24CA2260 Marriage of Skinner 09-04-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2260 El Paso County District Court No. 17DR4082 Honorable Laura N. Findorff, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Tabitha Skinner n/k/a Tabitha Reigns,
Appellee,
and
Arthur Eric Skinner,
Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN Berger*, and Bernard*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 4, 2025
No Appearance for Appellee
Arthur Eric Skinner, Pro Se
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this post dissolution proceeding involving Arthur Eric
Skinner (father) and Tabitha Skinner, now known as Tabitha Reigns
(mother), father appeals the district court’s order denying his
motion to modify parenting time. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Mother and father are the parents of two children. The district
court dissolved their marriage in 2019. In October 2022, the court
permitted mother to relocate with the children from Colorado to
Florida, with father receiving parenting time with the children in
Colorado during school breaks.
¶3 In April 2024, father moved to modify parenting time and
requested that the children be relocated back to Colorado to live
with him. Following a hearing, the district court denied father’s
motion after finding that he had failed to establish that the
children’s present environment with mother endangered their
physical health or significantly impaired their emotional
development.
II. Standards of Review and Applicable Law
¶4 We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision
on a motion to modify parenting time. In re Marriage of Hatton, 160
1 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007). A court abuses its discretion if its
decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or if it
misconstrues or misapplies the law. In re Marriage of Evans, 2021
COA 141, ¶ 25. A court’s discretion over parenting time matters is
broad, such that we exercise every presumption in favor of
upholding the court’s decision so long as it is supported by
competent evidence in the record. Hatton, 160 P.3d at 330.
¶5 A modification of parenting time that substantially changes
parenting time and changes the parent with whom the children
reside the majority of the time requires a finding that there has
been a change in the circumstances of the children or of the party
with who the children reside a majority of the time and that the
modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the children.
§ 14-10-129(2), C.R.S. 2024. In addition, when considering such a
modification, the court must retain the existing parenting time
unless the children’s present environment endangers the children’s
physical health or significantly impairs the children’s emotional
development and the harm likely to be caused by a change in
residence is outweighed by the advantage of the change.
§ 14-10-129(2)(d); see In re Parental Reps. Concerning B.R.D., 2012
2 COA 63, ¶¶ 19-21 (describing three-step analysis required starting
with presumption that the prior order remains in effect).
III. Denial of Motion to Modify Parenting Time
¶6 Father first contends that the district court erred in denying
his motion to modify parenting time because the evidence that he
presented supported modification. We are not persuaded.
¶7 Father specifically argues that the district court ignored his
testimony that the children were experiencing a decline in both
their mental health and academic performance while residing with
mother. According to father, such a decline included a suicide
attempt by the youngest child and declining grades and school
attendance on the part of both children.
¶8 However, it was for the district court to determine credibility of
the witnesses and the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the
evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn
therefrom. In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49.
Therefore, “[t]he [district] court c[ould] believe all, part, or none of a
witness’s testimony, even if uncontroverted, and its resolution of
conflicting evidence is binding on review,” In re Marriage of Amich,
192 P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. App. 2007), meaning that even where
3 “there is evidence in the record that could have supported a
different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of
the district court.” In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35.
¶9 In denying father’s motion, the court found that it was
undisputed that the parties’ youngest child had attempted suicide
and found that the children were generally not “thriving under
[m]other’s care.” But the court also found that much of the
evidence that father attempted to introduce was inadmissible
hearsay and, beyond his testimony as to his belief that mother was
an unfit parent, father had otherwise failed to provide “specifics of
non-hearsay evidence regarding the children’s physical health and
emotional development.” In sum, the court was not persuaded by
father’s testimony and found that, despite the issues that the
children were having in mother’s care, there was not sufficient
evidence to conclude that the children were in fact endangered. See
§ 14-10-129(2)(d).
¶ 10 And because such a determination was solely within the
district court’s purview as factfinder, we decline to reweigh the
evidence in father’s favor. See Thorburn, ¶ 49; Nelson, ¶ 35; Amich,
192 P.3d at 424.
4 ¶ 11 Finally, to the extent that father asserts the district court
erred by ignoring his testimony that mother’s former boyfriend was
a danger to the children, the district court heeded father’s concerns
and prohibited the former boyfriend from having contact with the
children. And while father asserts that mother has subsequently
violated that prohibition, we may not consider such assertions
because mother’s alleged violations of the court’s order are not
properly before us given our lack of a final, appealable order on that
issue. See Evans, ¶ 11 (“Our jurisdiction is limited to review of
final, appealable judgments or orders.”).
IV. Admission of Late-Disclosed Exhibits
¶ 12 We next consider and reject father’s contention that the
district court reversibly erred by admitting TalkingParents and
Google Voice text logs, which he asserts were not timely disclosed
and designated by mother as exhibits.
¶ 13 We will reverse an error, including a ruling admitting evidence,
only if the error affected a party’s substantial rights, which occurs if
“it can be said with fair assurance that the error substantially
influenced the outcome of the case or impaired the basic fairness of
the trial itself.” Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529, 535 (Colo. 2010)
5 (citation omitted); see also C.R.C.P. 61; Justi v. RHO Condo. Ass’n,
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24CA2260 Marriage of Skinner 09-04-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2260 El Paso County District Court No. 17DR4082 Honorable Laura N. Findorff, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Tabitha Skinner n/k/a Tabitha Reigns,
Appellee,
and
Arthur Eric Skinner,
Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN Berger*, and Bernard*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 4, 2025
No Appearance for Appellee
Arthur Eric Skinner, Pro Se
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this post dissolution proceeding involving Arthur Eric
Skinner (father) and Tabitha Skinner, now known as Tabitha Reigns
(mother), father appeals the district court’s order denying his
motion to modify parenting time. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Mother and father are the parents of two children. The district
court dissolved their marriage in 2019. In October 2022, the court
permitted mother to relocate with the children from Colorado to
Florida, with father receiving parenting time with the children in
Colorado during school breaks.
¶3 In April 2024, father moved to modify parenting time and
requested that the children be relocated back to Colorado to live
with him. Following a hearing, the district court denied father’s
motion after finding that he had failed to establish that the
children’s present environment with mother endangered their
physical health or significantly impaired their emotional
development.
II. Standards of Review and Applicable Law
¶4 We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision
on a motion to modify parenting time. In re Marriage of Hatton, 160
1 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007). A court abuses its discretion if its
decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or if it
misconstrues or misapplies the law. In re Marriage of Evans, 2021
COA 141, ¶ 25. A court’s discretion over parenting time matters is
broad, such that we exercise every presumption in favor of
upholding the court’s decision so long as it is supported by
competent evidence in the record. Hatton, 160 P.3d at 330.
¶5 A modification of parenting time that substantially changes
parenting time and changes the parent with whom the children
reside the majority of the time requires a finding that there has
been a change in the circumstances of the children or of the party
with who the children reside a majority of the time and that the
modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the children.
§ 14-10-129(2), C.R.S. 2024. In addition, when considering such a
modification, the court must retain the existing parenting time
unless the children’s present environment endangers the children’s
physical health or significantly impairs the children’s emotional
development and the harm likely to be caused by a change in
residence is outweighed by the advantage of the change.
§ 14-10-129(2)(d); see In re Parental Reps. Concerning B.R.D., 2012
2 COA 63, ¶¶ 19-21 (describing three-step analysis required starting
with presumption that the prior order remains in effect).
III. Denial of Motion to Modify Parenting Time
¶6 Father first contends that the district court erred in denying
his motion to modify parenting time because the evidence that he
presented supported modification. We are not persuaded.
¶7 Father specifically argues that the district court ignored his
testimony that the children were experiencing a decline in both
their mental health and academic performance while residing with
mother. According to father, such a decline included a suicide
attempt by the youngest child and declining grades and school
attendance on the part of both children.
¶8 However, it was for the district court to determine credibility of
the witnesses and the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the
evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn
therefrom. In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49.
Therefore, “[t]he [district] court c[ould] believe all, part, or none of a
witness’s testimony, even if uncontroverted, and its resolution of
conflicting evidence is binding on review,” In re Marriage of Amich,
192 P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. App. 2007), meaning that even where
3 “there is evidence in the record that could have supported a
different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of
the district court.” In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35.
¶9 In denying father’s motion, the court found that it was
undisputed that the parties’ youngest child had attempted suicide
and found that the children were generally not “thriving under
[m]other’s care.” But the court also found that much of the
evidence that father attempted to introduce was inadmissible
hearsay and, beyond his testimony as to his belief that mother was
an unfit parent, father had otherwise failed to provide “specifics of
non-hearsay evidence regarding the children’s physical health and
emotional development.” In sum, the court was not persuaded by
father’s testimony and found that, despite the issues that the
children were having in mother’s care, there was not sufficient
evidence to conclude that the children were in fact endangered. See
§ 14-10-129(2)(d).
¶ 10 And because such a determination was solely within the
district court’s purview as factfinder, we decline to reweigh the
evidence in father’s favor. See Thorburn, ¶ 49; Nelson, ¶ 35; Amich,
192 P.3d at 424.
4 ¶ 11 Finally, to the extent that father asserts the district court
erred by ignoring his testimony that mother’s former boyfriend was
a danger to the children, the district court heeded father’s concerns
and prohibited the former boyfriend from having contact with the
children. And while father asserts that mother has subsequently
violated that prohibition, we may not consider such assertions
because mother’s alleged violations of the court’s order are not
properly before us given our lack of a final, appealable order on that
issue. See Evans, ¶ 11 (“Our jurisdiction is limited to review of
final, appealable judgments or orders.”).
IV. Admission of Late-Disclosed Exhibits
¶ 12 We next consider and reject father’s contention that the
district court reversibly erred by admitting TalkingParents and
Google Voice text logs, which he asserts were not timely disclosed
and designated by mother as exhibits.
¶ 13 We will reverse an error, including a ruling admitting evidence,
only if the error affected a party’s substantial rights, which occurs if
“it can be said with fair assurance that the error substantially
influenced the outcome of the case or impaired the basic fairness of
the trial itself.” Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529, 535 (Colo. 2010)
5 (citation omitted); see also C.R.C.P. 61; Justi v. RHO Condo. Ass’n,
277 P.3d 847, 849-50 (Colo. App. 2011).
¶ 14 At the hearing, mother introduced a log of the parties’
TalkingParents communications. Father objected on the basis that
mother had not produced the TalkingParents exhibit until 3:00 a.m.
the morning of the hearing. The district court admitted the exhibit,
reasoning that the document largely contained father’s own
statements, which he should have been aware of. In denying
father’s motion to modify parenting time, the district court then
cited the TalkingParents logs as evidence of father’s longstanding
inability to regulate his emotions towards mother and as evidence of
father being unsupportive of the youngest child’s therapy.
¶ 15 Yet, even assuming, without deciding, that the district court
erred by admitting the TalkingParents exhibit, we conclude that any
error was harmless. As the moving party, the burden was on father
to demonstrate that a modification of parenting time was warranted
under the three-step analysis in section 14-10-129(2). See B.R.D.,
¶¶ 19-21. But in denying father’s motion, the district court
determined that father failed to satisfy the second step, which
required “evidence showing that the status quo endangers the
6 child[ren].” See id. at ¶ 21. Because father failed to produce
sufficient evidence demonstrating that the children were in danger,
we cannot say with fair assurance that, even if admitted in error,
the TalkingParents exhibit substantially influenced the outcome of
the case, thus requiring reversal. See Bly, 241 P.3d at 535.
¶ 16 We also reject father’s contention that a Google Voice text
messaging log, containing correspondence between father and one
of the children, was improperly admitted because mother had failed
to timely list the document as an exhibit. Father’s contention is
without merit because he concedes that he received a copy of the
document in May 2024, and the document was listed on mother’s
exhibit list filed a week before the hearing. See C.R.C.P. 16.2(h)
(governing the disclosure of exhibit lists).
V. ADA Accommodations
¶ 17 We lastly consider and reject father’s claim that the district
court erred by failing to provide him with reasonable
accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134.
¶ 18 The ADA was enacted not only to remedy discrimination
against persons with disabilities but also to mandate that public
7 entities, such as a court, make reasonable accommodations for
such persons. People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 18.
¶ 19 As best as we can discern, father, who lives with a traumatic
brain injury and post-traumatic stress disorder, claims that the
district court failed to provide reasonable accommodations by not
providing him with assistance in preparing for the proceedings,
which included obtaining documents in support of his motion.
¶ 20 However, as appellant, it was father’s responsibility to
designate the record on appeal and to ensure that all items
designated have been transmitted to the appellate court. In re
Marriage of Tagen, 62 P.3d 1092, 1096 (Colo. App. 2002); see C.A.R.
10(d)(3). And here, while it appears that father engaged in
correspondence with the district court’s ADA coordinator
concerning some possible accommodations a week before the
hearing, we have been unable to locate that correspondence
anywhere in the record, significantly hampering our review of
father’s contentions. Therefore, because we cannot review facts
missing from the record, we must presume that the missing
materials support the district court’s order. People v. Wells, 776
P.2d 386, 390 (Colo. 1989).
8 ¶ 21 We also reject father’s conclusory contention that the district
court failed to reasonably accommodate his disabilities when it
excluded significant portions of his evidence as hearsay. Father
has not provided any legal authority in support of his suggestion
that a court is required to excuse a party from compliance with the
rules of evidence as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA,
and we thus decline to further consider his contention. See
Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶
44 (declining to consider undeveloped and conclusory contentions
of error made without supporting argument or authority).
VI. Disposition
¶ 22 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE BERGER and JUDGE BERNARD concur.