Marriage of Zahrebelnyi

Opinion

25CA1426 Marriage of Zahrebelnyi 09-17-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1426 El Paso County District Court No. 24DR32318 Honorable Sarah Zane, Judge

In re the Marriage of Julia Zahrebelna, Appellee, and Mykola Zahrebelnyi, Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV

Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE* Harris and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced September 17, 2026

Julia Zahrebelna, Pro Se Mykola Zahrebelnyi, Pro Se

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026.

¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Julia Zahrebelna (wife) and Mykola Zahrebelnyi (husband), husband appeals the district court’s permanent orders concerning the marital property division and maintenance. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2024, wife petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage. Following a permanent orders hearing, the district court divided the parties’ marital estate and denied husband’s request for maintenance.

II. Marital Property Division

¶3 We first consider and reject husband’s challenge to the marital property division.

¶4 Upon dissolution, a district court divides marital property in a way that is just and equitable, although such a division need not be equal. See § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2026; In re Marriage of Burford, 26 P.3d 550, 556 (Colo. App. 2001). When dividing marital property, section 14-10-113(1) requires the court to consider certain statutory factors such as the contributions of each spouse and each party’s respective economic circumstances, although weighing the factors is within the district court’s broad discretion

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and the court need not make specific findings on each factor. See In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 35 (Colo. 2001); In re Marriage of Powell, 220 P.3d 952, 959 (Colo. App. 2009).

¶5 We will not disturb a court’s division of property unless it clearly abuses its discretion. Powell, 220 P.3d at 954. A district court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law. In re Marriage of Herold, 2021 COA 16, ¶ 5.

¶6 When considering the parties’ respective contributions to the marriage, the district court found that wife had contributed more than husband to the parties’ retirement accounts and home in Colorado. The court also found that the parties had largely maintained separate finances and that husband had failed to share information about his finances with wife during both the marriage and the dissolution proceedings.

¶7 As best as we can ascertain, husband asserts that the district court ignored evidence of his marital contributions, such as his role as the primary caregiver for the parties’ child and his contributions to their Colorado home. Yet, husband has not cited, nor have we been able to locate, any place in the record where he presented

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evidence on these topics, and thus, we cannot say that the court erred by not considering these alleged contributions. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A) (requiring an appellant to identify “the precise location in the record where the issue was raised”); In re Marriage of Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶ 23 (parties must present relevant evidence to the court, and their failure to do so does not provide grounds for reversal).

¶8 Husband also argues that the district court failed to consider premarital funds he contributed to purchasing a home that the parties still owned in Ukraine. It is unclear whether husband is arguing that some portion of the Ukrainian home should be treated as his separate property or whether he is merely asserting that the court should have given more weight to his contributions when equitably dividing the marital estate. But either way, we perceive no error.

¶9 When dividing the Ukrainian home, the court acknowledged husband’s testimony that the home was purchased using at least some funds from his family. But the court also observed that husband had not provided any documentation to support his testimony, and therefore, the court ultimately credited wife’s

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testimony that the parties had jointly purchased the home during the marriage using their joint funds. So, the district court effectively rejected any claim that husband had used or contributed separate premarital funds when the parties purchased the home in Ukraine.

¶ 10 We decline to disturb the district court’s findings concerning the Ukrainian home because “credibility determinations and the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are matters within the sole discretion of the [district] court.” In re Marriage of Lewis, 66 P.3d 204, 207 (Colo. App. 2003). Thus, we reject husband’s invitation to, in effect, reweigh the evidence concerning the Ukrainian home in his favor. See In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (recognizing that even where “there is evidence in the record that could have supported a different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the district court”); People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-56 (Colo. 2010) (reversing when an appellate court “improperly substituted its judgment for that of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses and the weight, sufficiency, and probative value of the evidence”).

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III. Maintenance

¶ 11 Husband next challenges the district court’s refusal to award him maintenance. Specifically, he argues that the court failed to make sufficient findings under the maintenance statute, section 14-10-114, C.R.S. 2026. We are not persuaded.

¶ 12 The district court has broad discretion in deciding the amount and duration of a maintenance award, and, absent an abuse of that discretion, we will not reverse its decision. See § 14-10-114(2), (3)(e); In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 15; In re Marriage of Vittetoe, 2016 COA 71, ¶ 14.

¶ 13 Under section 14-10-114(3), the court must follow a specific process when awarding maintenance. In re Marriage of Stradtmann, 2021 COA 145, ¶ 28. “[T]he court must first make written or oral findings on each party’s gross income, the marital property apportioned to each party, each party’s financial resources, the reasonable financial need as established during the marriage, and the taxability of the maintenance awarded.” Herold, ¶ 25; see § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I).

¶ 14 Next, the court must determine the amount and term of maintenance, if any, that is equitable after considering the

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statutory advisory guidelines and a list of non-exclusive statutory factors. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(A), (3)(a)(II)(B), (3)(b), (3)(c); Wright,

¶ 15. Finally, before the court may award maintenance, it must find that the party seeking maintenance lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to them, to provide for their reasonable needs and is unable to support themself through appropriate employment. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(C), (3)(d).

¶ 15 While the district court has discretion to enter a fair and equitable maintenance award, it must “make specific written or oral findings in support of the amount and term of maintenance awarded.” § 14-10-114(3)(e); see In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9; In re Marriage of Garst, 955 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Colo. App. 1998) (“Factual findings are sufficient if they identify the evidence which the fact finder deemed persuasive and determinative of the issues raised.”).

¶ 16 Although the district court made only perfunctory findings concerning maintenance in the written permanent orders, it expressly incorporated its more detailed July 2, 2025, oral ruling, into the written permanent orders. See In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 9 n.1 (treating an “oral ruling as supplementing the

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written order”); In re Marriage of Cespedes, 895 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Colo. App. 1995) (considering a district court’s oral ruling in rejecting a contention that its findings and conclusions were inadequate to support its order).

¶ 17 Based on our review of the oral ruling, we are satisfied that the district court made adequate findings when denying husband maintenance. The court made initial findings as to the parties’ respective incomes, see § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A), and found that wife was earning $6,936 per month in the military. After making a negative inference against husband based on his failure to disclose his finances, the court found that husband was underemployed and imputed to him an income of $3,500 per month based on his prior earnings.

¶ 18 The court then made findings concerning the marital property apportioned to each party, see § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(B), observing that husband was being allocated no debt, both parties were receiving vehicles of approximately equal value, both parties would have at least $20,000 in cash, and the parties’ retirement accounts were being divided equally. Similarly, the court considered the parties’ respective financial resources and reasonable financial

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needs, see § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(C), (D), finding that each party maintained the ability to work and support themselves and that the parties had largely kept their finances separate and were able to support themselves with little help from the other party during the marriage.

¶ 19 As required by the statute, the court determined that the guideline maintenance amount was $505 per month from wife to husband and weighed the various statutory factors under section 14-10-114(3)(c). For instance, the court found that husband could meet his financial needs independently, even after factoring in his need to obtain new housing. Likewise, the court observed that the parties’ lifestyle during the marriage was modest and that the parties had been able to save some money by living frugally and within their means. The court also considered husband’s health and past employment history as a truck driver when determining that he had the ability to work full time to support himself.

¶ 20 Lastly, the court found that husband did not lack sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs and was able to support himself through appropriate employment. See § 14-10-114(3)(d). Accordingly, the

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court denied husband’s request for maintenance, explaining that he had largely provided for himself during the marriage and that he could continue to do so in the future.

¶ 21 Given these detailed findings, we cannot say that the district court failed to explain its maintenance decision under section 14-10-114. See Gibbs, ¶ 9; Garst, 955 P.2d at 1058. And while husband also asserts that the district court’s maintenance findings are somehow inconsistent with its determination of his income for child support purposes, we disagree given that the court imputed husband the same income of $3,500 when calculating child support.

IV. Due Process Violation

¶ 22 Husband next claims that the district court violated his due process rights because he “attempted to raise” a conflict-of-interest objection concerning wife’s attorney, but the court prevented him from “making a record” on that issue. However, “[i]t is axiomatic that issues not raised in or decided by a lower court will not be addressed for the first time on appeal,” Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v. Hannon L. Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61, ¶ 18, and here, there

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is no indication in the record that husband ever attempted to present a conflict-of-interest objection.

¶ 23 While husband cites his exchange with the court at the beginning of the permanent orders hearing, at no point during that exchange did he mention an alleged conflict of interest even though the court asked him if there were any preliminary issues that he wanted to address. Thus, we cannot say that husband was somehow prevented by the court from presenting a conflict-of-interest objection, and we decline to further address his unpreserved contention of error.

V. Failure to Consider Unspecified Evidence

¶ 24 We lastly reject husband’s assertion that the district court abused its discretion because it failed to consider and make findings on certain evidence. Husband has not specified what evidence the court supposedly failed to consider, nor has he provided any meaningful explanation as to how the court allegedly erred. We thus decline to further consider his undeveloped contention of error. See Sinclair Transp. Co. v. Sandberg, 2014 COA 76M, ¶ 74 (declining to address “bald assertions of error that lack any meaningful explanation or support in legal authority”). And

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where husband expands on such arguments in his reply brief, we also decline to address them. See In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 31.

VI. Disposition

¶ 25 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.