Marsh v. Durham Life Insurance
This text of 154 S.E. 313 (Marsh v. Durham Life Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The knowledge of an insurance agent, who procures an application for insurance, that at the time the applicant is in ill health, is imputed to the company, and such knowledge will prevent the company from avoiding the contract on the ground of false warranty. Short v. Insurance Co., 194 N. C., 649, 140 S. E., 302; Insurance Co., v. *342 Grady, 185 N. C., 348, 111 S. E., 289. Therefore, evidence as to the knowledge of the agent writing the application, as to the physical condition of applicant was competent. The pertinent principle of law was thus declared in Follette v. Accident Asso., 107 N. C., 240, 12 S. E., 370: “Actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s defective hearing on the part of the agent was constructive notice of it to his principal, and, hence, the latter is deemed to have waived the objection that the deafness of the former was a bodily infirmity, notwithstanding the fact that it was provided in the policy that the agents of the company should have no power to waive its conditions.”
Hence the answer of the jury to the second issue entitles the plaintiff to recover.
No error.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
154 S.E. 313, 199 N.C. 341, 1930 N.C. LEXIS 111, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marsh-v-durham-life-insurance-nc-1930.