Marrige of Chorba

Opinion

25CA0086 Marriage of Chorba 07-23-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0086 La Plata County District Court No. 23DR30037 Honorable Kim S. Shropshire, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Melany Maddux Adler,

Appellant and Cross-Appellee,

and

James Alan Chorba,

Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Pawar and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 23, 2026

The Law Firm of Anderson & Baker, LLC, Curtis Kofoed, Durango, Colorado, for Appellant and Cross-Appellee

The Law Firm of Lisa Ward, LLC, Lisa Ward, Donald Lawrence, Jr., Durango, Colorado, for Appellee and Cross-Appellant ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage proceeding, Melany Maddux

Adler (wife) and James Alan Chorba (husband) both appeal the trial

court’s permanent orders and its order on their motions to

reconsider. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 After meeting in Austin, Texas, the parties were married in

May 2018, and wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in

Colorado in July 2023. At the time of the permanent orders

hearing, husband was sixty-nine years old and wife was sixty-eight

years old.

¶3 Shortly after they were married, husband purchased a lot on

Hermosa Meadows Road, and, with the help of local professionals,

he and wife designed and built a house on the lot (the Hermosa

property). Husband ended up serving as the general contractor and

completed a significant amount of work on the house. Wife

purchased fixtures and other items for the home.

¶4 Before and during the marriage, husband was the account

holder for a self-directed IRA (SDIRA). He bought and sold property

through the SDIRA. The SDIRA had a cash balance, but it also held

1 real property, including three apartment buildings on Hearthside

Drive in Austin (the Hearthside properties).

¶5 Although husband used the SDIRA to buy and sell property,

during the six years of the marriage, husband hadn’t made any

cash withdrawals until he withdrew a total of $100,000 in February

and April 2024 — a few months before the permanent orders

hearing. Husband also sold the Hearthside properties immediately

before the hearing, and the sales closed the day of the hearing.

¶6 After the hearing, the court made the following findings in its

permanent orders:

• it valued the marital estate at $2,641,382.74;

• it found that husband didn’t establish by clear and

convincing evidence that the Hermosa property was his

separate property;

• it found that the Hermosa property was marital property

because it was a “gift to the marriage”;

• after finding that each party would incur significant debt

if individually awarded the Hermosa property, the court

ordered its sale, with 65.6% of proceeds going to wife

and 34.4% of proceeds going to husband;

2 • it valued the SDIRA as it would any other IRA, as an

aggregate;

• it found that the appropriate time to value the SDIRA

was prior to the sale of the Hearthside properties; and

• it determined that the SDIRA’s date of marriage value

was $1,363,708.20; its value on the date of permanent

orders was $2,215,226.94; and its marital value was

$851,518.74.

¶7 Both parties moved for relief. Husband filed a C.R.C.P. 59

motion, asking the court, in relevant part, to (1) amend the date of

marriage value of the SDIRA to reflect the increased 2018 assessed

value of the Hearthside properties instead of using the properties’

2017 value; (2) find that the Hermosa property was his separate

property; and (3) reconsider the ordered sale of the Hermosa

property. Wife moved for relief under C.R.C.P. 59 and 60. She

asked the court to revise the SDIRA’s date of decree valuation to

reflect the individual value of the Hearthside properties — instead of

using the assets’ aggregate value. She also asked the court to

include husband’s combined $100,000 distributions in the SDIRA

valuation.

3 ¶8 The court denied the parties’ requests in their respective

motions to reconsider, except the court (1) granted wife’s request to

value the SDIRA prior to the withdrawal of the combined $100,000

distributions that husband had taken and (2) granted husband’s

request to reconsider the SDIRA’s value on the date of marriage to

reflect its value in May 2018. Based on the two adjustments, the

SDIRA’s date of marriage value was $1,735,256; its date of decree

value was $2,314,810.93; and its marital value was $579,554.93.

II. Analysis

¶9 Wife and husband both appeal. Wife contends that the court

incorrectly valued the SDIRA at the date of decree and used an

inconsistent method to value the SDIRA, which resulted in an

inequitable property division. Husband contends that the court

abused its discretion by adding $100,000 to the SDIRA’s valuation

for funds he withdrew during the dissolution proceedings and that

it erred by determining that the Hermosa property was marital

property. We consider wife’s contentions first and then turn to

husband’s.

4 A. Method of Valuing the SDIRA

¶ 10 Wife contends that the court erred by calculating the marital

value of the SDIRA based on the aggregate value of its assets at the

date of decree rather than calculating the value of the individual

assets within it. She also asserts that, because the 2024 assessed

value of the Hearthside properties was available on the date of

decree, the court should have used that assessment to value the

Hearthside properties instead of the 2023 assessment.

¶ 11 We disagree and discern no error with the way the court

aggregately valued the assets in the SDIRA to calculate the SDIRA’s

marital value. Because we decline to disturb the court’s aggregate

valuation method, we need not consider wife’s arguments that the

SDIRA’s aggregate valuation resulted in an inequitable distribution

of marital property or that court should have used the 2024 county

assessor’s valuations of the individual Hearthside properties to

value the SDIRA on the date of decree.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 12 The court must value marital property as of the date of the

decree of dissolution or as of the date of the hearing if the hearing

occurs before the date of the decree. § 14-10-113(5), C.R.S. 2025;

5 In re Marriage of Cardona, 2014 CO 3, ¶ 12. When valuing

property, the court may adopt the valuation of one party over the

other’s or make its own valuation. In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023

COA 42M, ¶ 41. The valuation of property is a factual

determination within the discretion of the trial court and won’t be

disturbed “if it is reasonable in light of the evidence as a whole.” In

re Marriage of Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶ 23.

2. Additional Facts

¶ 13 At the permanent orders hearing, wife presented evidence that,

at the time of the dissolution proceeding, two of the Hearthside

buildings were appraised at $740,000, and one was appraised for

$685,000. Husband presented evidence that the buildings were

valued at $557,000 each — the amount at which they were sold.

He also provided reports from Forge Trust, the SDIRA’s custodian,

showing the aggregate value of the SDIRA in 2018 and 2024.

Husband testified that the Forge Trust reports were what he

annually reported to the IRS.

¶ 14 The court found that the parties’ evidence individually valuing

the Hearthside properties was “overly optimistic” and, depending on

who was proffering it, leaned toward a “positive outcome” for either

6 husband or wife. Because the Forge Trust reports were required by

IRS regulations to substantiate the SDIRA’s entire value for tax and

compliance purposes, the court found that valuation credible and

used the reports to calculate the marital value of the SDIRA.

3. Analysis

¶ 15 Wife contends the court’s valuation methodology was

arbitrary, unreasonable, and unsupported by the evidence because

the SDIRA’s corrected date of marriage value was based on the

itemized valuation of the individual Hearthside properties, while the

date of divorce valuation was based on the SDIRA’s aggregate value.

¶ 16 Wife’s argument is misplaced. The court didn’t undertake an

itemized valuation of the individual Hearthside properties to value

the SDIRA on the date of marriage; instead, it relied on the SDIRA’s

account balance reported by Forge Trust (then IRA Services Trust

Company) following a valuation adjustment. The court recognized

that its prior date of marriage valuation — based on a Forge Trust

statement listing the 2017 assessed value of the Hearthside

properties — didn’t reflect the properties’ 2018 assessed value,

which increased the SDIRA’s aggregate value by several hundred

thousand dollars. Husband testified that even though the

7 adjustment occurred in November, it was effective January 1, 2018,

and represented the value of the SDIRA in May 2018.1

¶ 17 The court has significant discretion to value property, and

based on our review of the record, it didn’t abuse its discretion by

using the Forge Trust report’s corrected 2018 value to determine

the value of the SDIRA’s property on the date of marriage. In re

Marriage of Plesich, 881 P.2d 379, 381 (Colo. App. 1994) (“[A] trial

court has discretion to arrive at its own determination of value, and

its valuation will be upheld if it is reasonable in light of the evidence

as a whole.”).

¶ 18 Contrary to wife’s assertion, the court used the same method

to value the SDIRA on the date of decree, which was used to

calculate the SDIRA’s marital value. Despite considering other

valuation evidence, the court found that the valuation reported by

husband to Forge Trust was the appropriate valuation. See Krejci,

¶ 23 (“The court may select the valuation of one party over that of

the other party . . . , and its decision will be upheld on appeal

unless clearly erroneous.”).

1 Wife didn’t object to the adjustment.

8 ¶ 19 The court determined it was reasonable and equitable to value

the SDIRA in the aggregate because this was the same method used

to value other IRAs. See In re Marriage of Powell, 220 P.3d 952,

957-58 (Colo. App. 2009) (holding the court didn’t abuse its

discretion in treating an IRA as one asset for purposes of

determining an increased value rather than determining the value

based on the increase of the individual securities). Also, wife

testified that she didn’t want any portion of husband’s SDIRA

allocated to her. Because the court didn’t order an in-kind division

of the SDIRA’s assets between the parties, there was no need to

individually value the SDIRA’s contents. Moreover, neither party

presented compelling evidence that the SDIRA’s assets should’ve

been valued individually. See Krejci, ¶ 23 (“The parties must

present the court with sufficient data to make a reasonable

valuation; any failure to do so does not provide grounds for

reversal.”).

¶ 20 In sum, the court had discretion to value the SDIRA’s assets in

the aggregate to determine the SDIRA’s marital value, and its

valuation is supported by the Forge Trust documents. In re

Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 295 (Colo. App. 2005) (“The

9 determination of credibility and the weight, probative force, and

sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are matters within the sole

discretion of the trial court.”). Because the court’s valuation is

reasonable in light of the evidence as a whole, we will not disturb it.

¶ 21 Having determined that the court acted within its discretion,

we need not consider wife’s argument that the SDIRA’s erroneous

valuation resulted in an inequitable division of the marital estate.

Likewise, because we discern no error with the court’s aggregate

valuation method, we need not address wife’s argument that the

court should’ve used the county’s 2024 individually assessed values

of the Hearthside properties — instead of the county’s 2023

assessed values — when valuing the SDIRA’s marital value.

B. Addition of $100,000 to the SDIRA Valuation

¶ 22 Husband contends that the court erred by adding $100,000 to

the value of the SDIRA to account for his cash withdrawals. We

disagree.

¶ 23 The parties in a dissolution proceeding are temporarily

enjoined from “transferring, encumbering, concealing, or in any way

10 disposing of” marital property without an order from the court or

the consent of the other party, “except in the usual course of

business or for the necessities of life.” § 14-10-107(4)(b)(I)(A),

C.R.S. 2025. When a party has dissipated marital property, the

court can value the property as of the date that it last existed rather

than on the date of the dissolution hearing. In re Marriage of

Lockwood, 971 P.2d 264, 266 (Colo. App. 1998). Dissipation occurs

“when one spouse depletes the marital estate for an improper or

illegitimate purpose in contemplation of the dissolution.” In re

Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶ 75. “Whether a spouse

dissipated marital property is a question of fact,” and we won’t

disturb the district court’s findings unless there is no support in

the record. Id. at ¶ 76.

2. Analysis

¶ 24 Wife’s petition for dissolution, prepared using a Judicial

Department form, included automatic court orders that the parties

were required to follow until the case was finalized. Those orders

included the statutory temporary injunction language. See § 14-10-

107(4)(b)(I)(A).

11 ¶ 25 Husband argues that the court abused its discretion by

valuing the SDIRA account prior to his $100,000 distribution

because it didn’t find that he violated the temporary injunction.

But because husband’s withdrawal could have affected wife’s

equitable interest in the marital portion of the SDIRA, the court

concluded that the automatic temporary injunction applied, and it

had to consider the depletion in the context of its equitable division.

¶ 26 Husband claimed that he withdrew the funds in the ordinary

course of business, but wife testified — and the Forge Trust

documents from 2018 through 2024 confirmed — that husband

didn’t take any distributions from the SDIRA during their marriage.

See Martinez v. Gutierrez-Martinez, 77 P.3d 827, 830 (Colo. App.

2003) (holding that when there is a reasonable showing for the trial

court to conclude a party dissipated marital funds, the party must

establish that they were used in the usual course of business or for

necessities). Having noted that husband hadn’t withdrawn any

funds from the SDIRA during the six years he was married to wife,

the court valued the SDIRA as it stood before husband withdrew

$100,000.

12 ¶ 27 Husband now argues that he used the funds for credit card

debt, legal fees, and medical needs. But he didn’t develop this

argument in the trial court, arguing instead that he used the funds

to improve another home that he had purchased in Florida while

the dissolution was pending. Because husband’s argument is

undeveloped and raised for the first time on appeal, we won’t

address it. See Minshall v. Johnston, 2018 COA 44, ¶ 21 (This court

“do[esn’t] address arguments made for the first time on appeal.”).

¶ 28 Husband also argues that the court abused its discretion by

including the $100,000 he withdrew from the SDIRA but not

considering that wife had dissipated $103,000 from an investment

account containing marital funds. Husband’s argument is

misplaced.

¶ 29 In his response to wife’s motion for relief under C.R.C.P. 59

and 60, husband only indicated that “wife ma[de] no proposal for

how her divorce period spending should be addressed by the

[c]ourt” and requested that “[w]ife’s proposal of solely penalizing

[h]usband for divorce spending should be denied.” Unlike wife, who

filed a detailed motion asking the trial court to consider the effect of

husband’s $100,000 withdrawal on the SDIRA, husband didn’t ask

13 the trial court to consider wife’s spending as a dissipation of the

marital estate for an improper or illegitimate purpose in

contemplation of the dissolution. Rather, he just asked the court

not to penalize him for his withdrawals. Because husband’s

dissipation argument is conclusory and underdeveloped, we decline

to address it. See Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d

582, 604 (Colo. App. 2007) (declining to address underdeveloped

argument).

¶ 30 Likewise, husband raises a new issue on appeal that we

decline to consider — that the court violated his right to “like

treatment” of “similarly situated” individuals when it considered his

withdrawals, but not wife’s. As we have noted, if an argument is

raised for the first time on appeal, we won’t consider it. See

Minshall, ¶ 21 (declining to address argument not raised in the

district court).

¶ 31 We conclude that the court didn’t abuse its discretion by

including husband’s $100,000 distribution in the value of the

SDIRA.

14 C. The Hermosa Property

¶ 32 Husband argues that the trial court erroneously determined

that the Hermosa property was marital property. We disagree.

¶ 33 Section 14-10-113, which governs the disposition of property,

requires a multi-step analysis. LaFleur v. Pyfer, 2021 CO 3, ¶ 63; In

re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 35 (Colo. 2001). The district

court must first determine whether an interest constitutes property,

and if so, the court must classify such property as marital or

separate. LaFleur, ¶ 63. Finally, it must value and make an

equitable distribution of the marital property after considering the

statutory factors of section 14-10-113. Id.; Balanson, 25 P.3d at

35.

¶ 34 Apart from a few statutory exceptions, all property acquired

during a marriage is generally presumed to be marital property.

§ 14-10-113(3); see Balanson, 25 P.3d at 36. And “[t]he burden to

rebut the statutory presumption that all property acquired during

the marriage constitutes marital property rests on the party seeking

to have the property declared separate.” Medeiros, ¶ 52.

15 ¶ 35 When a spouse claims that property existing at the time of

dissolution is separate because it was owned prior to the marriage,

that spouse “has the burden of proof to trace the property back to

the original premarital asset.” In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024

COA 103M, ¶ 10. Thus, if assets received during marriage are

traceable to specific premarital property, the assets may remain

separate property. Id. But if it isn’t possible to trace a spouse’s

premarital property because it has been commingled with marital

property, the premarital property doesn’t retain its separate

character. In re Marriage of Green, 169 P.3d 202, 204 (Colo. App.

2007).

¶ 36 “The classification of property as a marital asset or a separate

asset is an issue of law that is based on the court’s findings of fact.”

In re Marriage of Corak, 2014 COA 147, ¶ 9. We review de novo the

legal standard applied by the district court but defer to the court’s

factual findings. In re Marriage of Vittetoe, 2016 COA 71, ¶ 17. “We

may not reweigh the evidence to reach a different conclusion.”

Green, 169 P.3d at 204 (“[A]n appellate court cannot substitute

itself as a finder of fact; thus, factual findings of the trial court are

not to be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous and not

16 supported by the record.” (citing Gebhardt v. Gebhardt, 595 P.2d

1048, 1050 (Colo. 1979))).

2. The Hermosa Property is Marital Property

¶ 37 Husband claims that the court erred by “sua sponte deeming

the Hermosa property to be a gift to the marriage” even though he

purchased the property using his own premarital funds and held

the property solely in his name. We discern no error with the trial

court’s finding that the Hermosa property was marital property.

¶ 38 Wife testified that the Hermosa property was a gift,2 but

husband testified that he never intended to make such a gift and

that the Hermosa property was his separate property. According to

husband, because the Hermosa property was acquired in exchange

for property acquired prior to the marriage under section 14-10-

113(2)(b), the marital property presumption doesn’t apply.

Husband argues that the Hermosa property was his separate

property because (1) he can trace the premarital funds that he used

to purchase it to the sale of his premarital home; (2) he acquired the

2 The court presumed that wife meant that the Hermosa property

was a gift to the marital estate and that it wasn’t an individual gift to her.

17 property in his sole name; and (3) wife made several judicial

admissions that the Hermosa property was his. We aren’t

persuaded.

¶ 39 We agree with the trial court that the evidence husband

offered to support these assertions didn’t overcome the presumption

that the Hermosa property was marital property. First, although

husband used funds from the sale of his premarital home in Austin

to purchase the Hermosa property’s lot, he deposited the money

from the home sale into an account containing commingled funds,

and he used that account to purchase the lot and to cover

construction costs. The fact that husband used funds from the sale

of his premarital home to purchase the lot isn’t by itself indicative

that the purchased property was separate. And husband’s

argument is belied because he used commingled funds to improve

and construct the Hermosa property. See, e.g., Green, 169 P.3d at

204 (Because “significantly all of the assets of the parties” were

commingled early in the marriage, husband’s contention that his

social security income was separate property wasn’t supported by

the documentation he provided).

18 ¶ 40 Because the funds used to construct the property were

commingled, husband’s argument that he can trace back at least

$560,687 is unpersuasive. The trial court admitted several exhibits

detailing the parties’ respective financial contributions to improve

the Hermosa property. But it found flaws with husband’s

calculations regarding the amount he claimed to have contributed

as separate property. And it determined that he hadn’t established

that any separate funds retained their separate character or that he

intended for the funds to be separate. Moreover, on appeal,

husband offers conclusory statements that the trial court erred but

doesn’t explain why or sufficiently develop his argument for our

review. See Antolovich, 183 P.3d at 600 (party who doesn’t refer to

evidence or authority in support of argument doesn’t present a

cogent argument to review (citing Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 148

P.3d 289, 291 (Colo. App. 2006))).

¶ 41 Second, husband’s argument that he held sole title to the

Hermosa property, and that, therefore, the property isn’t marital, is

unavailing. Section 14-10-113(3) expressly provides that “property

acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage and prior to a

decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property,

19 regardless of whether title is held individually.” Thus, holding title

to the Hermosa property, without more, doesn’t extinguish the

possibility that the property was a gift to the marriage, especially

when husband didn’t proffer sufficient evidence rebutting that

presumption. Cf. In re Marriage of Bartolo, 971 P.2d 699, 700-01

(Colo. App. 1998) (holding that property that had been titled in joint

tenancy and was then transferred to wife by quitclaim deed was

wife’s separate property).

¶ 42 Third, wife contributed at least $95,000 toward the

construction of the Hermosa property. Husband admitted that wife

contributed two checks — one for $70,000 and another for

$25,000 — toward constructing and furnishing the house.

Moreover, wife participated in nearly every aspect of the home’s

design and construction. She drew the initial floor plans, retained

architects to finalize and submit plans, selected and purchased

interior finishes and fixtures, and testified that she and husband

jointly designed the residence.

¶ 43 Finally, the parties testified that the Hermosa property was

intended to be their permanent marital residence. Husband stated

that he planned to relocate the parties from Austin to Durango and

20 to build a home in an environment that wife chose. This suggests

that, from the onset of their marriage, husband viewed and treated

the Hermosa property not as a separate asset but as a marital

asset. And wife consistently testified that she regarded the

residence as “our home” and that the parties intended to remain

there permanently.

¶ 44 Given this record, we can’t say that the trial court erred by

concluding that husband failed to establish that the Hermosa

property was his separate property.

3. The Court Equitably Divided the Hermosa Property

¶ 45 After determining that property is marital, a district court

must equitably divide it. § 14-10-113(1); In re Marriage of Thornhill,

232 P.3d 782, 787 (Colo. 2010). To make an equitable division, the

court must value the marital property as of the date of the

dissolution decree. § 14-10-113(5); Balanson, 25 P.3d at 36.

¶ 46 When dividing marital property, the court must consider all

relevant factors, including (1) each spouse’s contribution to the

acquisition of the marital property; (2) the value of the property set

apart to each spouse; (3) the economic circumstances of each

spouse; and (4) any increases or decreases in the value of separate

21 property during the marriage or the depletion of separate property

for marital purposes. § 14-10-113(1)(a)-(d); see also Cardona, ¶ 11

(listing the same factors).

¶ 47 The district court has great latitude to equitably divide marital

property based on the facts and circumstances of the case, and we

won’t disturb its decision absent a clear abuse of discretion.

Balanson, 25 P.3d at 35. However, a district court must make

sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to give an appellate

court a clear understanding of the basis of its order. In re Marriage

of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815, 822 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 48 We discern no reason to disturb the trial court’s distribution of

the future sales proceeds of the Hermosa property. The record

reflects that the court carefully considered the statutory factors for

equitable distribution and explained its reason for the allocation. It

recognized that a substantial portion of the residence was

constructed with marital funds, and although each party separately

contributed to the property, the individual contributions weren’t

dispositive of the ultimate distribution.

¶ 49 The court evaluated the parties’ respective economic

circumstances and separate property interests. Based on wife’s

22 income, which consisted primarily of social security benefits, the

court found that it was unlikely that she could cover the property’s

substantial mortgage obligation if awarded the property.

Conversely, the court found that if it awarded the Hermosa property

to husband, he would receive about two-thirds of the marital estate

because he was also awarded the marital portion of the SDIRA. In

order to equalize the two-thirds distribution, husband would need

to borrow against the home’s equity or liquidate some of the

SDIRA’s assets, which would carry significant tax liabilities.

¶ 50 Finally, the court analyzed the separate property value of the

SDIRA, including any increase or decrease in its value, when it

ordered the parties to sell the Hermosa property and equitably

allocated a percentage of the future sales proceeds to the parties.

Thus, to the extent that husband argues that his use of separate

property to acquire and improve the Hermosa property entitles him

to a greater share of its sale, we disagree.

¶ 51 In sum, the trial court acted within its discretion, and its

allocation of the Hermosa property’s future sales proceeds was

neither arbitrary nor inequitable.

23 III. Disposition

¶ 52 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.