24CA1056 Marriage of Stevens 05-01-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1056 Boulder County District Court No. 12DR48 Honorable Timothy L. Johnson, Magistrate Honorable Andrew Hartman, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Bethany Kay Stevens,
Appellee,
and
John Richard Stevens,
Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE KUHN Welling and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 1, 2025
Bethany Kay Stevens, Pro Se
John Richard Stevens, Pro Se ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage proceeding between John
Richard Stevens (father) and Bethany Kay Stevens (mother), father
appeals the order granting mother’s motion to enforce parenting
time under section 14-10-129.5, C.R.S. 2024. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The district court dissolved father and mother’s marriage in
2013. In doing so, the court approved the parties’ stipulated
parenting plan providing that their only child would primarily reside
with father and that mother would have the child “on Monday and
Wednesday from 4:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. and every other
Saturday from 8:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m.”
¶3 In 2021, mother moved to modify parenting time. Those
proceedings concluded with the district court approving the parties’
stipulated amended parenting plan. Under the amended plan, the
parties agreed that mother would follow a step-up parenting
schedule intended to gradually increase her parenting time with the
child. Consisting of five steps, mother would start with the
parenting schedule that she had been following in accordance with
the original plan and would progress to each next step after
satisfying the terms of the previous step. Upon reaching step five of
1 the schedule, she would have parenting time with the child every
Wednesday for four hours and every other weekend beginning on
Friday “after school or camp, or 4:00 p.m.,” and “until 4:00 p.m.
Sunday if the following Monday is not a school day, and until 12:00
p.m. Sunday if the following Monday is a school day.”
¶4 However, under paragraph 7 of the amended plan, mother had
to comply with certain conditions to advance between the steps and
avoid demotion to the baseline step one schedule. The relevant
conditions included the following:
b. Mother shall respond to communications regarding the child in a timely manner (defined as a response or acknowledgement within [forty-eight] hours). . . .
c. Mother shall engage in weekly therapy with a state licensed mental health provider. Mother shall provide a release to the therapist and the therapist must be willing to provide written confirmation to [f]ather that [m]other is consistently and steadily attending weekly therapy and complying with any prescribed or recommended treatment plans. If in the future [m]other and her therapist believe that [m]other no longer needs weekly therapy, [m]other will provide to [f]ather written verification from her therapist and the parties will discuss and attempt to agree as to whether continued therapy is necessary. If the parties do not agree, then [m]other may seek [c]ourt
2 [o]rders concerning the issue of ongoing therapy . . . .
Paragraph 7(e) provided that if mother failed to comply with any of
these conditions, her parenting time would “move back to or remain
on [s]tep [one] until [she was] compliant with the conditions for a
period of [thirty] consecutive days,” before she could again start
progressing through the steps in order.
¶5 In November 2023, mother filed an “Emergency Motion
Concerning Parenting Time Disputes Pursuant to [Section
14-10-129.5],” asserting that father had been withholding parenting
time from her to which she was entitled under step five of the
amended plan. Specifically, she argued that father had improperly
moved her from step five to step one a month earlier on the grounds
that she had violated paragraph 7 of the plan by failing to
(1) provide certain information regarding her mental health therapy
and (2) respond within forty-eight hours to one of father’s messages.
Mother further argued that father had engaged in a pattern of
inappropriately moving her down to lower steps in the parenting
plan. She requested makeup parenting time as a remedy for
father’s alleged noncompliance.
3 ¶6 A magistrate held an evidentiary hearing in February 2024, at
which both parties appeared pro se. Roughly one month later, the
magistrate issued an order granting mother’s motion after finding
that father had violated the amended parenting plan “by restricting
[m]other’s parenting time without cause and depriving her of her
four monthly overnights with the [child].” The magistrate awarded
mother twenty-two overnights in makeup parenting time. As a
further remedy, the magistrate modified the amended plan, as
permitted by section 14-10-129.5(2)(b). Among other changes, the
magistrate removed paragraph 7(e), ordered mother to attend
therapy as recommended by her therapist instead of every week,
and removed the step-up plan. In its place, the magistrate ordered
that mother must exercise her parenting time under a schedule that
was similar to the schedule that she had followed until father’s
violation.1
1 Specifically, following the magistrate’s modifications, mother’s
regular parenting schedule differed from the schedule under step five to the extent that “[i]f [m]other is exercising parenting time during the school year and there is no school on Monday, [her] parenting time shall be extended until 4:00 p.m. on Monday (allowing an extra overnight).”
4 ¶7 Father then filed a petition for review of the magistrate’s
decision under C.R.M. 7(a). The district court denied the petition,
thereby adopting the magistrate’s order, and father appeals.
II. Analysis
¶8 Because both parties appear pro se in this appeal, “we liberally
construe [their] filings while applying the same law and procedural
rules applicable to a party represented by counsel.” Gandy v.
Williams, 2019 COA 118, ¶ 8. Accordingly, we seek to effectuate the
substance, rather than the form, of their briefing. People v. Cali,
2020 CO 20, ¶ 34. We won’t, however, rewrite their arguments or
act as an advocate on their behalf. Johnson v. McGrath, 2024 COA
5, ¶ 10.
¶9 As we understand it, father contends that the magistrate erred
in granting mother’s motion under section 14-10-129.5 by
(1) determining that father had violated the parenting time order in
part because he had impermissibly restricted mother’s parenting
time when he changed mother’s schedule from step five to step one;
(2) failing to consider the best interests of the child; (3) allowing
mother’s therapist to opine on matters about which she had lacked
the requisite knowledge; (4) finding that father had admitted to
5 filing a complaint with the Colorado Department of Regulatory
Agencies (DORA) against the therapist that resulted in her
discipline; and (5) miscalculating mother’s makeup parenting time.2
We consider each of these contentions in turn.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 10 A district court reviewing a magistrate’s decision under C.R.M.
7(a) may not alter the magistrate’s factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous. C.R.M. 7(a)(9). Our review of the district court’s
decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review. In re
Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 25. Thus, like the district
court, we must accept the magistrate’s findings of fact unless they
2 Father raises two additional issues in his briefing. First, he asserts that the magistrate erred by admitting, over his objection, “exhibits that had not properly been served by [C.R.C.P. 5].” But he doesn’t offer legal authority in support of this argument and generally fails to develop it sufficiently to enable our review. And we don’t consider arguments that are unsupported and undeveloped. See Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 41 n.12, aff’d, 2021 CO 56. Second, father argues that the magistrate erred by modifying the amended parenting plan because mother had failed to file a motion seeking to modify the plan before the hearing. We disagree with that argument. The court has the authority to modify a previous parenting time order to meet the best interests of the child following a hearing on a parenting time dispute. See 14-10-129.5(2)(b), C.R.S. 2024.
6 are clearly erroneous and have no support in the record. In re
Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 22.
¶ 11 The determination of parenting time is a matter within the
discretion of the district court, and we will not disturb the court’s
decision absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. In re
Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007). “A court
abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair, or based on a misapplication of the law.”
In re Marriage of Bochner, 2023 COA 63, ¶ 12.
¶ 12 However, we review de novo questions of law, including
whether the court properly applied the correct legal standard or
construed a statute. Thorburn, ¶ 26.
¶ 13 The party asserting an error has the burden of showing that
the error wasn’t harmless. See Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355,
1375 (Colo. 1993). An error is harmless if it “does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.” C.R.C.P. 61. And an error affects
a party’s substantial rights “only if it can be said with fair
assurance that the error substantially influenced the outcome of
the case or impaired the basic fairness of the [proceeding] itself.”
7 Stockdale v. Ellsworth, 2017 CO 109, ¶ 32 (quoting Laura A.
Newman, LLC v. Roberts, 2016 CO 9, ¶ 24).
B. Applicable Law
¶ 14 Section 14-10-129.5 governs the resolution of parenting time
disputes. Under that statute, a district court must determine
“[w]ithin thirty-five days after the filing of a verified motion by either
parent or upon the court’s own motion . . . whether there has been
or is likely to be substantial or continuing noncompliance with the
parenting time order or schedule.” § 14-10-129.5(1). If the court
finds after a hearing that a parent hasn’t complied with a parenting
time order, it may impose one or more remedial orders.
§ 14-10-129.5(2). As pertinent here, those include an order
modifying the previous parenting time order to meet the best
interests of the child and an order requiring that makeup parenting
time be provided to the aggrieved parent. § 14-10-129.5(2)(b), (d).
¶ 15 Before entering an order modifying parenting time under
subsection (2)(b) of the statute, the court must consider all relevant
factors to determine the best interests of the child, including the
statutory factors set forth in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2024.
In addition, when a court sanctions a noncomplying parent by
8 awarding makeup parenting time to the other parent, the makeup
time must be of the same type and duration as the parenting time
that was withheld. § 14-10-129.5(2)(d)(I).
C. Preservation
¶ 16 As an initial matter, we address the issue of preservation
because mother contends that we should decline to review father’s
unpreserved arguments that the magistrate erred by failing to
consider the best interests of the child and allowing mother’s
therapist to opine on matters beyond the therapist’s qualifications
and knowledge.
¶ 17 To preserve an issue for our review, a party appealing from a
magistrate’s decision must raise the issue in a petition for review
and give the district court an opportunity to correct any error the
magistrate may have made. See C.R.M. 7(a)(7) (petition for review
must state with particularity the alleged errors in the magistrate’s
order); see also People in Interest of K.L-P., 148 P.3d 402, 403 (Colo.
App. 2006) (declining to review an issue in a dependency and
neglect proceeding when father failed to raise the issue in his
petition for district court review of the magistrate’s judgment); In re
Marriage of Ensminger, 209 P.3d 1163, 1167 (Colo. App. 2008)
9 (declining to address an argument that the party didn’t assert in
her petition for review, raising it for the first time on appeal).
¶ 18 Father argues that the magistrate failed to consider the best
interests of the child because the magistrate didn’t address (1) the
recommendations contained in the report from the child and family
investigator (CFI)3 and (2) the statutory factors set forth in section
14-10-124(1.5)(a). Instead, father asserts, the magistrate
incorrectly confined the best interests analysis to “the parent’s
conduct [that] would result in [a] situation endangering the child’s
physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional
development.”
¶ 19 As we understand his briefing, father argues that the
magistrate incorrectly applied the child endangerment standard,
disregarding the recommendations in the CFI report and the best
interests considerations under section 14-10-124(1.5)(a). However,
the record shows that father didn’t raise this argument to the
magistrate or in his petition for district court review. See C.R.M.
3 The CFI report was prepared in 2021 in connection with the
modification proceedings that resulted in the district court’s adoption of the parties’ amended parenting plan.
10 7(a)(7). Consequently, because this issue is unpreserved, we
decline to address it further. See K.L-P., 148 P.3d at 403.
¶ 20 Likewise, father failed to preserve in the district court his
challenge to the therapist’s statements. In support of this
challenge, he directs us to a letter in which the therapist stated that
based on her experience with father and the parents’
communications, father was violating the parenting time order; he
was “more interested in winning the power struggle than providing
a healthy, co-parenting atmosphere for [the child]”; and father’s
conduct was detrimental to the child. Father argues that the
magistrate “erred in treating those statements as credible” because
the evidence established that the therapist didn’t have the
“credentials, training, certification, or authorization” to provide an
opinion about any of these issues.
¶ 21 But the record shows that father didn’t object to the admission
of the letter during the hearing. Nor did he challenge the therapist’s
statements on the basis of her credentials or licensure. And father
also didn’t raise this issue in his petition for review. Under these
11 circumstances, this issue likewise isn’t preserved for our review.
We thus decline to address it further.4 See id.
D. Father’s Failure to Comply with the Parenting Time Order
¶ 22 Father contends that the magistrate erred by determining that
father violated the parenting time order when he changed mother’s
parenting schedule in accordance with paragraph 7(e) of the
amended parenting plan. He argues that (1) the record doesn’t
support the magistrate’s finding that father improperly moved
mother from step five to step one of the step-up parenting schedule,
and (2) the magistrate erred by determining that father
impermissibly restricted mother’s parenting time. We disagree with
both contentions.
4 In any case, father challenges the therapist’s credibility and the
weight the magistrate accorded to her statements, but those matters are within the magistrate’s sole discretion. See In re Marriage of Lewis, 66 P.3d 204, 207 (Colo. App. 2003) (noting that credibility and weight of evidence determinations are matters within the sole discretion of the trial court).
12 1. The Magistrate Didn’t Clearly Err by Finding that Father Violated the Parenting Time Order when He Changed Mother’s Parenting Schedule Back to Step One
¶ 23 In the proceedings before the magistrate, the parties disputed
mother’s parenting time and her compliance with the conditions in
paragraphs 7(b) and 7(c) of the amended parenting plan. In his
response to mother’s motion, father argued that he was authorized
to move mother’s parenting time back to step one after (1) her
therapist had failed to provide information regarding the length and
location of mother’s therapy sessions; and (2) mother had failed to
respond within forty-eight hours to the following message that
father had sent her on September 29, 2023: “It will mess up my
schedule to bring [the child] to you on Monday[, October 2]. If I
need to do that, I would like confirmation asap.”
¶ 24 The magistrate disagreed with father, finding that when father
informed mother that he would start following the parenting
schedule under step one, mother was still in compliance with the
plan. Specifically, the magistrate found that mother had been
attending weekly therapy and that she had “complied with the
requirement of providing a release to her therapist so the therapist
[could] provide information to [f]ather.” However, the magistrate
13 also found that father wasn’t entitled to rest of the information he
sought regarding the length and duration of therapy sessions under
the plan’s plain language.
¶ 25 As for the communication condition under paragraph 7(b), the
magistrate stated that mother didn’t timely respond to or
acknowledge father’s September 29 message and that her untimely
response was technically a violation of the plan. However, he
observed that this provision of the amended parenting plan violated
section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2024, because it amounted to an
impermissible restriction on mother’s parenting time, and
regardless, father’s message was an unnecessary communication to
which mother didn’t need to respond. In making the last finding,
the magistrate noted that because the terms of the amended
parenting plan set forth the parenting schedule and which parent
was responsible for dropping off the child, it was unnecessary for
mother to confirm these points with father.
¶ 26 The record supports the magistrate’s finding that father
violated the parenting time order by improperly changing mother’s
schedule under the step-up plan. As noted above, to comply with
the therapy condition, mother was required to provide a release of
14 information (ROI) to her therapist, and the therapist was then
obligated to inform father in writing that mother had been
“consistently and steadily attending weekly therapy and complying
with any prescribed or recommended treatment plans.” The record
shows that mother executed the ROI in August 2022, soon after she
started seeing her therapist. It also shows that mother had been
consistently attending weekly therapy and that her therapist had
been emailing father every month with updates regarding the dates
of mother’s therapy sessions. While some updates specified that
the sessions were one hour long, the magistrate correctly observed
that the language of the parenting plan didn’t require mother to
provide information regarding the length and location of her therapy
to comply with the condition in paragraph 7(c).
¶ 27 True, it’s undisputed that mother didn’t acknowledge father’s
September 29 message until October 2, one day late. However, the
record doesn’t support father’s argument that this late response
was the reason why he started to follow the parenting schedule
under step one, “which meant the child was scheduled to be in
[m]other’s care from [4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.] on Monday,
October 2.” As the magistrate noted, father had communicated to
15 mother that her parenting plan would revert to step one even before
she was supposed to respond to the relevant message, on the
grounds that she had failed to comply with the therapy condition in
the plan.
¶ 28 For example, on September 26, father wrote to mother,
I am giving you until Friday (September 29, 2023) to provide your therapist with the required ROI so she can verify the standard information I have requested: day, time, duration, and modality of sessions. For July, August, and if we reach Friday before I receive these documents, for September [2023]. . . .
If you do not provide the ROI to your therapist, and she does not verify your therapy session details, the plan says that you being out of compliance with those requirements means our plan reverts to Step 1.
¶ 29 Then, on September 29, mother sent father the following
message: “You might have noticed I paid [child] support early. This
is because I’m going out of town, camping, and will likely be out of
cell range. So, if you send me a message between now and then[,] I
won’t be responding until after [October 1].” Father responded,
“Well, I need you to communicate about your therapy verification
before then.” This exchange supports the magistrate’s conclusion
that when father attempted to bring the child to mother on October
16 2 for parenting time in accordance with the step-one schedule, he
did so because he didn’t receive the therapy information that he
had requested, not because mother failed to timely respond to his
message about why it was important for mother to confirm whether
she would be sending that information.
¶ 30 And because the magistrate found, with record support, that
mother wasn’t required to provide information regarding the length
and duration of her therapy sessions, father couldn’t use the lack of
such a disclosure as the basis for changing mother’s parenting
schedule back to step one and withholding from her the parenting
time that she was entitled to under the step-five schedule.5
2. The Magistrate Didn’t Err by Concluding that Father Impermissibly Restricted Mother’s Parenting Time
¶ 31 Father also contends that the magistrate erred when he
determined that by utilizing the step-down procedure under
5 While it’s true that the court found that mother had committed a
technical violation of the plan, the court also found that the violation wasn’t material. Under the circumstances, the court found that mother’s response was one day late but that father also knew that she would be unavailable when he sent the message. Additionally, the court found that this wasn’t the kind of message that mother had to respond to under the court’s orders. Those findings have record support, so we have no basis to disturb them.
17 paragraph 7(e) to revert mother to step one, father improperly
imposed a restriction on her parenting time. Section
14-10-129(1)(b)(I) prevents a court from restricting a parent’s
parenting time unless the court finds that the parenting time would
endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the
child’s emotional development.
¶ 32 In response to father’s argument that he was authorized to
change mother’s parenting schedule as soon as she failed to
respond to his message as required under paragraph 7(b), the
magistrate observed that this provision and paragraph 7 as a whole
were “problematic at best” because it purported to allow father to
restrict mother’s “parenting time without a correlating finding that
the parent’s conduct would result in [a] situation endangering the
child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional
18 development.”6 See id. The magistrate also “note[d] that the step[-
]down procedure within the Amended Parenting Plan [was]
draconian and [did] not consider the best interests of the child”
given that “[t]here [was] nothing correlative between the violations
[of the conditions] and the step down.”
¶ 33 Father contends that the magistrate “improperly designate[d]
moves between steps in the Step plan portion of the Amended
Parenting Plan as a ‘restriction in time.’” He asserts that the time
“allocation between steps is similar for all Steps, it is only the
parenting schedule that changes.” In support of his argument,
6 We disagree with father to the extent he repeats on appeal the
argument that he didn’t impermissibly withhold mother’s parenting time because he was only acting in accordance with paragraph 7(e) when he started to follow the parenting schedule under step one. Regardless of what father believed the amended parenting plan said, only the district court had the authority to make decisions regarding mother’s parenting time with the child. See In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 334 (Colo. App. 2007) (concluding that it was improper for the trial court to delegate to one parent decisions regarding the other parent’s parenting time); see also In Interest of D.R.V-A., 976 P.2d 881, 884 (Colo. App. 1999) (concluding that a court may not delegate parenting time decision-making to a guardian ad litem and family therapist). Moreover, as discussed above, the magistrate determined with record support that mother had not committed a material violation of the parenting plan.
19 father points out that mother and the child had the same number
of monthly “contact days” under steps one and five.
¶ 34 But this argument misses the mark. The fact that the number
of days on which mother may get to spend at least some time with
the child is roughly the same doesn’t automatically mean that her
parenting time is also the same regardless of the step she is on. In
other words, the parenting days and parenting time are not
coextensive under the amended parenting plan. Indeed, a
comparison of the parenting schedules under steps one and five
reveals that mother’s parenting time varied significantly between
the two plans. Under step one, mother had eight hours of
parenting time on two weeknights each week plus an additional
twelve hours on one Saturday every other weekend. This means
that in a four-week month, mother was entitled to about fifty-six
hours of parenting time. Under step five, in contrast, mother was
entitled to parenting time consisting of four hours one weeknight
every week and two overnights every other weekend. On a
parenting time weekend, mother would have parenting time
between approximately forty-four hours (if the next day was a
school day) and forty-eight hours (if there was no school).
20 Accordingly, mother had between 104 and 112 hours of parenting
time a month under step five.
¶ 35 Considering these differences in the amount of mother’s
parenting time between the two plans, we can’t say that the
magistrate erred by determining that when father improperly moved
mother back to step one of the parties’ parenting schedule, father
also inappropriately restricted her parenting time.7
¶ 36 In sum, we discern no error in the magistrate’s determination
that father violated the parenting time order.
E. The Magistrate Didn’t Reversibly Err when Making a Finding Regarding Father’s Disciplinary Complaint Against the Therapist
¶ 37 Father next contends that the magistrate clearly erred by
finding that father had admitted to filing a complaint against
mother’s therapist resulting in the therapist’s discipline.
Specifically, the magistrate stated that
7 We can’t tell from father’s briefing if he’s asserting that the
magistrate incorrectly applied the child endangerment standard, as opposed to the best interests of the child standard, in determining whether there was a restriction on mother’s parenting time. To the extent he’s arguing that the magistrate applied the wrong legal standard, we decline to address it because father failed to raise it in his petition for district court review. See C.R.M. 7(a)(7); People in Interest of K.L-P., 148 P.3d 402, 403 (Colo. App. 2006).
21 [f]ather confronted the [therapist] about not being in contact with [m]other’s prior therapists. Father admitted to filing a DORA complaint against [the therapist]. As a result of this complaint, [the therapist] took additional education classes. Father went through [an exhibit] which indicated [that the therapist] “violated boundaries by bringing a client [into] her home.” The [c]ourt did not find this line of questioning to be helpful to the [c]ourt.
(Emphasis added.) Father asserts that the italicized finding has no
record support because the relevant complaint had been filed in
2021, approximately one year before mother started therapy with
the therapist.
¶ 38 We agree with father that this specific finding isn’t supported
by the record. We see no indication that father admitted to filing
the complaint that resulted in the therapist’s discipline. Even so,
we conclude that this error doesn’t require reversal because father
fails to carry his burden of showing harm from the magistrate’s
finding. See Moody, 843 P.2d at 1375.
¶ 39 In his opening brief, father contends that “[t]his error was one
of several that [he] believes affected the [magistrate’s] discretion and
led to . . . [the magistrate’s] arbitrary assessment” that his
testimony wasn’t credible. But while the magistrate did find
22 father’s testimony not credible, father doesn’t explain how the
finding he challenges on appeal bore upon his credibility.
¶ 40 Further, the magistrate heard testimony from the therapist
suggesting that father had filed a separate disciplinary complaint
against her.
[Father:] . . . [W]ere you sanctioned in 2022 for infractions related to your private therapy?
[Therapist:] What does that have to do with anything?
[Father:] I’m asking a question.
THE COURT: It goes to credibility -- is what he’s trying to establish. And I’ll overrule the objection. You need to answer the question.
[Therapist:] So a person did file a complaint just as you filed a complaint.
....
[Father:] Okay.
(Emphasis added.) This colloquy shows that the magistrate erred
only to the extent he equated father’s complaint with the complaint
that purportedly resulted in the therapist’s discipline. There was
still record support for the conclusion that father had filed a
complaint against the therapist, even if he hadn’t admitted to that
fact.
23 ¶ 41 Regardless, we don’t see any indication that this conclusion
was the foundation of the magistrate’s credibility determination. To
the contrary, the magistrate characterized the line of questioning as
unhelpful in resolving the issues before him. Considering this
record, we can’t say that the magistrate’s error in summarizing the
evidence substantially influenced the outcome of this case or
impaired the basic fairness of the proceeding itself. See Stockdale,
¶ 32. Accordingly, any error was harmless and doesn’t warrant
reversal. See C.R.C.P. 61 (requiring courts to disregard any error
that doesn’t affect the substantial rights of the party).
F. The Magistrate Didn’t Err in Calculating Mother’s Makeup Parenting Time
¶ 42 Father contends that the magistrate erred in awarding mother
makeup parenting time as a remedy for father’s violation of the
parenting time order. We discern no error.
¶ 43 The magistrate determined that mother was entitled to
makeup time consisting of the two overnights every other weekend
that she missed after father started withholding parenting time that
she had been exercising in accordance with step five of the
parenting schedule. The magistrate found that during the
24 five-month period between October 2023 and the hearing in
February 2024, mother had missed twenty overnights with the
child. In addition, he awarded mother two overnights for the one
month between the hearing date and when the order was issued.
The magistrate arrived at twenty-two overnights of makeup time
based on mother’s statements at the hearing that, during the
relevant period, she had missed four overnights per month except
for one month when she only had the right to two overnights. The
magistrate stated that mother “shall exercise an additional weekend
each month of overnight parenting time”; that those “overnights
shall begin after school (or at 4:00 p.m. if the child is not in school
or camp) on Friday and will last through 4:00 p.m. on Sunday”; and
that the goal was to have the makeup time completed by the start of
the upcoming school year (i.e., August 2024).
¶ 44 In challenging this ruling, father asserts that (1) mother lost
no parenting time because she had more “days of contact” with the
child under step one than what she would have had if she had
remained on step five; (2) the schedule for completing the makeup
time “was impossible to execute as written” and wasn’t in the best
25 interests of the child; and (3) the makeup time wasn’t of the same
duration as parenting time that mother was denied.
¶ 45 In support of his first argument, father points out that while
mother calculated her missed parenting time in overnights, the
magistrate repeatedly referred to missed “days” during the hearing.
Under these circumstances, father further argues, the magistrate
gave mother twenty-two “days” (not overnights) of makeup
parenting time. In doing so, father asserts, the magistrate erred
because while mother “did miss out on [seventeen] overnights”
through the date of the order, she “gained [twenty-four] Monday
afternoons under Step [one] during that time that [we]re not
allocated under Step [five], resulting in a total increase of
seven . . . additional days of contact.” But this argument is
premised on an incorrect characterization of the magistrate’s ruling.
In his order, the magistrate clearly and unequivocally calculated
mother’s makeup parenting time in overnights, not days. Further,
father offers no meaningful explanation why his calculations using
“days of contact” should prevail over the magistrate’s determination
for makeup of missed overnights. See Sinclair Transp. Co. v.
Sandberg, 2014 COA 76M, ¶ 74 (declining to address “bald
26 assertions of error that lack any meaningful explanation or support
in legal authority”). Moreover, father largely rehashes his argument
that “contact days” equate to parenting time, a proposition that we
have already rejected above in connection with the restriction issue.
¶ 46 We also disagree with father’s argument that the magistrate
erred by ordering an additional weekend each month of overnight
parenting time so that mother could complete her makeup time by
the beginning of the upcoming school year. The statute provides
that if makeup parenting time can’t be completed within six months
of a parent’s violation of a parenting time order, then “the parenting
time shall be made up within one year after the noncompliance
occurs.” § 14-10-129.5(2)(d)(II). Given that father started
withholding mother’s parenting time in October 2023 — and their
dispute didn’t get resolved until about six months later — the
magistrate didn’t err by imposing a schedule that was intended to
complete makeup time by August 2024, within twelve months of
father’s noncompliance.
¶ 47 Finally, father contends that the magistrate violated section
14-10-129.5(2)(d)(I) by giving mother more parenting time than she
would have gotten had father complied with the amended parenting
27 plan. Specifically, father points out that while under step five
mother was entitled to keep the child until 4:00 p.m. on Sunday
only if there was no school the next day, her makeup time provided
for that schedule regardless of whether the child had school the
next day. And as part of this argument, father asserts that the
makeup time schedule failed to incorporate the CFI’s
recommendations and was therefore not in the best interests of the
child. But like several other arguments in his appeal, father failed
to assert these two arguments in his petition for district court
review. See C.R.M. 7(a)(7). We therefore decline to address them
for the first time in this appeal. See K.L-P., 148 P.3d at 403; see
also Valentine v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 252 P.3d 1182,
1188 n.4 (Colo. App. 2011) (“We review only the specific arguments
a party pursued before the district court.”).
¶ 48 In conclusion, we perceive no error in the magistrate’s decision
to remedy father’s noncompliance with the parenting time order by
awarding mother twenty-two overnights of makeup parenting time.
28 III. Appellate Fees and Costs
¶ 49 Father and mother each request an award of costs incurred in
connection with this appeal. Father also requests an award of
“attorney’s fees related to this [appeal].”
¶ 50 We deny father’s attorney fee request because he’s not entitled
to such fees as a nonattorney pro se party. See Smith v. Furlong,
976 P.2d 889, 890 (Colo. App. 1999) (holding that there is no basis
to award “attorney fees” to a nonattorney pro se litigant because no
“attorney fees” exist in such situations). And because we affirm the
order, we deny father’s request for appellate costs. However,
mother is entitled to her costs on appeal. See C.A.R. 39(a)(2) (“[I]f a
judgment is affirmed, costs are taxed against the appellant.”).
Mother may pursue those costs in the district court by filing an
itemized and verified bill of costs within fourteen days after entry of
the appellate mandate. See C.A.R. 39(c)(2).
IV. Disposition
¶ 51 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.