24CA1020 Marriage of Uhlar 05-29-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1020 Douglas County District Court No. 05DR747 Honorable Robert Lung, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Katherine Uhlar,
Appellee,
and
Jonathan Uhlar,
Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division A Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN Martinez* and Berger*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 29, 2025
The Demkowicz Law Firm, LLC, Danielle Demkowicz, Centennial, Colorado, for Appellee
Anne Whalen Gill, LLC, Anne Whalen Gill, Castle Rock, Colorado; Sue Kokinos, Centennial, Colorado, for Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage case involving Jonathan
Uhlar (father) and Katherine Uhlar, now known as Katherine
Martiny (mother), father appeals the district court’s order that
adopted a magistrate’s decision determining retroactive child
support. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The parties’ marriage ended in 2005. At that time, the district
court ordered father to pay mother child support for their two
children, M.W. and K.U.
¶3 About a decade later, the parties agreed that neither would
owe child support to the other.
¶4 In February 2018, father moved to modify child support
because M.W. was emancipated and K.U. was living with him full
time. The district court ordered child support but after an appeal, a
division of this court remanded the case with directions to
reconsider child support.
¶5 In June 2022, K.U. emancipated.
¶6 In August 2023, a magistrate held a hearing on father’s
modification motion.
1 ¶7 On September 28, 2023, the magistrate issued a written order.
While the existing parenting plan provided for shared time, the
magistrate acknowledged that K.U. had been living exclusively with
father since 2018. Using Worksheet B (shared physical care), the
magistrate determined that father owed mother $7,500 in
retroactive child support for the period between February 2018,
when he filed his motion, and the child’s emancipation in June
2022. See § 14-10-122(1)(d), C.R.S. 2024 (Modification of child
support is generally “effective as of the date of the filing of the
motion.”). In doing so, the magistrate denied, as inequitable, his
request for retroactive support under Worksheet A (sole physical
care). The magistrate reasoned that, despite the child residing with
father since 2018, father did not comply with the parenting plan
and failed to encourage the sharing of love and affection between
the child and mother.
¶8 On October 6, 2023, father requested an expedited transcript
of the August 2023 hearing.
¶9 On October 19, 2023, father timely filed a petition for district
court review under C.R.M. 7(a)(5) as well as a separate motion for
2 an extension of time to file a supporting memorandum brief
(memorandum) under C.R.M. 7(a)(6)-(7).
¶ 10 In the motion for extension of time, father explained that he
needed the hearing transcript before he could draft and complete
the memorandum. He asked for an additional thirty days to file the
memorandum after receiving the transcript. Anticipating that it
would arrive by November 11, 2023, he aimed to file the
memorandum by December 11, 2023. He also stated that he
“reserve[d] the right to request a second extension of time if the
transcript [was] not received on or before November 11, 2023.”
¶ 11 Without setting a deadline, the district court granted the
motion for extension of time.
¶ 12 On December 29, 2023, father filed the memorandum.
¶ 13 Mother then moved to “dismiss” the memorandum as
untimely.
¶ 14 Father responded, arguing that, consistent with his motion for
extension of time and the district court’s order “with no stated time
frame,” the memorandum was timely filed within thirty days of
receiving the transcript. He appended an email indicating that the
3 transcript was electronically sent to him on December 3, 2023. He
asserted that he “complied” with the court’s order and that the
“memorandum should be accepted.”
¶ 15 Unpersuaded, the district court found that the memorandum
was untimely primarily because of father’s earlier representation
that he would file a second motion if the transcript was delayed
beyond November 11, 2023. The court also noted that his response
to the motion to dismiss did not allege good cause for a late filing.
Moreover, the court pointed out that his timely petition for review
failed to identify any specific errors as required under C.R.M.
7(a)(7). The court added that “there [was] a jurisdictional bar in
reviewing the [m]emorandum, and that [f]ather by not timely filing
the [m]emorandum or requesting additional time, abandoned the
[p]etition for [r]eview.”1 “For all the aforementioned reasons,” the
court disregarded the untimely memorandum and adopted the
magistrate’s decision.
¶ 16 Father now appeals.
1 We offer no opinion as to the propriety of the district court’s
jurisdictional ruling, given that father did not challenge it on appeal. 4 II. Discussion
¶ 17 In challenging the district court’s adoption of the magistrate’s
decision, father contends that the court erred by rejecting his
memorandum as untimely as it should have found excusable
neglect under C.R.C.P. 6(b)(2). To get there, he says that the court’s
order granting his motion for extension of time was “vague” and
that he had made an “honest mistake.” We decline to address the
issue.
¶ 18 To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must bring
the issue to the district court’s attention so that the court can rule
on it. See In re Marriage of Martin, 2021 COA 101, ¶ 13. We decline
to review an issue raised for the first time on appeal. In re Marriage
of Crouch, 2021 COA 3, ¶ 13.
¶ 19 In the preservation section of his opening brief, father claims
that he raised the excusable neglect issue in his response to
mother’s motion to dismiss. But he took the opposite position
there. He maintained that the memorandum “was actually on time”
because he “complied with the [c]ourt’s [o]rder as written” by
“fil[ing] [it] within [thirty] days of receipt of the transcript.” He did
5 not assert in the alternative that, even if untimely, his failure or
“honest mistake” should be forgiven due to excusable neglect under
C.R.C.P. 6(b)(2). Thus, because he has not preserved his contention
regarding excusable neglect, we will not consider it now.2 See
Martin, ¶ 13; see also Crouch, ¶ 13.
¶ 20 We likewise decline to consider father’s undeveloped
contention that the district court erred by ultimately adopting the
magistrate’s decision. See Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condo.
Ass’n v. Metro. Homes, Inc., 2017 CO 69, ¶ 40 (An appellate court
will “decline to assume the mantle” when parties offer no
supporting arguments for their claims.); In re Marriage of Zander,
2019 COA 149, ¶ 27 (appellate court may decline to consider an
argument not supported by legal authority or any meaningful legal
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24CA1020 Marriage of Uhlar 05-29-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1020 Douglas County District Court No. 05DR747 Honorable Robert Lung, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Katherine Uhlar,
Appellee,
and
Jonathan Uhlar,
Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division A Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN Martinez* and Berger*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 29, 2025
The Demkowicz Law Firm, LLC, Danielle Demkowicz, Centennial, Colorado, for Appellee
Anne Whalen Gill, LLC, Anne Whalen Gill, Castle Rock, Colorado; Sue Kokinos, Centennial, Colorado, for Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage case involving Jonathan
Uhlar (father) and Katherine Uhlar, now known as Katherine
Martiny (mother), father appeals the district court’s order that
adopted a magistrate’s decision determining retroactive child
support. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The parties’ marriage ended in 2005. At that time, the district
court ordered father to pay mother child support for their two
children, M.W. and K.U.
¶3 About a decade later, the parties agreed that neither would
owe child support to the other.
¶4 In February 2018, father moved to modify child support
because M.W. was emancipated and K.U. was living with him full
time. The district court ordered child support but after an appeal, a
division of this court remanded the case with directions to
reconsider child support.
¶5 In June 2022, K.U. emancipated.
¶6 In August 2023, a magistrate held a hearing on father’s
modification motion.
1 ¶7 On September 28, 2023, the magistrate issued a written order.
While the existing parenting plan provided for shared time, the
magistrate acknowledged that K.U. had been living exclusively with
father since 2018. Using Worksheet B (shared physical care), the
magistrate determined that father owed mother $7,500 in
retroactive child support for the period between February 2018,
when he filed his motion, and the child’s emancipation in June
2022. See § 14-10-122(1)(d), C.R.S. 2024 (Modification of child
support is generally “effective as of the date of the filing of the
motion.”). In doing so, the magistrate denied, as inequitable, his
request for retroactive support under Worksheet A (sole physical
care). The magistrate reasoned that, despite the child residing with
father since 2018, father did not comply with the parenting plan
and failed to encourage the sharing of love and affection between
the child and mother.
¶8 On October 6, 2023, father requested an expedited transcript
of the August 2023 hearing.
¶9 On October 19, 2023, father timely filed a petition for district
court review under C.R.M. 7(a)(5) as well as a separate motion for
2 an extension of time to file a supporting memorandum brief
(memorandum) under C.R.M. 7(a)(6)-(7).
¶ 10 In the motion for extension of time, father explained that he
needed the hearing transcript before he could draft and complete
the memorandum. He asked for an additional thirty days to file the
memorandum after receiving the transcript. Anticipating that it
would arrive by November 11, 2023, he aimed to file the
memorandum by December 11, 2023. He also stated that he
“reserve[d] the right to request a second extension of time if the
transcript [was] not received on or before November 11, 2023.”
¶ 11 Without setting a deadline, the district court granted the
motion for extension of time.
¶ 12 On December 29, 2023, father filed the memorandum.
¶ 13 Mother then moved to “dismiss” the memorandum as
untimely.
¶ 14 Father responded, arguing that, consistent with his motion for
extension of time and the district court’s order “with no stated time
frame,” the memorandum was timely filed within thirty days of
receiving the transcript. He appended an email indicating that the
3 transcript was electronically sent to him on December 3, 2023. He
asserted that he “complied” with the court’s order and that the
“memorandum should be accepted.”
¶ 15 Unpersuaded, the district court found that the memorandum
was untimely primarily because of father’s earlier representation
that he would file a second motion if the transcript was delayed
beyond November 11, 2023. The court also noted that his response
to the motion to dismiss did not allege good cause for a late filing.
Moreover, the court pointed out that his timely petition for review
failed to identify any specific errors as required under C.R.M.
7(a)(7). The court added that “there [was] a jurisdictional bar in
reviewing the [m]emorandum, and that [f]ather by not timely filing
the [m]emorandum or requesting additional time, abandoned the
[p]etition for [r]eview.”1 “For all the aforementioned reasons,” the
court disregarded the untimely memorandum and adopted the
magistrate’s decision.
¶ 16 Father now appeals.
1 We offer no opinion as to the propriety of the district court’s
jurisdictional ruling, given that father did not challenge it on appeal. 4 II. Discussion
¶ 17 In challenging the district court’s adoption of the magistrate’s
decision, father contends that the court erred by rejecting his
memorandum as untimely as it should have found excusable
neglect under C.R.C.P. 6(b)(2). To get there, he says that the court’s
order granting his motion for extension of time was “vague” and
that he had made an “honest mistake.” We decline to address the
issue.
¶ 18 To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must bring
the issue to the district court’s attention so that the court can rule
on it. See In re Marriage of Martin, 2021 COA 101, ¶ 13. We decline
to review an issue raised for the first time on appeal. In re Marriage
of Crouch, 2021 COA 3, ¶ 13.
¶ 19 In the preservation section of his opening brief, father claims
that he raised the excusable neglect issue in his response to
mother’s motion to dismiss. But he took the opposite position
there. He maintained that the memorandum “was actually on time”
because he “complied with the [c]ourt’s [o]rder as written” by
“fil[ing] [it] within [thirty] days of receipt of the transcript.” He did
5 not assert in the alternative that, even if untimely, his failure or
“honest mistake” should be forgiven due to excusable neglect under
C.R.C.P. 6(b)(2). Thus, because he has not preserved his contention
regarding excusable neglect, we will not consider it now.2 See
Martin, ¶ 13; see also Crouch, ¶ 13.
¶ 20 We likewise decline to consider father’s undeveloped
contention that the district court erred by ultimately adopting the
magistrate’s decision. See Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condo.
Ass’n v. Metro. Homes, Inc., 2017 CO 69, ¶ 40 (An appellate court
will “decline to assume the mantle” when parties offer no
supporting arguments for their claims.); In re Marriage of Zander,
2019 COA 149, ¶ 27 (appellate court may decline to consider an
argument not supported by legal authority or any meaningful legal
analysis), aff’d, 2021 CO 12.
III. Appellate Attorney Fees
¶ 21 Mother asks for her appellate attorney fees under section 14-
10-119, C.R.S. 2024, based on the disparity in the parties’ financial
2 Despite mother’s concession that this issue was preserved, “an
appellate court has an independent, affirmative duty to determine whether a claim is preserved.” People v. Tallent, 2021 CI 68, ¶ 11. 6 resources. See In re Marriage of Gutfreund, 148 P.3d 136, 141
(Colo. 2006) (“Section 14-10-119 empowers the [district] court to
equitably apportion costs and fees between parties based on relative
ability to pay.”). Given that the district court is better situated to
determine whether the parties’ relative financial circumstances
warrant such an award, we remand to the district court for it to
consider her request. C.A.R. 39.1; see also Gutfreund, 148 P.3d at
141; In re Marriage of Nevedrova, 2024 COA 112, ¶ 18.
IV. Disposition
¶ 22 The order is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the district
court to resolve mother’s section 14-10-119 appellate attorney fees
request.
JUSTICE MARTINEZ and JUDGE BERGER concur.