23CA1801 Marriage of Stone 11-14-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1801 El Paso County District Court No. 20DR31770 Honorable Diana K. May, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Christopher Everett Stone,
Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
and
Iryna Hermanova Stone, n/k/a Iryna Hermanova Mokhoshchokova,
Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division V Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Freyre and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 14, 2024
Belzer Law, Aaron B. Belzer, Ashlee N. Hoffman, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellee and Cross-Appellant
Mark Anthony Law, Mark Anthony Barrionuevo, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant and Cross-Appellee ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage proceeding, Iryna Hermanova
Stone, n/k/a Iryna Hermanova Mokhoshchokova (mother) appeals
the portion of the district court’s permanent orders allocating
property and parental responsibilities between herself and
Christopher Everett Stone (father). Father also appeals, arguing the
district court erred when it declined to enforce a marital agreement
that purported to control the disposition of the marital property and
committed a series of errors when it declined to declare an oral
decree of dissolution a final judgment.
¶2 We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand the case for
further proceedings.
I. Background
¶3 Mother and father met in Ukraine in 2001 while father was on
vacation looking for romance through a companion business.
Mother is from Ukraine and worked at the companion business as
an interpreter. The two started a romantic relationship, and in
2002, mother arrived in the United States on a marriage visa.
¶4 Father presented mother with an estate plan and, allegedly, a
marital agreement. Mother signed the estate plan, but as we
explain further below, the district court found that she did not sign
1 the marital agreement. After the estate plan was signed, the couple
married in Las Vegas on February 7, 2002. Father’s parents
witnessed the wedding.
¶5 The marriage produced two children. Until 2014, mother was
the children’s primary caretaker and father was the primary earner.
He served in the United States Air Force before the marriage; while
the parties were married, he worked as an engineer and executive
until 2014.
¶6 According to father, mother’s mental health began to decline
in 2011. Among other things, father reported that mother
attempted to abscond with their three-year-old son to Crimea in
2014, that she hoarded rotten food (leading to pest infestations and
family illness), and that she engaged in a number of other troubling
behaviors. As a result of mother’s decline, father stated he stopped
working — in part so that he could protect the children. In
response, mother claimed father committed domestic violence
against her, alienated the children from her, and forced her out of
their marital home. Father filed for divorce on August 21, 2020.
¶7 The district court held a permanent orders hearing on July 20,
2021, that resulted in oral findings and an unsigned minute order
2 stating that the court had “enter[ed] a decree of dissolution.” But
two weeks later, on August 2, 2021, the court issued another order
delaying the entry of permanent orders due to “serious concerns
about [mother’s] mental competence.” To address these issues, the
court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) “to represent [mother’s]
interests and report back to the court.” On August 4, 2021, the
court “revok[ed] the entry of the decree” and ordered that it would
be withheld “until such time as the court’s recent order requiring a
GAL to assist [mother] and report back to the court is satisfied.”
¶8 Several delays followed as the GAL opened a probate case for
mother, and father changed attorneys. In February 2023, the
parties agreed to bifurcate the proceedings. On May 9, 2023, the
court issued permanent orders related to the decree of dissolution,
the validity of the marital agreement, the partial division of marital
assets, spousal maintenance, and attorney fees. On September 6,
2023, the district court issued permanent orders regarding parental
responsibilities and the remaining marital property. Mother’s
appeal and father’s cross-appeal followed.
3 II. Mother’s Claims
¶9 Mother contends that the district court (1) divided the parties’
marital assets in a way that was manifestly unfair, inequitable, and
unconscionable and (2) allocated parenting time and decision
making responsibilities in a manner contrary to the children’s best
interests. We address each issue in turn.
A. Property Division
1. Additional Facts
¶ 10 The parties had substantial marital assets, almost all of which
were in father’s name. They had no marital debts. In addition to
the family home and some personal property, the bulk of the
marital assets were comprised of various investment, retirement,
and bank accounts that had a total value of close to $5 million.
¶ 11 The district court found that father was “appropriately retired”
and noted that the military had found him to be permanently
disabled. Father’s gross monthly income was $11,930.
¶ 12 The court found that mother was “unemployed, but capable of
working.” Because she would be “reentering the work force with
little to no skills,” the court imputed a minimum wage salary with
“a gross monthly income of $2,366.00.”
4 ¶ 13 Mother was awarded the following:
• the value of father’s thrift savings plan (TSP) and some
other retirement investments;
• utilizing the time-rule formula, the “eight year
percentage” of father’s Federal Employee Retirement
System (FERS) account after setting aside $100,000 as
father’s separate property;
• half of the value of the marital home;
• half of the value of a vehicle;
• half of the value of the marital portion of father’s comic
book collection;
• half of the marital savings and checking accounts;
• half of the value of the remaining household items; and
• $2,514 per month in lifetime maintenance with mother
owing father $926 per month in child support.
¶ 14 Father was awarded the following:
• the entire Vanguard account;
• half the value of a vehicle;
5 • half of the value of the marital portion of father’s comic
• half of the marital savings and checking account; and
• the remaining household items.
¶ 15 The district court ordered taxes to be split equally and did not
total up the share of the marital estate awarded to each party. On
appeal, however, mother asserts that, with respect to the various
investment and retirement accounts, father received an 83.45%
share of the marital property (the entire Vanguard account, valued
at $4,624,528), while she received only 16.55% (the TSP account
and other retirement accounts, valued at $917,458). Father does
not contest these calculations. (In addition, we note that, aside
from the FERS account, which we address below, the remaining
marital assets were divided equally, so they would affect the
distribution by only a few percentage points even if they were added
in.)
2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 16 In reviewing a district court’s property division, we recognize
that the court has great latitude to affect an equitable distribution
based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In re
6 Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525, 537-38 (Colo. 1995). We review a
court’s factual findings for clear error. In re Marriage of Powell, 220
P.3d 952, 954 (Colo. App. 2009). We defer to the court’s factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of
Connerton, 260 P.3d 62, 66 (Colo. App. 2010). However, the court
must make sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give the appellate
court a clear understanding of the basis of its order. In re Marriage
of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815, 822 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶ 17 Thus, on review, an appellate court must not disturb a district
court’s decision regarding the division of property unless there has
been a clear abuse of discretion. Hunt, 909 P.2d at 538. A court
abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair, or if it misapplies the law. In re Marriage
of Badawiyeh, 2023 COA 4, ¶ 9.
¶ 18 The disposition of marital property is governed by the Uniform
Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA). In re Marriage of Balanson, 25
P.3d 28, 35 (Colo. 2001). When dividing property between spouses,
the district court must consider all relevant factors, including the
contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital
property, the value of property set apart to each spouse, the
7 economic circumstances of each spouse, and any increases or
decreases in values of separate property. § 14-10-113(1)(a)-(d),
C.R.S. 2024. “[F]actors such as occupational experience, coupled
with education, training, and business background should be
considered in determining what division should be made of
property.” Carlson v. Carlson, 497 P.2d 1006, 1009-10 (Colo.
1972). The court’s distribution of marital property must be
equitable — not necessarily equal. In re Marriage of Morehouse, 121
P.3d 264, 267 (Colo. App. 2005).
3. Analysis
¶ 19 Mother contends that the district court abused its discretion
by failing to consider all the relevant factors when dividing the
marital property. She also argues that the court divided the marital
assets inequitably. Mother asks us to reverse the district court’s
property division and (1) award her fifty percent of the value of the
Vanguard account, (2) hold that the entire FERS account is marital
property, and (3) award her half of the total value of the comic book
collection.
¶ 20 While a district court “need not make specific findings as to
each statutory factor,” Powell, 220 P.3d at 959, its findings must be
8 specific “to give an appellate court a clear understanding of the
basis of its order.” Rozzi, 190 P.3d at 822. Here, the district court
offered little explanation for why it awarded mother less than one-
fifth of the marital property.
¶ 21 To be sure, the district court stated it “factored in [m]other’s
contributions” when dividing marital assets, found mother
contributed to the household as “the homemaker,” and considered
the couple’s economic circumstances. But aside from those
conclusory statements, the court did not explain how the statutory
factors outlined in section 14-10-113 shaped its decision to award
at least eighty percent of the marital property to father.
¶ 22 Father’s arguments on appeal are similarly thin. While he
asserts that mother “contributed little financially to the marriage,
trashed the family’s homes, and abandoned her parenting
responsibilities for ten years,” and that “allocating cash” from the
Vanguard account would have caused him to incur capital gains
taxes, he does not engage with the statutory factors at all.
¶ 23 In addition, some of the district court’s property division
appears arbitrary or internally inconsistent. For example, the court
evenly divided the marital checking and savings accounts without
9 knowing their value (due to father’s failure to comply with orders to
produce account statements) and without addressing mother’s
allegation that father had intentionally dissipated the assets in
these accounts as the date for permanent orders approached.
Similarly, even though the court drew “adverse inferences” against
father for failing to produce a statement showing the value of the
FERS account, it nonetheless proceeded to award $100,000 of that
account to father as separate property — even though the overall
value of the account was unknown.1
¶ 24 “To achieve an equitable division, the court must consider all
relevant factors” under section 14-10-113(1). In re Marriage of
Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶ 64. And where, as here, the division of
marital assets is substantially unequal, the need for a detailed
explanation is particularly acute. We are unable to discern from
the district court’s order why its consideration of the statutory
1 Notably, after awarding $100,000 of the value of the FERS
account to father as separate property, the court awarded mother the eight-year percentage of the FERS account valued at the time of divorce. Even if the record included information about the total value of the account, it is not at all clear how (or even whether), in the pension context, a division under the time-rule formula could be combined with an allocation of part of the account’s total value. 10 factors led it to allocate more than four-fifths of the marital property
to father. In the absence of sufficient findings, the property division
cannot stand. We therefore reverse the district court’s property
division and remand this issue to the district court for further
consideration.2 The court must consider the parties’ economic
circumstances at the time of the hearing. In re Marriage of Burford,
26 P.3d 550, 557 (Colo. App. 2001).3
B. Allocation of Parental Responsibility
¶ 25 Mother contends the district court applied the wrong legal
standard when, as part of permanent orders, it restricted her
parenting time. Alternatively, she argues the court abused its
discretion when it allocated parenting time and decision-making
2 The court’s review should take into account all the parties’ assets.
This includes the re-evaluation of the FERS account, including the extent to which it is separate property. The court has already determined, with record support, that the marital portion of the comic book collection should be evenly divided based on a total valuation of $5,000. 3 We note also that if property allocation is adjusted on remand, the
district court must also re-examine mother’s maintenance allocation and child support. In re the Marriage of Jones, 627 P.2d 248, 253 (Colo. 1981) (“Only after the property division has been made can the court determine, by application of the statutory standards, whether maintenance is necessary to provide for the reasonable needs of one of the parties.”). 11 responsibility. She asks that we vacate the parental responsibilities
order and specifically reallocate parenting time and decision-
making responsibility. We are not persuaded.
¶ 26 In its September 6, 2023, permanent orders, the district court
awarded full parental responsibilities to father and determined
mother should not have any parenting time or contact with the
children. The court also ordered that mother must successfully
complete her court-ordered therapy before it would consider any
parenting time or reunification therapy.
¶ 27 The district court must determine the allocation of parenting
time according to the child’s best interests, “giving paramount
consideration to the child’s safety and the physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs of the child.” § 14-10-124(1.5),
C.R.S. 2024. In making the best interests determination, the court
must consider the factors set forth in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I)-
(XI). In re Marriage of Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 327 (Colo. App. 1996).
¶ 28 For a court to “impos[e] . . . a parenting time restriction,” the
court must find “that parenting time by the [restricted] party would
12 endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the
child’s emotional development” and “enumerate the specific factual
findings supporting the restriction,” including findings related to
child abuse. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a). “[W]hat constitutes
endangerment to a particular child’s physical or emotional health is
a highly individualized determination . . . .” In re Marriage of Parr,
240 P.3d 509, 512 (Colo. App. 2010).
¶ 29 The determination of parenting time falls within the district
court’s broad discretion, and we will exercise every presumption
that supports upholding the court’s decision. In re Marriage of
Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 30 “It is the responsibility of the [district] court as the trier of fact
to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency,
probative effect, and weight of the evidence.” Id. We review de
novo, however, whether the court applied the correct legal
standards in determining parenting time. In re Parental
Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15.
¶ 31 When allocating decision-making responsibility under section
14-10-124(1.5)(b), a court shall generally consider (1) credible
evidence of the parties’ ability to cooperate and make decisions
13 jointly; (2) whether the parties’ past pattern of involvement with the
child reflects a system of values and mutual support that would
indicate the parties’ ability to provide a positive relationship with
the child as joint decision-makers; and (3) whether an allocation of
joint decision-making responsibility would promote more frequent
contact between the child and each of the parties. Where a claim of
child abuse is made, the court shall consider “[w]hether one of the
parties has committed an act of child abuse or neglect as defined in
section 18-6-401, C.R.S. [2024], or as defined under the law of any
state, which factor must be supported by a preponderance of the
evidence.” § 14-10-124(4)(a)(I); see also In re Marriage of McCaulley-
Elfert, 70 P.3d 590, 593 (Colo. App. 2003). Allocation of decision-
making responsibilities falls within the court’s sound discretion. In
re Marriage of Morgan, 2018 COA 116M, ¶ 23.
¶ 32 Mother contends the court erred by restricting her parenting
time without first making a statutory endangerment finding. See
§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a). Mother also argues the court abused its
discretion when it allocated full decision-making responsibilities
and parenting time to father.
14 ¶ 33 The court’s orders concerning parenting time include a robust
discussion of the facts as well as detailed findings on the question
of parental responsibilities. Consistent with section 14-10-
124(1.5)(a), the court made an endangerment finding, ruling that
“[m]other’s current mental health and state [are] injurious to the
children.” The court supported this finding by relying on its own
observations, those made by a previous judge assigned to this case,
and psychological testing conducted on the children by a court-
appointed evaluator. While the court opined that father, too, was in
“need of counseling,” it found father’s mental health “did not seem
to negatively affect the children.”
4. Decision-Making Responsibilities
¶ 34 As for the allocation of decision-making responsibilities, the
record reflects the district court’s consideration of all the factors
outlined in section 14-10-124(1.5)(b). The court explained that it
decided to award sole decision-making responsibility to father due
to mother’s mental health issues and her refusal to “engage with
institutions,” both of which would “make it very difficult if not
impossible to ensure that schooling obligations and other
appointments are met.” Mother disputes many of the court’s
15 findings, but all of them have record support and we will not
second-guess the district court’s resolution of conflicting evidence.
See Gagne v. Gagne, 2019 COA 42, ¶ 51 (appellate court will not
reweigh evidence).
¶ 35 Because the court correctly applied the law and adequately
explained its decisions with facts supported in the record, we will
not disturb its allocation of parental responsibilities.
III. Father’s Claims
¶ 36 In his cross-appeal, father contends the district court (1) erred
when it found mother did not sign the marital agreement and
(2) committed a series of errors when it ruled that the parties’
marriage was dissolved by the order issued on May 9, 2023, rather
than by the July 20, 2021, oral decree and accompanying minute
order.
A. Marital Agreement
¶ 37 Father challenges the district court’s finding that mother did
not sign the marital agreement, arguing that the court
(1) misapplied the burden of proof and (2) incorrectly assessed the
evidence before it. We perceive no error.
16 1. Additional Facts
¶ 38 According to father, the division of the parties’ marital
property should have been governed by a marital agreement that he
asserts mother signed before their wedding. The district court held
a hearing on the validity of the marital agreement and found it
invalid after concluding that mother did not sign it.
¶ 39 At the hearing, mother and father offered conflicting evidence
as to whether mother was presented with and signed a marital
agreement. They also disagreed as to whether father offered to have
mother speak to an attorney before signing the agreement and
whether father’s parents witnessed the parties sign the agreement
before their wedding.
¶ 40 A copy of the alleged agreement was presented to the district
court, which focused its inquiry on whether mother actually penned
the signature purported to be hers. Both sides presented
handwriting experts who addressed the authenticity of the
signature, but the court declined to credit either one.
¶ 41 Mother and father also testified about the circumstances
surrounding the alleged marital agreement, and the court relied
heavily on that testimony in making its findings. Father testified
17 that he pulled the agreement from the internet and that his parents
witnessed them both sign it in the front room of the couple’s home
in Colorado Springs. Then, he said, all four of them flew to Las
Vegas where the couple was married. Later, father claimed, mother
stole the signature page of the marital agreement out of his safe
room.
¶ 42 Mother testified she only signed an estate plan, and not a
marital agreement. She denied being presented with or signing the
alleged marital agreement and maintained that father’s parents met
the couple in Las Vegas, not Colorado Springs, just prior to the
wedding. She admitted to taking the estate plan from the safe
room, which she presented in discovery, but denied taking any
marital agreement.
¶ 43 Based on this testimony and documentation presented to it,
the district court found that mother proved “by a preponderance of
the evidence she did not sign the [marital agreement]” and that
there was “not a pre-marital agreement entered into by both
parties.” The court found it significant that the name of father’s
father (who was purportedly a witness to the signing) was
misspelled on the signature block. It was also skeptical of father’s
18 alleged timeline of his parents’ visit, questioned why the estate plan
and marital agreement purported to be signed on different days,
and noted that mother’s signature was absent on all the property
asset pages related to the marital agreement.
¶ 44 We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and
application of the Colorado Marital Agreement Act (CMAA). See In
re Marriage of Zander, 2021 CO 12, ¶ 13. A district court’s factual
findings are clearly erroneous only if there is no support for them in
the record. Van Gundy v. Van Gundy, 2012 COA 194, ¶ 12.
However, the legal conclusions the district court drew from those
findings are reviewed de novo. E–470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. 455
Co., 3 P.3d 18, 22 (Colo. 2000).
¶ 45 There is no dispute that the alleged marital agreement is
governed by the CMAA, § 14-2-310, C.R.S. 1986, which was the
version of the CMAA in effect in 2002.
¶ 46 Under the CMAA, a marital agreement is valid if it is in writing
and “between prospective spouses made in contemplation of
marriage or between present spouses, but only if signed by both
19 parties prior to the filing of an action for dissolution of marriage or
for legal separation.” § 14-2-302(1), § 14-2-303, C.R.S. 1986.
¶ 47 Father first contends that the district court applied the wrong
analytical framework when it concluded that mother had “proven by
a preponderance of the evidence she did not sign the Agreement.”
As best we can tell, he seems to contend that once the court
accepted the fact that the marital agreement existed, mother’s
defenses were limited by section 14-2-307, C.R.S. 1986, to, as
father writes in his reply brief, “prov[ing] either that she did not sign
the Agreement voluntarily or that there were no reasonable
disclosures.”
¶ 48 As support for his argument that the district court should
have applied this framework, father relies on Liberty Mortgage Corp.
v. Fiscus, 2016 CO 31, a case involving the enforceability of
negotiable instruments under the Uniform Commercial Code. The
holding in Fiscus, however, is inapposite. Marital agreements in
Colorado formed between 1986 and 2014 are governed by the
20 CMAA,4 which specifically sets forth the legal formalities necessary
to form such agreements. See In re Marriage of Ikeler, 161 P.3d
663, 667 (Colo. 2007) (the CMAA specifies the requisite legal
formalities of all marital agreements).
¶ 49 Under the CMAA, for an agreement to be considered a “marital
agreement” it must be “signed by both parties.” § 14-2-302(1),
C.R.S. 1986. Relying on evidence presented at the hearing, the
district court made a factual finding that mother did not sign the
agreement. Building on this factual finding, the court correctly
concluded that the document presented by father did not fit the
CMAA’s definition of a “marital agreement.”
¶ 50 To the extent that father challenges the court’s factual finding
that mother did not sign the agreement, we reject his argument.
There is ample record support for the court’s finding, including
mother’s own testimony denying that the signature on the
agreement was hers. The weight that the court gave to this
testimony and the remaining evidence offered by both parties was
4 The Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act governs all
marital agreements formed after 2014. In re Marriage of Zander, 2021 CO 12, ¶ 11 n.5. 21 within its discretion. See Gagne, ¶ 51; In re Marriage of Young,
2021 COA 96, ¶ 8 (“A court’s factual finding is clearly erroneous if
there is no support for it in the record.”).
B. Finality of the Decree
¶ 51 Lastly, father argues the district court’s July 20, 2021, oral
decree, which was reflected in an unsigned minute order, was a
final decree of dissolution dissolving the parties’ marriage. He
contends that either the oral decree or the minute order should
have been deemed final and asks that we remand the case with
instructions to the district court to enter the decree of dissolution
nunc pro tunc to July 20, 2021. We decline to do so.
¶ 52 To recap, on July 20, 2021, the district court made findings on
the record that, in addition to the other requirements of section 14-
10-106(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024, the marriage was “irretrievably broken.”
The district court then orally stated it “enter[ed] a decree of
dissolution.” This oral decree was reflected in a minute order that
was signed by the clerk, but not the judge. Shortly afterwards, the
district court entered a “Order of Deferral of Decree,” which stated
that the court was both delaying entering a final order and revoking
22 the oral entry of a decree of dissolution in order to appoint a GAL
for mother. Later, the court reiterated that it had “set aside” the
oral decree referenced in the minute order.
¶ 53 In several different motions, father unsuccessfully sought to
have the court reconsider its decision to set aside the July 20,
2021, oral decree. The district court denied each motion, stating
repeatedly that the oral decree never met the C.R.C.P. 58
requirements for finality and that, in any event, the delay had
become necessary once it became apparent that it was necessary to
appoint a GAL for mother. See In re Marriage of Sorensen, 166 P.3d
254, 257 (Colo. App. 2007) (holding it is an abuse of discretion for a
court to fail to appoint a GAL for a spouse in a dissolution of
marriage proceeding when cognitive impairment is present).
¶ 54 The court entered a final decree of dissolution on May 9, 2023.
¶ 55 Statutory interpretation is a question of law and is reviewed de
novo. Zander, ¶ 13.
¶ 56 The UDMA governs divorce proceedings in Colorado. §§ 14-
10-101 to -113, C.R.S. 2024. The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure
23 apply to all proceedings under the UDMA unless specifically
provided otherwise. § 14-10-105(1), C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 57 Section 14-10-106(1) establishes the circumstances under
which “the district court shall enter a decree of dissolution of
marriage.” Father contends that the statute requires the court to
enter a final decree as soon as it has found that (1) one of the
parties has been domiciled in Colorado for ninety-one days prior to
the commencement of the proceedings, (2) the marriage is
irretrievably broken, and (3) ninety-one or more days have elapsed
since it has acquired jurisdiction over the respondent. § 14-10-
106(1)(a)(I)-(III). Likewise, he points out that C.R.C.P. 58(a) requires
the court to “promptly” enter the final decree of dissolution and
argues that the delay here violated that rule. See In re Sharp’s
Marriage, 539 P.2d 1306, 1309 (Colo. App. 1975) (not published
pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)) (disapproving of a ten-month delay
between a hearing and the final decree of dissolution but holding it
was not an abuse of discretion).
¶ 58 We would be hard-pressed to say that the court’s actions were
“prompt” given that nearly two years elapsed between the hearing
24 (which led to the oral decree and the minute order) and the entry of
the final decree of dissolution. But once mother’s cognitive issues
became apparent, the court was required to resolve them before
dividing the marital property and allocating parental
responsibilities. See Sorensen, 166 P.3d at 256-57 (holding that a
court abuses its discretion by not appointing a GAL in a dissolution
case when a spouse is mentally impaired to the degree that the
spouse (1) is incapable of understanding the nature and
significance of the proceeding; (2) is incapable of making critical
decisions; (3) lacks the intellectual capacity to communicate with
counsel; or (4) is mentally or emotionally incapable of weighing
counsel’s advice on the particular course to pursue in the spouse’s
own interest”); cf. C.R.C.P. 17(c) (providing that a court shall
appoint a GAL for an incompetent person who is not otherwise
represented in an action).
¶ 59 Moreover, the court was required to consider the financial and
parental responsibilities issues “[i]n connection with [the] decree of
dissolution of marriage.” § 14-10-106(1)(b). And while the court
certainly could have found that this was an exceptional case and
bifurcated the proceedings, such a ruling would need to have been
25 premised on a finding that bifurcation was in the parties’ collective
best interests. See id.; see also Est. of Burford v. Burford, 935 P.2d
943, 951 (Colo. 1997) (observing that district court did not abuse its
discretion when it found, among other things, that “the wife would
not be placed at a disadvantage by the bifurcation order”). Yet
father offered no reasons — either in the district court or in his
appellate briefing — as to why that was the case, and instead
focuses only on why bifurcation of the proceedings and an
immediate entry of the decree would have benefited him.5
¶ 60 Thus, father’s arguments concerning whether the court’s
actions satisfied the technical requirements of finality are largely
beside the point. Father did not demonstrate that this was the type
of “exceptional” case that warranted bifurcation, and the district
court’s delay was merited by its efforts to ensure mother’s interests
were adequately represented given her mental state. See Sorensen,
5 We recognize that the court’s order addressing the validity of the
marital agreement and dividing marital assets, issued on May 9, 2023, could be read as suggesting that the proceedings were bifurcated when “Judge Miller reserved jurisdiction for everything but the actual dissolution of the marriage.” However, our review of the record, in particular the court’s order issued on February 18, 2022, establishes that neither the oral order nor the minute order was “a final order,” nor was it “intended to be so.” 26 166 P.3d at 256-57; C.R.C.P. 17(c). We accordingly perceive no
error in the court’s decision to defer the dissolution and the entry of
a final order pending appointment of a GAL for mother and an
evaluation of mother’s mental health.
IV. Attorney Fees
¶ 61 We deny mother’s request for an award of appellate attorney
fees under section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2024. She did not raise the
issue in her opening brief. See C.A.R. 39.1 (party seeking attorney
fees for the appeal must, in their principal brief, explain the legal
and factual basis for the award). We do not consider mother’s
answer-reply brief a “principal brief” for the purposes of section 14-
10-119 because her request for fees under that statute did not
depend on father’s arguments on appeal.
¶ 62 Because father’s arguments on appeal did not lack substantial
justification, we reject mother’s request for an award of appellate
fees under section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2024.
V. Disposition
¶ 63 We reverse the district court’s order dividing the marital
property, and as a result, also reverse the court’s awards of
maintenance and child support. See In re Singewald’s Marriage,
27 535 P.2d 252, 254 (Colo. App. 1975) (not published pursuant to
C.A.R. 35(f)) (concluding awards of maintenance and child support
were inextricably intertwined with the property division and the
latter cannot be set aside without setting aside the entire order).
¶ 64 We affirm the district court’s remaining orders and remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE LUM concur.