Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Cady

Supreme Court of Minnesota

Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Cady

77 N.W. 831, 75 Minn. 241, 1899 Minn. LEXIS 456

CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota

DecidedJanuary 9, 1899

DocketNos. 11,445—(101)

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 77 N.W. 831 (Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Cady) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Cady, 77 N.W. 831, 75 Minn. 241, 1899 Minn. LEXIS 456 (Mich. 1899).

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Opinions

PER CURIAM.

Assuming, without deciding, that an order appointing a receiver in foreclosure during the pendency of the action can be reviewed on appeal from the final judgment or decree, we are of opinion that, while the plaintiff did not present a very strong case, yet we could not hold that the court abused its discretion in appointing a temporary receiver. The affidavits presented would have justified the court in finding that the mortgaged premises were inadequate security; that the mortgagor was insolvent; that for four years taxes were unpaid and delinquent, for three of which the premises had been sold, and were unredeemed, that portions of the building on the premises were somewhat out of repair, that repairs were necessary for the full preservation of the property, and that the mortgagor was receiving rent for part of the premises, which he was not applying to the payment of taxes or the making of repairs. There was some evidence that the mortgagor was using a part of the building as his sleeping apartments, and, hence, that the premises were his homestead.

While a court should ordinarily require a somewhat stronger showing for the appointment of a receiver of the mortgagor’s homestead than in the case of other property, yet, when a debtor mortgages his homestead, he subjects the property to all the ordinary legal and equitable rights of a'mortgagee, among which is the right to have a receiver appointed when necessary to prevent waste or to preserve the property. The same facts which would justify the court in appointing a receiver during the pendency of the action would justify it in providing in the final judgment that the receivership should be continued.

As there is neither a “case” nor bill of exceptions, the question whether the evidence justified the-findings is not presented. The findings are presumed to have been based upon the evidence introduced on the trial, and not upon the affidavits presented on the motion for the appointment of a receiver during the pendency of the action.

The judgment is silent as to the duration of the receivership. No point is made on this by the defendant; but we mention the fact in order that it may not be inferred that we impliedly hold that a [243]*243receivership could be continued after a foreclosure sale, or that the rents and profits of the property could be applied towards paying the mortgage debt, or used for any other purpose than to prevent waste and preserve the property. The judgment should be affirmed.

So ordered.

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PER CURIAM.

Assuming, without deciding, that an order appointing a receiver in foreclosure during the pendency of the action can be reviewed on appeal from the final judgment or decree, we are of opinion that, while the plaintiff did not present a very strong case, yet we could not hold that the court abused its discretion in appointing a temporary receiver. The affidavits presented would have justified the court in finding that the mortgaged premises were inadequate security; that the mortgagor was insolvent; that for four years taxes were unpaid and delinquent, for three of which the premises had been sold, and were unredeemed, that portions of the building on the premises were somewhat out of repair, that repairs were necessary for the full preservation of the property, and that the mortgagor was receiving rent for part of the premises, which he was not applying to the payment of taxes or the making of repairs. There was some evidence that the mortgagor was using a part of the building as his sleeping apartments, and, hence, that the premises were his homestead.

While a court should ordinarily require a somewhat stronger showing for the appointment of a receiver of the mortgagor’s homestead than in the case of other property, yet, when a debtor mortgages his homestead, he subjects the property to all the ordinary legal and equitable rights of a'mortgagee, among which is the right to have a receiver appointed when necessary to prevent waste or to preserve the property. The same facts which would justify the court in appointing a receiver during the pendency of the action would justify it in providing in the final judgment that the receivership should be continued.

As there is neither a “case” nor bill of exceptions, the question whether the evidence justified the-findings is not presented. The findings are presumed to have been based upon the evidence introduced on the trial, and not upon the affidavits presented on the motion for the appointment of a receiver during the pendency of the action.

The judgment is silent as to the duration of the receivership. No point is made on this by the defendant; but we mention the fact in order that it may not be inferred that we impliedly hold that a [243]*243receivership could be continued after a foreclosure sale, or that the rents and profits of the property could be applied towards paying the mortgage debt, or used for any other purpose than to prevent waste and preserve the property. The judgment should be affirmed.

So ordered.

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77 N.W. 831, 75 Minn. 241, 1899 Minn. LEXIS 456, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marshall-ilsley-bank-v-cady-minn-1899.

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