Marsh v. Durham Life Insurance

154 S.E. 313, 199 N.C. 341, 1930 N.C. LEXIS 111
Supreme Court of North Carolina·Decided August 20, 1930·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

Per Curiam.

The knowledge of an insurance agent, who procures an application for insurance, that at the time the applicant is in ill health, is imputed to the company, and such knowledge will prevent the company from avoiding the contract on the ground of false warranty. Short v. Insurance Co., 194 N. C., 649, 140 S. E., 302; Insurance Co., v. *342 Grady, 185 N. C., 348, 111 S. E., 289. Therefore, evidence as to the knowledge of the agent writing the application, as to the physical condition of applicant was competent. The pertinent principle of law was thus declared in Follette v. Accident Asso., 107 N. C., 240, 12 S. E., 370: “Actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s defective hearing on the part of the agent was constructive notice of it to his principal, and, hence, the latter is deemed to have waived the objection that the deafness of the former was a bodily infirmity, notwithstanding the fact that it was provided in the policy that the agents of the company should have no power to waive its conditions.”

Hence the answer of the jury to the second issue entitles the plaintiff to recover.

No error.

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Marsh v. Durham Life Insurance, 154 S.E. 313, 199 N.C. 341, 1930 N.C. LEXIS 111 (N.C. 1930).

154 S.E. 313 (Marsh v. Durham Life Insurance) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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