Marriage of Smith

2024 MT 124N

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: June 11, 2024
• Docket: DA 22-0580
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

06/11/2024

DA 22-0580 Case Number: DA 22-0580

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2024 MT 124N

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

PEGGY LEANN SMITH,

Petitioner and Appellee,

and

WILLIAM MICHAEL SMITH,

Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Third Judicial District, In and For the County of Powell, Cause No. DR-19-43 Honorable Ray J. Dayton, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Lewis K. Smith, Smith Law Firm, P.C., Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Jamie J. McKittrick, Thomas H. Stanton, Wells & McKittrick, P.C., Missoula, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: June 14, 2023

Decided: June 11, 2024

Filed:

Vor-64w—if __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Dirk Sandefur delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, we decide this case by memorandum opinion. It is not precedent and shall not be

cited as such. The case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s

quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 William Michael Smith (Mike) appeals the September 2022 judgment of the

Montana Third Judicial District Court, Powell County, denying his M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)

motion for post-judgment relief from the court’s March 2022 final divorce decree regarding

an alleged surveying error in the certificate of survey effecting the agreed partition of a

tract of marital property. We reverse and remand for further proceedings in accordance

with this opinion.

¶3 Mike and Peggy Smith (Peggy) were married in 1977. In 1987, they jointly

purchased a 158-acre property in Powell County, Montana (Property). In December 2019,

Peggy petitioned for dissolution of the parties’ marriage and equitable apportionment of

their marital estate. During negotiations in late summer 2020, the parties settled on an

agreed partition of the Property. Peggy thus commissioned a licensed land surveyor (Tom

Moodry) to prepare a proposed certificate of survey (COS) which, upon co-owner

signatures and filing, would divide the Property as agreed pursuant to a contemplated

marital settlement agreement.1 Moodry initially produced a preliminary draft COS.

1 See § 40-4-201, MCA (marital settlement agreements), and §§ 76-3-103(1), (4), -201(1)(a), -302(1), -401, and -404(1), MCA (authorizing divisions of land by filed certificate of survey exempt from local subdivision review for divisions of land “that . . . could be” effected by court order or operation of law).

2 A comprehensive marital settlement agreement ultimately did not materialize, however,

due to the parties’ continuing disagreement regarding other marital estate matters. Moodry

later provided a final COS (2022) to the parties shortly before trial.

Diagram 1 — 2022 Moodry COS Excerpt

Irsr IMMELLI PORTILIK. SROVN AMOR IS A SIONEYED TAAL AEGIVESTCO OA ME WAIN IS,

1NSiST MT. .LIAT 1,13.4010. %AA Tas 26 14IKE sum, 30. 2.Sy srigt,r'" cos Pg: 112,, 52„R'w PEGGY SIAI211 AROLO JETTA

,.,. 1„1 3,,111,0, Stif."'

TRACT 1 54.51 ACRES r

UWE Sum,. Cl/. SI . 5l4Ji'S1 •f 112Y 3' Ae:-....?,?..'frp 305 22, , 12/2.7LT POB DETAIL TRACT I • SCALE

ag 67. 32-11/ PEGGY SMITH TPR CI I2T 2 NW/ SEA 40.51 ACRES PLEASE SEE DETAIL TRACT 2 20.83 ACRES PEGGY SMITH

see. ge.091•• SPT , 54. 09`w 13 4

VOL 80 PAGE 282

PEGGY SMITH Z.* SW4 SEA Y.POITA1 USPCTOR'S RCA. ss.ao *GRES MAT RASEARan AND PM. ENAEMENDES 2.9. MAAS mal, oluER •....o.rer PART L MTN ME ACCESS WADS. INOIVDA, REPP. SURVEYS PPG LL.2 MAL SEONOTT

13 51 SIPT1W14.* SOD 11P14.11/ 1324.44-

S73 " 3 w...a..V.M 2- KU... 5•0 ff f SECTION CORNEA

¶4 At trial in March 2022, the parties notified the court of their previously agreed

apportionment of all but a few items of disputed marital property. They provided the court

with a written schedule setting forth their agreed marital property apportionment as

supported by their respective trial testimonies. Both parties acknowledged that the

intended purpose of the Moodry COS was to effect their previously agreed partition of the

Property, and that Peggy’s agreed share of the Property would be benefitted by a roadway

easement running north-south across Mike’s retained share of the Property.2

2 Peggy testified to her understanding that she would receive a 40-foot roadway easement on and along the existing “lane on . . . Mike’s property.”

3 On cross-examination, however, Mike’s counsel questioned whether the Moodry COS

depicted the north-south easement as running “over” the adjoining property of Harold Jette,

rather than running north-south inside the west boundary of Mike’s share of the Property.

Peggy answered that she did not know the precise location of the easement as indicated on

the Moodry COS and related property records, only “what Tom Moodry said.”

¶5 At the close of trial, the District Court acknowledged that there was “a problem with

the easement” and that it “might be in the wrong place” as indicated by the Moodry COS.

The court thus instructed the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions

of law that would “finish this divorce” without “magnify[ing]” the problem. Through their

respective counsel, Mike and Peggy later filed separate proposed findings, conclusions of

law, and decrees which similarly specified their previously agreed partition of the Property

consistent with their respective trial testimonies and stipulated marital estate apportionment

schedule.3 Neither party’s proposed findings, conclusions, and decree referenced, much

less attempted to address, any discrepancy between the location of the easement and

preexisting roadway as mutually agreed by the parties and any different location indicated

by the referenced Moodry COS.

¶6 The District Court subsequently issued comprehensive written findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and resulting decree dissolving the parties’ marriage and apportioning

their marital estate. In accordance with the parties’ consistent trial testimonies and similar

3 Mike’s proposed findings, conclusions, and decree included the initial draft Moodry COS for attachment as decree Exhibit 1, while Peggy’s included the final COS produced by Moodry shortly before trial.

4 corresponding proposed findings, conclusions, and decrees, the court’s pertinent findings

and resulting decree apportioned the subject Property as follows:

(1) to Mike:

(A) approximately 54.51 acres as “identified” as Tract 1 (“Mike Smith” property) in the 2022 Moodry COS attached as Decree Exhibit 1, thus including:

(B) approximately 40 acres in the SE¼ of the NE¼ of Section 14, T6N, R10W; and

(C) approximately 14.51 acres in the N½ of the NE¼ of the SE¼ of Section 14, T6N, R10W; and thus not including the property more commonly known as “the [H]ayfield”; and

(2) to Peggy:

(A) approximately 80 acres in the W½ of the SE¼ of Section 14, T6N, R10W, as “identified” as the “Peggy Smith” property in the 2022 Moodry COS attached as Decree Exhibit 1;

(B) approximately 20.83 acres in the S½ of the NE¼ of the SE¼ of Section 14, T6N, R10W, as “identified” as Tract 2 (“Peggy Smith” property) in the 2022 Moodry COS attached as Decree Exhibit 1, and more commonly known as “the Hayfield”; and

(C) “[a] 40 foot easement through Mike’s property for use and access of the existing road or any replacement road to access [Peggy’s] property from the county road.”

(Emphasis added.) Neither party appealed.

¶7 Over a month later, Mike moved pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (3) for

post-judgment relief from the decreed marital dissolution partition of the subject Property

on the asserted ground that the referenced 2022 Moodry COS erroneously described and

depicted the location of the preexisting north-south roadway, and corresponding roadway

easement intended to benefit Peggy’s share of the Property, over Mike’s retained share of

5 the Property. He alleged that the Moodry COS was plagued by various surveying errors

later identified by a registered third-party professional land surveyor (Ken Jenkins) in the

wake of subsequent boundary disputes between Peggy and Mike, and Peggy and her

neighbors to the west (the Andersons). The motion was supported by an affidavit from

surveyor Jenkins specifying the various asserted surveying errors.4 The motion was further

supported by Mike’s affidavit assertion that he did not earlier object to the accuracy of the

Moodry COS at trial because: (1) he “believed the surveyor had done his job to make the

survey reflect the [parties’ prior] agreement . . . regarding” the land division; (2) he

assumed the Moodry COS “simply showed the easement across my ground that Peggy was

to receive”; and (3) Moodry misrepresented to Mike’s counsel prior to trial that he had

previously consulted with Mike and Peggy on-site when surveying to establish a corner to

mark the edge of the hayfield but in fact had not. The motion thus prayed for an order

compelling a revised or new COS correctly locating the preexisting roadway, and

corresponding easement benefitting Peggy’s share of the marital Property as previously

agreed, in accordance with the pertinent prior land records, and as reflected in the parties’

trial testimonies and corresponding provisions of the District Court’s findings and marital

dissolution decree.

4 Inter alia, the Jenkins affidavit pointed out the discrepancy between the easement location shown on the Moodry COS (inside the east boundary of the adjoining Jette property) and the location of the preexisting roadway that ran north-south inside the west boundary of Mike’s retained share of the Property as previously noted and depicted in a 1985 COS (Hendricks COS) filed to effect a division of the pre-partition Smith Property by the prior owner (Johnson) for purposes of a family conveyance effected by COS pursuant to §§ 76-3-103(1), (4), -207(1)(b), and -404, MCA.

6 ¶8 Peggy opposed Mike’s Rule 60(b) motion on the asserted grounds that he stipulated

to the Moodry COS at trial, and that the COS in any event correctly located the intended

easement in accordance with the pertinent land parcel/tract boundaries of record including

the 1985 Hendricks COS, supra note 4. Peggy’s latter assertion was supported only by a

purported unsigned and unsworn letter from Moodry to Peggy’s counsel defending the

accuracy of the Moodry COS. In response to the purported Moodry letter assertions, Mike

later filed a supplemental affidavit from surveyor Jenkins asserting, inter alia, that he had

since surveyed the Smith marital Property, inter alia including the west boundary of the

aliquot 80-acre parcel of Smith property apportioned to Peggy. The supplemental Jenkins

affidavit asserted that he also found that the Moodry COS erroneously located “seven of

the eight [property] corners,” and was thus “internally inconsistent.”

¶9 Both parties appeared with counsel at the ensuing Rule 60(b) hearing on Mike’s

motion. Mike presented the testimony of surveyor Jenkins detailing the various grounds

upon which he asserted that the Moodry COS was demonstrably inaccurate based on the

pertinent preexisting property records and uniform surveying practices. Consistent with

his earlier affidavit testimony, Jenkins ultimately concluded, inter alia, that a correct

survey of the Smith marital property, in accordance with the pertinent prior land records,

would show that the preexisting north-south roadway, and corresponding roadway

easement intended to benefit Peggy’s share of the marital Property, would run north-south

inside the west boundary of Mike’s retained share of the marital Property, rather than inside

or across the east boundary of the adjoining Jette property. Peggy presented no testimony

or evidence at hearing, thereby leaving Jenkins’ testimony unrebutted.

7 ¶10 At the close of hearing, the District Court acknowledged from the bench that the

Moodry COS, which was intended to effect the parties’ previously agreed partition of their

marital property, may have actually “defeated” it. The court asserted, however, that it

lacked authority to either establish or alter the record east boundary line of the adjoining

Jette property, or order a new corrective survey, without Jette as a party to this action.

Without any supporting finding of fact, or conclusion of law, the District Court issued a

one-page order on September 29, 2022, summarily denying Mike’s Rule 60(b) motion

because:

[i]t became apparent . . . that [Mike’s] requested relief could not be accomplished without involving individuals who have not been made parties. The Court also doubts that the relief requested will solve the problems that continue to exist between the parties.

Mike timely appeals.

¶11 “[P]roperty disposition” provisions set forth in a final marital dissolution decree

“may not be” subsequently “revoked or modified by a court” unless “the court finds the

existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state.”

Section 40-4-208(3)(b), MCA. However, M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is a “law of this state”

justifying “the reopening of” a marital property disposition judgment as referenced in

§ 40-4-208(3)(b), MCA. In re Marriage of Woolsey, 214 Mont. 106, 109-10, 629 P.2d

451, 453 (1984); Tanascu v. Tanascu, 2014 MT 293, ¶ 12, 371 Mont. 1, 338 P.3d 47;

In re Marriage of Conklin, 221 Mont. 30, 35, 716 P.2d 629, 633 (1986). “On motion and

just terms, [a] court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding”

based on “mistake, inadvertence, . . . or excusable neglect.” M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).

8 ¶12 Here, the District Court was presented with uncontroverted expert testimony that

the Moodry COS erroneously located the subject preexisting north-south roadway, and

corresponding easement intended to benefit Peggy’s retained share of the marital Property,

on and across the third-party Jette property, rather than wholly inside the west boundary of

Mike’s retained share of the marital Property as originally agreed before and at trial, and

as expressly specified in the court’s corresponding marital dissolution decree. Mike thus

made an unrebutted evidentiary showing that the court’s marital dissolution decree is

irreconcilably ambiguous and erroneous to the extent that it ultimately decreed “[a] 40 foot

easement through Mike’s [retained marital] property for use and access of the existing

road or any replacement road to access [Peggy’s] property from the county road,” but by

reference to a COS which locates the preexisting roadway, and corresponding Peggy

easement, in whole or in part on and across the adjoining third-party Jette property.

Whether based on mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect Mike thus made an

unrebutted showing that Rule 60(b)(1) relief was warranted to correct an erroneously

ambiguous apportionment of the parties’ marital Property under § 40-4-202, MCA.

¶13 The sole purpose of the Moodry COS, and ultimately the District Court’s pertinent

findings of fact and marital dissolution decree, was to effect an equitable apportionment of

the Smith marital estate, including the subject real Property, as required by § 40-4-202,

MCA. Consequently, notwithstanding any resulting third-party dispute that may have later

arisen, neither Jette nor any other third party was or is a necessary or proper party to the

inventory, i.e., survey, or apportionment of the Smith marital Property under § 40-4-202,

MCA. In turn, neither Jette nor any other third party was or is a necessary or proper party

9 to correction of the survey and apportionment of that marital Property under § 40-4-202,

MCA, pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).

¶14 We hold that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Mike’s motion for

Rule 60(b)(1) relief. The court’s September 2022 judgment denying Rule 60(b)(1) relief

is hereby reversed. This matter is accordingly remanded to the District Court for correction

of the apportionment of the subject marital real Property in accordance with the parties’

prior agreement as reflected in their respective trial testimonies and the court’s resulting

findings of fact and decreed partition of the Property, but by reference to an unambiguous

conforming COS produced and filed in accordance with the pertinent requirements of

§§ 76-3-103(1), (4), -201(1)(a), -302(1), -401, and -404(1), MCA (authorizing divisions of

land by filed certificate of survey exempt from local subdivision review for divisions of

land “that . . . could be” effected by court order or operation of law).

¶15 This case is decided by memorandum opinion pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c)

of our Internal Operating Rules. Reversed and Remanded.

/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR

We concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA