24CA1137 Marriage of Walda 08-28-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1137 El Paso County District Court No. 15DR31546 Honorable Laura N. Findorff, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Abigail LaVoo,
Appellee,
and
Kevin Walda,
Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Grove and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 28, 2025
Law Office of Joel M. Pratt, LLC, Joel M. Pratt, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Jones Law Firm, P.C., William H. Garvey, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 Kevin Walda (father) appeals the trial court’s order reducing
his parenting time with his children and granting Abigail LaVoo
(mother) sole decision-making authority in all matters except
religion. We affirm the trial court’s order.
I. Background
¶2 Mother and father were married in 2012 and share two minor
children, A.W. and K.W. In 2016, the court dissolved their
marriage. In its final orders, the court ordered a 5-2-2-5 parenting
time plan, giving each parent 50-50 parenting time (i.e., each
parent was allocated 182.5 overnights per year). The final orders
also granted mother and father joint decision-making authority.
¶3 In 2023, father filed a motion to modify his parenting time to
“support[] splitting time between C[olorado] and M[ichigan].” In his
motion, father sought to reduce his parenting time, citing a
“substantial increase in the cost of living, loss of employment and
[a] need for [him] to care for elderly and ailing parents.”
¶4 Approximately six months later (while father’s motion was still
pending), mother filed her own motion to modify. In her motion,
mother requested that the court modify the allocation of decision-
making to grant her sole decision-making authority. Mother alleged
1 that retaining joint decision-making would “endanger[] the
children’s physical health and/or significantly impair[] the
children’s emotional development” because father “ignores
[m]other’s attempts to discuss decisions” and “provides blanket
objections” to solutions she proposes.
¶5 The court set both motions to modify for a single hearing.
Before the hearing, the parties filed a joint trial management
certificate. In the joint trial management certificate, father
proposed a parenting time plan that would reduce the frequency of
his parenting time from 50-50 to approximately 37-63. His
proposed plan would have allocated parenting time as follows:
Starting the first Monday in April of every year, the parties would start a week on/week off parenting time schedule . . . .
The week on/week off schedule would continue until the start of the children’s summer school holiday. If father has parenting time the week that the children’s school concludes for the summer, he will just continue with his parenting time. If [m]other is exercising parenting time the week that the children’s school concludes for the summer, [m]other will exchange the children with [f]ather . . . on the second full day of the children’s summer school holiday.
2 Father will have parenting time with the minor children from the second full day of their summer school holiday until 14 days prior to the children’s first day of school in the fall. Mother will have parenting time with the children for the final fourteen days of the children’s summer school holiday . . . . Mother will then have parenting time with the children until the first Monday of the children’s school year, when the parties will again start a week on/week off parenting time schedule . . . .
The parties will continue with a week on/week off parenting time until the start of [m]other’s week of parenting time after October 15th each year. Mother will have parenting time with the children from the start of her week of parenting time after October 15th until the first Monday after April 1st when the parties resume week on/week off parenting time with [f]ather starting his parenting time on the first Monday after April 1st.
Father is not requesting any modification to the parties’ holiday parenting time schedule.
¶6 Mother proposed two parenting time plans, depending on
whether father chose to partially relocate to Michigan. If father
decided to remain in Colorado full-time, mother proposed that the
parties retain their then-existing 5-2-2-5 parenting time plan. If, on
the other hand, father chose to partially relocate to Michigan,
mother proposed the following parenting time plan:
3 Father [will] have parenting time from 2 days after summer break begins until July 6 every year . . . . In addition, [f]ather should have parenting time on the 2nd and 4th weekend of the months he is requesting to be in Colorado . . . with the exception of August, from Friday, after school until Monday drop off at school . . . .
Father should have Winter Break in even years from the 2nd day after the [S]chool [B]reak begins until 2 days before school resumes and the children’s Thanksgiving [B]reak in odd years. Father has stated in the past that he does not want Spring Break but [f]ather should have the opportunity to have Spring Break in odd years should he decide to use it . . . . Thanksgiving and Spring Break parenting should start the first day after school lets out and end one day before school resumes. Mother should have Winter Break in odd years and Thanksgiving Break and Spring [B]reak in even years.
¶7 During the hearing, the court heard testimony from father,
mother, and K.W.’s academic language therapist. Following the
hearing, the court adopted mother’s proposed parenting time plan
which, according to father, granted him only sixty overnights per
year. The trial court also “grant[ed] sole decision[-]making to
[m]other in all areas except religion.” Father appeals.
4 II. Analysis
¶8 On appeal, father contends that the trial court erred with
respect to both its allocation of parenting time and decision-making
rulings. We address each challenge in turn below.
A. Parenting Time
¶9 Father advances two challenges to the court’s modification of
parenting time. First, father contends that that the trial court erred
because it “restricted” his parenting time without applying the
correct legal standard. And second, he contends that the trial
court’s best-interests findings aren’t supported by the record. We
aren’t persuaded that the court erred in either respect.
1. Standard of Review
¶ 10 A trial court has “broad discretion when modifying an existing
parenting time order,” and we review the court’s modification
decision for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Barker, 251
P.3d 591, 592 (Colo. App. 2010). A court abuses its discretion if
“its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair; is
based on an erroneous understanding or application of the law; or
misconstrues or misapplies the law.” In re Marriage of Badawiyeh,
2023 COA 4, ¶ 9. Whether the court applied the correct legal
5 standard, however, is a question we review de novo. In re Parental
Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 11.
2. Restriction of Parenting Time
¶ 11 We first address father’s contention that the trial court
“restricted” his parenting time without applying the proper legal
standard. Because we conclude that the court didn’t restrict
father’s parenting time, we reject this contention.
a. Legal Principles
¶ 12 Subject to exceptions not applicable here, “the court may . . .
modify an order granting or denying parenting time rights whenever
such . . . modification would serve the best interests of the child.”
§ 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025 (emphasis added). But a
heightened standard applies when a court restricts a parent’s
parenting time. See § 14-10-129(1)(b)(I). A court can’t “restrict a
parent’s parenting time rights unless it finds that the parenting
time would endanger the child’s physical health or significantly
impair the child’s emotional development.” Id. Thus, as relevant
here, a trial court need only make endangerment findings if its
6 modification of parenting time constitutes a restriction. See § 14-
10-129(1)(a)(I), (b)(I).1
b. The Trial Court Didn’t Restrict Father’s Parenting Time Rights
¶ 13 Father’s argument that the court applied the incorrect legal
standard when it entered its order modifying parenting time rests
on two necessary premises: (1) the trial court restricted his
parenting time rights; and (2) because of that restriction, the trial
court should have, but failed to, make endangerment findings.
Father’s argument fails at the outset, however, because the trial
court’s order modifying parenting time didn’t constitute a restriction
of father’s parenting time.
1 Findings beyond just the best interests of the child are required
under other circumstances, which aren’t present here. For example, additional findings are required — potentially including endangerment findings — when the modified order “substantially changes the parenting time as well as changes the party with whom the child resides a majority of the time.” § 14-10-129(2), C.R.S. 2025. But because under the existing order “the parties share equal parenting responsibilities, any subsequent modification of that arrangement is governed by the best interests standard,” not section 14-10-129(2). In re Marriage of Stewart, 43 P.3d 740, 742 (Colo. App. 2002). Also, additional findings are required when one parent seeks to relocate with the child. See 14-10-129(2)(c); In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 140-42 (Colo. 2005). Although the purported impetus for father’s motion to modify was his partial relocation to Michigan, because he wasn’t proposing to relocate with the children, section 14-10-129(2)(c) and Ciesluk aren’t implicated.
7 ¶ 14 What constitutes a restriction on parenting time — as opposed
to a mere modification — isn’t defined in section 14-10-129.
Because of this lack of guidance, divisions of this court have
attempted to determine what constitutes a restriction on a case-by-
case basis. In assessing what constitutes a restriction, divisions of
this court have focused on quantitative versus qualitative
reductions in parenting time when determining what constitutes a
restriction in parenting time. See In re Marriage of Dale, 2025 COA
29, ¶ 32 (cert. granted in part July 21, 2025); In re Marriage of West,
94 P.3d 1248, 1251 (Colo. App. 2004).
¶ 15 In West, the trial court reduced a father’s summer parenting
time by fourteen overnights in granting a motion filed by the
children’s mother. 94 P.3d at 1249-50. The father appealed,
arguing that the trial court erred by reducing his parenting time
based on the best interests of the children. Id. When considering
whether endangerment findings were required, the division
concluded that “determining whether to apply the best interests
standard or the endangerment standard may involve inquiry into
both the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of the proposed
change to parenting time, as well as the reason or reasons
8 advanced for the change.” Id. at 1251. The division then
determined that the trial court’s reduction didn’t involve a
qualitative change and that the quantitative change was “one of
relatively limited magnitude.” Id. Under these facts, the division
concluded that the trial court didn’t restrict the father’s parenting
time, and, therefore, the trial court didn’t need to make
endangerment findings. Id.
¶ 16 Recently, a division of this court considered the
quantitative/qualitative distinction invoked in West. See Dale,
¶¶ 15-16. In Dale, the father requested that the trial court modify
his parenting time to accommodate his work schedule. Id. at ¶¶ 2-
3. After a hearing, the trial court applied the best interests of the
child factors and reduced the father’s parenting time by forty-five
overnights. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 4-5. On appeal, the father contended that
the trial court restricted his parenting time and should have made
endangerment findings. Id. at 7. In its opinion, the division
addressed whether a purely quantitative reduction in parenting
time could constitute a parenting time restriction. Id. at 15. The
division concluded that it couldn’t, stating “a purely quantitative
reduction in a parent’s parenting time is not a restriction on that
9 parent’s parenting time rights under section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I).” Id.
at ¶ 32. Instead, the division determined that a court restricts
parenting time rights when it “impos[es] a qualitative control over
the manner, location, or environment in which the parent engages
in parenting time, such as a requirement that parenting time be
supervised, a prohibition of overnight visits with a particular
parent, or a limitation on the location where a parent may exercise
parenting time.” Id.
¶ 17 Regardless of whether we apply the qualitative test laid out by
the division in Dale or the qualitative/quantitative approach
endorsed by the division in West, our conclusion is the same: The
court’s modification didn’t constitute a restriction.
¶ 18 To begin, father doesn’t argue in his briefing to us that the
court’s modified parenting time order imposed any qualitative
limitation on father’s parenting time. Such limitations would
include imposing a supervision requirement or limiting parenting
time to prohibit overnights. See Dale, ¶ 32. No such limitations or
conditions were imposed here. Instead, like in Dale, the
modification in this case was purely quantitative. See id. at ¶¶ 32-
33. Thus, if we were to apply the test set forth in Dale, we would
10 conclude, on this basis alone, that the court’s order didn’t
constitute a restriction on father’s parenting time.
¶ 19 Even if we apply the test set forth in West, we reach the same
conclusion. Recall, it was father who initially filed the motion to
modify seeking to reduce his parenting time. According to the trial
court’s assessment of father’s motion, father requested to reduce
his parenting time by modifying the 50-50 allocation to 37-63. And
because father requested a reduction in his parenting time, the
most relevant baseline for considering the magnitude of the
quantitative reduction the court ultimately adopted was father’s
requested reduction. In other words, in determining whether the
quantitative reduction the court adopted constitutes a restriction,
the primary comparison for its allocation should be to the 37-63
plan father sought, not the 50-50 parenting time plan the parties
had been operating under.
¶ 20 Moreover, in determining whether the court’s order constituted
a quantitative restriction, it’s the amount of parenting time that the
court allocated to father that is relevant, not the amount he actually
anticipates exercising. While father contends in his briefing to us
that the court reduced his parenting time from 50-50 to 16-84 —
11 accordingly, allocating him only approximately sixty overnights per
year — this contention doesn’t appear to account for all of parenting
time father is entitled to under the court’s order (just the time that
he anticipates exercising under the new order). Based on our review
of the order, it appears that the trial court’s modified parenting time
plan entitles father to approximately eighty overnights per year (i.e.,
a 22-78 allocation, not a 16-84 allocation).
¶ 21 Thus, in assessing whether the court’s order constituted a
quantitative restriction, we compare the 37-63 parenting time plan
father requested to the 22-78 allocation that the court ordered.
While this is a substantial change (certainly as compared to the
50-50 plan the parties had been operating under), we aren’t
persuaded that it constitutes a restriction. After all, father was
allocated approximately 60% of the overnights he sought. While we
certainly understand why father is frustrated and feels aggrieved by
the court’s order, we can’t conclude that the court’s substantial
reduction in his parenting time constituted a restriction.
¶ 22 We are further convinced that the trial court’s parenting time
plan doesn’t constitute a restriction based on the trial court’s
finding that father had voluntarily forfeited twenty-four weeks of
12 parenting time between 2023 and early 2024. As the trial court
observed, the amount of parenting time that father actually
exercised during this time isn’t substantially more than the eighty
overnights he is entitled to under the trial court’s modified plan.
Thus, even giving weight to the quantitative changes in the court’s
modified parenting time order, we conclude that the trial court
didn’t restrict father’s parenting time.
¶ 23 And because the court didn’t restrict father’s parenting time,
the trial court wasn’t required to make endangerment findings
under section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I). Accordingly, it wasn’t error for the
trial court to base its modified parenting time orders on the best
interests of the children.
3. Best Interests of the Children Findings
¶ 24 In his reply brief, father argues for the first time that, even if
the court wasn’t required to make endangerment findings, the trial
court still erred by finding that the parenting time plan it adopted
was in the best interests of the children. Although we need not
address this argument because father didn’t raise it in his opening
brief, see In re Marriage of Drexler, 2013 COA 43, ¶ 24 (declining to
address arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief), we
13 nevertheless conclude that the record supports the trial court’s best
interests findings.
¶ 25 “In determining the best interests of the child for purposes of
parenting time, the court shall consider all relevant factors.” § 14-
10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025. These factors include, as relevant
here, (1) “[t]he interaction and interrelationship of the child with his
or her parents, his or her siblings, and any other person who may
significantly affect the child’s best interests”; (2) “[t]he child’s
adjustment to his or her home, school, and community”; (3) “[t]he
ability of the parties to encourage the sharing of love, affection, and
contact between the child and the other party”; (4) “[w]hether the
past pattern of involvement of the parties with the child reflects a
system of values, time commitment, and mutual support”; (5) “[t]he
physical proximity of the parties to each other as this relates to the
practical considerations of parenting time”; and (6) “[t]he ability of
each party to place the needs of the child ahead of his or her own
needs.” § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III), (IV), (VI)-(VIII), (XI). The trial
court’s findings track these factors, and the record supports each of
the court’s findings.
14 ¶ 26 First, the trial court found that “the children have strong
relationships with their stepsiblings” from mother’s remarriage and
that the children’s relationship with father’s family isn’t “as
consistent.” This finding is supported by mother’s testimony that
the children have a “great” relationship with their stepbrothers and
stepdad and that the children’s stepbrothers and stepdad play with
the children and teach them various skills. And while father
testified that the children “have a pretty good relationship” with his
extended family in Michigan, the record shows that this relationship
is not as close due to the physical distance. That mother is now
divorced from the stepdad is of no moment because it isn’t a part of
the record and wasn’t presented to the trial court at the time it
issued its order. See In re Edilson, 637 P.2d 362, 364 (Colo. 1981)
(“Evidence which was not presented to the trial court will not be
considered on review.”).
¶ 27 Second, the trial court found that “the children have been in
the same schools and activities effectively since the parties’ divorce
and seem well adjusted” and that the children are involved in
extracurricular activities, and “K.W. has a therapist [in Colorado].”
This finding is supported by both mother’s and father’s testimony.
15 Father testified that the children like their school in Colorado, and
mother testified that the children participate in various
extracurricular activities in Colorado and that K.W. sees a therapist
in Colorado.
¶ 28 Third, the trial court found that father doesn’t “ha[ve] the
ability to encourage the sharing of love, affection and contact
between the children and their mother.” In support of this finding,
the trial court observed that father “made no positive comments
about [m]other and based on the testimony regarding doctor’s
appointments alone, he regularly disparages [m]other in front of the
minor children.” This finding is supported by mother’s testimony
that father disparages her in front of the children at doctor’s
appointments.
¶ 29 Fourth, the trial court found that “[f]ather does not participate
in activities that [m]other sets up for the children.” Again, mother’s
testimony supports this finding. Mother testified that father
wouldn’t take A.W. to her swim meets and wouldn’t take the
children to their martial arts belt tests. She also testified that
father didn’t attend some of the children’s piano or guitar concerts.
Father’s testimony also supports this finding. He indicated that
16 mother is heavily involved in activities with the children and said
that “[mother] has a lot of activities she likes to do with the
children.” The trial court also found, and the record supports, that
father voluntarily reduced his involvement in the children’s lives
and forfeited twenty-four weeks of parenting time in the year prior.
¶ 30 Fifth, the trial court found that it wasn’t clear where father
lives but concluded that he doesn’t “reside in Colorado on a full-
time basis” and that it would have to “fashion a long-distance
parenting plan.” In his motion to modify, in the joint trial
management certificate, and during his testimony, father made
conflicting statements about where he would be living. Specifically,
in the joint trial management certificate, father stated he “was
forced to relocate to the state of Michigan,” but during his
testimony, father stated that he wouldn’t be changing his residence
from Colorado. Father’s testimony also established, however, that
he planned to work outside of Colorado and that he would spend
the majority of his time with the children in Michigan. This
evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that it needed to
create a long-distance parenting time plan because mother and
father wouldn’t be living in close proximity to each other for an
17 entire year. That father is currently living in Colorado full-time isn’t
part of the record and wasn’t before the trial court at the time.
Therefore, it’s of no moment that father apparently resides in
Colorado. See Edilson, 637 P.2d at 364.
¶ 31 And sixth, the trial court found that father put his own needs
ahead of the children’s needs by interfering with their medical
appointments, not supporting K.W.’s tutoring, and forfeiting
parenting time. Again, the record supports that father voluntarily
forfeited twenty-four weeks of parenting time. Additionally,
mother’s testimony indicated that father had previously canceled
medical appointments after pulling the children out of school and
failed to assist K.W. with his tutoring exercises.
¶ 32 Because the trial court considered the factors relevant to
whether the adopted parenting time plan was in the best interests
of the children and because its findings are supported by the
record, the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion in concluding that
the parenting time plan it ordered was in the children’s best
interest.
18 B. Decision-Making
¶ 33 We next address father’s contention that the trial court erred
by granting mother sole decision-making authority. As part of this
contention, father argues that (1) the trial court’s findings aren’t
supported by the record, and (2) the trial court violated his due
process rights by considering facts not in evidence. For the reasons
set forth below, we disagree.
1. The Trial Court’s Findings Were Supported by the Record
¶ 34 Father asserts that the trial court erred by granting mother
sole decision-making responsibility because its findings aren’t
supported by the record. Again, we disagree.
a. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶ 35 Pursuant to section 14-10-131(2), C.R.S. 2025, the trial court
shall not modify a custody decree or a decree allocating decision-making responsibility unless it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the child’s custodian or party to whom decision-making responsibility was allocated and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child.
19 ¶ 36 But the court must retain the prior decree’s allocation of joint
decision-making unless, as relevant here, “[t]he retention of the
allocation of decision-making responsibility would endanger the
child’s physical health or significantly impairs the child’s emotional
development and the harm likely to be caused by a change of
environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change to the
child.” § 14-10-131(2)(c).
¶ 37 When modifying parental responsibilities, the trial court has
broad discretion, and “we exercise every presumption in favor of
upholding its decisions.” In re Marriage of Wenciker, 2022 COA 74,
¶ 26. “What constitutes endangerment is a highly individualized
determination, and we won’t disturb the trial court’s findings on the
issue if they are supported by the record.” Id. (citations omitted). If
conflicting evidence is presented, “the trial court’s findings resolving
such conflicts are binding on review if they have record support.”
Id.
b. Application
¶ 38 In contesting the adequacy of the trial court’s factual findings,
father contends that the trial court relied on anecdotal evidence
presented at the hearing and failed to consider alternative
20 inferences when assessing father’s reasoning for taking certain
actions. But the court isn’t required to discount evidence because
it’s “anecdotal,” nor is it required to draw any particular inferences.
Rather, it’s the trial court’s sole providence to assess witness
credibility and determine what weight, if any, to accord and what
inferences to draw from the evidence it receives. See In re Marriage
of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007) (“It is the
responsibility of the trial court as the trier of fact to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency, probative effect, and
weight of the evidence.”). And our review of the record convinces us
that the trial court properly considered evidence admitted at trial
and, after making extensive credibility determinations and weighing
the evidence, that it made findings supported by the evidence it
admitted.
¶ 39 In support of its decision to allocate sole decision-making
authority to mother, the court made findings pursuant to section
14-10-131(2)(c), stating that “[f]ather’s actions . . . constitute[d] an
endangerment to the children’s physical health or [would]
significantly impair their emotional development” and “given that
[f]ather ha[d] ignored orders regarding decision[-]making, . . . any
21 alleged harm to the children in changing decision[-]making from
joint to sole decision[-]making, [wa]s outweighed to the advantages
of the children in that they w[ould] no longer have to wait for
necessary appointments for [f]ather to consent.” In support of these
findings, the court also found that, historically, mother and father
hadn’t managed to cooperatively make major medical, dental, and
mental health decisions for the children; father had tried to
circumvent court orders in the past; and father had refused to
consent to joint decisions to control mother. Both mother’s and
father’s testimony supports these findings.
¶ 40 First, the record shows that mother and father have required
significant court intervention for major decisions regarding their
children, including decisions related to allergy medication,
orthodontic care, and therapy. Father admitted that coparenting
had been challenging and that it had been many years since he and
mother had made a major decision together. And mother testified
that the court had resolved disagreements regarding multiple
medical decisions in previous years. Indeed, because of these
impasses, the court had previously granted mother temporary
22 tiebreaking decision-making regarding orthodontic/dental care for
A.W. and allergy medication for both children.
¶ 41 Second, evidence admitted at the hearing demonstrates that,
at least once, father had attempted to circumvent the court’s
orders. Evidence showed that the court ordered therapy for K.W.,
but, notwithstanding this order, father refused to complete the
necessary documents for K.W. to attend therapy unless mother paid
the entire cost.
¶ 42 And third, the evidence in the record supports that father had
refused to consent to many other decisions and failed to act in the
children’s best interests. For example, evidence from the hearing
indicates that father (1) delayed K.W.’s therapy by refusing to
complete required paperwork; (2) requested that K.W. not be given
testing accommodations at school and failed to attend two
individualized education program meetings; (3) failed to assist K.W.
with reading lessons; (4) declined to take A.W. to an orthodontist to
fix her expander when it fell out; and (5) cancelled medical
appointments after taking the children out of school.
¶ 43 Given that the parties have required extensive court
intervention and considering father’s actions with regard to court
23 orders concerning the children’s medical, mental health, and dental
appointments and treatment and the children’s education, the trial
court didn’t err by concluding that father’s actions endanger the
“children’s physical health or significantly impair their emotional
development” and that any alleged harm in granting mother sole
decision-making authority was “outweighed to the advantages of the
children in that they w[ould] no longer have to wait for necessary
appointments for [f]ather to consent.”
¶ 44 Thus, the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion by granting
mother sole decision-making authority.
2. Due Process
¶ 45 Father next attempts to convert his argument that the court’s
findings aren’t supported by the record into a due process
contention by asserting that his rights were violated because the
court “considered facts that were never testified to or admitted into
evidence.” But because the record supports the court’s findings —
and father doesn’t otherwise challenge the adequacy of the
proceedings — we aren’t persuaded that father’s due process rights
were violated.
24 III. Disposition
¶ 46 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.