NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 8 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE HECTOR MARROQUIN No. 24-4743 AZUCENA; SARAI ABIGAIL PENA DE Agency Nos. MARROQUIN; J. R. M. P., A220-517-067 A220-517-074 Petitioners, A220-517-068 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 20, 2026** San Francisco, California
Before: COLLINS, JOHNSTONE, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Jose Hector Marroquin Azucena (“Marroquin”), and his wife and
minor child (collectively “Petitioners”), natives and citizens of El Salvador, seek
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of the immigration
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
Where, as here, the BIA agrees with some of the IJ’s reasoning and
supplements that reasoning with its own analysis, we review the decisions of the
BIA and the IJ to the extent that the BIA agreed with the IJ’s conclusions. See
Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 632 (9th Cir. 2022). “We review the
denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims for substantial
evidence.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019).
“Under this standard, we must uphold the agency determination unless the
evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Id. While the ultimate question of
whether a particular social group (“PSG”) is cognizable is a question of law
reviewed de novo, questions regarding particularity and social distinction involve
factual issues that are reviewed for substantial evidence. See Conde Quevedo v.
Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 2020).
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that
Petitioners failed to establish that any past or feared future persecution in El
Salvador was or would be on account of a protected ground. To be eligible for
1 Marroquin filed his applications for asylum and related relief with his wife and son as derivative beneficiaries. The derivative applicants also filed applications for asylum and related relief based on the same facts.
2 24-4743 asylum, Petitioners must establish that they are “unable or unwilling” to return to
El Salvador due to past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a PSG.
Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). PSG refers to a group that is “(1) composed of
members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with
particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.” Villegas
Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Petitioners’
proposed family-based PSGs—“The immediate family members of Jose Hector
Marroquin Azucena” and “The Marroquin Family in El Salvador”—lacked social
distinction. “Social distinction requires ‘those with a common immutable
characteristic [to be] set apart, or distinct, from other persons within the society in
some significant way.’” Id. (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227,
238 (BIA 2014)). Although family is important within Salvadoran society, the
record does not compel a finding that Petitioners’ family in particular is a group
separate and distinct within their society in some significant way. Marroquin
testified that his surname is unique in the city where he lived in El Salvador, but
the agency reasonably determined that this testimony was insufficient to meet
3 24-4743 Petitioners’ burden. See id. at 1181 (“[S]ocial distinction encompasses principles
that will ordinarily demand some type of corroborative, objective evidence other
than [a petitioner’s] testimony.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that
Petitioners’ proposed PSG composed of “Salvadoran witnesses to gang murders
who cooperate with the police” lacked social distinction. Although Petitioners
point to record evidence showing the difficulty in El Salvador of getting witnesses
to testify against gangs and instances in which witnesses to gang violence were
harmed, they fail to point to evidence in the record showing that this proposed PSG
is regarded as a socially distinct group within Salvadoran society. See Conde
Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1243 (holding that “[s]ubstantial evidence supports the
BIA’s conclusion” that “persons who report the criminal activity of gangs to the
police are [not] perceived or recognized as a group by society in Guatemala”); cf.
Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(holding that the “social visibility” of witnesses who testify in open court against
cartel members is supported by evidence that Salvadoran society sees them as a
social group and that El Salvador has passed legislation to protect them).
As to the proposed PSG composed of “Salvadorans taking concrete steps to
oppose gang authority,” the agency correctly found that it lacked particularity.
“[T]he particularity inquiry recognizes that the social group must be defined by
4 24-4743 characteristics that provide a clear benchmark for determining who falls within the
group, such that the group possesses discrete and . . . definable boundaries.” Diaz-
Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). “As a general matter, the BIA may conclude that a proposed
social group is insufficiently particular when the group definition involves
terminology that is undefined or unexplained in the record.” Andrade v. Garland,
94 F.4th 904, 911 (9th Cir. 2024). The agency properly determined that the phrase
“concrete steps to oppose” is not sufficiently defined in the record. As such,
Petitioners did not establish that this proposed PSG had the necessary “definable
boundaries” to determine group membership. See id.
Regarding withholding of removal, “[a] failure to satisfy the lower standard
of proof required to establish eligibility for asylum . . .
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 8 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE HECTOR MARROQUIN No. 24-4743 AZUCENA; SARAI ABIGAIL PENA DE Agency Nos. MARROQUIN; J. R. M. P., A220-517-067 A220-517-074 Petitioners, A220-517-068 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 20, 2026** San Francisco, California
Before: COLLINS, JOHNSTONE, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Jose Hector Marroquin Azucena (“Marroquin”), and his wife and
minor child (collectively “Petitioners”), natives and citizens of El Salvador, seek
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of the immigration
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
Where, as here, the BIA agrees with some of the IJ’s reasoning and
supplements that reasoning with its own analysis, we review the decisions of the
BIA and the IJ to the extent that the BIA agreed with the IJ’s conclusions. See
Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 632 (9th Cir. 2022). “We review the
denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims for substantial
evidence.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019).
“Under this standard, we must uphold the agency determination unless the
evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Id. While the ultimate question of
whether a particular social group (“PSG”) is cognizable is a question of law
reviewed de novo, questions regarding particularity and social distinction involve
factual issues that are reviewed for substantial evidence. See Conde Quevedo v.
Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 2020).
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that
Petitioners failed to establish that any past or feared future persecution in El
Salvador was or would be on account of a protected ground. To be eligible for
1 Marroquin filed his applications for asylum and related relief with his wife and son as derivative beneficiaries. The derivative applicants also filed applications for asylum and related relief based on the same facts.
2 24-4743 asylum, Petitioners must establish that they are “unable or unwilling” to return to
El Salvador due to past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a PSG.
Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). PSG refers to a group that is “(1) composed of
members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with
particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.” Villegas
Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Petitioners’
proposed family-based PSGs—“The immediate family members of Jose Hector
Marroquin Azucena” and “The Marroquin Family in El Salvador”—lacked social
distinction. “Social distinction requires ‘those with a common immutable
characteristic [to be] set apart, or distinct, from other persons within the society in
some significant way.’” Id. (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227,
238 (BIA 2014)). Although family is important within Salvadoran society, the
record does not compel a finding that Petitioners’ family in particular is a group
separate and distinct within their society in some significant way. Marroquin
testified that his surname is unique in the city where he lived in El Salvador, but
the agency reasonably determined that this testimony was insufficient to meet
3 24-4743 Petitioners’ burden. See id. at 1181 (“[S]ocial distinction encompasses principles
that will ordinarily demand some type of corroborative, objective evidence other
than [a petitioner’s] testimony.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that
Petitioners’ proposed PSG composed of “Salvadoran witnesses to gang murders
who cooperate with the police” lacked social distinction. Although Petitioners
point to record evidence showing the difficulty in El Salvador of getting witnesses
to testify against gangs and instances in which witnesses to gang violence were
harmed, they fail to point to evidence in the record showing that this proposed PSG
is regarded as a socially distinct group within Salvadoran society. See Conde
Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1243 (holding that “[s]ubstantial evidence supports the
BIA’s conclusion” that “persons who report the criminal activity of gangs to the
police are [not] perceived or recognized as a group by society in Guatemala”); cf.
Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(holding that the “social visibility” of witnesses who testify in open court against
cartel members is supported by evidence that Salvadoran society sees them as a
social group and that El Salvador has passed legislation to protect them).
As to the proposed PSG composed of “Salvadorans taking concrete steps to
oppose gang authority,” the agency correctly found that it lacked particularity.
“[T]he particularity inquiry recognizes that the social group must be defined by
4 24-4743 characteristics that provide a clear benchmark for determining who falls within the
group, such that the group possesses discrete and . . . definable boundaries.” Diaz-
Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). “As a general matter, the BIA may conclude that a proposed
social group is insufficiently particular when the group definition involves
terminology that is undefined or unexplained in the record.” Andrade v. Garland,
94 F.4th 904, 911 (9th Cir. 2024). The agency properly determined that the phrase
“concrete steps to oppose” is not sufficiently defined in the record. As such,
Petitioners did not establish that this proposed PSG had the necessary “definable
boundaries” to determine group membership. See id.
Regarding withholding of removal, “[a] failure to satisfy the lower standard
of proof required to establish eligibility for asylum . . . necessarily results in a
failure to demonstrate eligibility for withholding of [removal].” Pedro-Mateo v.
INS, 224 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). Because Petitioners are ineligible for
asylum as their proposed PSGs are not cognizable, they are also ineligible for
withholding of removal.
Because these conclusions are dispositive of Petitioners’ claims for asylum
and withholding of removal, we need not address Petitioners’ other arguments
concerning such relief. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per
5 24-4743 curiam) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings
on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
2. To qualify for CAT relief, Petitioners must show “a chance greater
than fifty percent that [they] will be tortured if removed” to El Salvador.
Velasquez-Samayoa v. Garland, 49 F.4th 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Cole
v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 770 (9th Cir. 2011)). Petitioners “must also establish that
[they] would experience torture with the acquiescence” of government officials.
Castillo v. Barr, 980 F.3d 1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Petitioners’
claim for CAT relief. The agency reasonably concluded that Petitioners had failed
to show that Salvadoran officials would acquiesce in future torture of Petitioners.
See B.R. v. Garland, 26 F.4th 827, 845 (9th Cir. 2022).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
6 24-4743