Marriage of Young

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 24, 2025
• Docket: 24CA2069
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA2069 Marriage of Young 07-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2069 Weld County District Court No. 19DR30175 Honorable Kimberly B. Schutt, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Briana Jurinski,

Appellant,

and

Joseph Young,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Tow and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 24, 2025

Rohweder Law Offices, Kerry P. Rohweder, Highlands Ranch, Colorado, for Appellant

No Appearance for Appellee ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage proceeding between Briana

Jurinski (wife) and Joseph Young (husband), wife appeals the

district court’s judgment (1) declining to hold husband in contempt

for failing to pay a first and second mortgage on the marital home

pursuant to temporary orders; (2) holding wife in contempt for

failing to refinance a trailer awarded to her as part of the court’s

permanent orders; and (3) declining to award attorney fees related

to the contempt proceedings. We affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 The parties married in July of 2003. They separated in 2019,

and the district court entered temporary orders in January 2020.

As part of the temporary orders, the court declined to order

maintenance. Instead, it ordered husband to continue paying the

first and second mortgages on the marital home, where wife and the

parties’ children were living, in an effort to maintain the status quo.

¶3 In April 2021, wife moved for a finding of contempt, alleging

that husband hadn’t paid the mortgages on the marital home after

he had secured a forbearance. Wife also claimed that husband

hadn’t paid other household expenses, including her phone and

some of the children’s extracurricular activities. The court never

1 ruled on the motion. In April 2022, just days before the permanent

orders hearing, wife again moved for contempt on the same

grounds.

¶4 The district court finalized the divorce and entered permanent

orders on financial matters on May 11, 2022. Eight days later, the

court denied wife’s April 2022 contempt motion because the

temporary orders were no longer in effect and had been superseded

by the court’s permanent orders. The court allowed wife, however,

to submit an amended verified motion for contempt citing additional

legal authority.

¶5 Wife again moved for contempt in June 2022, providing

additional authority supporting her assertion that the court

retained authority to enforce temporary orders. The court noted

that it was an open question whether it could enforce the temporary

orders through a contempt proceeding now that permanent orders

had been issued, but it nonetheless held a hearing. After hearing

evidence and considering written closing arguments, the court

found that husband wasn’t in contempt as it related to the

mortgages because he sought forbearance to preserve the marital

estate. This action, the court found, served the temporary orders’

2 purpose of preserving the status quo. The court found husband in

contempt, however, for nonpayment of wife’s phone bill and the

children’s extracurricular activities. Neither party appeals this

portion of the contempt order.

¶6 Meanwhile, in August of 2023, husband filed a motion for

contempt alleging that wife had (1) failed to retitle and refinance a

trailer that the court had allocated to wife in the permanent orders

and (2) withheld certain personal items. After a hearing on

husband’s motion, the court held wife in contempt related to the

trailer refinancing and ordered her to purge the contempt by paying

husband the value of the trailer loan as of the date permanent

orders were entered. The court didn’t find wife in contempt,

however, for withholding husband’s personal items.

¶7 The court then considered the parties’ requests for attorney

fees in each contempt proceeding. Finding that neither had fully

prevailed on their contempt motions, the court ordered the parties

to bear their own fees and costs.

3 II. Wife’s Contempt Motion for Failure to Pay Mortgages

A. Authority to Decide Contempt Motion Related to Temporary Orders

¶8 Before reaching the merits of wife’s contempt motion, we note

that the law is unclear whether a district court retains authority to

hear a contempt motion for a party’s failure to follow temporary

orders after the court enters permanent orders.

¶9 To be sure, the district court retains authority to hold a party

in punitive contempt for failing to comply with temporary orders for

spousal maintenance and child support. See In re Marriage of

Nussbeck, 974 P.2d 493, 499-500 (Colo. 1999). And section 14-10-

122(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024, provides that in any action where

maintenance is ordered, a missed payment becomes a final money

judgment when it is due and not paid and may be enforced as other

judgments without further court action.

¶ 10 But the court didn’t order temporary spousal maintenance in

this case. Rather, in lieu of maintenance and in an effort to

maintain the status quo, the court ordered husband to continue

paying the mortgages until permanent orders issued. Wife points

us to no authority holding that temporary orders of this type can be

4 enforced via a contempt proceeding after permanent orders have

been entered. Indeed, temporary orders terminate when the final

decree is entered. § 14-10-108(5)(c), C.R.S. 2024; In re Marriage of

Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 295 (Colo. App. 2005); In re A.D.C., 969 P.2d

708, 711 (Colo. App. 1998) (“Temporary orders terminate upon, and

merge into, the final decree unless continued pursuant to court

order.”).

¶ 11 The district court didn’t resolve the question of whether it

retained authority to entertain wife’s motion. It instead recited the

parties’ positions and, without deciding the issue, determined that

husband’s actions didn’t constitute contempt. We also need not

decide this question because the outcome remains the same

regardless of whether we conclude that the district court retained

authority to entertain wife’s contempt motion or we decline to

review the court’s contempt order. This is so because we conclude,

as discussed below, that the district court acted within its

discretion when it found that husband’s actions weren’t

contemptuous.

5 B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 12 A district court holds discretion to find a party in contempt,

and we will not reverse that decision unless the court abuses its

discretion reaching it. In re Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29,

¶ 23. A court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or if it misapplies the law. In re

Marriage of Bergeson-Flanders, 2022 COA 18, ¶ 10.

¶ 13 Colorado law recognizes two types of contempt sanctions:

punitive and remedial. Cyr, 186 P.3d at 91. The district court in

this case imposed a remedial sanction. “[R]emedial sanctions are

civil in nature and are intended ‘to force compliance with a lawful

order or to compel performance of an act within the person’s power

or present ability to perform.’” Id. at 92 (citation omitted). The

purpose of remedial sanctions is for the benefit of another. See id.

¶ 14 One basis for a court’s contempt finding is when (1) a party

hasn’t complied with a lawful court order (2) that the party knew

about. See Sheehan, ¶ 24 (citing In re Marriage of Cyr, 186 P.3d 88,

91 (Colo. App. 2008)); C.R.C.P. 107(a)(1) (defining “contempt” as

“disobedience or resistance by any person to or interference with

any lawful . . . order of the court”). With remedial contempt, once

6 the movant establishes these two factors, the burden shifts to the

alleged contemnor to show their inability to comply with the order.

Sheehan, ¶ 24.

C. Analysis

¶ 15 The district court found that husband was aware of the order

to pay the mortgages and made only three payments between

December 2021 through May 2022. The court noted that wife

sought approximately $12,000 to account for the payments not

made because husband’s nonpayment increased the balance that

she had to refinance after the marital home was allocated to her in

permanent orders.

¶ 16 The court found, however, that even if husband had the ability

to pay, “compelling him to reimburse [w]ife for those missed

payments through remedial sanctions . . . would not be consistent

with the [c]ourt’s detailed findings and orders in permanent orders

or the principles of contempt.” In sum, the court couldn’t find that

husband “engaged in contemptuous conduct by availing himself of .

. . available relief under the circumstances and not making the

actual payments . . . .” The court further found that (1) husband’s

actions were justified based on previous discussions the parties had

7 with the court and (2) the forbearance served the temporary orders’

purpose of “preserv[ing] the status quo and marital estate.”

1. Shifting the Burden of Proof

¶ 17 Wife first asserts that the district court erred when it required

her to show that husband had an ability to pay the mortgages once

she had established that he was aware of the order and failed to

comply.

¶ 18 At the contempt hearing, the parties stipulated that husband

knew of the order to pay the first and second mortgages but only

made three total payments during the time period in question.

After presenting these stipulations, wife’s counsel then stated “I

think that brings us to the point in the case . . . where the burden

has now shifted to [husband] . . . .” The court responded by saying

“I think you first have to establish some ability to pay . . . .” Wife’s

counsel disagreed but nonetheless proceeded to present an exhibit

of husband’s bank balances during the pendency of the proceeding.

¶ 19 Husband then presented evidence that he lost his job during

the pendency of the proceeding and explained why he sought

forbearance on the mortgages. He also relayed a conversation he

had with the court during a status conference during which the

8 court implored the parties to do what they could to preserve the

marital estate. He also presented evidence of his present inability

to pay at the time of the hearing based on his current finances.

¶ 20 We agree with wife that the district court improperly shifted

the burden to her to establish husband’s inability to pay the

mortgages. See Sheehan, ¶ 24 (“In remedial contempt proceedings,

once the movant establishes that an underlying order of which the

contemnor is aware has been violated, the burden shifts to the

contemnor to prove an inability to comply.”). But we conclude the

error was harmless because the court’s decision didn’t turn on

husband’s inability to pay, either at the time the payments were

due or at the time of the contempt hearing. See C.R.C.P. 61 (courts

must disregard any the error that doesn’t affect a party’s

substantial rights). Rather, the court found that husband’s failure

to pay the mortgages, which were in forbearance, wasn’t

contemptuous under the totality of the circumstances.

9 2. The District Court Acted Within its Discretion by Finding Husband’s Actions Weren’t Contemptuous

¶ 21 Wife also challenges the district court’s decision that husband

wasn’t in contempt, arguing that its consideration of “equitable”

factors constituted legal error.

¶ 22 Wife asserts that the court shouldn’t have considered the

equity awarded to her in the permanent orders because the court

had no evidence of husband’s failure to pay the mortgages before it

when it divided the marital assets. Because no transcript of the

permanent orders hearing is included in the record, we can’t

confirm what evidence was presented to the district court during

the permanent orders hearing. Husband testified at the contempt

hearing that the fact of the mortgages being in forbearance “was

discussed in the hearing,” although he didn’t specify which hearing.

¶ 23 Nonetheless, we can’t say that the court abused its discretion

by considering the totality of the circumstances when determining

whether husband was in contempt. See In re Marriage of Davis,

252 P.3d 530, 537 (Colo. App. 2011) (concluding that, although the

husband didn’t strictly comply with the order at issue, the district

10 court didn’t abuse its discretion when the totality of the

circumstances didn’t warrant a contempt finding).

¶ 24 For example, the district court considered that wife was

awarded $319,627 in equity from the marital home. And, after

allocating the remainder of the marital estate the overall property

division was unequal in wife’s favor, with wife receiving $405,339 in

net assets and husband receiving $220,364. The court noted that it

hadn’t required an equalization payment and that its permanent

orders took into account the balance of the mortgages while they

were in forbearance. The court saw no need to “now compel

husband to reimburse wife for the $12,000 that he would have

made” had the mortgages not been in forbearance, and that such

an order would be “contrary to the overall findings of fairness and

equity” in the permanent orders.

¶ 25 In addition to the division of property, the district court also

considered its discussion with the parties at a status conference on

May 11, 2020, during which husband expressed difficulty making

mortgage and vehicle payments due to losing his job and the

ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Although the court didn’t give

husband express permission to enter into forbearance on the

11 mortgages, it noted that it had ordered the parties to work together

in light of the unusual circumstances of the pandemic and to

investigate available relief to “preserve the marital estate.”

Accordingly, given the court’s statements at the status conference

and after considering the temporary orders’ purpose of preserving

the status quo, the court said it couldn’t find that husband engaged

in contemptuous conduct.

¶ 26 Based on these findings, and the record supporting them, we

can’t conclude that the district court abused its discretion by

denying wife’s contempt motion. See E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v.

Revenig, 140 P.3d 227, 230-31 (Colo. App. 2006) (Under the abuse

of discretion standard, we ask “not whether we would have reached

a different result but, rather, whether the trial court's decision fell

within a range of reasonable options.”).

III. Husband’s Contempt Motion for Failure to Refinance Trailer

¶ 27 Wife also contends that the district court erred when it found

her in contempt for failing to refinance the trailer, arguing that she

had paid husband the amount owed before the contempt hearing.

We disagree.

12 ¶ 28 The district court found that, at the time of the hearing on

husband’s contempt motion, a loan in husband’s name was still

associated with the trailer. The court found that the value of the

loan when permanent orders entered was $9,741.53. It thus

ordered wife to pay that amount to husband to purge the remedial

contempt.

¶ 29 Wife filed a motion for post-trial relief under C.R.C.P. 59,

asserting that she had paid the loan in full in January 2024. The

court denied wife’s motion because (1) wife sent the payment nearly

two years after permanent orders issued; (2) it was accompanied by

a communication explaining that it was a “full settlement of a

disputed amount” — and thus wasn’t a good faith payment; and (3)

husband rejected the payment. The court noted that a loan for the

trailer still existed and that wife had failed to extinguish it in

violation of the permanent orders.

¶ 30 On appeal, wife again asserts that she made attempts to

refinance the trailer but husband didn’t cooperate because he

refused to provide statements of the current balance. Wife also

reasserts that she sent husband a check for the loan balance in

January 2024. But wife doesn’t dispute that husband rejected her

13 payment or that a loan for the trailer still existed in husband’s

name. Thus, even if the court believed wife’s explanations that she

intended to refinance and retitle the trailer, all agree that she didn’t

do so. See Cyr, 186 P.3d at 92 (“Because the purpose is remedial,

and for the benefit of another, it does not matter what the

contemnor intended when he or she refused to comply.”). Moreover,

the district court heard wife’s evidence about her attempts to

comply with the order requiring refinancing of the trailer but still

found her in contempt. As an appellate court, we aren’t at liberty to

reweigh this evidence on appeal. See In re Marriage of Kann, 2017

COA 94, ¶ 36 (“[O]ur supreme court has . . . expressed unbridled

confidence in trial courts to weigh conflicting evidence.”).

IV. Attorney Fees

¶ 31 Finally, wife appeals the district court’s decision declining to

award attorney fees to either party for their respective contempt

motions. She asserts that (1) the court erred when it reserved its

decision regarding her request for attorney fees until both contempt

motions had been decided and (2) it should have engaged in a

“lodestar analysis” to determine reasonable attorney fees. We aren’t

persuaded.

14 ¶ 32 C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2), entitled “Remedial Sanctions,” provides in

part that costs and reasonable attorney’s fees in connection with

“the contempt proceeding may” be assessed in the court’s

discretion. See In re Marriage of Vega, 2021 COA 99, ¶ 18 (The use

of the word “may” is permissive; it is “generally indicative of a grant

of discretion or choice among alternatives.”) (internal quotations

omitted).

¶ 33 At the close of the hearing on wife’s contempt motion, the

court reserved ruling on wife’s request for attorney fees “given the

fact that she did not prevail on part of her contempt motion” and

because the findings on husband’s contempt motion “may impact

the [c]ourt’s orders as to attorney’s fees to be awarded to either

party.”

¶ 34 Wife asserts this was error because the use of “the” to modify

“contempt proceedings” in C.R.C.P. 107 “indicates a reference to a

specific type of contempt proceeding, not a general reference to any

contempt proceeding.” See Brooks v. Zabka, 450 P.2d 653, 655

(Colo. 1969) (“[T]he definite article ‘the’ particularizes the subject

which it precedes. It is a word of limitation as opposed to the

indefinite or generalizing force of ‘a’ or ‘an.’”). Thus, she claims, the

15 court had to decide the question of attorney fees on her motion for

contempt separately from husband’s motion.

¶ 35 We acknowledge that this court has previously used this

principle of interpretation to determine that attorney fees are an

available sanction for remedial, but not punitive, contempt

proceedings. See In re Marriage of Webb, 284 P.3d 107, 110 (Colo.

App. 2011) (because the “use of ‘the’ to modify ‘contempt

proceeding’ indicates a reference to a specific type of contempt

proceeding, not a general reference to any contempt proceeding,”

attorney fees were only available in connection with remedial

contempt proceedings). But we need not determine whether it also

requires a district court to determine attorney fees after each

separate contempt motion is decided, as wife asserts, because she

fails to explain how she was harmed.

¶ 36 The district court found that neither party prevailed on all

their claims for remedial contempt and that, “at times, both have

acted in ways that undermined the intent and execution of the

[c]ourt’s orders” and both “undoubtedly incurred considerable

attorney’s fees which outweighed any relief gained through these

protracted proceedings.” Wife doesn’t dispute these findings or

16 otherwise argue that the court would have awarded her attorney

fees had it considered her request separately. See C.R.C.P. 61. As

a result, we decline to disturb the court’s decision denying wife’s

request for attorney fees.

¶ 37 We also disagree with wife’s assertion that the court erred

when it didn’t conduct a “lodestar” analysis. Such an analysis is

only required once a court awards attorney fees and is tasked with

determining a reasonable amount. See In re Marriage of Aragon,

2019 COA 76, ¶ 13. Here, the court denied both parties’ request for

attorney fees related to their contempt motions. Accordingly, no

lodestar analysis was required.

V. Disposition

¶ 38 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE YUN concur.