Marriott International, Inc. v. M/Y Under the Radar, a 2001 37.8-Foot Sea Ray Sundancer Motor Yacht, U.S. Coast Guard Official No. 1120637

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedJune 30, 2025
Docket3:24-cv-01871
StatusUnknown

This text of Marriott International, Inc. v. M/Y Under the Radar, a 2001 37.8-Foot Sea Ray Sundancer Motor Yacht, U.S. Coast Guard Official No. 1120637 (Marriott International, Inc. v. M/Y Under the Radar, a 2001 37.8-Foot Sea Ray Sundancer Motor Yacht, U.S. Coast Guard Official No. 1120637) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marriott International, Inc. v. M/Y Under the Radar, a 2001 37.8-Foot Sea Ray Sundancer Motor Yacht, U.S. Coast Guard Official No. 1120637, (S.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., Case No.: 24-cv-1871-AJB-MSB dba SAN DIEGO MARRIOTT HOTEL & 12 MARINA, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 13 MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY Plaintiff, VESSEL SALE AND 14 v. AUTHORIZATION TO CREDIT BID 15 M/Y UNDER THE RADAR, a 2001 (Doc. No. 16) 16 37.8-Foot Sea Ray Sundancer Motor 17 Yacht, U.S. Coast Guard Official No. 1120637, AND ALL OF HER ENGINES, 18 TACKLE, ACCESSORIES, 19 EQUIPMENT, FURNISHINGS AND APPURTENCES, in rem, 20 21 Defendant. 22 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Marriott International, Inc.’s (“Plaintiff”) 23 Motion for Interlocutory Vessel Sale of M/Y UNDER THE RADAR, a 2001 37.8-Foot 24 Sea Ray Motor Yacht, U.S. Coast Guard Official No. 1120637 and all of her engines, 25 tackle, accessories, equipment, furnishings, and appurtenances (“Defendant Vessel”) at 26 public auction and permitting Plaintiff to credit bid a sum equal to its maritime lien claims. 27 (Doc. No. 16.) No appearance has been made in this action on behalf of the Defendant 28 1 Vessel. And no opposition has been filed to the instant motion. For the reasons discussed 2 below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion. 3 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 4 On October 15, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this action in admiralty against 5 Defendant Vessel by filing a Verified Complaint for vessel arrest, interlocutory sale, and 6 for money damages for breach of maritime contract, trespass, and quantum meruit. (Doc. 7 No. 1, Compl.) On November 25, 2024, the Court issued an order authorizing the arrest of 8 the Defendant Vessel and appointing Plaintiff as Substitute Custodian thereof. (Doc. No. 9 7.) On February 20, 2025, an entry of clerk default was entered against Defendant Vessel. 10 (Doc. No. 14.) On April 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for interlocutory vessel 11 sale and authorization to credit bid. (Doc. No. 16.) No opposition has been filed. 12 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 13 Plaintiff owns and operates Marriott Marquis San Diego Marina. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 2.) 14 On March 12, 2009, Plaintiff entered into a Maritime Contract for Private Wharfage 15 (“Wharfage Contract”) with Michael Hohn, who is identified therein as the owner of 16 Defendant Vessel. (Doc. No. 1-2, Exh. A to the Compl.) Plaintiff began providing wharfage 17 services for the benefit of Defendant Vessel on April 1, 2009. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 6.) 18 Plaintiff is informed and believes that Michael Hohn passed away in February 2023. 19 (Id. ¶ 8.) Based on United States Coast Guard records showing that he jointly owned the 20 Defendant Vessel with Gail Hohn, she became the sole owner of the vessel upon Michael 21 Hohn’s passing. (Id.) 22 In June 2023, Gail Hohn filed for bankruptcy protection, and in September 2023, the 23 bankruptcy court discharged her debts, including that to Plaintiff in the amount of 24 $1,986.00 reflected in her filings. (Id. ¶ 9.) 25 On October 10, 2023, Plaintiff sent Gail Hohn a letter notifying her that Plaintiff has 26 elected to terminate the Wharfage Contract on November 13, 2023. (Id. ¶11.) The letter 27 also advised that Plaintiff would waive the fees that were then due pursuant to the Wharfage 28 1 Contract in the amount of $7,218.77, if the Defendant Vessel was removed by the 2 termination date. (Id.) Neither Gail Hohn nor anyone else removed the Defendant Vessel 3 by the termination date or thereafter. (Id.) 4 On March 8, 2024, Plaintiff inquired of PNC Bank whether it would retrieve the 5 Defendant Vessel or release their interest therein, as U.S. Coast Guard records showed that 6 its predecessor (National City Bank) recorded a Preferred Ship Mortgage encumbering the 7 Defendant Vessel, and bankruptcy records showed that Gail Hohn owned PNC bank a 8 “mortgage.” (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.) PNC Bank responded that it would not pick up the Defendant 9 Vessel and that Plaintiff could apply for a mechanic’s lien. (Id. ¶ 13.) 10 Despite the termination of the Wharfage Contract, Defendant Vessel was not 11 removed from Plaintiff’s marina and remains there without authority. (Id. ¶ 14.) Because 12 of the failure to pay fees due pursuant to the Wharfage Contract, Plaintiff alleges damages 13 calculated through October 31, 2024, in a sum not less than $20,894.98. (Id. at ¶ 18.) 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 Through the instant motion, Plaintiff requests the Court: (1) find that Plaintiff has a 16 preferred maritime lien; (2) order the interlocutory sale of Defendant Vessel at public 17 auction; and (3) authorize Plaintiff to credit bid at the auction a sum equal to its maritime 18 lien claims. (Doc. No. 16-1.) 19 A. Preferred Maritime Lien 20 1. Maritime Lien 21 To begin, Plaintiff asserts that, under 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a), it has a statutorily 22 conferred maritime lien on the Defendant Vessel because it provides “necessaries” to the 23 Defendant Vessel. The statute provides, in pertinent part: 24 [A] person providing necessaries to a vessel on the order of the owner or a person authorized by the owner— 25

26 (1) has a maritime lien on the vessel; (2) may bring a civil action in rem to enforce the lien; and 27 28 1 (3) is not required to allege or prove in the action that credit was given to the vessel. 2

3 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a). What constitutes “necessaries” within the meaning of the statute 4 “has been expanded to encompass any item which is ‘“reasonably needed for the venture 5 in which the ship is engaged.’” Foss Launch & Tug Co. v. Char Ching Shipping U.S.A., 6 Ltd., 808 F.2d 697, 699 (9th Cir. 1987). 7 Here, Plaintiff has provided wharfage (storage) services to the Defendant Vessel at 8 its marina. Storage of the Defendant Vessel is reasonably needed for its operations. Indeed, 9 Michael Hohn affirmed in the Wharfage Contract that he enters into the agreement for 10 private wharfage for the benefit of the Defendant Vessel. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 4.) Thus, the 11 Court agrees with Plaintiff that it has provided necessaries to the Defendant Vessel giving 12 rise to a maritime lien against the Defendant Vessel under the statute. See, e.g., Ex parte 13 Easton, 95 U.S. 68, 73 (1877) (“Wharf accommodation is a necessity of navigation, and 14 such accommodations are indispensable for ships and vessels and water-craft of every 15 name and description, whether employed in carrying freight or passengers, or engaged in 16 the fisheries”). 17 2. Preferred Maritime Lien 18 Plaintiff further contends that, under 46 U.S.C. § 31301, it has a statutorily conferred 19 preferred maritime lien against the Defendant Vessel “for damage arising out of maritime 20 tort”—namely, trespass. 46 U.S.C. § 31301(5)(B). “There is no distinct claim for maritime 21 trespass under the admiralty substantive body of law. Accordingly, the Court looks to the 22 general common law to ascertain the requirements of a maritime trespass claim.” Stuart 23 Cay Marina v. M/V SPECIAL DELIVERY, 510 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1074 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 24 Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, one is liable for trespass if he intentionally: “(a) 25 enters land in the possession of another, or causes a thing or a third person to do so, or (b) 26 remains on the land, or (c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty 27 to remove.” Restatement 2nd of Torts § 158.

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Related

Ex Parte Easton
95 U.S. 68 (Supreme Court, 1877)
Stuart Cay Marina v. M/V SPECIAL DELIVERY
510 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (S.D. Florida, 2007)
Hamrick v. Bryan
21 F. Supp. 392 (N.D. Oklahoma, 1937)

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Bluebook (online)
Marriott International, Inc. v. M/Y Under the Radar, a 2001 37.8-Foot Sea Ray Sundancer Motor Yacht, U.S. Coast Guard Official No. 1120637, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marriott-international-inc-v-my-under-the-radar-a-2001-378-foot-sea-casd-2025.