Marrs v. Mikel

2026 Ohio 935

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 19, 2026
• Docket: 115299
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Marrs v. Mikel, 2026-Ohio-935.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STEVEN D’WAYNE MARRS, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 115299 v. :

SABRINA E. MICKEL, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 19, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division Case No. DR-19-378637

Appearances:

Stafford Cruz Law Company and Nicole A. Cruz, for appellee.

Jay F. Crook Attorney at Law, LLC and Jay F. Crook, for appellant.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:

Defendant-appellant Sabrina E. Mickel (“Mickel”) appeals the trial

court’s denial of her Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment challenging a qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”). Upon review, we affirm the trial

court’s decision.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiff-appellee Steven D’Wayne Marrs (“Marrs”) filed a complaint

for divorce in September 2019. The divorce was finalized in November 2022, when

the trial court issued a final-divorce-decree judgment entry (“divorce entry”).

Mickel appealed the divorce entry, and we affirmed the trial court’s decision in

Marrs v. Mickel, 2023-Ohio-4528 (8th Dist.).

In August 2023, the trial court issued a judgment entry (“contempt

entry”) finding Mickel in contempt of court for her failure to comply with the divorce

entry as it pertained to the payment of spousal support to Marrs, Marrs’ interest in

Mickel’s business, and Marrs’ attorney fees; the listing and selling of the marital

residence; and the division of Mickel’s 401(K). After Mickel failed to comply with

the contempt entry, Marrs filed motions to impose a jail sentence and show cause.

In December 2024, the parties entered into an agreement to remedy

Mickel’s contempt. The agreement was memorialized in an agreed judgment entry

(“agreed entry”), which was executed by Mickel, Marrs, and their attorneys.

Relevant to this appeal, the parties agreed to the following conditions:

[Mickel] shall transfer to [Marrs] the sum of $258,581.62 (as and for the remaining balance due to him for the division of her retirement) from her 401K account. Said transfer shall be an additional [QDRO]. QDRO to be executed within seven days of this entry.

... As an alternative to the additional QDRO set forth above, [Mickel] shall pay the sum of $258,581.62 directly to [Marrs] at the rate of $5,000.00 per month commencing on December 15, 2024 and due by the 15th of each month until paid in full.

Mickel did not challenge or appeal the agreed entry. While the agreed entry

referenced Marrs’ motion to impose a jail sentence and noted that “the parties ha[d]

resolved their differences by agreement,” the trial court did not enter a ruling on the

motion. Nor did the trial court rule on Marrs’ motion to show cause.

A telephone conference was held on Marrs’ pending motions in

February 2025 and a trial was set for June 2025. In the interim, Mickel — who was

represented by counsel — began filing several pro se motions, including a motion to

strike the appearance of counsel and recognize her self-representation. Therein,

Mickel stated that she discharged counsel and elected to proceed as a pro se litigant.

Mickel’s counsel subsequently filed a motion to withdraw, which was granted the

day after the scheduled trial.

Amongst her many pro se filings, Mickel also filed a motion to

continue the trial. The trial court denied the motion, noting that the trial would

proceed as scheduled. However, Mickel did not appear. That same day, Marrs filed

a notice of submission of the additional QDRO prescribed by the agreed entry, and

the trial court adopted the QDRO.

In response, Mickel filed a motion for relief from judgment, which she

amended days later. In the amended motion for relief from judgment, Mickel

requested that the trial court vacate the QDRO resulting from the June 2025 hearing pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (3), and (5). Mickel argued that she “never received

timely notice that her continuance had been denied” and that the QDRO included “a

signature line falsely bearing [her] name, suggesting she consented or was present

when, in fact, she was not.” Mickel also questioned the legitimacy of the QDRO

based on the timing of its filing. Mickel attached the following exhibits to her

motion: a mailed envelope addressed to her from the trial court; an “affidavit of non-

attendance and forgery,” attesting that she did not (1) attend the hearing because

she believed it had been continued or (2) sign or authorize the signing of her name

on the QDRO; and the QDRO. Except for her purportedly forged signature, Mickel

did not otherwise challenge the QDRO’s contents.

Marrs opposed the Civ.R. 60(B) motions, countering that Mickel

failed to appear for the trial or justify her continued noncompliance with the trial

court’s orders. Marrs also argued that “what [Mickel] refers to as a signature” reads

“Submitted.”

The trial court subsequently denied Mickel’s motions for relief from

judgment, finding that Mickel failed to present any operative facts demonstrating

grounds for relief — including mistake or fraud.

Mickel subsequently filed a notice of appeal and an amended notice

of appeal from the judgment entry denying her Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Significantly,

Mickel did not appeal the QDRO. Mickel also filed multiple motions and notices,

some of which acknowledged that the QDRO “did not bear [Mickel’s] actual

signature” and instead included “only the word ‘Submitted’ on [her] signature line.” Nonetheless, Mickel maintained that the QDRO was “forged” and “fraudulent.”

After several pro se filings, counsel entered an appearance and filed an appellate

brief on Mickel’s behalf. Mickel, by and through counsel, raises a single assignment

of error for review.

Assignment of Error

The trial court erred in denying, without hearing, [Mickel’s] motion to vacate the [QDRO].

II. Law and Analysis

In her sole assignment of error, Mickel argues that she “possessed

numerous defenses to the adoption of the QDRO and her request for relief, at

minimum, should have been ruled upon only after a hearing where she was allowed

to present evidence.” Specifically, Mickel asserts that she is entitled to relief under

Civ.R. 60(B)(3) and (5). Mickel argues that the agreed entry ended litigation by

resolving all pending issues and motions and, therefore, the June 2025 trial should

never have taken place. Mickel also argues that the domestic relations court must

act equitably and “there is nothing equitable about binding a party to an agreement

they never made.” Mickel asserts that “there is no evidence of record” that she did

not make the monthly payments contemplated in the agreed entry as an alternative

to the QDRO. She further claims that “mysterious circumstances surround[ed] the

submission of [the QDRO] with a signature of unknown origin.” Finally, Mickel

argues that her counsel’s untimely withdrawal entitles her to relief. As an initial matter, we note that many of Mickel’s arguments were

not introduced at the trial-court level and, therefore, were not preserved for

appellate review. A party cannot raise new claims or arguments for the first time on

appeal and a failure to present an issue before the trial court results in a waiver of

that issue for appellate purposes. Garrett v. Cuyahoga Cty., 2022-Ohio-2770, ¶ 27

(8th Dist.), citing Lycan v. Cleveland, 2019-Ohio-3510, ¶ 32-33 (8th Dist.) (“It is

well-established that arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally

barred and a reviewing court will not consider issues that the appellant failed to raise

in the trial court.”) and Cleveland Town Ctr., L.L.C. v. Fin. Exchange Co. of Ohio,

Inc., 2017-Ohio-384, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). Therefore, we only consider the Civ.R. 60(B)

arguments raised on appeal related to Mickel’s purportedly forged signature and her

nonappearance at the June 2025 trial.

Next, we turn to our standard or review. “The trial court has

discretion both in deciding a motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B)

and in determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion.” Rodeno

v. Mezenski, 2022-Ohio-1176, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), citing Kostoglou v. Fortuna, 2019-

Ohio-5116, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). Therefore, a trial court’s ruling on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion

is reviewed for an abuse of discretion on appeal. Internatl. Total Servs. v. Estate of

Nichols, 2019-Ohio-4572, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.). “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ implies

that the court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Id., citing

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). Civ.R. 60(B) establishes the procedure for seeking relief from a

judgment or order and the parameters for granting such relief. The rule provides:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence, which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B);

(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;

(4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or

(5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.

Civ.R. 60(B).

“To prevail on a motion for relief from judgment, the movant must

demonstrate that (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief

is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R.

60(B)(1)-(5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time.” Bank of N.Y. v.

Elliot, 2012-Ohio-5285, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), citing GTE Automatic Elec. v. ARC

Industries, 47 Ohio St.2d 146 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus. The movant

must satisfy all three requirements to obtain relief. Id., citing State ex rel. Richard

v. Seidner, 76 Ohio St.3d 149, 151 (1996).

A party seeking relief from judgment is not automatically entitled to

an evidentiary hearing and bears the burden of proving entitlement to a hearing on the Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Rodeno at ¶ 36, citing PNC Bank, N.A. v. DePalma, 2012-

Ohio-2774, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), and Esplandiu v. Esplandiu, 2017-Ohio-5744, ¶ 13 (8th

Dist.). If a motion for relief from judgment contains allegations of operative facts

warranting relief under Civ.R. 60(B), the trial court should grant a hearing to take

evidence and verify those facts before ruling on the motion. Id. If the movant fails

to demonstrate any of the three Civ.R. 60(B) elements — a meritorious defense or

claim, entitlement to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(1)-(5), and timeliness — the trial

court need not hold an evidentiary hearing. Id. at ¶ 37, citing Esplandiu at ¶ 13,

citing Adomeit v. Baltimore, 39 Ohio App.2d 97, 103-105 (8th Dist. 1974) (“If the

material submitted by the movant in support of its motion contains no operative

facts or meager and limited facts and conclusions of law, it will not be an abuse of

discretion for the trial court to refuse to grant a hearing and overrule the motion.”).

Based on the record before us, we find that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by denying Mickel’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from

judgment without holding a hearing. The parties agreed to the terms outlined in the

agreed entry to resolve Mickel’s contempt. Those terms specifically provided that

Mickel must transfer a sum of money to Marrs from her 401(K) account through an

additional QDRO. That QDRO was to be executed within seven days of the agreed

entry. Alternatively, Mickel could opt to pay the sum in monthly installments

commencing in December 2024 and ending upon payment in full. The agreed entry

was executed by both parties and their attorneys. The record is silent as to whether Mickel executed the additional QDRO within seven days of the agreed entry or made

the alternative monthly payments.

A judgment entry to which the parties voluntarily consent — like the

agreed entry — is based upon the agreements reached by the parties and is

considered a contract between those parties as well as an order of the court. State

v. Powell, 2024-Ohio-4923, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.), citing State ex rel. DeWine v.

Washington Court House, 2014-Ohio-3557, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.), and State ex rel.

DeWine v. Miller, 2011-Ohio-2107, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.); Negron v. Santini, 2020-Ohio-

5458, ¶ 18 (12th Dist.). Parties are bound to comply with orders they agreed to, and

such orders are enforceable by courts. Powell at id., citing Infinite Sec. Solutions,

L.L.C. v. Karam Props. II, 2015-Ohio-1101, ¶ 27; Negron at id.

Therefore, Mickel has only one meritorious defense, claim, or reason

for relief from the QDRO based on the terms she voluntarily consented to in the

agreed entry: monthly payments were, in fact, made under the agreed entry’s

alternative condition or the judgment was otherwise satisfied. Mickel did not appear

at the June 2025 hearing to present evidence of payment or assert in her motion for

relief from judgment that she made monthly payments pursuant to terms of the

agreed entry to invalidate the QDRO. Nor did Mickel file a notice of submission of

the executed QDRO, a satisfaction of judgment, or claim that she was entitled to

relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(4).

While Mickel alleges that her signature was forged on the QDRO and

Marrs counters that the word “Submitted” appears on her signature line, we need not resolve this dispute. Regardless of whether Mickel’s name or “Submitted” is

written on the QDRO — either of which could be true based on the handwriting’s

illegibility — Mickel’s signature was not necessary; Mickel previously consented to

execution of the QDRO and does not claim its contents are contrary to the agreed

entry. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Stanley, 2004-Ohio-71, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.) (affirming the trial

court’s adoption of an amended QDRO where an agreed order was signed by the

attorneys for both parties but the amended QDRO was signed by one party’s

attorney and notated “Seen but not approved” on the signature line for the other

party’s attorney); Eichholz v. Eichholz, 2009-Ohio-1421 (9th Dist.) (affirming the

trial court’s adoption of a QDRO applying to a husband’s retirement account that

was drafted and submitted by his wife); Cuyahoga C.P., Domestic Relations Loc.R.

28(F) (providing that the trial court may assign the responsibility of preparing a

QDRO to either party at its discretion and counsel for the alternate payee may

prepare a QDRO if the participant is in default).

Consequently, Mickel has not established that she is entitled to Civ.R.

60(B) relief or an evidentiary hearing on her motion; the trial court merely adopted

the QDRO based on the express terms of the agreed entry. Mickel’s appeal — in

effect — bootstraps challenges to the agreed entry, where conditions resolving her

contempt were established, and the QDRO, one of the conditions established in the

agreed entry, after she failed to timely contest or appeal either. “It is well established

that a Civ.R. 60(B) motion cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal and that the

doctrine of res judicata applies to such a motion.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 16, citing Harris v. Anderson, 2006-Ohio-1934, ¶ 8-9.

Moreover, “‘[i]t is axiomatic that a party may not appeal a judgment to which it has

agreed to.’” Gibbs at ¶ 21 (2d Dist.), quoting Wells v. Spirit Fabricating Ltd., 1995

Ohio App. LEXIS 3905 (8th Dist. Sept. 7, 1995).

Since Mickel’s motion did not contain allegations of operative facts

demonstrating a meritorious defense or claim and entitlement to relief under Civ.R.

60(B)(1)-(5), the trial court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.

Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s denial of Mickel’s motion for relief from

judgment without holding an evidentiary hearing was not unreasonable, arbitrary,

or unconscionable. Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

by denying her Civ.R. 60(B) motion, Mickel’s single assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into

execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

____ EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR