Marsh v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad

65 S.E. 911, 151 N.C. 160, 1909 N.C. LEXIS 223

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: October 20, 1909
• Status: Published

Opinion

Hoke, J.,

after stating the case: There is no error in the disposition made of this case in the court below. As applied to, domestic judgments, it is a principle universally recognized that when a court has jurisdiction ,of a cause and the parties, and on complaint filed, a judgment has been entered sustaining a general demurrer to the merits, such judgment, while it stands un-reversed. arid unassailed, is conclusive upon the parties and will bar any other or further action for the same cause. Willoughby v. Stevens, 132 N. C., 254; Johnston v. Pate, 90 N. C., 334; Alley v. Nott, 111 U. S., 472; Gould v. Railroad, 91 U. S., 526. And in Miller v. Leach, 95 N. C., 229, and in other decisions we have held — and this ruling, too, is in accordance with accepted doctrine — “that, by virtue of the Constitution of the United States, and acts of Congress in pursuance thereof, the judgments of other States are put upon the same footing as domestic judgments. -They are conclusive of all questions involved in them, excejit fraud in their procurement, and whether the parties were properly brought before the court.”

As far as appears, the judgment of the Florida court relied on by defendant stands unreversed; there is no suggestion either of fraud or lack of jurisdiction, and, under the authorities cited,, the plaintiff is barred of recovery on the cause of action set forth in his, complaint, if.it be conceded that a good cause of action is stated.

: It is contended .on the part of the appellants that the law favors trials on the merits, and “that a former judgment will not operate ‘as -a bar to a subsequent suit upon the same cause of action : unless the proceedings and judgment in the first case involved an investigation (or afforded full legal opportunity for an investigation) and determination of the merits of the suit. Or, as otherwise expressed, the judgment must be upon the merits in,.a competent action, the plaintiff having sued in his proper character and the pleadings having been correct.” This may be, taken ns a very correct statement of a general principle, but, on the; facts presented; its application is against appellant. The very question decided in the cases referred to is that a hearing on a general demurrer to the merits “affords this legal opportunity for investigation.” And a judgment sustaining such demurrer, while it stands unreversed and unquestioned, is as final and conclusive on the facts thereby admitted as if such facts had been considered by a jury and established by its verdict.

: Thus, in Johnston v. Pate, supra, it was'held: “That a judgment rendered upon a demurrer is as conclusive by way of estop-pel as a verdict finding the facts confessed would have been,” and Chief Justice Smith, delivering the opinion, said:

. “1. The rule is well settled that demurrer to the merits of a pomplaint or other pleading overruled and followed by a final judgment is decisive of all the material facts charged and of the rights dependent upon them.

“ ‘A judgment upon demurrer/ says Mr. Freeman, in his work on Judgments, sec. 267, hnay be a judgment upon the merits. If so, its effect is as-conclusive as though the facts set forth in the complaint were admitted by the parties or established by evidence submitted to the jury. No subsequent action can be maintained by the plaintiff if the judgment be against him on the same facts stated in the former complaint.’

¡ “ ‘A judgment rendered upon a demurrer/ in the language of the court, in Mispel v. Laparte, 74 Ill., 306, ffs equally conclusive (by way of estoppel) of the facts confessed by the demurrer as a verdict finding the same facts would have been,, since they are established, as well in the former case as in the other; and facts thus established .can never afterwards be contested between the same parties or those in privity with-them.'

: i “A general demurrer confesses all matters o.f fact well pleaded. Mansel Demr., 94; 24 Law Lib., 63; Big. Est., 33; Gould on Plead., pp. 43, 44; Wilson v. Perry, 24 Ind., 156.”

■ It is further urged that some material facts are stated in the complaint as filed in the suit in this State which did not appear in the Florida pleadings, but we do not think this position can be sustained. In the pleadings filed in the Circuit Court of Florida the plaintiff sets forth with great fullness of detail every phase a^id essential feature of the occurrence. The cause and the parties are the same. The Florida court had jurisdiction of both, and the ruling of his Honor below, holding the judgment of that court an estoppel in bar of plaintiff’s demand, must be ,. ;

Affirmed.