Marshall v. Delaware Ins.

16 F. Cas. 838, 2 Wash. C. C. 54

• Court: U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania
• Decided: April 15, 1807
• Status: Published

Opinion

"WASHINGTON, Circuit Justice.

The question is, whether if a right to abandon once exist, the subsequent release or safety of the property before the abandonment, but the fact unknown to the insured, will defeat that right, has never been directly decided, that we know of, but in the case of Hallet v. Payton. The reasoning of the case would seem to show, that the state of the loss at the time of the abandonment, ought to decide the right of the insured to make the loss a total one, and thus to throw the property upon the underwriters; and to demand from them the sum insured. The foundation of the right is the loss of the property, really or technically; and the transfer of what may be saved to the underwriter, is predicated upon the reality of the loss. But if the property be in safety, how can the underwriter, under the terms of his contract, be called upon for an indemnity; which was only promised in case of loss, and when no injury, or such as is merely partial, has been sustained? The information received by the insured may have been correct when it was given, but it cannot make the fact otherwise than it really is, at the time when the claim is made for a total loss. Although there is no case, but the one before mentioned, precisely in point, yet there are some which seem to throw considerable light upon the subject; and we think, enough may be gathered from what was said by Lord Mansfield, in Hamilton v. Mendez, to show his opinion respecting it In that case, the vessel, which had been captured and recaptured, was brought into Portsmouth before the offer to abandon. It is not stated, that at the time of the offer the arrival of the vessel was known to the insured, though the fact is strongly to be inferred. But it is clear, that if such was the fact it, does not enter into the reasoning of the judge, who, when he lays down the principles of the law, uses expressions and illustrations, which seem strongly to exclude that circumstance from the consideration which he took of the subject. His lordship observes; that this action, which is brought for an indemnity, must be founded on the nature of the damnification, as it really is at the time of the action brought, or, at most, at tile time of the offer to abandon. He considers it absurd to recover as for a total loss, when the final event proves that there was no loss at all, or only a partial one. He seems to fix the time of bringing the action, as that at which the rights of the parties are to be decided; and then lays it down, that if the cause of action does not subsist at the time, its having existed at any previous time will not avail. In no part of this opinion does he appear to consider the right of the insured to go for a total loss, to depend upon the circumstance of information he had received of the situation of the property at the time of. the offer to abandon, or at that of the action brought; and the cases which he cites as analogous to, and illustrative of the doctrine he is endeavouring to establish, afford strong ground for believing that he altogether relied upon the loss continuing to the time of abandonment and bringing the action; (and so he also expresses himself in another part of the same case;) and not upon the information to the insured of the safety of the property. For certainly it cannot be contended, that in answer to a plea of the tenant, in an action of waste, that he had repaired before the action brought; or to that of the principal to an action of the surety for an indemnity, that he had paid the debt; the plaintiff could reply, that at the time of bringing the action, he had not notice of the fact set out in the plea. And I think it is impossible to produce a case upon any other subject, where the rights of the parties could be made to depend upon any thing, but the real facts at the time when these rights accrued. Why should there exist an exception in cases of insurance? That Parker has deduced the same conclusion which this court does from the expressions of Lord Mansfield, in this and other cases, is very obvious. He says, that “the loss must continue total at the time when the offer to abandon is made, or the action brought.” Parker. 145. The case of Hallet v. Payton, in the highest court of judicature in the state of New-York, which appears to have been very fully argued and considered by the court, is in point. The expressions used .by the supreme court of the United States, and the supreme court of this state, in the cases cited, are very strong, though like those of Lord Mansfield, in Hamilton v. Mendez, they are obiter dicta. Upon the whole, then, relying upon these authorities, and the reasons which support them; and considering that they stand unopposed by any case whatever; we feel ourselves warranted in deciding this point in favour of the defendants.

[The case was taken on a writ of error to the supreme court, where the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, with costs. 4 Cranch (8 U. S.) 202.]

The next question is, whether at the time when the offer to abandon was made, the vessel was, in point of fact, in possession of the insured? I say, in his possession, because these are the terms which the counsel, in argument, appeared to consider as proper. But we wish it to be considered, that this court does not mean to decide that actual possession was not necessary after the decree and warrant of restitution delivered to the officer. It may, perhaps, become a question, whether if the property be in safety, by the acquittal and warrant to execute it, this circumstance may not 'be sufficient to defeat the right of abandonment. In the cases of capture and recapture, the possession of the property remains with the recaptors till salvage is paid; and in the case of Hamilton v. Mendez, the possession of the recaptors continued after the offer to abandon.

As to the fact; we think it very immaterial, whether the possession was delivered before or after the examination made of the state of the cargo, for it is obvious to any person who looks at the proces verbal, that it must have taken more than double the time to write this warrant, than was consumed in obtaining a knowledge of the facts which it records; consequently, if it began at nine in the morning, and the proces verbal was concluded at one in the afternoon, the facts of which it is a history, must have taken place and been completed long before meridian.

But we do not mean to decide so important a point, upon evidence which may be founded in conjecture. For we hesitate not to declare, that if for want of clear proof, the act of abandonment and restitution must be considered as contemporaneous, the decision ought to be in favour of the defendants, for two reasons — first; that the inclination of judges is not to extend the right of abandonment, for the purpose of converting a partial into a total loss, beyond the point to which former decisions have gone, because such a right is not warranted by the contract of the parties: and secondly, because the insured ought not only to prove the loss, but the continuance of it to the time of abandon-' ment; and if the evidence is not sufficient for these purposes, he must fail. Upon the whole, we are of opinion that the plaintiff is only entitled to recover for a partial loss.