sufficient mental capacity to comprehend the transaction.

In the case of A. N. Shown, Administrator, v. Bridget Marshall, decided at the present term, the question was presented respecting the mental capacity of Patrick Marshall to make a gift of about $12,000 in notes to his wife, the said Bridget, and the Court held the gift to be valid. The notes involved in that suit were given to the wife on [265]*265the same day the note in controversy was presented to Horace Brumley, and the same proof upon which the Court adjudicated in favor of the mental capacity of the' intestate is embodied in this record. The additional point, however, is made on this branch of the case, that even if it be conceded that Patrick had sufficient mental capacity to make a valid gift to his wife, yet the gift in this case was made to a stranger, who was in nowise related to him, and who had no natural claim upon his bounty, and that a higher degree of mental capacity is required to sustain a gift in the latter than in the former case. If this distinction be conceded to be sound, we find, upon an examination of the record, ample evidence of mental capacity to sustain such a gift, even to a stranger.

It is insisted on behalf of Bridget Marshall that the decree of the Chancellor is erroneous, for the reason that the evidence shows that said note was given to aud received by her agent, A. 1ST. Shown, and left in his' possession for her, and that the gift was completed by actual delivery to said agent; that the gift was then irrevocable, and that Patrick Marshall had no right to withdraw the note from Shown and make another disposition of it.

The settled rule is that a parol gift of a chattel or chose in action, whether it be a gift inter vivos or causa mortis, does not pass the title to the donee without delivery and transfer of the posses[266]*266sion. The effect of a valid delivery is to place the subject of the gift under the control and dominion of the donee, and his title and right of possession by such gift and delivery become absolute and irrevocable. McEwen v. Troost, 1 Sneed, 185.

It is therefore essential to the validity of such a gift that the transaction be fully completed — that nothing essential remains to be done. If left incomplete, there exists a locus poiniientice, and what has been done may be revoked. An absolute gift, which will divest the donor’s title, requires a complete renunciation on his part, and acquisition on the part of the donee, of all the title to and interest in the subject of the gift.

It is, however, settled that the delivery need not be directly to the donee, but may be made to a third party for the donee. If the delivery to the third party is simply for the purpose of delivery to the donee, as agent or messenger of the donor, the gift is not completed until the subject of the gift is actually delivered to the donee.' In such a case, until the gift is so completed by delivery to the donee, the donor can revoke the agent’s authority, and resume possession of the article. When the delivery to the third person is to ■ him in the capacity of a trustee for the donee, and not as agent of the donor, such delivery completes the gift. To constitute such a case, the circumstances should show a full relinquishment of dominion over the property to the trustee for the [267]*267purposes of the trust, so that the trustee shall not be tbe agent of the donor, but shall act for the donee instead. Menchen v. Merrill, 2 Edw.

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Bluebook (online)
93 Tenn. 261, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marshall-v-russell-tenn-1893.