25CA0756 Marriage of Sunderland 08-27-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0756 Jefferson County District Court No. 22DR30340 Honorable Christopher B. Rhamey, Judge
In re the Marriage of Sandra J. Sunderland, Appellant, and Stuart L. Sunderland, Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Pawar and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 27, 2026
Sandra J. Sunderland, Pro Se
Ciancio Ciancio Brown P.C., Marc J. Kaplan, Banafsheh Lari, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 In this post-decree dissolution of marriage case between Sandra J. Sunderland (wife) and Stuart L. Sunderland (husband), wife appeals the district court’s order denying her motion to modify maintenance and request for attorney fees. We affirm.
I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History ¶2 In 2023, the district court dissolved the parties’ twenty-seven- year marriage. At that time, husband was the fire chief for a local fire department, and he planned to retire in July 2024 (about eight months after the divorce). Wife was unemployed. ¶3 When dividing the marital estate, the court found that the marital home was worth $850,000. It acknowledged that wife wanted to keep the home, but the court found that it “couldn’t do [so] in a way that would be financially feasible.” The court directed the parties to sell the home. It allocated the home’s equity by giving wife the first $225,000, which encompassed $100,000 for an equalization payment and $125,000 for a reimbursement of husband’s marital waste during the case, and equally dividing the rest. (Given the court’s valuation, this gave wife $537,500 and husband $312,500.)
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¶4 The court also equally divided the marital portion of husband’s pension but noted that it was unable to determine an exact amount each party would receive until husband’s upcoming retirement was finalized. The court awarded wife an IRA, which was worth about $145,000, and awarded husband other various retirement accounts, which totaled about $342,000. ¶5 The court ordered husband to pay wife maintenance in the amount of $3,585 per month until husband retired. It then reserved jurisdiction over maintenance, finding that the anticipated but unknown changes to the parties’ incomes after husband’s retirement could be significant. ¶6 After permanent orders, wife purchased husband’s interest in the marital home for $189,750 and continued to live in the home. ¶7 In July 2024, husband retired, and wife filed a motion to modify maintenance. She asked the court to extend husband’s maintenance obligation and requested $1,840 per month. ¶8 After a hearing, the court denied wife’s motion and terminated maintenance. The court found that wife was working part-time as a cashier and earned $21 per hour. It explained that it had provided wife with an equitable distribution of marital assets in the
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permanent orders, including significant liquid assets from the sale of the marital home. Wife then elected to modify the court’s allocation by purchasing husband’s interest in the home. The court found that, after her purchase, wife’s total equity in the home increased to $660,250, which included the $225,000 the court awarded as her equalization payment and the reimbursement for husband’s marital waste. The court also found that she had inherited $100,000 after the divorce and noted that she was receiving $5,579 per month from husband’s pension. ¶9 The court then determined that husband’s seasonal job at a fly shop in Montana earning $13.50 per hour was reasonable, rejecting wife’s argument that he was voluntarily underemployed. It noted that husband’s main asset was his pension and that he received $9,078 per month from it — about $3,500 per month more than wife due to his premarital contributions. ¶ 10 The court found that wife chose to purchase the marital home and that wife’s equity in the marital home was significantly more than the difference in the monthly value of the pension. It then determined that wife had sufficient financial means to support herself and that her decision to retain the marital home equity
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didn’t justify awarding her additional maintenance. The court also denied wife’s request for attorney fees under section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025.
II. Maintenance
¶ 11 Wife contends that the district court reversibly erred by denying her request to modify maintenance. We consider and reject her contentions.
A. Standard of Review ¶ 12 The district court has broad discretion when deciding maintenance, and, absent an abuse of that discretion, we will not disturb its decision. See § 14-10-114(2), (3)(e), C.R.S. 2025; In re Marriage of Vittetoe, 2016 COA 71, ¶ 14. A court abuses its discretion when it acts in a manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair manner, or when it misapplies the law. In re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 7. We defer to the court’s factual findings unless they have no record support. In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024 COA 103M, ¶¶ 30-31. We review de novo the court’s application of the law. In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶ 12. ¶ 13 Generally, a request to modify maintenance is governed by section 14-10-122(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025, and requires a party to show
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that substantial and continuing changed circumstances have rendered the maintenance award unfair. In re Marriage of Thorstad, 2019 COA 13, ¶¶ 1-2, superseded by statute on other grounds, Ch. 176, sec. 1, § 14-10-114(5), 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 648, as stated in Young, ¶ 13. The court, however, may reserve jurisdiction at the time of the permanent orders based on a specific future event, and, when reserved, the court may modify maintenance under section 14-10-114 as though initially determining maintenance. See § 14-10-114(3)(g); Thorstad, ¶¶ 48-49; In re Marriage of Caufman, 829 P.2d 501, 503-04 (Colo. App. 1992). ¶ 14 Under section 14-10-114, the court must first make findings on each party’s gross income, the marital property apportioned to each party, each party’s financial resources, the reasonable financial need as established during the marriage, and the taxability of the maintenance awarded. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I); In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 14. The court then considers the amount and term of maintenance, if any, that is fair and equitable based on the totality of circumstances. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II), (3)(b), (3)(c), (3)(e); Wright, ¶ 15. The court may award maintenance only if it finds that the party seeking
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maintenance lacks sufficient property to provide for their reasonable needs and is unable to support themselves through appropriate employment. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(C), (3)(d); Wright, ¶ 16.
B. Pension Payments
¶ 15 Wife contends that the court improperly (1) included the marital portion of the pension when determining the parties’ incomes and (2) excluded husband’s separate portion of the pension from his gross income. We see no reversible error. ¶ 16 A party’s gross income for purposes of maintenance generally means income from any source and includes pension payments actually received unless the court previously divided the pension as marital property in the case. § 14-10-114(8)(c)(I)(H). ¶ 17 First, contrary to wife’s contention, the court didn’t include the marital portion of the pension payments within either party’s income. Before analyzing wife’s maintenance request, the court discussed that the pension payments were a reason it had reserved maintenance and, in doing so, acknowledged that it had divided a portion of the pension as a marital asset. The court also acknowledged that each party was receiving a monthly payment
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from the pension — the marital portion of which was $5,579 per month. When the court later conducted its analysis on maintenance, it didn’t discuss the marital portion of the pension or include those payments in its findings on each party’s income. Rather, it found that the gross income for each party was their present wages. See § 14-10-114(8)(c)(I)(B). Specifically, it found that wife’s income was $21 per hour, which, given her part-time schedule, equaled approximately $1,800 per month, and that husband’s income was $13.50 per hour, which, given his seasonal employment, equaled approximately $2,300 per month. Thus, we discern no merit to wife’s suggestion that the court improperly included the marital portion of the pension in either party’s gross income. ¶ 18 Second, wife argues that the court erred by excluding from husband’s gross income his separate portion of the pension (approximately $3,500 per month) because, unlike the marital portion, husband’s separate property wasn’t divided by the court. See § 14-10-114(8)(c)(I)(H); cf. In re Marriage of Folwell, 910 P.2d 91, 94 (Colo. App. 1995) (determining that a party could use the portion of their pension benefits earned after the divorce to pay
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maintenance). Even assuming wife is correct, she fails to demonstrate how such an error requires reversal. See C.A.R. 35(c) (“The appellate court may disregard any error or defect not affecting the substantial rights of the parties.”). ¶ 19 Although the court didn’t address the pension when determining husband’s gross income, it discussed his additional share of the pension as a financial resource when analyzing maintenance. See § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(C), (3)(c)(I), (II), (3)(e). It found that the pension paid him $3,500 per month more than it paid wife and that these additional funds provided him with more financial flexibility. Even so, the court found that, after wife purchased husband’s interest in the marital home, her equity in that asset had increased and that, when compared to husband’s additional pension funds, wife’s home equity was significantly more. Notably, wife bought husband’s interest in the home, valued at $312,500, for only $189,750. After completing its analysis, the court determined that wife had sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs, leading it to deny her maintenance request. See § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(C), (3)(d).
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¶ 20 The court therefore considered husband’s additional $3,500 per month from the pension, even if it didn’t include those funds in husband’s gross income. Wife doesn’t explain how the court’s analysis of his separate portion of the pension affected her substantial rights or otherwise prejudiced her. See C.A.R. 35(c); see also People in Interest of A.C., 170 P.3d 844, 845 (Colo. App. 2007) (concluding that an alleged error, without a valid allegation of prejudice, isn’t grounds for reversal). We thus conclude that any error was harmless.
C. Husband’s Assets
¶ 21 When addressing the marital property apportioned to each party, the district court found that husband had “little to no assets except for his considerable pension.” Wife contends that the court erred by disregarding the other marital assets allocated to husband. We discern no reversible error. ¶ 22 Despite the court’s statement, a complete review of its ruling shows that it was aware of the other assets it had allocated to husband and considered more than just his pension when denying wife’s request. In particular, the court found that husband had received a substantial portion of the marital home’s equity
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(approximately $312,500) and that he agreed to sell his interest in the home to wife for $189,750. The court also noted that husband was allocated retirement accounts. And it acknowledged that, during the dissolution proceeding, husband had depleted the marital estate by $125,000, which was attributed to him (and reimbursed to wife) in the permanent orders. The court further found that each party received an equitable distribution of assets from the marital estate. Moreover, we may presume that the court considered the additional evidence presented at the hearing related to husband’s assets and financial resources. See In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 21. ¶ 23 But even if the court misstated husband’s assets in its maintenance analysis, wife again fails to explain how the court’s brief misstatement prejudiced her substantial rights. See C.A.R. 35(c); A.C., 170 P.3d at 845. As noted above, the court denied wife’s maintenance request because she could financially support herself and therefore didn’t meet the requirement to receive maintenance. See § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(C), (3)(d). Further findings on husband’s assets wouldn’t have changed that determination. We thus discern no reversible error.
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D. Wife’s Home Equity
¶ 24 Wife contends that the district court erred by relying on her equity in the marital home to find that she had sufficient property to meet her reasonable needs. We are unpersuaded. ¶ 25 Wife highlights that the court can’t require a party to consume their portion of the marital property before being entitled to maintenance. In re Marriage of Sewell, 817 P.2d 594, 597 (Colo. App. 1991). But the court didn’t rely on only the home equity allocated to wife. It found that her decision to purchase the home after the divorce provided her with substantial additional equity, which was above and beyond the equity allocated by the court. The court then determined, with record support, that wife could support herself from this additional equity and her other financial resources. See § 14-10-114(3)(c)(I), (3)(d). We thus reject wife’s contention that the court’s ruling improperly required her to deplete her portion of the marital estate.
E. Husband’s Employment ¶ 26 Wife next contends that the district court erred by finding that husband wasn’t voluntarily underemployed. We disagree.
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¶ 27 A court generally determines maintenance based on a party’s actual gross income, among other factors. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A), (8)(a)(II). But if a party is voluntarily underemployed, the court considers their potential income instead. § 14-10-114(8)(c)(IV); Collins, ¶ 29. A party is voluntarily underemployed when they shirk their support obligation by unreasonably foregoing higher paying employment. Collins, ¶ 29. A party isn’t voluntarily underemployed when their employment represents a good faith career choice. § 14-10-114(8)(c)(V)(B). ¶ 28 Whether a party is underemployed for purposes of imputing income is predominantly a question of fact, and we will not disturb the court’s finding if the record supports it. Collins, ¶ 30. ¶ 29 At the hearing, wife didn’t dispute husband’s decision to retire from the fire department. Rather, she argued that he could work in a related profession and that he was voluntarily underemployed by earning $13.50 per hour at a fly shop. In support, she presented expert testimony from a vocational evaluator who opined that husband was qualified to work as a fire inspector or a fire prevention specialist and that he could earn $137,000 to $160,000 per year.
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¶ 30 The court wasn’t persuaded. It explained that husband had a long career in the fire department, his position as fire chief had ended, he bore no fault for being relieved of this position, and he was eligible to receive his retirement benefits. The court acknowledged wife’s expert witness’s opinion but didn’t find him credible, noting that the expert didn’t have the requisite industry knowledge to support his conclusion and wasn’t versed in the requirements husband needed for these purportedly higher paying jobs. ¶ 31 The court also found that while husband was earning less money, nothing showed that he was doing so to shirk his financial obligations. ¶ 32 Husband’s testimony supported the court’s findings. He explained that he didn’t currently have the certifications required to obtain the jobs proposed by wife’s expert and that it could take him years to fully complete the required certifications. He further testified that it was normal to retire from the fire department at fifty-eight years old, which was his age at retirement. Another former fire chief also confirmed that fifty-eight was a typical age to
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retire from their profession due to the high stress accompanying their work. ¶ 33 Given the record support for the court’s determination, we will not disturb it. See id. ¶ 34 To the extent wife suggests other evidence supported a finding of voluntary underemployment, the task of resolving the conflicting evidence fell to the district court, not us. See Tooker, ¶ 31 (recognizing that any conclusions to be drawn from the conflicting evidence were for the district court to resolve); see also In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (noting that the district court determines the witness’s credibility and the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom). We may not re-evaluate that evidence and set aside the court’s determination when, as here, the record supports it. See In re Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA 141, ¶ 45. ¶ 35 Wife further argues that when rejecting her claim that husband wasn’t voluntarily underemployed, the court incorrectly relied on its belief that husband wasn’t required to obtain additional training and education. She emphasizes that under section
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14-10-114(3)(c)(V), the court could consider the party’s “income, employment, and employability, obtainable through reasonable diligence and additional training or education.” But section 14-10-114(3)(c)(V) applies to the court’s determination for an equitable amount and term of maintenance. It doesn’t govern the court’s determination on voluntary underemployment. And wife directs us to no other legal authority to establish that the court’s analysis was improper. See In re Marriage of Drexler, 2013 COA 43, ¶ 27 (noting the appellant’s burden to provide legal authority in support of their contention of error). ¶ 36 We therefore will not disturb the court’s finding that husband wasn’t voluntarily underemployed.
F. Grounds for Modifying Maintenance ¶ 37 We also reject wife’s contention that the court erred by “misreading the grounds cited in” her motion to modify and improperly applying section 14-10-122(1)(a) rather than section 14-10-114 as a result. ¶ 38 Wife’s motion alleged that she required “continued maintenance to make ends meet” and asserted that (1) her “car is now unreliable and repairs are required”; (2) she needed “loans for
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refinancing the house and getting a reliable car”; and (3) she had “not received” her share of the pension in July. In accordance with these allegations, the court observed that wife “sought modification [of maintenance] on three grounds: to purchase reliable transportation, secure a mortgage on her home, and recoup her share of the pension alleged to be unpaid for the month of July.” The court then considered those and other relevant circumstances when it concluded that wife hadn’t established a basis to award further maintenance. ¶ 39 To the extent wife asserts that the court misapplied the law by applying section 14-10-122 when considering these alleged grounds for modifying maintenance, we conclude that any purported error was harmless. See C.A.R. 35(c). The court ultimately analyzed wife’s maintenance request under both sections 14-10-122 and 14-10-114, and, in doing so, thoroughly considered the totality of her present financial circumstances. It didn’t confine its analysis to the three grounds alleged in her motion. And after completing its section 14-10-114 analysis, the court concluded that wife wasn’t entitled to maintenance. The court thus properly resolved her request under section 14-10-114, and wife doesn’t explain how any
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purported error from improperly considering section 14-10-122(1)(a) prejudiced her substantial rights. See C.A.R. 35(c); A.C., 170 P.3d at 845. ¶ 40 In sum, the court didn’t abuse its discretion by denying wife’s request to modify maintenance.
III. Attorney Fees
¶ 41 Wife next contends that the district court erred by denying her request for attorney fees under section 14-10-119. We disagree. ¶ 42 Section 14-10-119 permits the district court to award attorney fees and costs based on the parties’ financial resources and relative ability to pay. In re Marriage of Gutfreund, 148 P.3d 136, 141 (Colo. 2006). The court’s decision to award fees under section 14-10-119 is discretionary, and we will not disturb its decision absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. In re Marriage of Davis, 252 P.3d 530, 538 (Colo. App. 2011). ¶ 43 The court considered the parties’ relative financial circumstances and declined to award wife attorney fees. It found that there wasn’t a significant difference between their financial resources and that wife had “considerable assets.” The record supports the court’s findings. In particular, wife (1) had substantial
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equity in the marital home; (2) received over $7,300 per month from the pension and her job; (3) recently inherited $100,000; and (4) owned a substantial retirement account. ¶ 44 Accordingly, the court didn’t abuse its discretion by denying wife’s request for attorney fees.
IV. Disposition
¶ 45 We affirm the order.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.