Marriage of Sharp

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 14, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1122
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1122 Marriage of Sharp 05-14-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1122 Weld County District Court No. 21DR30001 Honorable Kimberly B. Schutt, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Megan Rose Sharp,

Appellee,

and

Jeremiah Walker Sharp,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I Opinion by JUDGE FOX J. Jones and Dunn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 14, 2025

Massey, Kelly & Priebe, PLLC, Samantha J. Walsh, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Appellee

Hampton & Pigott LLP, David J. Pigott, Natalie T. Chase, Broomfield, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 The district court dissolved the marriage of Jeremiah Walker

Sharp (husband) and Megan Rose Sharp (wife) and entered

permanent orders awarding spousal maintenance to wife. Husband

later filed a motion to modify maintenance, which the district court

denied. Husband now appeals the court’s order. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The parties were married in September 2006 and wife filed for

dissolution in January 2021. After the parties stipulated to

parenting and financial matters, the district court dissolved the

marriage in August 2022. When the court entered permanent

orders, wife earned $3,417 per month working part time at

Compass Ag Solutions, LLC, and husband earned $10,650 per

month as a sergeant with the Colorado State Patrol (CSP). Based in

part on this disparity, the court awarded wife maintenance of

$1,700 per month for six years and six months.

¶3 In August 2024, husband moved to modify maintenance,

asserting that he had resigned from his “previous position to

improve legitimate health concerns,” is “now a full-time student

with a drastically reduced income,” and that maintenance should

1 therefore be reduced to $0. The motion failed to include

information about husband’s full-time employment at Federal

Signal (Federal), which he had assumed seven months before

requesting the modification.

¶4 At the hearing on husband’s motion, husband disclosed his

job at Federal. In a written order, the district court found that

husband’s income had increased; therefore, despite the job change

and his status as a full-time student, he had failed to establish that

there was a “substantial and continuing change in circumstances”

warranting modification. Accordingly, the court denied his motion.

¶5 On appeal, husband argues that (1) the court erroneously

dismissed as “speculative” his testimony that his full-time

enrollment in a graduate program would reduce his future earning

capacity at Federal; (2) the court’s reasoning discourages obligors

from pursuing an education while remaining employed; (3) the

court minimized wife’s “substantially” increased income to

determine whether maintenance remained fair; (4) the court erred

by relying on wife’s “inflated” expenses; and (5) the court erred by

awarding attorney fees to wife. Wife also asks for appellate attorney

2 fees. We affirm the district court’s order but deny wife’s request for

appellate fees.

II. Husband’s Future Earning Capacity

A. Additional Background

¶6 Husband resigned from CSP at the recommendation of his

therapist. He then enrolled in Franklin University’s online master’s

program for mental health counseling and opted to take a twenty-

four credit-hour course load during the spring semester. This

decision underpinned the motion to modify maintenance, in which

husband characterized himself as “a full-time student with

drastically reduced income.”

¶7 Around the time he enrolled, however, husband began working

a full-time sales job at Federal where his base salary was $80,000

per year plus commissions. He earned $169,138 in 2024 but said

that this was not a representative salary because he received a

“windfall” from his predecessor’s sales. Husband testified that his

rigorous course load would limit his ability to earn future

commissions and estimated that he would make closer to $100,000

annually after graduating from his mental health program. Based

on this, husband asked the court to recalculate maintenance using

3 a monthly income of $8,551.40 — which excluded commissions and

some benefits.

¶8 Evidence introduced at the hearing showed that wife’s income

had also increased. Because of this, the court found that “the

fairest approach is to treat both parties the same and analyze

maintenance [based] on their actual incomes for 2024 . . . rather

than speculating about the ‘what ifs’ that they each suggest.” The

court then found that husband’s gross monthly income was

$17,103.06 and wife’s gross monthly income was $8,427. Based on

the respective incomes, the court determined that husband had not

met his burden “to prove a substantial and continuing change in

circumstances” even though he acted in good faith in changing

employment. The court therefore found that the maintenance

award remained fair and denied the motion to modify maintenance.

¶9 Husband argues that the court erred by refusing to consider

the “foreseeable effect” of his full-time course load on his future

earning capacity. He posits that section 14-10-122(1)(a), C.R.S.

2025, requires a forward-looking inquiry because the statute

applies to payments accruing after a motion to modify maintenance

is filed. We are not persuaded.

4 B. Standard of Review

¶ 10 “We review an order denying a modification of maintenance for

an abuse of discretion.” In re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 7.

“A court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or if the court misapplies the law.” Id. To

the extent husband’s contention raises a question of statutory

interpretation, we review this de novo. In re Marriage of

Schmedeman, 190 P.3d 788, 790 (Colo. App. 2008).

C. Applicable Law and Analysis

¶ 11 When a court grants an initial maintenance award, it bases its

decision on findings concerning the parties’ gross income, financial

resources, and the marital property apportioned to each party.

§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025. But the inquiry is different on a

motion to modify maintenance. Under section 14-10-122(1)(a), the

threshold question is whether the moving party has demonstrated

“changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make

the terms unfair.” The party seeking modification “bears a heavy

burden of proving that the provisions have become unfair under all

relevant circumstances.” Young, ¶ 12.

5 ¶ 12 We first reject husband’s argument that the statute requires

the court to look at future circumstances when deciding whether to

modify maintenance. On the contrary, the statute places on the

moving party the burden of demonstrating that there are “changed

circumstances” warranting the modification. § 14-10-122(1)(a)

(emphasis added). The legislature’s use of “changed” (past tense)

manifests its intent for the court to focus on conditions already

present at the time of the hearing. See In re Marriage of Folwell,

910 P.2d 91, 93 (Colo. App. 1995) (“[M]odification of maintenance

must be based upon the parties’ needs and circumstances at the

time of the hearing rather than speculation about future

conditions.”); see also Allman v. People, 2019 CO 78, ¶ 13 (we apply

the plain and ordinary meanings of statutory terms, giving effect to

the legislature’s intent).

¶ 13 The record before us shows that the court properly based its

decision on the parties’ financial circumstances at the time of the

modification hearing. Though husband testified that his capacity to

earn commissions may decrease as a full-time student, the court

was not required to consider what may or may not happen in the

future. See Folwell, 910 P.2d at 93; see also In re Marriage of

6 Simon, 856 P.2d 47, 51 (Colo. App. 1993) (“[M]aintenance must be

based upon the parties’ needs and circumstances at the time of the

hearing, rather than upon their past or future conditions.”).

Husband carried a heavy burden of showing that the maintenance

award became improper based on “substantial and continuing”

changed circumstances, and such circumstances were not present

at the time of the hearing. § 14-10-122(1)(a); see Young, ¶ 12.

Indeed, it is undisputed that husband’s income had actually

increased between the original maintenance award and the

modification hearing. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion

by declining to speculate about husband’s future earnings. Id. at

¶ 7.

III. Good Faith Career Choice

¶ 14 Husband next argues that the district court’s decision

discourages obligors from seeking an education, which runs afoul of

the public policy embodied in section 14-10-114(8)(c)(V). This

provision protects a spouse from being deemed “underemployed” if

he is “enrolled in an educational program that is reasonably

intended to result in a degree or certification . . . and that will result

7 in a higher income, so long as the educational program is a good

faith career choice.” § 14-10-114(8)(c)(V)(C).

¶ 15 Neither party raised underemployment as an issue at the

modification hearing. And the court neither found husband

underemployed, nor made any findings under section

114(8)(C)(V)(C). Thus, the issue is unpreserved and we decline to

address it. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A); see also In re Marriage of Mack,

2022 CO 17, ¶ 12 (appellate courts generally do not review issues

not raised in or decided by a lower court).

IV. Wife’s Increased Income

¶ 16 At the time the district court entered permanent orders, wife

earned $3,417 per month. As of the 2025 modification hearing, her

salary had increased to $6,667, with monthly bonuses averaging

$1,256. The court determined that her monthly income was $8,427

and considered her income when denying husband’s motion.

Specifically, the court stated,

Wife’s income has also substantially increased since the time of the original maintenance award, particularly if the [c]ourt takes into consideration her bonus income from 2024. However, . . . the fact that one or both spouses

8 have experienced a change in income does not in and of itself warrant a modification.

.... The [c]ourt finds that the fairest approach is to treat both parties the same and analyze maintenance based on their actual incomes for 2024, inclusive of bonus/commission income, rather than speculating about the “what ifs” that they each suggest to the court.

.... When the [c]ourt made the original maintenance award, it was based on the fact that [w]ife had primarily cared for the parties’ children during the marriage and had lesser income than [h]usband; both of those things remain true today.

¶ 17 Husband argues on appeal that the court minimized the

significance of wife’s increased income and, in doing so, “ignored

the statutory requirement of fairness.” We disagree.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 18 We review the district court’s decision for an abuse of

discretion, applying the legal principles set forth supra Part II.B.

¶ 19 As noted, the threshold inquiry when modifying spousal

maintenance is whether the moving party has demonstrated

“changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make

9 the terms unfair.” § 14-10-122(1)(a). While relevant, the fact that

one spouse’s income may have increased since the court entered

permanent orders does not alone indicate that the initial

maintenance award has become unfair. Young, ¶ 37. Rather, in

determining “unfairness,” the court must examine the relevant

circumstances pertinent to the initial maintenance award and the

totality of the parties’ present financial situation. Id.; In re Marriage

of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 37.

¶ 20 The district court followed this approach. It considered wife’s

increased income, compared it to husband’s similarly increased

income, and noted the well-settled legal principle that an increase is

not dispositive. Further, it cited its reason for awarding

maintenance in the first instance: because wife made less money

than husband and wife served as the children’s primary caretaker.

These circumstances remained true at the time of the hearing, and

thus the court committed no abuse of discretion when considering

wife’s increased income. See Young, ¶ 37; Nelson, ¶ 37.

10 V. Wife’s Reasonable Needs

¶ 21 Despite her higher income, wife continued to experience a

$3,380 monthly deficit. Wife’s sworn financial statement listed

$11,590 in monthly expenses, which included housing and food,

utilities, vehicles, credit card debt, and costs associated with

supporting the parties’ two children. Wife testified about these

expenses, explained that she’s a “frugal person” who tries “to find

the cheapest way to do things,” and estimated that her expenses

could be even higher because children’s needs can be

unpredictable. Husband’s attorney cross-examined wife about the

necessity of a couple of expenses at the hearing, but the

reasonableness of the expenses listed in wife’s financial statement

remained largely uncontested. The district court made no direct

findings as to reasonableness but concluded that wife was

operating at a deficit and that “it would present a sudden and great

financial hardship to terminate the additional financial support

provided by the maintenance award.”

¶ 22 Husband now argues that wife’s expenses are “unusually

high.” He takes issue with miscellaneous categories such as hair

11 and nails and advocates for a recalculation of expenses using

“reasonable benchmarks.” He also contends that wife

impermissibly double counted a $656 credit card payment by

itemizing the expenses underlying that debt. Wife counters that the

$656 credit card payment is marital debt and maintains that her

expenses are reasonable. We conclude that the record supports the

court’s findings.

¶ 23 We review the district court’s decision for an abuse of

discretion, applying the legal principles set forth supra Part II.B.

We are bound by the district court’s factual findings unless they are

clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Rose, 134 P.3d 559, 561 (Colo.

App. 2006).

¶ 24 When initially awarding maintenance, the court must make

explicit findings on the parties’ reasonable financial needs. § 14-

10-114(3)(a)(I)(D). But, again, this is not required on a motion to

modify maintenance, where instead the moving party must prove a

substantial and continuing change in circumstances. § 14-10-

122(1)(a); Young, ¶¶ 12, 18. While the court may indeed examine

12 the reasonableness of the receiving party’s monthly expenses, the

court analyzes the totality of the circumstances when determining

whether a maintenance award has become unfair. See Young, ¶ 37;

Nelson, ¶ 37.

¶ 25 Here, wife testified about her housing, insurance, utility, and

vehicle costs and answered questions about discretionary child care

expenses such as hockey dues and prom outfits. Absent any

evidence that these expenses are unreasonable, we cannot say that

the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous. See Rose, 134

P.3d at 561-62. The district court found wife’s testimony to be

credible, and her testimony supports the court’s determination that

maintenance remained necessary. See In re Marriage of Hatton, 160

P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007) (we defer to the lower court’s

findings on credibility). We therefore conclude that the district

court did not abuse its discretion by partially relying on wife’s

monthly deficit when denying husband’s motion. See Rose, 134

P.3d at 561-62.

¶ 26 To the extent husband challenges — for the first time on

appeal — the reasonableness of wife’s hair, nail, clothing, and travel

costs, that is a matter for the district court, not us. See In re

13 Marriage of Page, 70 P.3d 579, 584 (Colo. App. 2003). Regarding

the $656 credit card payment, husband did not contest this

expense nor bring the alleged purchases underlying the debt to the

attention of the district court. Accordingly, the issue is unpreserved

and we decline to review it. See Mack, ¶ 12.

VI. Wife’s Attorney Fee Award

¶ 27 Wife asserted that husband’s motion to modify was

“groundless, frivolous, and vexatious” and requested attorney fees

under section 13-17-102(2), C.R.S. 2025. Wife argued that

husband filed the motion to “scare [her]” into resolving litigation

regarding parenting time and asserted that he could not, “in good

faith, indicate that his income had drastically reduced.” The court

agreed with wife and found that the motion was “groundless”

because it failed to mention that husband began working at Federal

after resigning from CSP. Thus, the motion was not “well-grounded

in fact and lacked substantial justification,” despite husband’s

credible reasons for leaving his previous job.

¶ 28 Husband argues that the court’s two findings — that husband

acted in good faith by leaving CSP and that the motion was

14 groundless — are irreconcilable, and therefore the court erred by

awarding fees to wife. We disagree and uphold the award.

¶ 29 We review the court’s decision to award attorney fees for an

abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Davis, 252 P.3d 530, 538

(Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 30 A court may order a party to pay the other party’s attorney

fees if that party brought or defended an action that lacked

substantial justification. § 13-17-102(2). A claim lacks

“substantial justification” if it is “substantially frivolous,

substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.” § 13-17-

101.5(1), C.R.S. 2025. The “groundlessness” inquiry turns on

“whether the party presented ‘any credible evidence’ on [his] behalf.”

In re Estate of Shimizu, 2016 COA 163, ¶ 20 (citation omitted).

¶ 31 Husband’s motion failed to disclose that he had accepted new

employment after resigning from CSP and instead characterized

him as a full-time student with a “drastic reduction in income.”

While we agree that the record supports the district court’s finding

that husband left CSP for a valid reason and that he is indeed a

15 full-time student, husband presented no credible evidence that he

had suffered an income reduction. In fact, the evidence proved that

he was earning more at the time of the hearing than he did when

the court initially ordered maintenance. Husband testified that his

income might decrease in the future, but as we have concluded, the

court was not required to consider this speculation. We therefore

perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to award fees

to wife. See Calvert v. Mayberry, 2019 CO 23, ¶ 43 (upholding the

district court’s attorney fee award when the underlying claim was

groundless).

VII. Wife’s Request for Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 32 Finally, wife requests appellate attorney fees, again under

section 13-17-102(2). Wife cites Melssen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.,

2012 COA 102, ¶ 75, for the proposition that a party who recovers

fees at a prior stage in the proceeding may be able to recover fees

for successfully defending the appeal. However, we cannot award

appellate attorney fees under section 13-17-102(2) merely because

fees were awarded under that statute below — instead, the appeal

itself must be frivolous. See, e.g., Shimizu, ¶ 34; Front Range Home

Enhancements, Inc. v. Stowell, 172 P.3d 973, 976-77 (Colo. App.

16 2007). We conclude that husband’s appeal is not frivolous and

therefore decline to award attorney fees to wife.

VIII. Disposition

¶ 33 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE DUNN concur.