Marriage of Trujillo

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 27, 2024
• Docket: 23CA1766
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23CA1766 Marriage of Trujillo 11-27-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1766 Douglas County District Court No. 21DR30592 Honorable Benjamin Figa, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Eric W. Trujillo, as the executor and personal representative of the estate of Earnest R. Trujillo,

Appellee,

and

Ruth M. Trujillo,

Appellant.

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART AND JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Lipinsky and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 27, 2024

The Law Firm of Dennis A. Lacerte, Dennis A. Lacerte, Parker, Colorado; The Law Office of William S. Schneider, LLC, William S. Schneider, Centennial, Colorado, for Appellee

The Harris Law Firm PLLP, Katherine O. Ellis, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 Ruth M. Trujillo (wife) appeals the district court’s judgment

dissolving her marriage with Earnest R. Trujillo (husband) and

entering permanent orders allocating the marital estate and

declining to award her maintenance. We dismiss the portion of the

appeal concerning maintenance and affirm the judgment dividing

the marital estate.

I. Background

¶2 The parties were married in 1971. In 2021, after husband

experienced a number of health problems, wife petitioned the

probate court for the appointment of a conservator for husband. A

few days later, husband initiated the dissolution of marriage case.

The conservatorship case was then dismissed.

¶3 While the dissolution case was pending, husband reported to

the court that wife had withdrawn approximately $1.1 million from

their joint account and deposited the money into her individual

account. Wife admitted that she had withdrawn the funds. She

explained that, since doing so, she had returned $513,000 to

husband and used a similar amount to buy herself a new home.

The court determined that wife had violated the mandatory

temporary injunction imposed by section 14-10-107(4)(b)(I), C.R.S.

1 2024, and it directed her to provide financial documentation and a

full accounting of the withdrawn funds. Wife submitted her

documentation, and the court didn’t enter further sanctions.

¶4 At the permanent orders hearing, wife asked for an equal

allocation of the marital estate. But husband argued that he

should receive a larger portion of the marital assets. He explained

that he had contributed substantially to the acquisition of the

marital assets, highlighting his employment earnings, his military

disability payments, and a financial settlement related to his

military service. He also highlighted that wife’s violation of the

temporary injunction had prevented them from accumulating

additional investment income on their marital funds.

¶5 After the hearing, the court divided the $2.3 million marital

estate by allocating about $1.4 million of the marital assets to

husband and about $855,000 to wife. The court divided the marital

debt by allocating to husband about $3,000 and wife about

$14,500, which corresponded to the debts they had identified on

their most recent respective sworn financial statements. The court

then declined to award wife maintenance, finding that she hadn’t

made a timely request for it and that, in any event, she could meet

2 her reasonable needs with the significant financial resources

allocated to her.

Assets and Debts Husband’s Allocation Wife’s Allocation

Real Estate $620,000 $520,000

Vehicles $8,500 $14,000

Bank/Investment $666,943 $154,850 Accounts Life Insurance $40,000 (or $20,000) Furnishings $2,000

Retirement Accounts $125,616 $166,186

Debts -$2,899 -$14,553

TOTAL $1,460,160 $840,483 (or $1,440,160)

II. Husband’s Death

¶6 Husband died after the district court entered the judgment

and wife initiated this appeal. The personal representative of

husband’s estate was substituted for him in this case. See C.A.R.

43(a)(1). We therefore clarify the scope of our review.

¶7 An appellate court may review a dissolution decree

determining the parties’ property rights even though one of the

parties has died. In re Marriage of Piper, 820 P.2d 1198, 1200

3 (Colo. App. 1991). However, any obligation to pay maintenance is

purely personal and, unless otherwise agreed to or ordered by the

court, a maintenance obligation doesn’t survive the death of the

payor spouse. Id. at 1199-1200; see § 14-10-122(2)(a)(I), C.R.S.

2024. Thus, any decision we render on the court’s ruling declining

to award maintenance would have no practical legal effect after

husband’s death because the court can no longer impose a

maintenance obligation. See Piper, 820 P.2d at 1199 (concluding

that the appellate court didn’t have jurisdiction to review the court’s

order denying the wife maintenance after the husband’s death); cf.

In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 24 (“[M]aintenance is

based on the parties’ financial circumstances at the time the order

is entered . . . .”).

¶8 We therefore dismiss the portion of wife’s appeal concerning

maintenance and review only her appeal relating to the court’s

allocation of the marital estate. See Piper, 820 P.2d at 1199-1200.

III. Property Division

¶9 Wife contends that the district court reversibly erred by

allocating to husband a disproportionate share of the marital estate.

We aren’t persuaded.

4 A. Governing Legal Standards

¶ 10 The court has great latitude to equitably divide the marital

estate in such proportions as it deems just. See § 14-10-113(1),

C.R.S. 2024; In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 28. The

property division must be equitable, but it doesn’t have to be equal.

Wright, ¶ 3. “The key to an equitable distribution is fairness,”

which depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In re

Marriage of Gallo, 752 P.2d 47, 55 (Colo. 1988); accord Wright, ¶ 3.

¶ 11 To determine an equitable division, the court should consider

“all relevant factors.” § 14-10-113(1). Relevant factors may

include, but aren’t limited to, the parties’ contributions to the

acquisition of marital property, the value of property set aside to

each party, the parties’ economic circumstances, and the depletion

of a party’s separate property for marital purposes. Id.

Determining how to weigh the relevant factors when determining an

equitable allocation is within the court’s sound discretion. In re

Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶ 67.

¶ 12 We may not disturb a court’s property division absent a

showing that the court abused its discretion. Medeiros, ¶ 28. A

court abuses its discretion when it acts in a manifestly arbitrary,

5 unreasonable, or unfair manner, or it misapplies the law. Id.; see

also Hall v. Moreno, 2012 CO 14, ¶ 54 (explaining that, when

reviewing a court’s discretionary decision, we consider whether the

decision fell within the range of reasonable options, not whether we

would have reached a different result).

B. Discussion

¶ 13 When determining the allocation of the marital estate, the

district court acknowledged the applicable legal standard and then

summarized the conflicting evidence. The court found that

husband and the parties’ son, who testified in support of husband,

were “very credible.” And it found that wife was “not as credible.”

The court explained that wife had made misrepresentations to the

court, violated the temporary injunction during the case, and didn’t

fully disclose financial information to husband. In light of those

credibility determinations, the court discussed the relevant factors

under section 14-10-113.

¶ 14 The court found that the parties were married for over fifty

years and that husband was the primary source of their financial

resources during the marriage. See § 14-10-113(1)(a). The court

explained that, in addition to his employment, husband contributed

6 the funds from his military disability benefits and a financial

settlement he received relating to Agent Orange exposure. See id.

The court acknowledged that wife also contributed as a

homemaker, but it found that “on balance it was [husband] who

contributed more” to the acquisition of their marital property. See

id.

¶ 15 The court also found that, although husband’s monthly

income was more than wife’s income, after the dissolution each

party would have a debt-free residence. See § 14-10-113(1)(c). The

court then allocated to husband the condominium where he was

living, and it allocated to wife the home she purchased during the

proceedings.

¶ 16 In addition, the court noted that husband’s health had

suffered due to the effects of his military service and that, for the

past couple of years, he had been receiving full-time care from their

son, who had moved into a second condominium owned by the

parties, which was located close to husband’s residence. See § 14-

10-113(1). And the court considered as a relevant factor that wife

had violated the temporary injunction and used a significant

7 amount of marital funds without husband’s consent to buy her

home.

¶ 17 Based on these facts and circumstances, the court divided the

marital assets. It determined that its division, which allocated to

husband about $1.4 million and wife the remaining $855,000, was

fair and equitable.

¶ 18 Wife argues that the court’s allocation was manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, and unfair. But the court weighed the

relevant factors, and it made findings supported by the record

explaining its decision. See Smith, ¶ 67; see also In re Marriage of

Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (recognizing that it is for the district

court to determine witness credibility and the weight, probative

force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn from the evidence). We therefore may not

set aside its determination. See Medeiros, ¶ 28; see also Hall, ¶ 54.

¶ 19 In particular, husband testified that, while wife made

significant contributions, he contributed “way more to the marital

estate,” and he confirmed that his Agent Orange settlement

payments and military disability benefits helped them accumulate

the marital assets. The record also revealed that husband’s

8 deteriorating health over the last decade warranted additional care

and support. Husband had suffered a heart attack and a stroke,

received a kidney transplant, was diagnosed with diabetes,

experienced a lengthy hospitalization for COVID-19, and had his leg

amputated.

¶ 20 Still, wife contests the court’s finding that she violated the

temporary injunction, arguing that the record doesn’t support this

finding. (She does not challenge the court’s decision to consider

this circumstance as a relevant factor when allocating the marital

estate. See § 14-10-113(1).) Upon the filing of a dissolution

petition, “a temporary injunction shall be in effect against both

parties,” restraining them from “transferring, encumbering,

concealing, or in any way disposing of, without the consent of the

other party or an order of the court, any marital property, except in

the usual course of business or for the necessities of life.” § 14-10-

107(4)(b)(I)(A). Wife highlights that the temporary injunction was

not in place when she withdrew the marital funds from their joint

account because husband had not yet filed the dissolution petition.

While that may be true, she didn’t merely withdraw the marital

funds. The evidence also showed that, after husband filed his

9 petition, wife took over $500,000 of those marital funds to buy a

new home without husband’s consent. Wife’s conduct supports the

court’s finding that she violated the injunction. See id.

¶ 21 Wife also suggests that the court erred by saying that it “did

not hear any evidence today from [wife] as to why she was not in

violation of [the] temporary injunction.” In support, she asserts

that, before the hearing, she provided information to the court that

gave a detailed accounting of the withdrawn marital funds.

However, she fails to explain how providing that information

renders the court’s statement incorrect, particularly when the court

didn’t base its finding that she had violated the temporary

injunction on her lack of accounting. See In re Marriage of Drexler,

2013 COA 43, ¶ 27 (recognizing that the appealing party bears the

burden to explain the legal basis and provide supporting authority

for a contention of error asserted on appeal).

¶ 22 To the extent wife suggests that the court incorrectly found

that she didn’t provide a full accounting of the withdrawn funds, we

disagree. Although wife supplied financial information to the court

before the hearing, the evidence at the hearing concerning the

extent of her accounting conflicted. Husband said that she didn’t

10 adequately account for the withdrawn funds, and wife’s testimony

was equivocal. The court made its finding after weighing the

conflicting evidence, and we, therefore, may not set it aside. See

Thorburn, ¶ 49; see also In re Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA 141,

¶ 45 (“We are not at liberty to re-evaluate the conflicting evidence

and set aside findings supported by the record.”).

¶ 23 Wife also generally asserts that the court’s findings on each

party’s credibility doesn’t explain the unequal allocation. However,

the court’s credibility findings informed its resolution of the

conflicting evidence and its consideration of the relevant factors.

Beyond her general assertion, wife doesn’t develop this argument,

and we decline to address it further. See In re Parental

Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 29 (declining to

address undeveloped argument).

¶ 24 In re Marriage of Singewald, 535 P.2d 252 (Colo. App. 1975)

(not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)), on which wife principally

relies, is distinguishable. In that case, the division reversed a

property division because the district court had misapprehended

the transaction creating a particular asset, resulting in an

inequitable division. Id. at 253-54. Wife doesn’t assert any

11 analogous mistake in this case. And, in any event, the validity of

any property division turns on the relevant facts, which will of

course differ from case to case.

¶ 25 In sum, we aren’t persuaded that the court abused its

discretion by ordering an unequal allocation of the marital estate.

See Wright, ¶¶ 3, 10; see also In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525,

538 (Colo. 1995) (“[A]n appellate court must not disturb the delicate

balance achieved by the [district] court in [its] division of

property . . . unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.”).

IV. Disposition

¶ 26 We dismiss the portion of the appeal concerning the court’s

maintenance ruling and affirm the court’s judgment allocating the

marital estate.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.