Marriage of Solis Encarnacion

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 7, 2025
• Docket: 24CA2215
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA2215 Marriage of Solis Encarnacion 08-07-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2215 Arapahoe County District Court No. 21DR1560 Honorable Christine Alexandra Washburn, Judge Honorable Amanda Jane Bradley, Magistrate

In re the Marriage of

Cesar Alejandro Solis Encarnacion,

Appellant,

and

Ashley Solis Encarnacion,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE FOX Harris and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 7, 2025

Cesar Alejandro Solis Encarnacion, Pro Se

No Appearance for Appellee ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Cesar Alejandro

Solis Encarnacion (father) and Ashley Solis Encarnacion (mother),

father appeals from the district court’s adoption of the magistrate’s

order denying his motion to disclaim paternity. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The court file reflects that the parties were married in 2011.

Seven months later, one child was born to the marriage. Father

filed an action to dissolve the parties’ marriage in 2021.

¶3 In April of 2023, father filed a Motion to Convert Petition for

Dissolution of Marriage to Declaration of Invalidity, based, in part,

on a DNA test that indicated “nonparentage by [father] of the child

[of the marriage].” Father argued that mother conceived the child

with another man before the parties were married and that father

married mother because “she fraudulently led [him] to believe she

was pregnant with his child.” Father requested a hearing for

determination of nonparentage. In response, mother disputed the

validity of the DNA test and “implied that [father] did not have the

child . . . complete the test, but an imposter child.” The magistrate

scheduled a status conference on father’s motion, but the parties

1 agreed to a continuance because mother’s attorney was

hospitalized.

¶4 Four months later, nearly twelve years after the child was

born, father filed a Motion and Petition to Disclaim Paternity, along

with a new Motion and Petition for Invalidity of Marriage. In his

new motions, father asked the court to order DNA testing but did

not renew his request for a hearing. The magistrate then scheduled

a hearing on the Motion and Petition for Invalidity of Marriage but

dismissed the Motion and Petition to Disclaim Paternity, pursuant

to section 19-4-107(1)(b), C.R.S. 2024, because the child was over

five years old.

¶5 Father filed a petition for review of the magistrate’s order and

the district court judge denied the petition and adopted the

magistrate’s order. Nearly one year later, the district court entered

permanent orders after a contested hearing. In its permanent

orders, the court noted that it previously denied father’s motion to

disclaim paternity and implicitly reaffirmed its earlier adoption of

the magistrate’s order.

¶6 Representing himself, father appealed.

2 II. Paternity

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶7 Our review of a district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s

decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review. In re

Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 22. We must accept the

magistrate’s factual findings to determine whether they have

support in the record. In re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 8.

However, we review de novo questions of law, including questions of

statutory interpretation and whether the magistrate applied the

correct legal standard. See Sheehan, ¶ 22; Young, ¶¶ 8-9.

¶8 When a paternity issue arises, the court must follow the

procedures outlined in the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), §§ 19-4-

101 to -130, C.R.S. 2024. See People in Interest of J.G.C., 2013

COA 171, ¶ 11. Section 19-4-105(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024, states that a

person is presumed to be the natural parent of a child if the person

and the parent who gave birth to the child were married at the time

the child was born. The UPA protects parental relationships and

“[t]hat purpose finds expression in the strong presumption of

paternity accorded to a man married to the child’s mother at the

time of [the child’s] birth.” People in Interest of S.L.H., 736 P.2d

3 1226, 1227 (Colo. App. 1986). This presumption protects the family

unit and improves “the system of support enforcement.” Id. at

1227-28.

¶9 Section 19-4-107(1)(b), C.R.S. 2024, provides that certain

parties, including a man presumed to be the child’s father, under

UPA section 19-4-105(1)(a), may bring an action to declare the

nonexistence of the presumed father and child relationship no later

than five years after the child’s birth. Failing to bring an action for

nonexistence of paternity before the child is five years old bars any

such later-filed action. Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 10 It is difficult to discern what father’s appellate arguments are.

We recognize that “[p]leadings by pro se litigants must be broadly

construed to ensure that they are not denied review of important

issues because of their inability to articulate their argument like a

lawyer.” Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5. “It is not this court’s

role, however, to rewrite a pro se litigant’s pleadings. Nor may we

act as an advocate for a pro se litigant.” People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20,

¶ 34 (citation omitted).

4 ¶ 11 Regardless, we discern no error in the district court’s denial of

father’s motion to disclaim paternity. Because the parties were

married to each other when the child was born, father was

precluded from challenging his presumed paternity five years after

the child’s birth. Consequently, the court correctly concluded that

the action was time-barred pursuant to § 19-4-107(1)(b). See Cali,

¶ 18 (if a statute is unambiguous, we need not resort to other

methods of statutory interpretation); see also S.L.H., 736 P.2d at

1228 (“[T]he presumption that petitioner is the natural father

because the child was born during the parties’ marriage has the

greater weight of policy and logic behind it, and therefore, that

presumption controls.”).

¶ 12 Given our disposition, we reject father’s related contentions

that the district court erred by failing to order genetic testing

pursuant to section 13-25-126, C.R.S. 2024, and that he did not

receive a hearing pursuant to section 19-4-128, C.R.S. 2024

(though we note that father did not demand a hearing in his second

motion to disclaim paternity).

¶ 13 Because the district court properly dismissed father’s petition

to disclaim paternity as untimely, we also reject father’s contention

5 that child support should be terminated. See 14-10-122(6)(a),

C.R.S. 2024 (allowing individual named as father to file a motion to

terminate child support if genetic testing pursuant to section 13-25-

126 excludes the individual as a biological parent). As we already

mentioned above, the district court properly denied father’s request

for genetic testing under section 13-25-126.

III. Disposition

¶ 14 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.