Marshall Foundry Co. v. . Killian

6 S.E. 680, 99 N.C. 501
Supreme Court of North Carolina·Decided February 5, 1888·Published·Cited by 29 cases

Opinion

Davis, J.,

(after stating the case).' This action was commenced before a Justice of the Peace, and the allegations of *504 fraud, or other grounds upon which the plaintiff Murrill was appointed receiver, do not distinctly appear, but it appears to have been done at the instance of a creditor, and we assume that it was done under the provision of § 668 of The Code, authorizing the appointment of receivers, for the causes there stated.

By the “ articles of agreement ” filed with the Clerk, under which, “letters declaring” the incorporation were issued, it is stated: “ The capital stock of the incorporation shall be $10,000, divided into 100 shares of $100 each,” but in fact, as appears from the subscription list, only 70 shares ($7,000) were subscribed, and in other respects the provisions of the statute seem not to have been complied with, in the formation of the corporation; but of this the defendant, who became the president of the comparfy upon its organization under the charter, can take no advantage, for the company was organized, and by participating in the organization, and acting as its president, all objection to the validity of its constitution or organization was waived, and, as to him, the provisions of the charter and by-laws of the company were binding. Cook on the Law of Stock and Stockholders, § 181 and § 233.

When a number of persons associate themselves together for the purpose of carrying on any business, a partnership is constituted, by which each member becomes liable to any person who may give it credit, and the creditor has a right to be paid, if any one of the firm is able to pay; but when a corporation is formed under the authority of the State, the capital subscribed becomes the basis of credit, and the members of the company are not individually liable for its debts, except, and only to the extent, that the charter or letters of incorporation may make them so.

It is said in Cook on the Law of Stock and Stockholders, § 199, “The capital, or capital stock of a corporation, is the aggregate of the par value of all the shares into which the *505 capital is divided upon the incorporation; it is the fund or resource with which the corporation is enabled to act, and transact its business, and upon the faith of which, persons give credit to the"corporation, and become corporate creditors. The public, in dealing with a corporation, has the right to assume that its actual capital, in money or money’s worth, is equal to the capital stock which it purports to have, unless it has been impaired by business losses. The public has a right also to assume that the capital stock has been or will be fully paid up if it be necessary, in order to meet corporate liabilities. Accordingly the American Courts go very far to protect corporate creditors; and in this country it is a well settled doctrine, that capital stock, and especially unpaid subscriptions to the capital stock, constitute a trust fund, for the benefit of the creditors of the corporation.” He then enumerates some of the methods by which stockholders seek to avoid their liability to corporate creditors, one of which is, “by a transfer of the stock,” another is, by “a cancellation or withdrawal from the contract,” and another, by “ a release from the obligation to pay the full par value of the stock.”

It is said, that, for the protection of corporate creditors, Courts will look with rigid scrutiny into every such transaction. “The reason why the capital stock of a corporation is deemed to embrace all the stock for which the members have subscribed, whether paid in or not, is, that since the members are not, in general, personally liable for the debts of the corporation, this fund is the stake held out to the public, upon the faith of which the company gains credit.” Thompson’s Liability of Stockholders, § 11, and the authorities cited in the note. So far as creditors are concerned, the capital stock is regarded as a trust fund, pledged for the payment of the debts of the corporation, and this is as true of the unpaid shares subscribed as of those paid up. Adler v. Milwaukee Brick Co., 13 Wis., 60.

*506 In Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall., at page 620, Mr. Justice Miller says: “ Though it be doctrine of modern date, we think it now well established, that the capital stock of a corporation, especially its unpaid subscriptions, is a trust fund, for the benefit of the general creditors of the corporation. And when we consider the rapid development of corporations as instrumentalities of the commercial and business world, in the last few years, with the corresponding necessity of adapting legal principles to the new and varying exigencies of this business, it is no solid objection to such a principle that it is modern, for the occasion for it could not sooner have' arisen.” It was there held, that creditors of a corporation had a right to examine into the action of the corporation and see how the subscriptions to the stock had been paid; and citing Burke v. Smith, 16 Wall., 390, and New Albany v. Burke, 11 Id., 96, he says: “The governing officers of a corporation cannot, by agreement, or other transaction, with the stockholders, release the latter from their obligation to pay, to the prejudice of creditors, except by fair and honest dealing, and for a valuable consideration.” Such conduct is characterized as a “fraud upon the public, who were expected to deal with them.”

Upon a review of the authorities, we take the overwhelming weight to be, that after stock is subscribed and the company is organized, each subscriber becomes liable for the amount of stock subscribed by him, and he can only discharge this liability by paying it in money or money’s worth,in the manner indicated by the subscription, and the charter or by-laws of the company; and neither the officers of the company nor the stockholders can release him from this liability without the consent of every stockholder. Each subscription, when made, becomes a conditional contract with every other person who may subscribe, that the amount subscribed shall, upon the formation of the company, be paid in accordance with the terms of subscription, and when *507 the requisite stock is subscribed, and the company is duly organized, it becomes the offer or basis of credit to the public, or to all who may deal with it, and .every subscriber participating in the organization, thereby makes his subscription absolute, and is bound to pay it, according to the terms-of the charter and by-laws of the company, and he can discharge his liability in no other way.

As between the corporators themselves, it may be that-certificates of stock, by the consent of all the members, may be issued as if paid'up, without any actual payment in full, or even in part; but however this may be, no device or arrangement among the corporators themselves, not made' known to the public, by which the stock subscribed, instead of being paid, as the safe foundation of the credit and confidence which the company invites the public to give it, can be permitted to avail against the claims of persons who may deal with," and trust, the company upon the faith of its capital stock and corporate liability.

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Marshall Foundry Co. v. . Killian, 6 S.E. 680, 99 N.C. 501 (N.C. 1888).

6 S.E. 680 (Marshall Foundry Co. v. . Killian) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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