Marshall v. Citibank

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Mexico
DecidedJanuary 27, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-00063
StatusUnknown

This text of Marshall v. Citibank (Marshall v. Citibank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Mexico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marshall v. Citibank, (D.N.M. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO ROBERT A. MARSHALL, Plaintiff, v. No. 1:25-cv-00063-SCY

CITIBANK, Defendant. ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE THIS MATTER comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff’s Civil Rights Complaint Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Doc. 1, filed January 22, 2025 (“Complaint”), and Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs, Doc. 2, filed January 22, 2025. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis The statute for proceedings in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), provides that the Court may authorize the commencement of any suit without prepayment of fees by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets the person possesses and that the person is unable to pay such fees. When a district court receives an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, it should examine the papers and determine if the requirements of [28 U.S.C.] § 1915(a) are satisfied. If they are, leave should be granted. Thereafter, if the court finds that the allegations of poverty are untrue or that the action is frivolous or malicious, it may dismiss the case[.]

Menefee v. Werholtz, 368 F. App’x 879, 884 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Ragan v. Cox, 305 F.2d 58, 60 (10th Cir. 1962)). “The statute [allowing a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis] was intended for the benefit of those too poor to pay or give security for costs . . . .” Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 344 (1948). While a litigant need not be “absolutely destitute,” “an affidavit is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for the costs and still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life.” Id. at 339. The Court grants Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying

Fees or Costs. Plaintiff signed an affidavit stating he is unable to pay the costs of these proceedings and stated: (i) his average monthly income amount during the past 12 months is $1,500.00; and (ii) his monthly expenses total $1,831.00. The Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to pay the costs of this proceeding because Plaintiff signed an affidavit stating he is unable to pay the costs of these proceedings and because his monthly expenses exceed his monthly income. Order to Show Cause Plaintiff alleges he discovered fraudulent activity on his account involving a credit card and notified TransUnion and Defendant Citibank. See Complaint at 1. Plaintiff further alleges TransUnion and Citibank both failed to conduct investigations and did not provide

documentation to validate the debt. Id. at 2-3. He asserts Citibank falsely reported the alleged debt to the credit bureaus. Id. The Complaint brings three causes of action, all of which fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. First, Plaintiff asserts a claim pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g and 1692e of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). Section 1692g imposes certain requirements on debt collectors if a consumer notifies the debt collector that the debt is disputed. Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false or misleading representations in connection with the collection of any debt. Plaintiff has not shown that Citibank is a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA. In order to be subject to liability under the FDCPA, the person attempting to collect a debt must be a “debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The FDCPA excludes entities attempting to collect debts owing to them from the definition of debt collector as long as the collector does not use a name that might lead a debtor to believe a third party had become involved in the collection effort. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

Daros v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 19 F. App’x 26, 27 (2d Cir. 2001); 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (“The term ‘debt collector’ means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. . . . The term does not include [] any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, collect[s] debts for such creditor.”). There are no allegations that Citibank took any actions that could be construed as an attempt to collect a debt from Plaintiff. Second, Plaintiff asserts a claim pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6050P, Returns relating to the cancellation of indebtedness of certain entities, of the Internal Revenue Code. See Complaint at 3. This statute governs the reporting of certain transactions to the IRS. The Complaint does not explain how Section 6050P is applicable to this case. See Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, at Arapahoe County Justice Center, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]o state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to him or her; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed him or her; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.”). Third, Plaintiff asserts a claim for “Collection of extension of credit (18 USC 894)” and “Securities Fraud (15 USC 78ff).” Complaint at 3-4. Sections 894 and 78ff are criminal statutes. 18 U.S.C. § 894 (prohibiting collection of extensions of credit by extortionate means); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (setting forth penalties for violations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). The complaint therefore fails to state a claim under these statutes. “[C]riminal statutes do not provide for private civil causes of action.” Kelly v. Rockefeller, 69 F. App’x 414, 415-16 (10th Cir. 2003); see Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986) (“a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another”). Thus, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause why the Court should not dismiss his

lawsuit. If Plaintiff asserts the Court should not dismiss his lawsuit, Plaintiff must file an amended complaint. Lastly, although the Complaint references grievances against TransUnion, it does not assert a claim against TransUnion. See Complaint at 1-2. If Plaintiff is asserting a claim against TransUnion, the amended complaint must clearly indicate so, cite the legal and factual basis for the claim, and name TransUnion in the caption.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Adkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.
335 U.S. 331 (Supreme Court, 1948)
Diamond v. Charles
476 U.S. 54 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Kelly v. Rockefeller
69 F. App'x 414 (Tenth Circuit, 2003)
Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents
492 F.3d 1158 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Yang v. Archuleta
525 F.3d 925 (Tenth Circuit, 2008)
Menefee v. Werholtz
368 F. App'x 879 (Tenth Circuit, 2010)
Daros v. Chase Manhattan Bank
19 F. App'x 26 (Second Circuit, 2001)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Marshall v. Citibank, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marshall-v-citibank-nmd-2025.