Marrico v. Misericordia Hospital

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Marrico v. Misericordia Hospital

59 A.D.2d 680, 398 N.Y.S.2d 660, 1977 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13615

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 20, 1977

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 59 A.D.2d 680 (Marrico v. Misericordia Hospital) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Marrico v. Misericordia Hospital, 59 A.D.2d 680, 398 N.Y.S.2d 660, 1977 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13615 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977).

Pincite

Opinion

Appeal from order, Supreme Court, Bronx County, entered May 3, 1977, denying defendant-appellant’s application for an order (1) vacating the medical malpractice mediation panel’s finding, and (2) setting the matter down for a new hearing, unanimously dismissed, without costs and without disbursements, the order being nonappealable. "The legislative intent underlying section 148-a [Judiciary Law] is for an expeditious and informal resolution of the litigation. Such an intent would be thwarted were we to construe section 148-a as permitting appeals from what does not even amount to an interim determination. Furthermore, section 148-a permits counsel to explore the claimed underlying infirmities of the nonbinding panel determination at the trial of the action (see Judiciary Law, § 148-a, subd 8)” (Kletnieks v Brookhaven Mem. Assn., 53 AD2d 169, 174). Such orders are not even appealable by permission. (See CPLR 5701, subds [b], [c]; Lee v Chemway Corp, 20 AD2d 266; 7 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 5701.27; contra Kletnieks v Brookhaven Mem. Assn., supra, pp 174, 178.) We call to the attention of medical malpractice panels that the "liability” envisioned by subdivision 8 of section 148-a, as the predicate of a formal written recommendation, includes not only malpractice but also proximate cause (Kletnieks v Brookhaven Mem. Assn., supra). Concur—Birns, J. P., Lane, Markewich and Lynch, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Appeal from order, Supreme Court, Bronx County, entered May 3, 1977, denying defendant-appellant’s application for an order (1) vacating the medical malpractice mediation panel’s finding, and (2) setting the matter down for a new hearing, unanimously dismissed, without costs and without disbursements, the order being nonappealable. "The legislative intent underlying section 148-a [Judiciary Law] is for an expeditious and informal resolution of the litigation. Such an intent would be thwarted were we to construe section 148-a as permitting appeals from what does not even amount to an interim determination. Furthermore, section 148-a permits counsel to explore the claimed underlying infirmities of the nonbinding panel determination at the trial of the action (see Judiciary Law, § 148-a, subd 8)” (Kletnieks v Brookhaven Mem. Assn., 53 AD2d 169, 174). Such orders are not even appealable by permission. (See CPLR 5701, subds [b], [c]; Lee v Chemway Corp, 20 AD2d 266; 7 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 5701.27; contra Kletnieks v Brookhaven Mem. Assn., supra, pp 174, 178.) We call to the attention of medical malpractice panels that the "liability” envisioned by subdivision 8 of section 148-a, as the predicate of a formal written recommendation, includes not only malpractice but also proximate cause (Kletnieks v Brookhaven Mem. Assn., supra). Concur—Birns, J. P., Lane, Markewich and Lynch, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

59 A.D.2d 680, 398 N.Y.S.2d 660, 1977 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13615, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marrico-v-misericordia-hospital-nyappdiv-1977.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack