Marshall S. Vaughan v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Marshall S. Vaughan v. State

219 So. 3d 116, 2017 WL 1534816, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 5951

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedApril 28, 2017

DocketCase 5D16-4443

StatusPublished

This text of 219 So. 3d 116 (Marshall S. Vaughan v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Marshall S. Vaughan v. State, 219 So. 3d 116, 2017 WL 1534816, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 5951 (Fla. Ct. App. 2017).

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Opinion

WALLIS, J.

Marshall S. Vaughn appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his Second Motion to Vacate and Set Aside a Sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, in which he asserted three claims for relief. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Vaughn’s second and third claims without further discussion. In his first claim, Vaughn argued he involuntarily entered his plea because he was not informed about his possible maximum sentence as a habitual felony offender. “[P]ri- or to acceptance of the plea: 1) the defendant must be given written notice of intent to habitualize, and 2) the court must confirm that the defendant is personally aware of the possibility and reasonable consequences.” Baker v. State, 12 So.3d 281, 282 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (quoting Ashley v. State, 614 So.2d 486, 490 (Fla. 1993)). We find that the attached records do not conclusively refute Vaughn’s claim. Accordingly, we reverse the summary denial of the first claim and remand for the *117 trial court to either attach records or hold an evidentiary hearing to conclusively establish that the trial court advised Vaughn of the consequences of his habitualization.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED with Instructions.

PALMER and BERGER, JJ., concur.

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WALLIS, J.

Marshall S. Vaughn appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his Second Motion to Vacate and Set Aside a Sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, in which he asserted three claims for relief. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Vaughn’s second and third claims without further discussion. In his first claim, Vaughn argued he involuntarily entered his plea because he was not informed about his possible maximum sentence as a habitual felony offender. “[P]ri- or to acceptance of the plea: 1) the defendant must be given written notice of intent to habitualize, and 2) the court must confirm that the defendant is personally aware of the possibility and reasonable consequences.” Baker v. State, 12 So.3d 281, 282 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (quoting Ashley v. State, 614 So.2d 486, 490 (Fla. 1993)). We find that the attached records do not conclusively refute Vaughn’s claim. Accordingly, we reverse the summary denial of the first claim and remand for the *117 trial court to either attach records or hold an evidentiary hearing to conclusively establish that the trial court advised Vaughn of the consequences of his habitualization.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED with Instructions.

PALMER and BERGER, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

219 So. 3d 116, 2017 WL 1534816, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 5951, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marshall-s-vaughan-v-state-fladistctapp-2017.

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