Marriage of: Steinbeisser

2025 MT 289

Opinion

12/16/2025

DA 25-0077 Case Number: DA 25-0077

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2025 MT 289

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

KAREN STEINBEISSER,

Petitioner and Appellee,

and

CRAIG STEINBEISSER,

Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Richland, Cause No. DR-19-16 Honorable Kaydee Snipes Ruiz, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Marybeth M. Sampsel, Measure Law, PC, Kalispell, Montana

For Appellee:

Terrance L. Toavs, Law Office of Terrance L. Toavs, PLLC, Wolf Point, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: November 5, 2025

Decided: December 16, 2025

Filed:

__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Craig Steinbeisser (Craig or Appellant) appeals from the December 16, 2024 Order

on Pending Motions entered by the Seventh Judicial District Court, Richland County,

holding him in contempt and modifying a previously entered dissolution of marriage decree

involving Craig and former spouse Karen Steinbeisser (Karen or Appellee).1 We consider:

1. Whether the District Court erred by holding Craig in contempt of court.

2. Whether the District Court erred by modifying the judgment’s distribution of marital property.

We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The Appellant and Appellee were married on May 19, 1991, in Richland County,

Montana. During the marriage, the parties had two children. While neither party brought

significant property into the marriage, the couple accumulated both property and debt

during their approximately 31-year marriage, pursuant to their farming and other work.

Karen was the bookkeeper for family businesses.

¶3 In February 2019, Karen petitioned for dissolution of the marriage, citing mutual

agreement of the parties to end the marriage due to serious marital discord and the

impossibility of reconciliation. A lengthy proceeding followed to judicially determine the

value of the marital estate. Karen sought discovery of financial information related to

Craig’s family ranch partnership, 5-S Partnership (Partnership), in which Craig owned a

1 Karen’s maiden name of Iversen was restored following the District Court’s November 9, 2023, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Dissolution of Marriage. 2 25% interest. After the Partnership objected to the request, Karen moved the District Court

to compel Craig to disclose the information, which the District Court ordered.

¶4 The parties each submitted to the court proposed valuations of the marital estate,

which varied widely, particularly with regard to the Partnership. Craig’s valuation utilized

original purchase prices of property rather than current value, based upon “financial

statements prepared in-house.” Karen utilized a valuation by a certified public accountant

who specialized in preparing property valuations for litigation, “adjust[ing] from historical

value to fair market value, and average[ing] appraisal reports.” The court found Karen’s

valuations “to be more credible and accurate than Craig’s valuations,” and that evidence

“squarely and credibly contradicts Craig’s valuation.”

¶5 Regarding the Partnership, the District Court ultimately found the Partnership’s

assets totaled approximately $25,288,300, and the net equity value was $14,284,645, with

Craig’s individual share valued at $3,214,000. Finding that the parties “do not agree on

how this asset should be distributed,” and that “the parties are asset rich and cash poor,

with most of their assets tied up in 5-S Partnership,” the District Court determined that

“Craig should be given the opportunity to make an equalization payment over time.” Up

to that point, two motions regarding Craig making equalization payments had been made

in the proceeding and resolved in Karen’s favor. The decree, entered November 9, 2023,

thus included in a paragraph entitled “Equalization Payment,” on page 13:

[T]he Husband shall pay to Wife monthly equalization payments of $3,500.00 per month, starting December 1, 2023, over the next seventeen (17) years, with the last payment due December 1, 2040, or a total of $714,000.00.

3 If Craig fails to pay Karen within this time period or refuses to make this equalization payment, pursuant to this schedule, then Craig’s interest in 5-S Partnership shall be awarded to Karen. . . . In the event Craig divests or otherwise liquidates his 25% interest in [] 5-S Partnership and/or VS Inc. in the next seventeen (17) years, any remaining balance of the equalization payment shall be then paid in full within 90 days.

¶6 On December 6, 2023, Craig filed a motion for Nunc Pro Tunc Amendment of

Exhibit A to the decree, which was the District Court’s allocation of properties between

the parties. He argued that, while the District Court stated in its findings that Craig should

retain all property he could trace to the inheritance from his father, Exhibit A had allocated

the LPL Financial account ending in 4092 (Account 4092), which he asserted was traceable

to his inheritance, to Karen. He contended that “[f]rom the testimony presented and

according to Trial Exhibit J, this account was inherited from Craig’s father and, therefore,

was not to be included as part of the marital estate.” Karen opposed the motion on the

ground that Account 4092 had been commingled with other funds and could not be clearly

traced to Craig’s inheritance.

¶7 While that motion was pending, on December 13, 2023, Craig filed a notice of

appeal of the judgment to this Court, and Karen filed a notice of cross-appeal the same day.

Noting that Craig had failed to make the initial equalization payment on December 1, Karen

applied to the District Court on December 15, 2023, for an order requiring Craig to “show

cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for failing to pay the court ordered,

monthly equalization payment[s.]” In response to a motion by Craig, on December 27,

2023, the District Court stayed the judgment pending Craig’s appeal to this Court.

4 ¶8 This Court, noting that the District Court had entered the stay order “prematurely

and without the benefit of Karen’s response in opposition[,]” granted Karen’s motion for

relief from the stay and remanded the case to allow Karen the opportunity to respond to

Craig’s motion for a stay, and to supplement the record for appeal, on January 23, 2024.

However, before the District Court could hold a hearing on remand, Craig moved this Court

to dismiss his appeal, which we granted on February 26, 2024. Karen thereafter also

dismissed her cross-appeal.

¶9 The parties resumed pursuit of their post-judgment motions before the District

Court, and the District Court authorized Karen to conduct post-trial discovery regarding

what had occurred to estate accounts that had been awarded to her, as some had been

emptied by Craig, including Account 4092. Craig asserted that he had transferred the

balance of that account, without judicial authority, because he believed it contained

inherited funds. The discovery was followed by Karen’s motion to compel Craig to

disclose his updated financial information, which was granted by the District Court. In

June 2024, Karen moved for an order requiring execution of a clerk’s deed to transfer the

marital home to Karen, which had been awarded to her in the decree, but asserting Craig

had refused to cooperate by signing a deed, and for payment of her attorney fees associated

with that motion. Craig responded that “it is unclear what the urgency is in placing the title

into her name, as there is no debt on the property and no required refinancing,” and opposed

Karen’s request for fees. Karen also moved to hold Craig in contempt.

¶10 Up to this point in the proceedings, Craig had made no equalization payments,

maintaining instead that he was choosing to transfer his interest in the Partnership to Karen.

5 However, delivery of the interest to Karen was delayed. According to Craig’s opening

brief to this Court, this delay resulted for various reasons, including Karen’s name being

listed incorrectly on documents, a lack of knowledge about how to transfer his interest, and

the Partnership’s attorney’s prolonged vacation. And, what would become a key point in

the current dispute, the Partnership had undergone a reorganization by the partners during

this time after entry of the decree. However, whatever the reasons, the result was that

Karen received neither the equalization payments nor the Partnership interest during this

time.

¶11 On September 25, 2024, the Partnership’s attorney contacted Karen with a proposal

for transfer of Craig’s interest in the Partnership. However, the Partnership had been

reorganized since the decree, about which an expert for Karen testified at a hearing on

November 6, 2024. The expert explained that, while a vote of partners holding an 80%

capital share was previously necessary to determine capital contributions, that percentage

had been reduced in the restructuring to 75%. Consequently, if Karen held Craig’s 25%

partnership interest, her interest would no longer be sufficient to successfully oppose the

imposition of new capital obligations upon the partners, as it had been previously. Further,

the agreement was amended to require only a 75% vote, reduced from 80%, to authorize

distributions to the partners, thus potentially eliminating the need for her agreement on

distribution decisions. Karen’s expert testified that, under the restructuring, the value of

the 25% share “would be significantly less, just based on the fact that Karen [would] have

no voice and no power to make any decisions in th[e] company,” including the possible

reduction or elimination of distributions from the Partnership. The District Court found

6 that Craig’s Partnership interest had been “materially altered” by the amendment to the

agreement.

¶12 Further, the Partnership had entered into a verbal management agreement with

another entity also owned by the 5-S partners, VS Inc., to take over management of the

Partnership operations. As a result of this verbal agreement, the District Court found that

the Partnership stopped paying draws to its partners altogether. Whereas Craig had been

drawing $4,613.62 per month from the Partnership, this amount was reduced to zero “and

his VS, Inc., income increased by approximately the same amount.” Karen refused to

accept the transfer of interest proposed by Craig and the District Court found that she

“should not be required to accept it” in satisfaction of the judgment, because she would

have “virtually zero control while Craig could retain the income through the verbal

‘management contract.’”

¶13 In its December 16, 2024 Order, the District Court found that the alteration of

Craig’s Partnership interest “did not excuse his duty to make equalization payments,” and

further, that the decree did not “provide Craig’s duty to make payments [was] suspended

while he works on transferring an interest to Karen.” The District Court found that Craig

had transferred funds out of accounts that had been awarded to Karen into other accounts

controlled by himself. Craig argued that these transfers were fair because the District Court

had made an error in the original distribution, but the court rejected this argument,

reasoning that the distribution plan was “not an ‘equal’ division,” but rather “an ‘equitable’

division,” and that any supposed error did not “affect the equity of the court’s distribution.”

7 ¶14 The District Court found Craig in contempt for failing to make equalization

payments, and for his other obstructive actions, and awarded Karen her attorney fees. “In

light of the new evidence,” the District Court struck the provision of the original decree

that permitted Craig to remedy his failure to make equalization payments by transferring

his partnership interest, as the reorganization of the Partnership was “inconsistent with the

decree because it would defeat the court’s intent” that Karen “receive an equitable share of

the estate.” The District Court required Craig to:

 Restore to Karen the balance of Account 4092, $153,336.83, and accompanying post-judgment interest by June 1, 2025.

 Restore to Karen the balance of the LPL Financial accounts ending in 5607 and 6371, with current balance due at $1,314.56 and associated interest payments.

 Pay Karen $45,671 to make up for missed equalization payments.

 Restore to Karen the balance of the Yellowstone Bank account ending in 3434, $15,496.80, and accompanying interest.

¶15 Craig appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶16 A district court’s order of contempt is ordinarily not subject to appeal, except by a

limited statutory exception for contempt judgments in a family law case “when the

judgment or order appealed from includes an ancillary order that affects the substantial

rights of the parties involved.” Section 3-1-523, MCA. Upon a determination that the

“family law” exception applies, as here, “we review the order to determine whether the

district court acted within its jurisdiction and whether the evidence supports the contempt.”

8 Marez v. Marshall, 2014 MT 333, ¶ 23, 377 Mont. 304, 340 P.3d 520 (citing Novak v.

Novak, 2014 MT 62, ¶ 37, 374 Mont. 182, 320 P.3d 459).

¶17 We review findings of fact in dissolution proceedings “to determine whether they

are clearly erroneous.” Hollamon v. Hollamon, 2018 MT 37, ¶ 7, 390 Mont. 320, 413 P.3d

460 (citation omitted). We will affirm a district court’s distribution of property and

maintenance, absent a showing of plain error or abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of

Crilly, 2005 MT 311, ¶ 10, 329 Mont. 479, 124 P.3d 1151 (citing In re Marriage of Payer,

2005 MT 89, ¶ 9, 326 Mont. 459, 110 P.3d 460). Finally, we review a district court’s

conclusions of law for correctness. In re Marriage of Rudolf, 2007 MT 178, ¶ 16,

338 Mont. 226, 164 P.3d 907 (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

¶18 1. Whether the District Court erred by holding Craig in contempt of court.

¶19 “[D] isobedience of any lawful judgment, order, or process of the court” constitutes

contempt. Section 3-1-501(1)(e), MCA.2 “Contempt of court is a discretionary tool used

to enforce compliance with a court’s decisions.” Woolf v. Evans, 264 Mont. 480, 483,

872 P.2d 777, 779 (1994). Contempt can be either civil or criminal. Section 3-1-501(4),

MCA. “A contempt is civil if the sanction imposed seeks to force the contemnor’s

compliance with a court order.” Section 3-1-501(4), MCA.

¶20 Craig argues the District Court erred by holding him in contempt for simply “acting

in accordance with the underlying order[.]” He argues the District Court “isolated one

2 Section 3-1-501, MCA, was amended in 2025 following the District Court’s order appealed from here. However, none of the amendments impact provisions discussed herein. 9 provision, deprived that paragraph of any meaning, omitted what had been inserted, and

inserted what had been omitted,” referring to the equalization payment provision, quoted

above. Craig contends that the decree did not “command” him to make the payments,

rather, it “created a true choice,” namely, to either make the equalization payments to Karen

or tender his interest in the Partnership to her, and thus, “[w]ithout a command, there can

be no disobedience[, a]nd without disobedience, there can be no contempt.”

¶21 During the contempt hearing, the District Court characterized this interpretation of

the decree offered by Craig as “bad faith.” It explained that the equalization payments

were a mandatory obligation, with the Partnership interest transfer serving as a backup

remedy to “ensure the payments were going to be made, but apparently that’s just not

enough to make that happen.” The court referenced Craig’s other violations of the decree,

such as his failure to sign the deed to the marital home, his failure to make any payments

despite long delays, his unauthorized transfer of funds awarded to Karen, and his discovery

obstructions. Even if Craig’s interpretation of the decree is assumed, arguendo, to be

correct, he first made no equalization payments, and then he affirmatively undermined the

efficacy of a transfer of the Partnership interest. Craig’s claim that he transferred the funds

within Account 4092 to another account because he believed it contained inherited funds,

even if true, does not present a valid reason for directly disobeying the decree. In short, he

did nothing in these regards but violate the decree, and the District Court’s contempt

finding is supported by substantial credible evidence. This is a very appropriate case for

use of “a discretionary tool used to enforce compliance with a court’s decisions.” Woolf,

264 Mont. at 483, 872 P.2d at 779.

10 ¶22 Craig argues the District Court erred by modifying the judgment “as a sanction for

civil contempt,” because modification of a decree is not a remedy for contempt and it

violates § 3-1-520, MCA. Karen answers that “the District Court did not amend the

Judgement as a sanction for contempt,” but rather modified the decree to preserve the

original intention of the decree, which Craig had undermined. The District Court’s

conclusion that “the language at page 13, lines 6-9 of the judgment regarding transfer of

the 5-S Partnership should be stricken[,]” demonstrates that the court sought to close any

potential loophole Craig might continue to exploit in an attempt to further evade his

obligations to Karen under the decree, rather than impose a sanction on Craig, and thus

does not violate statute. Indeed, the District Court’s Order expressly states that “the court

reserves judgment on penalties for contempt.”

¶23 2. Whether the District Court erred by modifying the judgment’s distribution of marital property.

¶24 Craig argues that the District Court “simply held Craig in contempt and then used

contempt as a vehicle to modify the property division, without addressing the statutory

requirements that would authorize such modification.” He contends that neither party

consented in writing to modification of the decree and the District Court erred by

modifying the property division of the estate without making the findings to do so as

required by §§ 40-4-202, and -208, MCA. He argues the District Court contradicted the

decree by ordering him to restore the full balance of Account 4092 because the funds were

traceable to his inheritance. Karen answers that the District Court’s modification was

justified under its equitable powers and that “the appellant acquiesced or participated” in

11 the amendment. Notably, on this point, Craig’s counsel stated during the hearing that,

“I understand the Court sits in equity, and that in equity you have the option to fashion

relief that you seem to feel most appropriate, and with that there could be modifications to

the decree.”

¶25 “Section 40-4-202, MCA, vests the district court with broad discretion to equitably

apportion the marital estate in a manner equitable to each party according to the

circumstances of each case.” In re Marriage of Frank, 2022 MT 179, ¶ 35, 410 Mont. 73,

517 P.3d 188 (citation omitted). Further, the property disposition provisions of a

dissolution decree may be modified “if the court finds the existence of conditions that

justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state.” Section 40-4-208(3)(b),

MCA.

¶26 In Karr v. Karr, 192 Mont. 388, 628 P.2d 267 (1981), we highlighted the district

court’s findings that a spouse in that case was no “ordinary reluctant litigant. He is an

embittered and resolute opponent of ‘the system,’ bent on defying and defeating it

whenever and wherever possible and taking unscrupulous advantage of it when he can.”

Karr, 192 Mont. at 410, 628 P.2d at 279. As a consequence, we explained that

A District Court, sitting in a marriage dissolution case, has the same broad powers as a court of equity in fashioning decrees that will be responsive to the fact situations before it, effective to accomplish the objectives that the District Court, through its judgment, determines must ensue and to do complete justice.

Karr, 192 Mont. at 410-11, 628 P.2d at 279. The District Court was likewise empowered

here to exercise its equitable powers to do complete justice. The record reflects that it

inquired of counsel about its power to modify the decree, and there was no objection raised

12 by either party. There was certainly an evidentiary basis in the record for the court to do

so, and it entered sufficient findings, both written and as stated orally in the hearing, to

demonstrate evidentiary support for the modification.

¶27 Lastly, Craig’s argument regarding Account 4092 does not establish error. The

District Court ruled that it had “awarded this account to Karen after applying the factors

set forth in M.C.A. § 40-4-202 because the court found allocating LPL Financial account

4092 to Karen is equitable, considering all of the circumstances,” a decision in accordance

with Funk’s holding regarding inherited property. See In re Funk, 2012 MT 14, ¶¶ 19, 32,

363 Mont. 352, 270 P.3d 39. The court cited multiple exhibits in making this distribution

to Karen, determining that the inheritance received by Craig from his father’s estate had

been commingled in Account 4092. The District Court stated, “[A]ccount 4092 may have

contained life insurance proceeds from Craig’s family but Craig co[m]mingled these

proceeds with marital funds.” After an analysis of the record, it is our conclusion that the

District Court’s ruling was supported by substantial evidence, and it did not abuse its

discretion.

¶28 We conclude the District Court did not err by holding Craig in contempt, and by

modifying the dissolution decree.

¶29 Affirmed.

/S/ JIM RICE We Concur:

/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON