Filed 6/22/15 Marriage of Zhang and Zheng CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re the Marriage of JIANYI ZHANG and LUO ZHENG. D067441 JIANYI ZHANG,
Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. FAMRS1101550)
v.
LUO ZHENG,
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Michael
Knish, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Ricky W. Poon and Ricky W. Poon for Appellant.
Law Offices of C. Stephanie Chen and Chaoyi Stephanie Chen for Respondent.
Luo Zheng (Luo)1 appeals a family court's spousal support order following its
grant of Jianyi Zhang's (Zhang) petition for nullity of marriage. Luo contends the family
1 Following appellant's practice in her brief, we refer to her by her first name to avoid confusion. court erred by: (1) failing to award her spousal support under the criteria set forth in
Family Code2 section 4320; (2) "disregarding" the parties' stipulation that Luo be
regarded as a putative spouse; (3) failing to rule the disputed residence in Chino Hills,
California (Chino Hills property) was Zhang's gift to Luo; (4) failing to apply proper
tracing rules to determine the source of funds used to purchase the Chino Hills property;
and (5) finding Zhang was entitled to reimbursement under section 2640, in light of
Zhang's act of bigamy. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2011, Zhang filed a petition for nullity of marriage based on bigamy. He
and Luo were married on December 29, 2010. The parties stipulated that they separated
less than two months later, on February 17, 2011. In the petition, Zhang represented that
the couple had no children. Zhang claimed the Chino Hills property and other property
as his separate property. Luo also filed for nullity of marriage, claiming the Chino Hills
property as her separate property. Both parties testified at the hearing through
interpreters.
Zhang testified that in 1997, Luo started working as his secretary when he was
general manager of a company in Shanghai, China. He claimed that when he started
dating Luo in approximately 1998, she knew he was married to Wu Lei, with whom he
remained married at the time of the hearing on this matter. He testified that in 2009, he
purchased the Chino Hills property for $401,000 with funds he had borrowed from a
2 All statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise stated. 2 friend. Zhang claimed he and seven individuals he enlisted in China wired approximately
$49,980 each to Luo's bank account in the United States. Zhang explained: "Because
according to the foreign exchange control regulations of China, a Chinese citizen is
allowed only to remit to a foreign country one year, $50,000 U.S. dollars in total. That is
why all these people were found for that purpose. Of course I, myself, was included."
Zhang executed a power of attorney authorizing Luo to buy the Chino Hills property on
his behalf. The escrow company's "Buyer's Final Settlement Statement" records Zhang
as buyer of the Chino Hills property. A title deed introduced into evidence shows Zhang
obtained title to it as a single man on August 19, 2009.
Zhang testified that since Luo immigrated to the United States in March or April
2008, he gave her $1,000 monthly for her living expenses. On December 29, 2010, he
and Luo got married in Las Vegas, Nevada. On January 12, 2011, Zhang quitclaimed the
Chino Hills property to Zhang and Luo as joint tenants. Zhang filed in the family court
an income and expense declaration representing that his monthly income was 3,500
Renminbis (RMB), the Chinese currency. The parties stipulated that as of March 10,
2013, the Chino Hills property was appraised at $370,000.
Luo testified that since 1997, she and Zhang were "involved in a girlfriend-
boyfriend relationship. And he started giving me money." She stated Zhang supported
her with approximately $1,500 monthly for 13 years. When she moved to the United
States in 2008, she opened her separate bank account here. She testified that on her
return visit to Shanghai in October 2008, Zhang promised to marry her and buy her a
house in California as a marital gift. She explained: "Therefore, to show his sincerity,
3 [Zhang] deposit [sic] $50,000 to my personal account . . . and I told him to give the rest
of the $350,000 to my father." She added, "First of all, my dad would be a witness to
testify that [Zhang] had given me the money as a gift. It is a free gift and voluntarily [sic]
gift. Number two, my dad could find seven individuals to wire the money to my
account." Luo claimed she paid $396,606 for the Chino Hills property with funds from
her separate bank account.
Luo testified she initially planned to buy the Chino Hills property in her own
name but Zhang opposed, saying that since they were getting married, he wanted his
name on the deed: "[H]e was not sure I was going to marry him or not. And now he's
given me the money, the house. And I may not marry him. So he was not feeling
comfortable doing so. So he decided to have all the documents sent to Shanghai . . . so
he could sign his name on the documents."
In support of her argument the Chino Hills property was a gift to her, Luo relies on
emails Zhang sent to her referring to it as the "bridal home" and "our house," and
declaring himself "ready to welcome my bride." Luo testified she was currently
conducting "internet business," and earning between one and two thousand dollars
monthly.
In its July 2013 ruling, the court entered a judgment of nullity on the ground
Zhang was engaged in a bigamous marriage, and terminated jurisdiction to order spousal
support. It acknowledged the parties had stipulated to accord Luo putative spouse status:
"Initially, the litigation focused on [Luo's] knowledge of the bigamy and thus her
potential status as a putative spouse. However, at trial, counsel stipulated that [Luo]
4 should have putative spouse status." The court continued: "A putative spouse is entitled
to spousal support in a nullity case, pursuant to [] section 2254. . . . In spite of the
stipulation, it is appropriate to consider the facts underlying [Luo's] situation in this case,
in addition to the [section] 4320 permanent support factors, to determine the
appropriateness of such an award."3
In analyzing the section 4320 factors, the court declined to award spousal support
to either party, ruling: "[] Section 4320 does not help [Luo]. While it is true that Zhang
may make a much greater income than [Luo], and have many more assets than she does,
the fact remains that this marriage was of [two] months or less in duration. Mr. Zhang
did financially support [Luo] for years; however, this was done voluntarily and under no
promise or legal obligation. When [Zhang] decided to end the relationship, he ended the
support, although [Luo] did continue to live rent-free in the Chino Hills home. [Luo] had
already planned to move to the United States and has worked for many years and
3 The court explained its view regarding Luo's knowledge Zhang was married to Wu Lei: "The court is sympathetic to [Luo's] situation. These parties had engaged in a 13[-plus-]year relationship, and Mr. Zhang no doubt did assure [Luo] that he would divorce his wife in China and marry her. . . . However, when [Luo] married another person knowing that that other person was married to someone else, she assumed the risk that her marriage to that other person would be annulled and she would receive nothing. It would be far different if she had no idea of [Zhang's] other marriage, but such is not the case here. [¶] The situation would also be different if [Zhang] promised to marry [Luo] while secretly intending not to do so. However, the evidence in this case indicates that Mr. Zhang was planning to divorce [Wu Lei] and marry [Luo], but backed out when [Luo] failed to end her relationship with [another man]. [¶] Therefore the court is reluctant, even before considering the [section] 4320 factors, to award spousal support to someone who knowingly entered into a bigamous marriage."
5 therefore has the skills to support herself. [¶] [Luo] did testify to health problems related
to this case, and she stated that the health issues, anxiety, and depression make her unable
to support herself. However, while sympathetic, the court simply can find no legal basis
to require [Zhang] to continue to support her over two years after separation, with only 60
or less days of marriage prior to that separation, especially in light of her knowledge of
the situation she was getting into."
The court's ruling on the division of the community property acknowledged the
stipulation: "Both parties agree that, based on [Luo's] putative spouse status, [she] may
be entitled to the same share of any community property as if the marriage were valid."
The court explained: "The issue of the . . . home in Chino Hills was the driving force
behind this litigation. [Zhang] transferred funds from China to [Luo's] American bank
account and gave [Luo] power of attorney to allow her to purchase this home in 2009
prior to their wedding. The home was originally in [Zhang's] name as a single man. In
January 2011, after the wedding, the home was placed in both parties' names as husband
and wife, joint tenants. [Luo] has resided in the home since separation."
The court outlined the parties' opposing views regarding the ownership of the
Chino Hills property: "[Luo] attempted to rebut the presumption [that the Chino Hills
property was Zhang's separate property based on his originally holding title to it as a
single man] by arguing that the home was meant as a gift to her from the very beginning.
She testified that she contributed the deposit out of her own money and that all of the
$396,600 used to close the deal was money sent by Mr. Zhang to her bank account as a
gift to be used to purchase her home. Mr. Zhang had no power of attorney over her funds
6 or her bank account, and therefore the money was hers to use as she saw fit. She also
stated that [Zhang] wanted the home as their bridal house and bought it solely for her
because she was marrying him. She had originally intended to put the home in her name
only, but Mr. Zhang insisted on ownership because he was unsure she would marry him.
She agreed to put it in his name because she trusted him. [¶] [Zhang] stated that he
bought the home as an investment, as American real estate was in a slump and he felt he
could get a good deal. The monies for the home were all paid out of his funds, and he
only used [Luo] as an agent because she was actually in the United States and had told
him that the escrow company insisted that he give her authority to consummate the
transaction. He gave her power of attorney to buy the house for him."
The court made its credibility determination: "The court suspects that the truth
lies somewhere in the middle of these positions. It is doubtful that [Zhang] bought this
house only as an investment. Clearly, he wanted to marry [Luo] very much, and this
house would be a great place for them to share their lives together in California.
However, a gift can only be found when there is a clear transfer of property with an intent
to do so. In this case, there is no evidence that Mr. Zhang intended to give this home to
[Luo], and the title clearly indicates otherwise. The court finds that there is no proof that
[Luo] contributed anything to the purchase of the home other than money given to her by
[Zhang]. [¶] Consequently, there is no rebuttal to the title presumption at the time of the
original purchase, and the home was bought as [Zhang's] separate property."
The court next found "that the transmutation is valid and the Chino Hills residence
is quasi-marital property, the equity of which is to be divided equally, as with community
7 property." The court continued: "The problem for [Luo] comes when running the
numbers. The community is entitled to the difference between the value at time of the
transmutation [$368,000] and the time of separation or trial [$370,000]. Here, that
amount is $2,000, and thus [Luo] is entitled to $1,000. [¶] However, as [Zhang] argues,
under [] Section 2640, he is entitled to reimbursement of all separate property which he
contributed, up to the value at time of the quitclaim deed. Since he paid for the entire
home [over $400,000], out of his separate property, the community share must pay him
for his contributions. Obviously, the $1,000 due to [Luo] is eliminated by this
reimbursement."
The court denied Luo's claim she was entitled to reimbursement for remodeling
and improving the Chino Hills property. It also denied Zhang's claim for reimbursement
for the reasonable rental value of the home for the approximately two and a half years in
which Luo occupied it following their separation "[b]ecause [Zhang] is not a putative
spouse and because he entered into this marriage knowing he was already married to
another woman, the court chooses not to make this award." The court ordered Luo to
quitclaim the Chino Hills property to Zhang.
In ruling on Luo's attorney fees motion, the court relied on the parties' stipulation:
"[Luo] requested that [Zhang] pay $50,000 in her attorney fees. In considering this issue,
the court faces a dilemma: Under [] section 2255, the court may not award attorney's fees
to a party to a nullity, such as [Luo], who had knowledge of the other party's existing
marriage. On the other hand, the parties stipulated that she is a putative spouse. The
court concludes it would be unfair to apply [section] 2255 in opposition to a trial
8 stipulation, and therefore finds that she is eligible for an attorney's fees award under []
sections 2030-2032."
The court discussed the parties' respective incomes in the context of Luo's request
for attorney fees: "In applying the factors of [sections 2030 thru 2032], the court finds
difficulty in determining either party's income. Mr. Zhang claims a modest monthly
income from his job . . . but his lifestyle and some of the e[-]mail communications [such
as the one indicating he was in a million-dollar club in China], as well as the speculation
of [Luo], who worked with him in the company at one point, suggest that his income may
be much higher. [Luo] indicates no income, but she also testified that she does some
internet sales. Consequently the court does not really know what each party makes. [¶]
However, it is clear that [Zhang] makes significantly more than [Luo, who] does not have
the ability to pay her attorney[.]" The court ordered Zhang to pay Luo $15,000 in
attorney fees.
DISCUSSION
I.
Luo contends the family court erred by failing to evaluate all of the section 4320
factors. She specifically claims the court failed to consider "[t]he extent to which the
earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the standard of living established
during the marriage" (§ 4320, subd. (a)); "[t]he marketable skills of the supported party;
the job market for those skills; the time and expenses required for the supported party to
acquire the appropriate education or training to develop those skills; and the possible
need for retraining or education to acquire other, more marketable skills or employment"
9 (§ 4320, subd. (a)(2)); and the needs of each party based on the standard of living
established during the marriage. Luo adds, "The evidence at trial clearly showed that
[she] did not need to go to work because Zhang had provided support to [her] for about
$1,500 to $2,000 per month for about 13 years."
In ordering permanent spousal support, " 'the trial court must consider and weigh
all of the circumstances enumerated in [section 4320], to the extent they are relevant to
the case before it. [Citations.] The first of the enumerated circumstances, the marital
standard of living, is relevant as a reference point against which the other statutory
factors are to be weighed. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Other relevant statutory factors
include the supporting spouse's ability to pay; the needs of each party, based on the
marital standard of living; the duration of the marriage; the age and health of the parties;
the balance of hardships to the parties; and the goal that the supported party be self-
supporting within a reasonable period of time." (In re Marriage of Williamson (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1316.) After weighing all those factors, the court may "fix
spousal support at an amount greater than, equal to or less than what the supported spouse
may require to maintain the marital standard of living, in order to achieve a just and
reasonable result under the facts and circumstances of the case." (In re Marriage of
Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 475.) "In balancing the applicable statutory factors,
the trial court has discretion to determine the appropriate weight to accord each." (In re
Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 283.)
Luo's contention that the trial court did not consider all of the section 4320 factors
is inconsistent with the general principle of appellate practice that we presume that a
10 judgment or order of a lower court is correct. " 'All intendments and presumptions are
indulged to support [the judgment] on matters as to which the record is silent, and error
must be affirmatively shown.' " (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564;
see also In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130 ["under [Code of Civil
Procedure] section 634, the party must state any objection to the statement in order to
avoid an implied finding on appeal in favor of the prevailing party. . . . [I]f a party does
not bring such deficiencies to the trial court's attention, that party waives the right to
claim on appeal that the statement was deficient . . . and hence the appellate court will
imply findings to support the judgment." (Arceneaux, supra, at pp. 1133-1134, fn.
omitted.) Luo is correct that the family court agreed to prepare a statement of decision;
therefore, Luo was not required to request one. However, Luo did not request
clarification of the statement of decision to address the concerns she now raises.
In any event, as noted, the trial court's order mentioned certain section 4320
factors. It first acknowledged Zhang earned more and had more assets than Luo,
although it candidly admitted it did not exactly know what either Zhang or Luo earned.
Nevertheless, the court emphasized section 4320, subdivision (f), dealing with the
duration of the marriage, and reiterated that "this marriage was of [two] months or less in
duration." " 'In short-term marriages the duration of the marriage, considered alone,
will usually militate against any but short-term spousal support with a fixed termination
date . . . .' [Citation.] 'True, the length of the marriage is only one factor to be considered
in making a support award. [Citation.] But it is a substantial one. It is indicative of the
11 very essence of the union.' " (Hebbring v. Hebbring (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1266
[applying section 4320's predecessor statute].)
Applying section 4320, subdivision (a)(1) regarding the "marketable skills of the
supported party," the court pointed out Luo had worked for many years and therefore had
the skills necessary to support herself. This conclusion is supported by Luo's testimony
regarding her internet business, which earned her between one and two thousand dollars
in monthly income. The court also emphasized section 4320, subdivision (n), referring to
any other factors it determines are "just and equitable." The court found no legal basis to
require Zhang to continue supporting Luo two years after separation, in part because she
had continued to live rent-free in the Chino Hills home. We conclude the family court's
finding on this point is consistent with the legislative policy that the supported spouse
should make a good faith effort to become self-supporting. (See section 4320, subd. (l)
[even in short-term marriages, a "reasonable period of time" within which to achieve the
goal of self-support "generally shall be one-half the length of the marriage"].)
To the extent Luo sought to bolster her claim for spousal support by conflating the
standard of living that Zhang helped her maintain in the 13 years before marriage with
the standard she enjoyed in the approximately 50 days of marriage, the court did not err
by ruling that any consideration of premarriage support was foreclosed under California
law. (See In re Marriage of Bukaty (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 143, 149 [concluding that in
making a limited support award, the court properly refused to consider parties' lengthy
period of premarital cohabitation].)
12 Finally, Luo contends the family court disregarded the parties' stipulation that Luo
would be accorded putative spouse status, and instead discussed in its final ruling that
Luo knew of Zhang's marriage. We agree that discussion was not necessary to the family
court's resolution of the case. "A stipulation is 'An agreement between opposing counsel
. . . ordinarily entered into for the purpose of avoiding delay, trouble, or expense in the
conduct of the action,' [citation] and serves 'to obviate need for proof or to narrow range
of litigable issues' [citation] in a legal proceeding." (County of Sacramento v. Workers'
Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1118.) However, we point out that on
one issue the trial court used the stipulation to benefit Luo, granting her attorney fees
when it otherwise would not have been available to her. Moreover, we deem the trial
court's statements regarding Luo's knowledge of Zhang's previous marriage to be
harmless error and we do not consider them on this appeal. Instead, we rely solely on the
other aspects of the court's decision that were sufficiently based on section 4320 factors.
We review the family court's ruling, not its reasoning. (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996)
13 Cal.4th 25, 32.)
II.
Luo contends the trial court committed reversible error by finding that the Chino
Hills property was Zhang's separate property, rather than his gift to her. She points to the
following factors purportedly showing Zhang's donative intent: "[T]he money used to
purchase the Chino Property was transferred to Luo's bank account prior to marriage . . . ;
2) Luo's bank account was an individual bank account and Zhang had no rights to access
or control said bank account . . . ; 3) Zhang orally told Luo that the money was a gift to
13 Luo in contemplation of marriage . . . ; 4) Zhang's written e-mails to Luo [were] also
evidence the money transferred to Luo was for her to purchase the Chino property and
such intention was clearly shown by Zhang's statements and acts such as: a) 'decorate the
bridal home;' b) 'it is our house;' c) a house 'similar to ours;' and d) Zhang's subsequent
act by transferring to Luo the title as Husband and Wife, Joint Tenancy."
We review the family court's factual findings for substantial evidence and they
"will be upheld 'as long as [the family court's] determination is within the range of the
evidence presented.' " (In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 197.)
We do not reweigh the evidence or make determinations as to credibility. (Id. at pp. 204,
205.) "This court views the entire record in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party . . . . We must resolve all conflicts in the evidence and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the findings." (In re Marriage of Duffy (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 923,
931.) Luo has failed to demonstrate how the family court erred other than criticizing the
court for not crediting her evidence. She thus has failed to carry her burden to show
error, given the substantial evidence standard of review we are bound to apply.
The family court rejected Luo's testimony that Zhang gave her the house as a gift,
concluding no evidence supported that conclusion. Rather, it believed Zhang's testimony
he paid for the Chino Hills property out of his funds, and only gave Luo the power of
attorney to use those funds to buy the house for him. Further, Zhang gained title to the
property as his separate property, thus he was entitled to the statutory presumption it was
his separate property. We do not reweigh the evidence, but are satisfied substantial
evidence, in the form of Zhang's testimony and the title deed, support the court's finding.
14 As stated in Evidence Code section 662: "The owner of the legal title to property
is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted
only by clear and convincing proof." Evidence Code section 662 codifies the common
law " 'form of title' " presumption under which "the description in a deed as to how title is
held is presumed to reflect the actual ownership interests in the property." (In re
Marriage of Brooks (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 176, 184-185, disapproved on other grounds
in In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1495; see In re Marriage of Haines
(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 292 [summarizing history of Evidence Code section 662].)
On appeal, we review the trial court's determination that the Evidence Code section 662
presumption was rebutted for substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Ruelas (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 339, 345.)
We reach the same conclusion on Luo's contention the court erred by ignoring
tracing rules regarding the source of funds used to buy the Chino Hills property. Citing
no authority, she contends: "Zhang's transfer of the Chino Property to both Luo and
Zhang as joint tenants demonstrates that the Property was actually a gift to Luo. . . . It is
worth noting that [her] name as on as a joint tenant [on the title deed] does not diminish
the inference that the parties intended the Chino property to be [her] separate property."
Luo repeats her claim that Zhang gave her a gift by transferring the funds to buy the
Chino Hills property to her bank account through several wire transfers. But the family
court rejected that claim, finding no evidence Zhang intended to give Luo a gift. The
record supports that conclusion.
15 Luo provides us no basis in the record or in law for her claim that "Zhang's
transfer of the Chino Property to both Luo and Zhang as joint tenants demonstrates that"
the parties "intended the Chino property to be [her] separate property." We therefore
reject the contention.
III.
Luo contends the trial court erred by finding Zhang was entitled to reimbursement
under section 2640: "[T]here is no California case law or statutory authority to suggest
that [] section 2640's reimbursement would apply to Zhang in a nullity of marriage as a
result of Zhang's bigamy. [¶] In fact, it is against California's public policy to protect the
interest of a foreign citizen who has committed bigamy over a citizen of its own state.
Moreover, Zhang clearly has unclean hands but seeks the protection of [] section 2640 for
reimbursement of all money from his putative spouse, Luo." Luo adds, "Under a
[section] 2640 reimbursement analysis, [she] never agreed in writing to waive her claim
to the title of the property. The evidence shows that [she] paid for the entire purchase
price from her separate bank account before marriage and as a putative spouse, [she] is
entitled to the full reimbursement under [] section 2640."
To the extent Luo now contends section 2640 is inapplicable to this case, the
contention is forfeited under the doctrine of invited error. In Luo's trial brief, she argued,
she was entitled to "the ownership interest of all community or quasi-community
property pursuant to . . . section 2640." She elaborated: "Based upon the clear statutory
language of [ ] section 2640, the Court will clearly see that there are triable issues of
material fact relating to the Chino Hills Property. These triable issues will be related to
16 the source and character of money used to purchase the Chino Hills property; whether
money wired by [Zhang] to [Luo] is a 'gift' and became [Luo's] separate property;
whether the source and character of money used for the maintenance of the Chino Hills
property after its purchase (property tax, maintenance, household expenses, etc.) came
from [Luo] or [Zhang's] separate property; whether [Luo] is entitled to one[-]half the
Chino Hills Property because of [Zhang's] quitclaim to [Luo] as a 'Joint Tenancy';
whether [Zhang] did make a contribution to the Chino Hills Property; and whether [Luo]
is entitled to the Chino Hills property under the putative spouse doctrine." Luo's counsel
made the same arguments in closing arguments at the hearing. (See Norgart v. Upjohn
Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 403 [doctrine of invited error rests on the principle that
" '[w]here a party by his conduct induces the commission of error, he is estopped from
asserting it as a ground for reversal' on appeal"].)
In any event, the court did not err by relying on section 2640 to trace the parties'
contributions to acquisition of the Chino Hills property, which it deemed as quasi-marital
property: "Both parties agree that, based on [Luo's] putative spouse status, [she] may be
entitled to the same share of any community property as if the marriage were valid."
Section 2640, subdivision (b) provides: "In the division of the community estate
under this division, unless a party has made a written waiver of the right to
reimbursement . . . , the party shall be reimbursed for the party's contributions to the
acquisition of the property of the community property estate to the extent the party traces
the contributions to a separate property source." "The amount of reimbursement
recoverable is the value of the separate property contributions at the time they were
17 made." (In re Marriage of Cochran (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1057.) "Commingling
of separate and community property does not alter the status of the separate property
interest so long as it can be traced to its separate property source." (Ibid.) "Whether the
spouse claiming a separate property interest has adequately met his or her burden of
tracing to a separate property source is a question of fact and the trial court's holding on
the matter must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence." (Id. at pp. 1057-1058.)
"Apparently, the Legislature concluded it was fairer to the contributing spouse to
permit reimbursement for separate property contributions upon dissolution of the
marriage. [Citation.] Thus, under section [2640], 'the tables are turned so that the
separate property interest is now preserved unless the right to reimbursement is waived in
writing.' " (In re Marriage of Perkal (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1198, 1201-1202 (Perkal )
[discussing predecessor statute to Family Code section 2640, former Civil Code section
4800.2].) To establish a waiver of the right of reimbursement, a spouse must demonstrate
that the other spouse actually intended to relinquish the right to reimbursement or acted
" 'so inconsistent with the intent to enforce th[e] right in question as to induce a
reasonable belief that it has been relinquished.' " (Perkal, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p.
1203.)
Quasi-marital property is "property acquired during the union which would have
been community property or quasi-community property if the union had not been void or
voidable." (§ 2251, subd. (a)(2); see Estate of Leslie (1984) 37 Cal.3d 186, 191, fn. 5;
Estate of Hafner (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1384, fn. 12.) "The theory of 'quasi-
marital property' equates property rights acquired during a putative marriage with
18 community property rights acquired during a legal marriage." (Estate of Vargas (1974)
36 Cal.App.3d 714, 717.)
Upon declaration of putative spouse status, the court is required to divide the
quasi-marital property as if it were community property. (§ 2251, subd. (a)(2); Marvin v.
Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 678, fn. 13.) Thus, "the share to which the putative spouse
is entitled is the same share of the quasi-marital property as the spouse would receive as
an actual and legal spouse if there had been a valid marriage, i.e., it shall be divided
equally between the parties." (Estate of Hafner, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 1384; see
§ 2550.)
Here, the court concluded Luo was a putative spouse and it complied with the
statutory requirements of treating the Chino Hills property as community property. There
is no evidence in the record that Zhang waived his right to reimbursement of his separate
property used to buy the Chino Hills property.
19 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
McINTYRE, J.