Marshall v. City of Providence

Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Marshall v. City of Providence

633 A.2d 1360, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 209, 1993 WL 441217

CourtSupreme Court of Rhode Island

DecidedOctober 18, 1993

Docket92-666-Appeal

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 633 A.2d 1360 (Marshall v. City of Providence) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Marshall v. City of Providence, 633 A.2d 1360, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 209, 1993 WL 441217 (R.I. 1993).

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Opinion

ORDER

This matter was before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order issued to the plaintiff to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. In this case plaintiffs have appealed from an order in the Superior Court granting defendant City of Providence’s motion for summary judgment. In doing so the Superior Court ruled that plaintiffs notice to the city of injuries suffered because of a defect in the sidewalk was insufficient under G.L.1956 (1991 Reenactment) § 45-15-9 as a matter of law.

After reviewing the memoranda submitted by the parties and after hearing their counsel *1361 in oral argument, the court is of the opinion that cause has not been shown.

Section 45-15-9(a) provides that “a person injured shall within sixty days give to the municipality notice of the time, place and cause of the injury * * In Maloney v. Cooke, 21 R.I. 471, 44 A. 692 (1899) plaintiff had notified the city that she had fallen “while walking on the southerly side of Church Street.” This court ruled that notice was insufficient or too vague and general to meet the statute’s purpose of adequately informing the city council of the defect causing the injury.

We have ruled that the notice requirement is a condition precedent to the plaintiffs right of action. Hareld v. Napolitano, 615 A.2d 1015, 1016 (R.I.1992) (citing Barroso v. Pepin, 106 R.I. 502, 506, 261 A.2d 277, 279 (1970)). It may not be waived. Batchelder v. White, 28 R.I. 466, 68 A. 320 (1907).

Our interpretation is a strict one because for many years this court has construed that to be the intent of the Legislature in enacting this statute. Any change, therefore, should come from the Legislature.

In view of the above, plaintiffs’ arguments in support of an estoppel theory are unavailing.

For these reasons the plaintiffs’ appeal is denied and dismissed, the judgment appealed from is affirmed and the papers of the ease are remanded to the Superior Court.

FAY, C.J., did not participate.

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ORDER

This matter was before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order issued to the plaintiff to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. In this case plaintiffs have appealed from an order in the Superior Court granting defendant City of Providence’s motion for summary judgment. In doing so the Superior Court ruled that plaintiffs notice to the city of injuries suffered because of a defect in the sidewalk was insufficient under G.L.1956 (1991 Reenactment) § 45-15-9 as a matter of law.

After reviewing the memoranda submitted by the parties and after hearing their counsel *1361 in oral argument, the court is of the opinion that cause has not been shown.

Section 45-15-9(a) provides that “a person injured shall within sixty days give to the municipality notice of the time, place and cause of the injury * * In Maloney v. Cooke, 21 R.I. 471, 44 A. 692 (1899) plaintiff had notified the city that she had fallen “while walking on the southerly side of Church Street.” This court ruled that notice was insufficient or too vague and general to meet the statute’s purpose of adequately informing the city council of the defect causing the injury.

We have ruled that the notice requirement is a condition precedent to the plaintiffs right of action. Hareld v. Napolitano, 615 A.2d 1015, 1016 (R.I.1992) (citing Barroso v. Pepin, 106 R.I. 502, 506, 261 A.2d 277, 279 (1970)). It may not be waived. Batchelder v. White, 28 R.I. 466, 68 A. 320 (1907).

Our interpretation is a strict one because for many years this court has construed that to be the intent of the Legislature in enacting this statute. Any change, therefore, should come from the Legislature.

In view of the above, plaintiffs’ arguments in support of an estoppel theory are unavailing.

For these reasons the plaintiffs’ appeal is denied and dismissed, the judgment appealed from is affirmed and the papers of the ease are remanded to the Superior Court.

FAY, C.J., did not participate.

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Bluebook (online)

633 A.2d 1360, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 209, 1993 WL 441217, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marshall-v-city-of-providence-ri-1993.

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