24CA1813 Marriage of Tafolla 08-21-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1813 El Paso County District Court No. 23DR30649 Honorable Monica J. Gomez, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Aaron Andrew Tafolla,
Appellant,
and
Lisa Marie Tafolla,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division II Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Fox and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 21, 2025
Law Office of Greg Quimby, P.C., Greg Quimby, Erica Vasconcellos, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant
The Byrnes Law Firm, Laurel Meyers Byrnes, Theodore D’Arcy, Jim Yontz, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Aaron Andrew
Tafolla (father) and Lisa Marie Tafolla (mother), father appeals those
portions of the permanent orders concerning parenting time,
maintenance, child support, and the allocation of the children’s
extraordinary expenses. We affirm the portion of the permanent
orders concerning mother’s supervised parenting time but reverse
the portion of the permanent orders concerning mother’s
unsupervised digital and telephone contact with the children. We
also reverse the district court’s awards of maintenance and child
support and its allocation of extraordinary expenses. We remand
the case for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶2 The parties married in 2001 and have three children. In 2023,
father petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage, and mother
stipulated to a restriction of her parenting time after she was
charged in a separate criminal proceeding with various crimes
related to her abuse of father and the children. To resolve the
charges, mother pleaded guilty to misdemeanor harassment and
entered into a stipulation for a deferred judgment and sentence.
1 ¶3 A permanent orders hearing was held in July 2024. In the
resulting permanent orders, the district court awarded father sole
decision-making responsibility and allowed him to relocate with the
children to Hawaii. Mother requested reunification therapy,
although she did not seek any parenting time. The court denied
mother’s request for reunification therapy but awarded her
supervised parenting time once per month in Hawaii. The court
also awarded her “reasonable telephone/digital contact” with the
children three times per week.
¶4 After dividing the marital estate, which primarily consisted of
over $260,000 in debt, the district court awarded mother $1,600
per month in maintenance for eleven years. The court declined to
award father any child support.
II. Parenting Time
¶5 Father first challenges the allocation of parenting time. We
conclude that father invited any error as to mother’s supervised
parenting time. But because we are unable to ascertain why the
court deemed it in the children’s best interests to have
unsupervised digital and telephone contact with mother, we reverse
2 and remand to the district court for further findings on the portion
of the permanent orders concerning digital and telephone contact.
A. Applicable Law
¶6 A district court must allocate parenting time according to the
children’s best interests, “giving paramount consideration to the
child[ren]’s safety and the physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs of the child[ren].” § 14-10-124(1.5), C.R.S.
2024. The court must consider the factors in section 14-10-
124(1.5)(a)(I)-(XI). In re Marriage of Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 327 (Colo.
App. 1996). The court is not required to make specific findings on
all statutory factors. In re Marriage of Rodrick, 176 P.3d 806, 813
(Colo. App. 2007). However, the court’s findings must be
sufficiently explicit to give the reviewing court a clear understanding
of the factual basis for the order. In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA
104, ¶ 9; In re Marriage of Garst, 955 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Colo. App.
1998) (“Factual findings are sufficient if they identify the evidence
which the fact finder deemed persuasive and determinative of the
issues raised.”).
¶7 For a court to “impos[e] . . . a parenting time restriction,” the
court must find “that parenting time by the [restricted] party would
3 endanger the child[ren]’s physical health or significantly impair the
child[ren]’s emotional development” and “enumerate the specific
factual findings supporting the restriction,” including findings
related to child abuse. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a).
¶8 We review a district court’s parenting time determinations for
an abuse of discretion, meaning that we will only reverse if the
court acted in a manifestly unfair, arbitrary, or unreasonable
manner. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 8. We
generally review the district court’s factual findings for clear error,
meaning that we will not disturb them unless they are devoid of
record support. Van Gundy v. Van Gundy, 2012 COA 194, ¶ 12.
B. Discussion
¶9 To start, we reject father’s contention that, because of
mother’s history of child abuse, the district court erred by
permitting her to have any parenting time with the children. At the
hearing, father’s attorney asked father if he wanted mother to “only
have supervised parenting time at her expense,” and father replied,
“[y]es.” Consistent with father’s wishes, the court awarded mother
supervised parenting time in Hawaii, once per month, at her
expense.
4 ¶ 10 Accordingly, we conclude that father’s contention of error
concerning mother’s supervised parenting time is barred by the
doctrine of invited error because the permanent orders implemented
his own request as to mother’s parenting time. See In re Marriage of
O’Connor, 2023 COA 35, ¶ 24 (recognizing that “[t]he doctrine of
invited error precludes a party from appealing an error that the
party invited or injected into the case”); cf. Horton v. Suthers, 43
P.3d 611, 619 n.10 (Colo. 2002) (recognizing that invited error
merely mandates that the claim of error cannot be considered but
does not suggest that actual error occurred).
¶ 11 Father also contends that the district court abused its
discretion by permitting mother to have unsupervised digital and
telephone contact with the children. We conclude that further
proceedings are necessary because we are unable to tell what
information the district court found relevant when deciding that it
was in the children’s best interests to have unsupervised contact
with mother. See Gibbs, ¶ 9.
¶ 12 The district court found that mother had a history of verbally,
emotionally, and physically abusing the children, which included
“coercive control” of them. The court explained that “[t]he
5 testimony concerning [m]other’s abuse of the children and the
videos presented [at the hearing] [were] horrific” and found that
mother’s “need to rage at the children t[ook] precedence over her
relationship with them.” Such verbal abuse included “belittling and
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24CA1813 Marriage of Tafolla 08-21-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1813 El Paso County District Court No. 23DR30649 Honorable Monica J. Gomez, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Aaron Andrew Tafolla,
Appellant,
and
Lisa Marie Tafolla,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division II Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Fox and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 21, 2025
Law Office of Greg Quimby, P.C., Greg Quimby, Erica Vasconcellos, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant
The Byrnes Law Firm, Laurel Meyers Byrnes, Theodore D’Arcy, Jim Yontz, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Aaron Andrew
Tafolla (father) and Lisa Marie Tafolla (mother), father appeals those
portions of the permanent orders concerning parenting time,
maintenance, child support, and the allocation of the children’s
extraordinary expenses. We affirm the portion of the permanent
orders concerning mother’s supervised parenting time but reverse
the portion of the permanent orders concerning mother’s
unsupervised digital and telephone contact with the children. We
also reverse the district court’s awards of maintenance and child
support and its allocation of extraordinary expenses. We remand
the case for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶2 The parties married in 2001 and have three children. In 2023,
father petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage, and mother
stipulated to a restriction of her parenting time after she was
charged in a separate criminal proceeding with various crimes
related to her abuse of father and the children. To resolve the
charges, mother pleaded guilty to misdemeanor harassment and
entered into a stipulation for a deferred judgment and sentence.
1 ¶3 A permanent orders hearing was held in July 2024. In the
resulting permanent orders, the district court awarded father sole
decision-making responsibility and allowed him to relocate with the
children to Hawaii. Mother requested reunification therapy,
although she did not seek any parenting time. The court denied
mother’s request for reunification therapy but awarded her
supervised parenting time once per month in Hawaii. The court
also awarded her “reasonable telephone/digital contact” with the
children three times per week.
¶4 After dividing the marital estate, which primarily consisted of
over $260,000 in debt, the district court awarded mother $1,600
per month in maintenance for eleven years. The court declined to
award father any child support.
II. Parenting Time
¶5 Father first challenges the allocation of parenting time. We
conclude that father invited any error as to mother’s supervised
parenting time. But because we are unable to ascertain why the
court deemed it in the children’s best interests to have
unsupervised digital and telephone contact with mother, we reverse
2 and remand to the district court for further findings on the portion
of the permanent orders concerning digital and telephone contact.
A. Applicable Law
¶6 A district court must allocate parenting time according to the
children’s best interests, “giving paramount consideration to the
child[ren]’s safety and the physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs of the child[ren].” § 14-10-124(1.5), C.R.S.
2024. The court must consider the factors in section 14-10-
124(1.5)(a)(I)-(XI). In re Marriage of Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 327 (Colo.
App. 1996). The court is not required to make specific findings on
all statutory factors. In re Marriage of Rodrick, 176 P.3d 806, 813
(Colo. App. 2007). However, the court’s findings must be
sufficiently explicit to give the reviewing court a clear understanding
of the factual basis for the order. In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA
104, ¶ 9; In re Marriage of Garst, 955 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Colo. App.
1998) (“Factual findings are sufficient if they identify the evidence
which the fact finder deemed persuasive and determinative of the
issues raised.”).
¶7 For a court to “impos[e] . . . a parenting time restriction,” the
court must find “that parenting time by the [restricted] party would
3 endanger the child[ren]’s physical health or significantly impair the
child[ren]’s emotional development” and “enumerate the specific
factual findings supporting the restriction,” including findings
related to child abuse. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a).
¶8 We review a district court’s parenting time determinations for
an abuse of discretion, meaning that we will only reverse if the
court acted in a manifestly unfair, arbitrary, or unreasonable
manner. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 8. We
generally review the district court’s factual findings for clear error,
meaning that we will not disturb them unless they are devoid of
record support. Van Gundy v. Van Gundy, 2012 COA 194, ¶ 12.
B. Discussion
¶9 To start, we reject father’s contention that, because of
mother’s history of child abuse, the district court erred by
permitting her to have any parenting time with the children. At the
hearing, father’s attorney asked father if he wanted mother to “only
have supervised parenting time at her expense,” and father replied,
“[y]es.” Consistent with father’s wishes, the court awarded mother
supervised parenting time in Hawaii, once per month, at her
expense.
4 ¶ 10 Accordingly, we conclude that father’s contention of error
concerning mother’s supervised parenting time is barred by the
doctrine of invited error because the permanent orders implemented
his own request as to mother’s parenting time. See In re Marriage of
O’Connor, 2023 COA 35, ¶ 24 (recognizing that “[t]he doctrine of
invited error precludes a party from appealing an error that the
party invited or injected into the case”); cf. Horton v. Suthers, 43
P.3d 611, 619 n.10 (Colo. 2002) (recognizing that invited error
merely mandates that the claim of error cannot be considered but
does not suggest that actual error occurred).
¶ 11 Father also contends that the district court abused its
discretion by permitting mother to have unsupervised digital and
telephone contact with the children. We conclude that further
proceedings are necessary because we are unable to tell what
information the district court found relevant when deciding that it
was in the children’s best interests to have unsupervised contact
with mother. See Gibbs, ¶ 9.
¶ 12 The district court found that mother had a history of verbally,
emotionally, and physically abusing the children, which included
“coercive control” of them. The court explained that “[t]he
5 testimony concerning [m]other’s abuse of the children and the
videos presented [at the hearing] [were] horrific” and found that
mother’s “need to rage at the children t[ook] precedence over her
relationship with them.” Such verbal abuse included “belittling and
threatening the children” and calling one the children a “worthless
orphan child.”
¶ 13 Yet, despite these extensive findings concerning mother’s
verbal abuse, the district court, without further explanation,
allowed mother to have unsupervised telephone and digital contact
with the children. Accordingly, we cannot determine why the court
concluded that unsupervised contact with mother was in the
children’s best interests. See id.
¶ 14 We therefore reverse the portion of the permanent orders
concerning mother’s digital and telephone contact with the children
and remand for the district court to re-address that issue. See In re
Marriage of Goodbinder, 119 P.3d 584, 587 (Colo. App. 2005)
(requiring remand where the district court did not include in its
order any factual findings or legal conclusions that would enable
the appellate court to understand the basis of its order and,
accordingly, whether the court abused its discretion). Because the
6 permanent orders were entered almost a year ago, the district court
should receive additional evidence on remand concerning the
children’s current circumstances and then make appropriate
factual findings regarding the type of contact authorized between
mother and the children. See In re Parental Responsibilities
Concerning M.W., 2012 COA 162, ¶ 27. The current parenting time
orders shall remain in effect pending the additional findings and
orders on remand. See id.
III. Maintenance
¶ 15 Father next challenges the award of $1,600 per month in
maintenance to mother. Because we agree that the district court,
at least in part, based the maintenance award on improper
speculation that father could consolidate or otherwise obtain relief
from his significant debt, we reverse the maintenance award and
remand for further proceedings.
A. Preservation
¶ 16 We first reject mother’s contention that this issue was not
preserved because “[t]he Rules provide for an objection to proposed
orders,” and father did not file such an objection in the district
court. At no point did either party file a proposed version of the
7 permanent orders, and instead, the court indicated that it would
issue its own written permanent orders. Moreover, “a party is not
required to object to the trial court’s findings in the trial court to
preserve a challenge to those findings.” People in Interest of D.B.,
2017 COA 139, ¶ 30. We thus consider the substance of father’s
contentions.
B. Applicable Law
¶ 17 The district court has broad discretion in deciding the amount
and duration of a maintenance award, and, absent an abuse of that
discretion, we will not reverse its decision. See § 14-10-114(2),
(3)(e), C.R.S. 2024; In re Marriage of Vittetoe, 2016 COA 71, ¶ 14.
¶ 18 Under section 14-10-114(3), the court must follow a specific
process when awarding maintenance. In re Marriage of Wright,
2020 COA 11, ¶ 13. “[T]he court must first make written or oral
findings on each party’s gross income, the marital property
apportioned to each party, each party’s financial resources, the
reasonable financial need as established during the marriage, and
the taxability of the maintenance awarded.” In re Marriage of
Herold, 2021 COA 16, ¶ 25; see also § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I).
8 ¶ 19 Next, the court must determine the amount and term of
maintenance, if any, that is equitable after considering the
statutory advisory guidelines and a list of non-exclusive statutory
factors. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(A), (3)(a)(II)(B), (3)(b), (3)(c); Wright,
¶ 15. Finally, before the court is permitted to award maintenance,
it must find that the party seeking maintenance lacks sufficient
property, including marital property apportioned to them, to provide
for their reasonable needs and is unable to support themself
through appropriate employment. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(C), (3)(d).
¶ 20 The district court must “make specific written or oral findings
in support of the amount and term of maintenance awarded.” § 14-
10-114(3)(e); see also Gibbs, ¶ 9; Garst, 955 P.2d at 1058.
C. Discussion
¶ 21 In determining maintenance, the court found that father
earned $8,861 per month, whereas mother only earned $3,144 per
month. Based on the parties’ respective incomes, the district court
found that the guideline amount of maintenance was $3,649 per
month from father to mother. However, the court acknowledged
that, given the approximately $121,000 in unsecured debt allocated
9 to father, with monthly payments totaling almost $3,000, father did
not have the ability to pay the guideline maintenance amount.
¶ 22 The court appeared to credit father’s sworn financial
statement showing that, even before any maintenance obligation, he
had a monthly budgetary shortfall of approximately $4,000. But
the court then opined that “[s]hould [f]ather file for bankruptcy or
manage his debt through a debt consolidation program, his
financial picture will improve dramatically.” After finding that
mother lacked the financial resources to support herself, the court
concluded that father “has the financial resources to pay spousal
maintenance” and ordered him to pay mother $1,600 per month
based “on a totality of [the] circumstances.”
¶ 23 We agree with father that the court’s speculation about his
ability to consolidate or otherwise eliminate his debt was improper
because “[a]wards of maintenance must be based upon the parties’
needs and circumstances at the time of the hearing, rather than
upon their past or future conditions.” In re Marriage of Simon, 856
P.2d 47, 51 (Colo. App. 1993); see also In re Marriage of Folwell, 910
P.2d 91, 93 (Colo. App. 1995) (recognizing that maintenance should
not be based on “speculation about future conditions”). Here, there
10 was no testimony or other evidence concerning father’s ability or
intention to obtain future debt relief via bankruptcy or debt
consolidation. Consequently, the district court’s observation that
father could improve his finances, and thus his ability to pay
maintenance, by filing for bankruptcy or consolidating debt was
unsupported speculation about his future financial conditions. See
Simon, 856 P.2d at 51; Folwell, 910 P.2d at 93. Therefore, we
reverse the maintenance award and remand for the district court to
reconsider mother’s request for maintenance.
IV. Child Support and Remand Instructions
¶ 24 Maintenance and child support are “inextricably intertwined,”
In re Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 301 (Colo. App. 2005), and
because we are reversing the maintenance award, we also reverse
the portion of the permanent orders determining child support.
Because the district court will need to reconsider child support, we
decline to address father’s contention that the district court erred
by awarding him no child support.
¶ 25 In determining both maintenance and child support on
remand, the district court must base its orders on the parties’
economic circumstances at the time of remand. In re Marriage of
11 Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 79 (maintenance is based on the parties’
financial situations when an order is entered); In re Marriage of
Berry, 660 P.2d 512, 513 (Colo. App. 1983) (directing court on
remand to determine the needs of the children at the time of the
hearing). Therefore, the district court should direct the parties to
produce updated disclosures, see C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(1), (4), and allow
them to present additional evidence on their present economic
circumstances. Cf. Salby, 126 P.3d at 301 (parties on remand
should be given a full opportunity to present all relevant evidence
affecting child support and maintenance).
¶ 26 The district court must make sufficiently explicit findings of
fact to give us a clear understanding of the basis of its orders, see
Gibbs, ¶ 9, including specific findings in support of any deviation
from the child support guidelines, see § 14-10-115(8)(e), C.R.S.
2024.
V. Payment of the Children’s Extraordinary Expenses
¶ 27 We also agree with father that the district court erred by
allocating “extraordinary medical and agreed-upon extracurricular
activity expenses in proportion to income,” with mother being
responsible for nine percent and father being responsible for ninety-
12 two percent of expenses. In addition to the fact that the sum of the
percentages calculated by the court exceeds 100%, we are unable to
ascertain how the court determined that father was ninety-two
percent responsible and mother was nine percent responsible given
that the court found that the parties earned $8,861 per month, and
$3,144 per month, respectively. See Gibbs, ¶ 9; § 14-10-
115(5)(I)(Y), (10)(h)(I) (requiring extraordinary medical expenses to
be divided between the parties in proportion to their “adjusted gross
incomes,” which includes maintenance, subject to certain
adjustments).
¶ 28 Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the permanent orders
allocating the children’s extraordinary expenses and direct the
district court to reconsider that allocation on remand.
VI. Discovery Issues
¶ 29 Because both parties will be required to update their financial
disclosures as part of the district court’s consideration of their
current economic circumstances on remand, we decline to consider
father’s additional contentions that the district court erred by (1)
failing to rule on his motion to compel mother to produce certain
financial documents, and (2) failing to make negative inferences
13 against mother when determining maintenance and child support
because of her failure to produce certain documents.
VII. Attorney Fees
¶ 30 Father requests an award of his appellate attorney fees under
section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2024, which allows a court to equitably
apportion, based on a disparity in the parties’ financial resources,
attorney fees in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. But father
has not identified any disparity in the parties’ financial
circumstances which would warrant an award of attorney fees in
his favor. See C.A.R. 39.1 (requiring a party seeking attorney fees
on appeal to “explain the legal and factual basis for an award of
attorney fees”). We thus deny his request.
VIII. Disposition
¶ 31 The portion of the permanent orders concerning mother’s
supervised parenting time is affirmed. Those portions of the
permanent orders concerning mother’s digital and telephone
contact with the children, maintenance, child support, and the
allocation of the children’s extraordinary expenses are reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
14 opinion. Those portions of the judgment not challenged on appeal
remain undisturbed.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.