24CA1908 Marriage of Strickland 02-19-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1908 La Plata County District Court No. 17DR30040 Honorable Kim S. Shropshire, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Bryson Tylor Strickland,
Appellee,
and
Lacy Joe Strickland,
Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE BERNARD* Pawar and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 19, 2026
Aitken Law, LLC, Sharlene J. Aitken, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
The Law Firm of Lisa Ward, LLC, Lisa Ward, Durango, Colorado, for Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Bryson Tylor Strickland, who we shall call “father,” filed a
motion to restrict the parenting time of Lacy Joe Strickland, whom
we shall call “mother.” In granting the motion, the trial court
ordered that the children of mother and father would change their
primary residence from mother’s home to father’s home. Mother
appeals. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Since their divorce in 2018, mother and father have shared
custody of their two children. Under their separation agreement,
the children lived primarily with mother in Colorado, where they
attended school. Father, who lived in Texas, had monthly parenting
time plus more time with the children during the summer and
holidays.
¶3 In July 2024, father filed an emergency motion to restrict
mother’s parenting time. He alleged there was domestic violence in
mother’s home endangering the children. After a hearing, the trial
court found, in an August 2024 order, that mother had been the
victim of domestic violence involving her fiance; that it was
concerning mother was unable to acknowledge she had been the
victim of violence; and that video evidence presented during the
1 hearing disturbingly showed the intensity of the violence and the
children’s reactions to witnessing it.
¶4 These findings led the court to decide the children were at risk
of emotional, physical, and psychological harm in mother’s
residence and that their well-being was endangered when mother
had unrestricted parenting time with them. The court entered a
written order restricting mother’s parenting time, ordering that the
children were to remain in Texas with father, and requiring the
children to begin school there.
¶5 Mother filed a C.R.C.P. 59 motion and a motion to remove the
restrictions the court had imposed when granting father’s
emergency motion. The court denied both motions.
II. The Court’s Findings
¶6 Mother contends the court did not consider the children’s best
interests, the harm a change of residence might cause them, or the
least detrimental alternative between allowing the children to
remain in mother’s home while prohibiting the fiance from having
any contact with them and transferring their primary residence to
father’s home. We disagree.
2 A. Applicable Legal Standards
¶7 A court “may make or modify an order granting or denying
parenting time rights whenever such order or modification would
serve the best interests of the child.” § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), C.R.S.
2025. The best interest of the child “is the controlling factor for a
trial court when entering any order relating to parenting time.” In
re Marriage of Barker, 251 P.3d 591, 592 (Colo. App. 2010). A court
has “broad discretion when modifying an existing parenting time
order, taking into consideration the child’s best interests.” Id.
While “some detriment to a child is present in every child placement
decision, a court’s task is to make the placement choice ‘least
detrimental’ to the child.” In re Marriage of Martin, 42 P.3d 75, 78
(Colo. App. 2002)(citation omitted). This analysis is “subsumed
within the concept of best interests of the child” standard. Id.
¶8 We review an order modifying parenting time for an abuse of
discretion. Id. A court abuses its discretion if “its decision is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair; is based on an
erroneous understanding or application of the law; or misconstrues
or misapplies the law.” In re Marriage of Badawiyeh, 2023 COA 4,
¶ 9.
3 B. Additional Facts
¶9 During the hearing on father’s motion, the court heard
testimony from witnesses relating to the alleged domestic violence
that mother’s fiance had inflicted on her. The fiance’s daughter, a
minor child, testified she took videos of mother and the fiance
fighting and of mother’s children fighting. She also said the fiance
had forced her to drink alcoholic beverages. After this testimony,
the court watched the videos. (We note that the video of mother
and the fiance fighting is very dark, and one cannot clearly see what
anyone is doing. But one can hear screams and yelling.)
¶ 10 The daughter’s mother testified she checked her daughter’s
phone after the daughter had returned from parenting time with the
fiance, discovering disturbing and demeaning messages the fiance
had sent to the daughter. She added that her daughter was not
doing well emotionally since returning from seeing the fiance and
that her daughter would frequently call her distraught from being
with him.
¶ 11 A caseworker with the La Plata Department of Human Services
testified about her investigation and eventual determination that
the presence of the alleged domestic violence in mother’s home was
4 a safety concern for the children. The caseworker added she knew
of twenty reports over a four-year period relating to alleged domestic
violence in mother’s home. Mother objected to these reports being
admitted into evidence at the hearing, stating they were
inadmissible because they contained hearsay and because they
were irrelevant. The court admitted the reports into evidence.
¶ 12 Mother testified. She characterized the incident depicted in
the video recorded by the fiance’s daughter as a “communication
issue.” She said a 2022 investigation into an incident in which the
fiance allegedly assaulted her was a “misunderstanding,” and she
claimed he had not assaulted her.
¶ 13 Father testified. He was concerned “something irreversible”
would happen to the children during mother’s parenting time. He
said the children were more withdrawn after they returned from
parenting time at mother’s home when the incident shown in the
video took place.
¶ 14 In its written order restricting mother’s parenting time, the
court stated that section 14-10-129(1)(a)(I) allows courts to modify
parenting time rights whenever such a modification would “serve
the best interests of the child.” It then found “the children’s
5 emotional, physical, and psychological wellbeing is endangered due
to unrestricted parenting time with [m]other,” and “[m]other’s denial
of the presence of domestic violence in the home, as well as the
children’s repeated exposure to the domestic violence, puts the
children at risk of emotional, physical, and psychological harm.” It
also found mother “failed to protect the children from this harm,”
and she posed an “emotional and psychological safety risk to the
children.” Finally, it found there was “credible testimony [mother’s]
prior partner had both engaged in domestic violence and excessive
discipline of the children.”
¶ 15 In an oral ruling from the bench, the court found, due to the
children being endangered in mother’s home, it would restrict her
parenting time until the threatening conditions no longer existed or
until the court adopted a different parenting time plan that was in
the children’s best interests.
C. Analysis
¶ 16 We conclude, for the following reasons, that the court, when
entering its order, considered the children’s best interests, the harm
that a change of residence might cause them, and the least
detrimental alternative between allowing the children to remain in
6 mother’s home while prohibiting her fiance from having any contact
with them and transferring their primary residence to father’s
home. We further conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion when entering its order because its decision (1) was not
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair; (2) was not based on an
erroneous understanding or application of the law; and (3) did not
misconstrue or misapply the law. See Marriage of Badawiyeh, ¶ 9.
¶ 17 First, in its written order, the court stated the best-interests-
of-the-child standard governed its analysis of whether a restriction
of mother’s parenting time was appropriate and proper.
¶ 18 Second, the court’s oral and written orders prioritized the
children’s best interests.
¶ 19 Third, the court found that, “when [it] consider[ed] what [was]
in the children’s best interest after it ma[de] the endangerment
analysis, it could not “put these children back in [mother’s] home”
and that it “ha[d] limited options available to it and [it thought the
restriction was] what’s in the best interest of the children.”
¶ 20 Fourth, contrary to mother’s assertion, the court considered
mother’s proposed least detrimental alternative of prohibiting
contact between mother’s fiance and the children. The record
7 shows the court considered this alternative insufficient to protect
the children because the court was concerned mother had
demonstrated a “willingness to lie to protect her relationship with
[the fiance]” to the point that the court could not take her word “at
face value.”
¶ 21 Fifth, the “least detrimental alternative” analysis is “subsumed
within the concept” of the analysis of what arrangement is in the
best interests of the child. See Martin, 42 P.3d at 78. So, even if
the court had not expressly addressed the inadequacy of mother’s
proposed least detrimental alternative, it implicitly addressed that
alternative by deciding that the best interests of the children
required a transfer of their primary residence to father.
¶ 22 Sixth, the court considered the potential harm of changing the
children’s primary residence. The court said, “I absolutely
understand how disruptive this is moving the children from one
state to the next. The court’s hands are a little tied because of the
geographic distance.”
8 III. Endangerment Finding
¶ 23 Mother asserts the court erred by restricting her parenting
time and changing the children’s primary residence without finding
that she had endangered them. We disagree.
A. Applicable Legal Standards
¶ 24 A court “shall not restrict a parent’s parenting time rights
unless it finds that the parenting time would endanger the child’s
physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional
development.” § 14-10-129(1)(b)(I). In addition to such a finding, a
court “shall enumerate the specific factual findings supporting the
restriction.” Id. Finally, a court must determine that the restriction
would serve the best interests of the child. See § 14-10-129(2.5)(a).
B. Analysis
¶ 25 Contrary to mother’s assertion, the court found that living
with mother endangered the children. In its written order, the court
found that mother had not protected the children from the harm
resulting from witnessing the fiance subject mother to domestic
violence; that mother posed an “emotional and psychological safety
risk to the children”; and that, in part due to her denying that the
domestic violence had occurred, it was “difficult to ascertain when,
9 or if, the children would be safe in her care.” In its oral ruling, the
court also specified that it found “that there was sufficient evidence
to remove the children due to emotional, mental, and physical
endangerment to them in [mother and the fiance’s] home.”
¶ 26 The court also laid out the specific factual underpinnings of its
order, including the video, the testimony about the children’s
emotional well-being, and its “great concern regarding the impact
[of the presence of domestic violence] on the children’s
development.”
¶ 27 In her C.R.C.P. 59 motion, mother asked for relief because her
fiance’s daughter supposedly admitted her testimony had been
false. But, in its ruling on the motion, the court stated that this
putative admission would not have made a difference in its ruling.
Based on the other evidence upon which the court relied, we see no
reason to question this ruling.
¶ 28 Mother last asserts the court’s finding of endangerment was
undermined by its willingness to allow the children to stay with
mother during her parenting time without supervision as long as
her fiance remained out of the house. But the court’s order was
also based on concerns about the harm mother’s conduct had
10 caused the children and about mother’s credibility. As we noted
above, the court found (1) unrestricted parenting time with mother
endangered the children’s “emotional, physical, and psychological
wellbeing”; (2) mother’s denial of domestic violence in the home
along with the children’s repeated exposure to it “put[] the children
at risk of emotional, physical, and psychological harm”; (3) mother
failed to protect the children from this risk, so she also posed a
safety risk to the children; (4) it was hard for the court “to ascertain
when, or if, the children would be safe in [mother’s] care”; and
(5) mother was willing “to lie to protect her relationship with [the
fiance],” so the court could not take her word “at face value.”
¶ 29 Relatedly, it is important to keep in mind what the court’s
order was and what it was not.
¶ 30 The order addressed an emergency motion, and it imposed a
temporary remedy. The order did not address a motion to modify
parenting time on a more long-term basis, which would ask the
court to adjudicate whether the children should relocate to Texas to
live with father. The court anticipated father would file such a
motion, which he did September 2024. That motion is pending.
11 IV. Evidentiary Claims
¶ 31 Mother submits the court erred because it admitted hearsay
and irrelevant evidence and because it relied on evidence outside
the record. We disagree.
¶ 32 Evidence is relevant, and presumptively admissible, if it has
“any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.” CRE 401;
accord Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8, ¶ 3.
¶ 33 Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. CRE 801(c). Hearsay statements
are generally inadmissible except as provided in CRE 803. People v.
Vanderpauye, 2023 CO 42, ¶ 25. One such exception, the business
records exception, renders hearsay evidence admissible when the
evidence was “kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to
make [the record].” CRE 803(6).
12 ¶ 34 To satisfy the business records exception, the proponent of the
evidence must establish five things. First, the document must have
been made at or near the time of the matters recorded in it. People
v. Flores-Lozano, 2016 COA 149, ¶ 13. Second, the record must
have been prepared by, or from information transmitted by, a
person with knowledge of the matters recorded. Id. Third, the
person who recorded the document must have done so as part of a
regularly conducted business activity. Id. Fourth, it must have
been the regular practice of that business activity to make such
documents. Id. Finally, the document must have been created and
kept during a regularly conducted business activity. Id.
¶ 35 We review a court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. People v. Russell, 2014 COA 21M, ¶ 22, aff’d, 2017 CO
3. We have described what amounts to an abuse of discretion
previously in this opinion. See Marriage of Badawiyeh, ¶ 9.
¶ 36 A trial court’s decision about “whether a statement constitutes
hearsay is a legal conclusion, which we review de novo.” People v.
Hamilton, 2019 COA 101, ¶ 12.
13 B. Analysis
¶ 37 We conclude, for the following reasons, that the court did not
improperly admit hearsay or irrelevant evidence and that it did not
improperly rely on evidence outside of the record. As a result, the
court did not abuse its discretion when it made the evidentiary
rulings mother contests. See Marriage of Badawiyeh, ¶ 9.
¶ 38 Mother submits that the court improperly admitted the reports
from the La Plata Department of Human Services because they were
irrelevant and inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.
¶ 39 The reports were highly relevant to a material issue: whether
the historical presence of domestic violence in mother’s home
endangered the children. See CRE 401; Rojas, ¶ 3. Mother
contends that some of the reports concerned people who are no
longer present in her life. But the reports were still relevant for the
court to understand the historical pattern of domestic violence in
mother’s relationships and its effect on the children. The reports
helped the court to decide whether mother’s parenting time
endangered the children and what would be in their best interests.
As such, the reports were relevant and presumptively admissible.
14 ¶ 40 Next, the reports were not inadmissible hearsay. The court
properly concluded that they were admissible under the business
records exception to the hearsay rule. It found that the reports
were generated in the regular course of the Department of Human
Service’s business and that the caseworker’s testimony satisfied the
other four elements of the business records exception. And mother
does not develop any other hearsay arguments in her opening brief.
¶ 41 Last, the court did not improperly rely on information that had
not been introduced into evidence. Rather, it relied on its
experience to make an individualized determination that the
children’s physical, emotional, and psychological health was
endangered by unrestricted parenting time with mother. Although
mother contends the court’s recitation of harm to children from
witnessing domestic violence was not based on the evidence in the
record, the record contains evidence that the children were harmed
while living with mother. For example, father testified the children
were more withdrawn after the domestic violence incident depicted
on the video. For another example, our review of the video indicates
the children were exposed to a traumatizing event.
15 V. Father’s Request for Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs
¶ 42 Father asks us to award him appellate attorney fees under
section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2025; C.A.R. 38(b); and C.A.R. 39.1
because, he submits, mother’s appeal lacked substantial
justification and was frivolous. We deny this request. See Mission
Denv. Co. v. Pierson, 674 P.2d 363, 365 (Colo. 1984)(“Standards for
determining whether an appeal is frivolous should be directed
toward penalizing egregious conduct without deterring a lawyer
from vigorously asserting his client’s rights.”); Glover v. Serratoga
Falls LLC, 2021 CO 77, ¶ 70 (noting that attorney fees awards for
frivolous appeals should be reserved for “clear and unequivocal”
cases involving “egregious conduct” (citation omitted)). While we
are affirming the trial court’s order, it was not “so plainly correct
and the legal authority so clearly against [mother’s] position that
there [was] really no appealable issue.” Martin v. Essrig, 277 P.3d
857, 862 (Colo. App. 2011).
¶ 43 But, because we affirm the order, father is entitled to his
appellate costs under C.A.R. 39(a)(2), which states, “[I]f a judgment
is affirmed, costs are taxed against the appellant.” Father may
16 pursue those costs in the trial court by following the procedure
described in C.A.R. 39(c)(2).
¶ 44 The trial court’s order is affirmed.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.