24CA1078 Marriage of Veach 05-22-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1078 Dolores County District Court No. 17DR30001 Honorable William Young Furse, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Jeremy Wade Veach,
Appellant,
and
Skye Lunn Veach,
Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Gomez and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 22, 2025
The Law Office of Jill M. Carlson, LLC, Jill M. Carlson, Hays, Kansas, for Appellant
Belcastro Law, PPLC, Dan Belcastro, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 Jeremy Wade Veach (father) appeals the permanent protection
order (PPO) protecting his two children from him. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Father and the children’s mother, Skye Lynn Veach (mother),
divorced in 2017. In September 2023, mother petitioned for and
obtained a temporary civil protection order (TPO) against father,
with the children listed as the protected parties as victims of
physical assault or threats. The court did not hold a hearing before
granting the TPO. As grounds for the protection order, mother cited
a recent incident in which father allegedly grabbed the oldest child
by the neck and threw him to the ground in frustration while
playing a board game with the children. Mother also cited an
incident in which father allegedly made the children run home in
the dark in front of father’s truck because he was not happy with
the children’s performance at a wrestling meet.
¶3 Following the issuance of the TPO, the district court held a
hearing and entered the PPO against father. The court found by a
preponderance of the evidence that father had committed acts
constituting grounds for entering the PPO and that, unless
restrained, he would continue to commit such acts. The PPO
1 prohibited father from having any contact with the children except
for supervised parenting time two times per week for two hours per
session. The PPO also awarded temporary care and control of the
children to mother.
¶4 To further clarify the parenting time arrangement under the
PPO, the district court simultaneously issued a temporary
parenting time order. That order again explained that father was
entitled to supervised parenting time twice per week and stated that
it was not the court’s intent to “indefinitely have [father] subject to
supervised parenting time.” Accordingly, the court set the matter
for a status conference in sixty days to consider possible
modifications to the PPO.
II. Discussion
¶5 Father contends that the district court erred by (1) failing to
hold a statutorily mandated hearing before issuing the TPO;
(2) making certain erroneous evidentiary rulings; and (3) finding
that father had committed acts constituting grounds for entering
the PPO. We perceive no reversible error.
2 A. Statutory Framework
¶6 Section 13-14-104.5, C.R.S. 2023, authorizes a court to issue
a temporary or permanent civil protection order to prevent, as
relevant here, assault and threatened bodily harm.
§ 13-14-104.5(1)(a); Martin v. Arapahoe Cnty. Ct., 2016 COA 154, ¶
16.
¶7 Under Colorado’s criminal code, assault includes “knowingly
or recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury to another person.”
§ 18-3-204(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024; see also § 18-1-901(3)(c), C.R.S. 2024
(defining bodily injury as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment
of physical or mental condition”); People v. Lobato, 530 P.2d 493,
495 (Colo. 1975) (recognizing that bodily injury “need not be of a
crippling or otherwise incapacitating nature”).
¶8 “A motion for a temporary civil protection order shall be set
for hearing at the earliest possible time.” § 13-14-104.5(4); see
Martin, ¶ 18. If “after hearing the evidence” the court is “fully
satisfied therein that sufficient cause exists,” it may issue a TPO
and a citation “to the respondent commanding [them] to appear
before the court . . . to show cause, if any, why said temporary civil
protection order should not be made permanent.” § 13-14-104.5(8).
3 ¶9 At the PPO hearing, the court “shall examine the record and
the evidence” to decide whether to make the TPO permanent or to
enter a PPO on different terms. § 13-14-106(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024; see
also Martin, ¶ 20. To issue a PPO, the court must find by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) the person to be restrained
“has committed acts constituting grounds for the issuance of a civil
protection order” and (2) “unless restrained the [person] will
continue to commit the acts or acts designed to intimidate or
retaliate against the protected person.” § 13-14-106(1)(a). The
grounds for issuing a civil protection order are those set forth in
section 13-14-104.5(1)(a). See Martin, ¶ 20.
B. TPO Hearing
¶ 10 As best as we can discern, father contends that the PPO is
flawed because the district court failed to hold a hearing before
granting the TPO. But we conclude that any error was harmless.
1. Standard of Review
¶ 11 Statutory construction and application present questions of
law that we review de novo. Hickerson v. Vessels, 2014 CO 2, ¶ 10.
If we identify an error, we review for harmlessness and will reverse
only if the error affected a party’s substantial rights. C.R.C.P. 61;
4 People in Interest of R.D., 2012 COA 35, ¶ 25. “An error affects a
substantial right only if ‘it can be said with fair assurance that the
error substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired
the basic fairness of the trial itself.’” Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529,
535 (Colo. 2010) (citation omitted).
2. Any Error Was Harmless
¶ 12 Father contends, and mother does not dispute, that the
district court failed to hold any sort of a hearing before issuing the
TPO. Father thus suggests that, because the TPO was procedurally
flawed, the PPO is invalid. But even though a TPO hearing was not
held, we conclude that any error is harmless.
¶ 13 We so conclude because “a temporary protection order issued
under section 13-14-104.5 is not the . . . court’s ‘final decision’ on a
plaintiff’s request for a civil protection order.” Martin, ¶ 22. Rather,
the procedure governing TPOs “merely permits a court to make an
initial determination as to whether an imminent danger exists to
the person[s] seeking protection, and to issue a temporary
protection order based on that finding.” Id.; see § 13-14-104.5.
Conversely, section 13-14-106(1)(a) “contemplates that a final
ruling regarding the plaintiff’s entitlement to a civil protection order,
5 and the terms of the order, will be made at the permanent order
hearing.” Martin, ¶ 22.
¶ 14 Additionally, while section 13-14-104.5 plainly requires that a
hearing be set prior to granting a TPO, the statute permits the
hearing to be conducted ex parte. § 13-14-104.5(4). Because
father had no right to be present at any TPO hearing, we fail to see,
and he has failed to articulate, how he was prejudiced by the court
not holding a TPO hearing.
¶ 15 Finally, the district court held a PPO hearing during which it
weighed the evidence and evaluated the credibility of the witnesses.
See Parocha v. Parocha, 2018 CO 41, ¶ 16 (It is the district court’s
“prerogative to weigh and evaluate the parties’ credibility.”); see also
Martin, ¶ 23 (“The permanent protection order hearing gives the
respondent a prompt opportunity to challenge the court’s initial ex
parte findings and raise any jurisdictional or procedural
deficiencies.”). Because father had the benefit of cross-examining
mother’s witnesses and presenting his own evidence during a
hearing before the PPO was granted, we conclude that any failure to
hold a hearing before granting the TPO was harmless. See Martin, ¶
23 (“[T]he [PPO] hearing and ordinary appellate procedures provide
6 adequate alternative remedies for challenging a temporary
restraining order.”).
C. Evidentiary Rulings
¶ 16 Father next contends that the district court abused its
discretion in making certain evidentiary rulings at the PPO hearing.
To the extent that the district court erred, we conclude that any
error was harmless.
¶ 17 We review a trial court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of
evidence for an abuse of discretion. Gebert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
2023 COA 107, ¶ 29. A court abuses its discretion when its ruling
is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or is based on an
erroneous understanding or application of the law. Id.
2. Mother’s Reputation for Truthfulness
¶ 18 We first consider and reject father’s assertion that the district
court abused its discretion when it prohibited one of father’s
witnesses, who was mother’s uncle, from testifying concerning
mother’s reputation for truthfulness.
¶ 19 In prohibiting the witness from testifying about mother’s
reputation for truthfulness, the district court reasoned that mother
7 had not testified in the protection order proceedings and therefore
her character and reputation for truthfulness were not at issue.
¶ 20 CRE 405(a) allows for “testimony as to reputation” in “all cases
in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is
admissible.” However, CRE 404(a) provides that “[e]vidence of a
person’s character or a trait of that person’s character” is generally
not admissible, subject to certain enumerated exceptions, one of
which is “[e]vidence of the character of a witness.” CRE 608 then
provides certain limitations on attacking or supporting the
“credibility of a witness . . . by evidence in the form of opinion or
reputation.” But here, mother did not testify as a witness in the
protection order proceedings, and thus we perceive no error on the
part of the district court when it excluded father’s witness from
testifying as to mother’s reputation for truthfulness.
3. Hearsay
¶ 21 Father next challenges the district court’s ruling permitting
the oldest child’s teacher to testify as to the child’s disclosure of the
neck-grabbing and truck incidents. When mother’s attorney asked
about the child’s description of those incidents, father objected
based on hearsay. But after the teacher testified that the child
8 appeared to be very upset at the time that he disclosed the
incidents, the district court overruled father’s objection, holding
that the testimony fell under the excited utterance exception in CRE
803(2).
¶ 22 Hearsay is generally inadmissible, subject to certain
enumerated exceptions. CRE 802. One of those is the excited
utterance exception, which excludes “[a] statement relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition” from the
general prohibition on the admission of hearsay. CRE 803(2).
¶ 23 Under CRE 803(2), the statement to be admitted must meet
the following requirements:
(1) the event was sufficiently startling to render normal reflective thought processes of the observer inoperative; (2) the statement was a spontaneous reaction to the event; and (3) direct or circumstantial evidence exists to allow the jury to infer that the declarant had the opportunity to observe the startling event.
People v. Vanderpauye, 2023 CO 42, ¶ 42 (citation omitted). In
considering the second requirement, the court must also weigh
the lapse of time between the startling event or condition and the . . . statement; whether the statement was a response to an inquiry;
9 whether the statement is accompanied by outward signs of excitement or emotional distress; and the declarant’s choice of words to describe the startling event or condition.
Id. at ¶ 45 (quoting Compan v. People, 121 P.3d 876, 882 (Colo.
2005)), overruled on other grounds by Nicholls v. People, 2017 CO
71, ¶ 30. Moreover, “‘[t]he most important of the many factors’
related to whether the observer reacted spontaneously or engaged
in reflective thought ‘is the temporal element.’” Id. at ¶ 47 (quoting
2 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 272 (Robert P.
Mosteller ed., 8th ed.)).
¶ 24 Here, we share father’s concern that the teacher’s testimony
regarding the oldest child’s description of the incidents did not
qualify as an excited utterance. Specifically, the teacher testified
that the child did not state when the incidents had occurred,
meaning that the court was unable to assess whether the child’s
statements were indeed a spontaneous reaction to very recent
events. See id. at ¶¶ 42, 47. Likewise, the teacher did not testify
that the child was upset because of the incidents but instead
recounted that the child “was upset because he had to end a
friendship because he was told to do so by his father.” Thus, it
10 appears that the child’s statements were not a spontaneous
reaction to the incidents but were instead made while he was upset
about a different matter. See id. at ¶ 42.
¶ 25 However, even if the district court erred in admitting the
teacher’s testimony as to the child’s statements, we conclude that
any error was harmless because the teacher’s testimony was merely
cumulative of other admitted evidence, so the error does not
warrant reversal. See In re Marriage of Adamson, 626 P.2d 739,
741 (Colo. App. 1981).
¶ 26 Here, an intake caseworker for child protective services and
the children’s therapist were both qualified as expert witnesses and
testified at the hearing. Without objection from father, the
caseworker testified as to the oldest child’s description of the
neck-grabbing and truck incidents. And without any hearsay
objection from father, the caseworker’s intake report, the therapist’s
trauma assessments, and a police report were admitted as
exhibits.1 Those documents in turn summarized the children’s
1 The record reflects that father initially objected to the admission of
the police report, but he then withdrew his objection. It further shows that father’s objection to the trauma assessments based on reliability was overruled, and he does not challenge that ruling here.
11 descriptions of the incidents forming the basis of the PPO. Thus,
because substantial, cumulative evidence concerning the incidents
was admitted, we decline to reverse the PPO even if the district
court erred by allowing the teacher to testify as to hearsay
statements. See id.
¶ 27 Finally, we reject father’s contention that the district court
abused its discretion by excluding certain hearsay testimony that
one of his witnesses had offered to discredit the child’s report
regarding the truck incident. As mother correctly points out, the
district court in fact admitted the statements that father has
claimed were improperly excluded.
D. Evidentiary Support for the PPO
¶ 28 Father also contends that the district court improperly placed
the burden on him to refute the allegations in mother’s petition,
and that there was otherwise insufficient evidence to support the
issuance of the PPO. We are not persuaded.
¶ 29 We review a trial court’s factual findings for clear error. In re
Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 55. A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous if there is no support for it in the record. In re
12 Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA 141, ¶ 39. It is for the trial court to
determine credibility of the witnesses and the weight, probative
force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and
conclusions to be drawn therefrom. In re Marriage of Thorburn,
2022 COA 80, ¶ 49; see also In re Marriage of Amich, 192 P.3d 422,
424 (Colo. App. 2007) (“The trial court can believe all, part, or none
of a witness’s testimony, even if uncontroverted, and its resolution
of conflicting evidence is binding on review.”).
2. The Record Supports the Court’s Findings
¶ 30 Based on the incidents between father and the children, the
district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that father
committed acts constituting grounds for a protection order, and
that unless restrained, he would continue to commit such acts.
The court was persuaded by the fact that the children had given
similar statements about the incidents to multiple adults. And the
court otherwise found that father’s former girlfriend, who testified in
support of father, was not “all that compelling of a witness.”
¶ 31 From the outset, we reject father’s contention that the district
court applied the wrong legal standard when making its findings in
support of the PPO by placing the burden of proof on him instead of
13 mother. While the court concluded that the allegations against
father were largely “unrefuted,” the court emphasized in response to
a question from father’s counsel that it had found by “a
preponderance of the evidence” that the PPO was warranted. Thus,
we are satisfied that the court did not simply accept the allegations
in the petition at face value, but instead, the court was persuaded
by the evidence introduced by mother.
¶ 32 For similar reasons, we reject father’s contention that the
district court applied the wrong legal standard or otherwise made
inconsistent findings when it explained that, although it was
issuing the PPO, it was “not finding that [father] is an unfit parent.”
The district court unambiguously indicated that it had found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the requirements for issuing a
PPO under section 13-14-106 had been met, and father has not
cited any legal authority suggesting that a finding of parental
unfitness was required before issuing a PPO.
¶ 33 Moreover, we disagree with father’s assertion that the district
court was confused about whether it was applying the protection
order statute or the standards governing the children’s best
interests under the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act. See
14 § 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2024. In terms of the court’s statement
that it also had jurisdiction to restrict or modify parenting time in
the children’s best interests, we construe that statement to be part
of an inquiry as to the circumstances under which the court may
modify the PPO in the children’s best interests in the future. We
otherwise express no opinion on that inquiry.
¶ 34 Finally, contrary to father’s assertions, we conclude that there
was sufficient evidence to support the issuance of the PPO. Even
without considering the testimony of the oldest child’s teacher, both
the caseworker and the therapist confirmed the children’s
descriptions of the neck-grabbing and truck incidents. The
caseworker specifically described how the oldest child reported that
father became upset while playing a board game with the children
and “grabbed [the oldest child] by the back of his neck and threw
him on the ground.” The caseworker confirmed that the oldest
child was traumatized by the incident.
¶ 35 Likewise, the therapist’s trauma assessments explained that
both children considered the truck incident to be a recent traumatic
event and described the incident as a punishment implemented by
father for the children’s poor performance during wrestling practice.
15 The trauma assessments described how, during that incident,
father stopped the truck multiple miles away from home and made
the children run all the way home in front of the truck, with father
driving the truck very close behind the children if they slowed
down. Accordingly, the therapist testified that the children felt
unsafe around father, and both the caseworker and the therapist
recommended that, going forward, father should only interact with
the children in a supervised environment. And while father
contends that the testimony of both the caseworker and therapist
was largely based on hearsay statements of the children, father
failed to object to that testimony on that basis. See Am. Fam. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. DeWitt, 218 P.3d 318, 325 (Colo. 2009) (“In order to
properly preserve an objection to evidence admitted at trial, a timely
and specific objection must appear in the trial court record.”).
¶ 36 Likewise, while father directs us to other evidence that he
contends weighs against the issuance of the PPO, including
mother’s course of conduct during past parenting disputes and the
testimony of his former girlfriend, we may not reweigh the evidence
in father’s favor given that the district court’s findings enjoy record
support. See In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (“[Even
16 where] there is evidence in the record that could have supported a
different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of
the district court.”). And in terms of father’s assertion that there
was no evidence that he would continue to engage in future acts
supporting a PPO, we disagree given that the PPO was based on
multiple incidents and the evidence indicated that the children
continued to feel unsafe around father.
¶ 37 In sum, given the evidence presented, we conclude that the
record supports the district court’s finding that father had
committed acts constituting grounds for issuance of a civil
protection order and unless restrained, would continue to commit
such acts. See § 13-14-106(1)(a). Specifically, given both the
neck-grabbing and truck incidents, we conclude that sufficient
evidence was presented to support a finding that the PPO was
necessary to prevent assaults on, and threatened bodily harm
against, the children. See § 13-14-104.5(1)(a); § 18-3-204(1)(a).
III. Disposition
¶ 38 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.