25CA1989 Marriage of Zunker 05-14-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1989 City and County of Denver District Court No. 11DR4141 Honorable Adam J. Espinosa, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Derek Zunker,
Appellee,
and
Sabrina Zunker,
Appellant.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART, ORDER AFFIRMED, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division I Opinion by JUDGE FOX J. Jones and Dunn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 14, 2026
Sherr Puttmann Akins Lamb PC, Tanya L. Akins, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Sabrina Zunker, Pro Se ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage proceeding involving Derek
Zunker (father) and Sabrina Zunker (mother), mother appeals from
the district court’s adoption of the magistrate’s order effectively
denying her pro se motion seeking the magistrate’s recusal. We
dismiss mother’s appeal in part and otherwise affirm. We also
award father his appellate attorney fees under section 13-17-102,
C.R.S. 2025, and we accordingly remand the case for the district
court to determine the reasonable amount of father’s attorney fees.
I. Background
¶2 The parties’ three-year marriage ended in 2012. They are the
parents of one child.
¶3 The parties originally shared equal parenting time. In
November 2017, a district court magistrate awarded father sole
decision-making responsibility and modified parenting time, with
father becoming the majority-time parent. In October 2020,
mother’s attorneys withdrew from the case.
¶4 Since October 2022, mother has engaged in a persistent
campaign of filing largely meritless pro se motions and other
requests for relief with the district court. In all, mother filed more
1 than twenty-five motions and other requests for relief between
October 2022 and September 2024.
¶5 Given mother’s barrage of pro se pleadings, in January 2024,
father moved to enjoin her from filing additional pleadings as a pro
se party. After holding a hearing, a district court magistrate
granted father’s motion and prohibited mother from filing any
further motions or other requests for relief without an attorney.
¶6 The magistrate cited mother’s numerous filings and found that
her conduct had been “egregious and harassing” because she had
been “us[ing] the judicial process to disrupt [father]’s life” and was
causing him to incur significant legal costs. The magistrate also
found that most of mother’s pro se filings did “not contain legal
authority, misstate[d] facts, and [were] repetitious.” Similarly, the
magistrate observed that mother “simply appeals every [m]agistrate
[o]rder [to the district court] as a matter of course,” and that the
arguments in her multiple petitions for review were “often unclear,
overlapping, circular, and recycled.”
¶7 Mother unsuccessfully petitioned for district court review, and
another division of this court later affirmed in In re Marriage of
Zunker, (Colo. App. No. 25CA0123, Oct. 23, 2025) (not published
2 pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). That division agreed that mother’s filings
were often meritless, given that they did not contain relevant legal
authority, were repetitious and circular, and otherwise contained
numerous arguments taken from previously denied motions. Id. at
¶ 19.
¶8 In January 2025, father also obtained an award of
approximately $80,000 in attorney fees against mother under
section 13-17-102 arising from her numerous frivolous filings. That
award of attorney fees has since been affirmed by a different
division of this court in In re Marriage of Zunker, (Colo. App. No.
25CA1431, May 14, 2026) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).
¶9 Undeterred by the existing order barring her from filing pro se
motions, on August 25, 2025, mother filed a motion seeking the
recusal of the magistrate assigned to her case. Mother’s motion
represented, at minimum, her third attempt to have the magistrate
recuse from the case. One day later, the magistrate issued an order
stating that mother’s motion had been “accepted in error” and
indicated that there would be “NO ACTION TAKEN,” effectively
denying the motion. After mother petitioned for district court
3 review, the reviewing district court judge adopted the magistrate’s
order because mother was barred from filing pro se.
II. Appellate Review of Magistrate Orders
¶ 10 Our review of a district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s
decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review. In re
Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 22. We must accept the
magistrate’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. In
re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 8. However, we review
questions of law de novo. Sheehan, ¶ 22.
III. Prior Court Orders
¶ 11 As best as we can discern, much of mother’s appeal is directed
at multiple other orders that significantly predate the magistrate’s
order effectively denying mother’s motion to recuse. Specifically,
mother repeatedly asks us to vacate orders issued years ago on
topics such as the court’s allocation of parental responsibilities,
father’s income for child support purposes, the adequacy of father’s
financial disclosures, and mother’s previous motions to recuse the
magistrate.
¶ 12 But mother’s attempt to appeal these prior orders is time
barred. An appellate court must always be satisfied that it has
4 jurisdiction to hear an appeal. Chavez v. Chavez, 2020 COA 70,
¶ 22. If a timely notice of appeal is not filed, we lack jurisdiction to
review the appeal. In re Marriage of Roddy, 2014 COA 96, ¶ 7; In re
Marriage of Buck, 60 P.3d 788, 789 (Colo. App. 2002). Specifically,
a notice of appeal must be filed “within 49 days” of the entry of a
final judgment or order. C.A.R. 4(a)(1). Moreover, when a
magistrate order is involved, an “[a]ppeal of an order or judgment of
a district court magistrate may not be taken to the appellate court
unless a timely petition for review has [first] been filed and decided”
by the district court. See C.R.M. 7(a)(11) (2025) (repealed 2026).
¶ 13 Here, mother’s notice of appeal — filed in October 2025 —
postdates by multiple years the various other orders that she now
asks us to vacate, and to the extent applicable, mother has not
identified where she sought timely district court review of those
orders. Thus, because mother did not timely seek our review of
those other orders in accordance with C.A.R. 4(a)(1) and C.R.M.
7(a)(11), we lack the jurisdiction to review those orders. Roddy, ¶ 7.
We thus dismiss mother’s appeal as to all orders except for the
district court’s October 14, 2025, order adopting the magistrate’s
order denying mother’s recusal motion, and we decline to address
5 the numerous arguments that mother makes related to those prior
orders.
IV. Denial of Mother’s Motion to Recuse the Magistrate
¶ 14 While most of mother’s appeal is directed at old court orders,
mother advances a few arguments which, giving her the benefit of
the doubt, can be construed as challenging the magistrate’s order
that effectively denied her recusal motion. However, we are not
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25CA1989 Marriage of Zunker 05-14-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1989 City and County of Denver District Court No. 11DR4141 Honorable Adam J. Espinosa, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Derek Zunker,
Appellee,
and
Sabrina Zunker,
Appellant.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART, ORDER AFFIRMED, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division I Opinion by JUDGE FOX J. Jones and Dunn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 14, 2026
Sherr Puttmann Akins Lamb PC, Tanya L. Akins, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Sabrina Zunker, Pro Se ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage proceeding involving Derek
Zunker (father) and Sabrina Zunker (mother), mother appeals from
the district court’s adoption of the magistrate’s order effectively
denying her pro se motion seeking the magistrate’s recusal. We
dismiss mother’s appeal in part and otherwise affirm. We also
award father his appellate attorney fees under section 13-17-102,
C.R.S. 2025, and we accordingly remand the case for the district
court to determine the reasonable amount of father’s attorney fees.
I. Background
¶2 The parties’ three-year marriage ended in 2012. They are the
parents of one child.
¶3 The parties originally shared equal parenting time. In
November 2017, a district court magistrate awarded father sole
decision-making responsibility and modified parenting time, with
father becoming the majority-time parent. In October 2020,
mother’s attorneys withdrew from the case.
¶4 Since October 2022, mother has engaged in a persistent
campaign of filing largely meritless pro se motions and other
requests for relief with the district court. In all, mother filed more
1 than twenty-five motions and other requests for relief between
October 2022 and September 2024.
¶5 Given mother’s barrage of pro se pleadings, in January 2024,
father moved to enjoin her from filing additional pleadings as a pro
se party. After holding a hearing, a district court magistrate
granted father’s motion and prohibited mother from filing any
further motions or other requests for relief without an attorney.
¶6 The magistrate cited mother’s numerous filings and found that
her conduct had been “egregious and harassing” because she had
been “us[ing] the judicial process to disrupt [father]’s life” and was
causing him to incur significant legal costs. The magistrate also
found that most of mother’s pro se filings did “not contain legal
authority, misstate[d] facts, and [were] repetitious.” Similarly, the
magistrate observed that mother “simply appeals every [m]agistrate
[o]rder [to the district court] as a matter of course,” and that the
arguments in her multiple petitions for review were “often unclear,
overlapping, circular, and recycled.”
¶7 Mother unsuccessfully petitioned for district court review, and
another division of this court later affirmed in In re Marriage of
Zunker, (Colo. App. No. 25CA0123, Oct. 23, 2025) (not published
2 pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). That division agreed that mother’s filings
were often meritless, given that they did not contain relevant legal
authority, were repetitious and circular, and otherwise contained
numerous arguments taken from previously denied motions. Id. at
¶ 19.
¶8 In January 2025, father also obtained an award of
approximately $80,000 in attorney fees against mother under
section 13-17-102 arising from her numerous frivolous filings. That
award of attorney fees has since been affirmed by a different
division of this court in In re Marriage of Zunker, (Colo. App. No.
25CA1431, May 14, 2026) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).
¶9 Undeterred by the existing order barring her from filing pro se
motions, on August 25, 2025, mother filed a motion seeking the
recusal of the magistrate assigned to her case. Mother’s motion
represented, at minimum, her third attempt to have the magistrate
recuse from the case. One day later, the magistrate issued an order
stating that mother’s motion had been “accepted in error” and
indicated that there would be “NO ACTION TAKEN,” effectively
denying the motion. After mother petitioned for district court
3 review, the reviewing district court judge adopted the magistrate’s
order because mother was barred from filing pro se.
II. Appellate Review of Magistrate Orders
¶ 10 Our review of a district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s
decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review. In re
Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 22. We must accept the
magistrate’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. In
re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 8. However, we review
questions of law de novo. Sheehan, ¶ 22.
III. Prior Court Orders
¶ 11 As best as we can discern, much of mother’s appeal is directed
at multiple other orders that significantly predate the magistrate’s
order effectively denying mother’s motion to recuse. Specifically,
mother repeatedly asks us to vacate orders issued years ago on
topics such as the court’s allocation of parental responsibilities,
father’s income for child support purposes, the adequacy of father’s
financial disclosures, and mother’s previous motions to recuse the
magistrate.
¶ 12 But mother’s attempt to appeal these prior orders is time
barred. An appellate court must always be satisfied that it has
4 jurisdiction to hear an appeal. Chavez v. Chavez, 2020 COA 70,
¶ 22. If a timely notice of appeal is not filed, we lack jurisdiction to
review the appeal. In re Marriage of Roddy, 2014 COA 96, ¶ 7; In re
Marriage of Buck, 60 P.3d 788, 789 (Colo. App. 2002). Specifically,
a notice of appeal must be filed “within 49 days” of the entry of a
final judgment or order. C.A.R. 4(a)(1). Moreover, when a
magistrate order is involved, an “[a]ppeal of an order or judgment of
a district court magistrate may not be taken to the appellate court
unless a timely petition for review has [first] been filed and decided”
by the district court. See C.R.M. 7(a)(11) (2025) (repealed 2026).
¶ 13 Here, mother’s notice of appeal — filed in October 2025 —
postdates by multiple years the various other orders that she now
asks us to vacate, and to the extent applicable, mother has not
identified where she sought timely district court review of those
orders. Thus, because mother did not timely seek our review of
those other orders in accordance with C.A.R. 4(a)(1) and C.R.M.
7(a)(11), we lack the jurisdiction to review those orders. Roddy, ¶ 7.
We thus dismiss mother’s appeal as to all orders except for the
district court’s October 14, 2025, order adopting the magistrate’s
order denying mother’s recusal motion, and we decline to address
5 the numerous arguments that mother makes related to those prior
orders.
IV. Denial of Mother’s Motion to Recuse the Magistrate
¶ 14 While most of mother’s appeal is directed at old court orders,
mother advances a few arguments which, giving her the benefit of
the doubt, can be construed as challenging the magistrate’s order
that effectively denied her recusal motion. However, we are not
persuaded by mother’s contentions.
¶ 15 It is apparent to us that the magistrate took no action on
mother’s motion to recuse because of the existing order barring
mother from filing pro se. The reviewing district court judge
likewise cited that order enjoining mother from filing pro se when
adopting the magistrate’s order. And that order prohibiting mother
from “filing any further motions or requests for relief” while pro se
was unambiguous and plainly applied to mother’s pro se motion
seeking the magistrate’s recusal. Thus, the magistrate did not err
in effectively rejecting mother’s motion on that basis.
¶ 16 Likewise, to the extent that mother now asks us to vacate that
existing order prohibiting her from filing pro se, we decline to do so
given that it was affirmed by another division of this court in
6 Zunker, No. 25CA0123, slip. op. at ¶ 30, and she hasn’t given us
any reason to exercise our discretion to depart from what is now the
law of the case. See Core-Mark Mid-Continent, Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp.,
2012 COA 120, ¶ 10 (the law of the case is discretionary when
applied to a court’s own prior decisions, and recognizing
circumstances in which refusing to follow a prior decision of the
same court would be justified). And we otherwise lack the authority
to entertain in the first instance a request from mother to lift the
order barring her from filing pro se motions. See In re Marriage of
Evans, 2021 COA 141, ¶ 11 (“Our jurisdiction is limited to review of
final, appealable judgments or orders.”).
¶ 17 Mother also seems to assert that she was denied due process
in the specific context of her recusal motion because the order
prohibiting her from filing pro se has effectively insulated the
magistrate from disqualification on account of the biases alleged by
mother. See People v. Acosta, 2014 COA 82, ¶ 92 (recognizing that
a judge must be free of any bias, prejudice, or interest directed
toward a party).
¶ 18 Due process requires, at a minimum, notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Van Sickle v. Boyes, 797 P.2d 1267, 1273-
7 74 (Colo. 1990); In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 329 (Colo.
App. 2007). We interpret mother’s argument as an allegation that
the order preventing her from filing pro has denied her a
meaningful opportunity to be heard as to her motion to recuse the
magistrate. But we are not persuaded for multiple reasons.
¶ 19 To start, mother is not barred from seeking the recusal of the
magistrate. Instead, mother is enjoined from seeking the
magistrate’s recusal while mother is pro se. And critically, when the
reviewing district court judge originally adopted the magistrate’s
order enjoining mother from filing pro se, the reviewing judge
specifically found that mother could afford an attorney to represent
her, yet mother nevertheless continued to go without counsel.
Therefore, if mother wished to file a motion to disqualify the
magistrate on account of alleged bias, mother in fact had an
adequate remedy, which was to hire an attorney to act her behalf.
¶ 20 Moreover, mother has not cited any legal authority supporting
her assertion that her due process rights were violated, nor has she
developed her contention beyond restating her grievances with the
magistrate. We accordingly decline to further address mother’s
undeveloped contentions. See Barnett v. Elite Props. of Am., Inc.,
8 252 P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010) (“We will not consider a bald legal
proposition presented without argument or development.”).
¶ 21 Mother also appears to challenge the rejection of her motion to
recuse based on the concepts of cumulative error and structural
error. Although these concepts are applicable in criminal appeals,
they have not been extended to civil cases, and we therefore reject
her claim that reversal is warranted under such concepts in this
civil proceeding. See Acierno v. Garyfallou, 2016 COA 91, ¶ 66;
People in Interest of E.R.S., 2019 COA 40, ¶ 37.
¶ 22 Lastly, to the extent that mother asks us to independently
remove the magistrate from the case based on her allegations of
bias, we again may not entertain such a request because we are a
court of limited jurisdiction. Evans, ¶ 11.
V. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs
¶ 23 Relying on C.A.R. 38 and 39, plus section 13-17-102, father
seeks his appellate attorney fees and costs. Under section 13-17-
102, he asserts that mother’s appeal is substantially frivolous,
groundless and vexatious. We agree that an award of appellate
attorney fees and costs is warranted.
9 ¶ 24 Under section 13-17-102(2), a court “shall award” reasonable
attorney fees “against any attorney or party who has brought . . . a
civil action, either in whole or in part, that the court determines
lacked substantial justification.” An action lacks substantial
justification when it is “substantially frivolous, substantially
groundless, or substantially vexatious.” § 13-17-101.5(1), C.R.S.
2025. However, a court cannot assess fees against a pro se party
“unless the court finds that the party clearly knew or reasonably
should have known that the party’s action or defense, or any part of
the action or defense, was substantially frivolous, substantially
groundless, or substantially vexatious.” § 13-17-102(6).
¶ 25 An appeal may be frivolous in one of two ways: as filed or as
argued. Calvert v. Mayberry, 2019 CO 23, ¶ 45. An appeal is
frivolous as filed if “there are no legitimately appealable issues
because the judgment below ‘was so plainly correct and the legal
authority contrary to the appellant’s position so clear.’” Id. (quoting
Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 292 (Colo. App. 2006)).
An appeal is frivolous as argued if “the appellant ‘fail[s] to set forth
. . . a coherent assertion of error, supported by legal authority.’” Id.
(quoting Castillo, 148 P.3d at 292) (alteration in original).
10 ¶ 26 Mother’s appeal is both frivolous as filed and as argued. First,
it is frivolous as filed because it largely fails to present legitimately
appealable issues given that our review of most of the issues
identified in the opening brief is time-barred. Mother knew or
reasonably should have known that she may not untimely appeal
years-old orders because she has been previously sanctioned in the
district court for her nonstop attempts to relitigate long-settled
issues, and her attempts to untimely appeal such orders have been
dismissed by this court in previous appeals. See In re Marriage of
Zunker, slip. op. at ¶¶ 12-15 (Colo. App. No. 24CA1180, May 1,
2025) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).
¶ 27 Moreover, the magistrate’s order that effectively denied
mother’s recusal motion was plainly consistent with the existing
order that unambiguously prohibited mother, with no exceptions,
from filing any motions or requests for relief while pro se. That
prohibition was then upheld by another division of this court in
Zunker, No. 25CA0123, slip. op. at ¶ 30, mere days after mother
filed her notice of appeal in this proceeding. Yet, mother
nevertheless persisted in prosecuting this appeal, in which she, in
11 effect, seeks to bypass the order enjoining her from filing pro se
despite the affirmance of the same in Zunker, No. 25CA0123.
¶ 28 Moreover, a significant portion of mother’s appeal is frivolous
as argued because it consists of a laundry list of her grievances
against the magistrate and father’s counsel, unrelated to the
magistrate’s order denying her motion to recuse. These grievances,
which mother presents with minimal legal authority, are largely
related to her dissatisfaction with prior court orders. Mother’s
attempt to challenge this litany of issues was already rejected in
Zunker, No. 25CA0123, slip. op. at ¶¶ 22-25.
¶ 29 For similar reasons, mother’s attempt to relitigate, for the
umpteenth time, prior claims that were previously unsuccessful in
this court and the district court is substantially vexatious. See GHP
Horwath, P.C. v. Kazazian, 2024 CO 8, ¶ 2 (characterizing “fruitless
attempts at relitigating long-decided issues” as “vexatious
behavior”). Therefore, mother should know by now that her ongoing
efforts to relitigate these previously resolved issues, such as child
support and husband’s financial disclosures, are without merit.
See Rose L. Watson Revocable Trust v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 2014 COA
11, ¶¶ 25-26 (awarding appellate fees where a party “continue[d] to
12 assert frivolous arguments even after courts ha[d] repeatedly
declared that those arguments are frivolous”).
¶ 30 In sum, we conclude that an award of attorney fees against
mother is warranted. We exercise our discretion under C.A.R. 39.1
to remand the case to the district court for a determination of
father’s reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal. Lastly, we
award father his costs in connection with C.A.R. 39(a)(1) and (2).
VI. Disposition
¶ 31 The order is affirmed and the case is remanded to district
court for further proceedings regarding the amount of father’s
reasonable appellate attorney fees under section 13-17-102 and the
amount of father’s appellate costs under C.A.R. 39. We dismiss the
portions of mother’s appeal that challenge orders predating the
district court’s October 14, 2025, order.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE DUNN concur.