Marriage of Sell

Opinion

No. 81-42

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF LARRY KENNETH SELL, Petitioner and Respondent, and CAROL JEAN SELL, Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for the County of Flathead Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge presiding.

Counsel of Record:

For Appellant:

Darrell S. Worm, Montana Legal Services, Kalispell, Montana For Respondent:

Patrick M. Springer, Kalispell, Montana

Submitted on briefs: May 15, 1981 Decided: ' JIII~~~S~O

Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The Flathead County District Court entered a decree of dissolution following a petition by husband, Larry K. Sell, and a trial without a jury. Carol Jean Sell, respondent and appellant, appeals from provisions of that decree relating to the distribution of marital assets.

The parties were married from July 20, 1971, until the dissolution of the marriage on May 9, 1980. They had one child who was eight years old at the time of dissolution. From 1971 to 1980 there were several separations of unknown duration, but the final separation occurred in July 1979.

Petitioner-respondent is employed by the Anaconda Copper Company with take-home wages of about $1,200 a month. The wife was working as a motel maid at the time of the dissolution and has had experience working as a licensed practical nurse.

The major marital asset is a home purchased by the parties in December 1976, after they had been separated for several months. At the time of purchase, the appellant contributed $1,000 to the downpayment, and the husband contributed $850. The wife's contribution was from a sale of her former home.

The parties lived in the home from December 1976 until July 1980. When they moved into the home it was unfinished. For three years they made substantial improvements to the home, most of the work being done by the husband. The materials used to make the improvements came to approximately $5,500. Petitioner testified that he devoted at least 1,500 hours in labor to make the improvements. In addition, he was a s s i s t e d by h i s f a t h e r who d i d n o t g e t any c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r h i s work. There is sharp disagreement over the extent t o which the appellant assisted in the improvements. S h e t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e had worked about one-half as much as her husband, while he claims she helped very little. The parties eventually planned t o sell the house and p u r c h a s e a bigger piece of

property .

Due t o t h e i m p r o v e m e n t s p l u s a g e n e r a l i n f l a t i o n i n

property values in the area, the property increased in v a l u e from t h e o r i g i n a l p u r c h a s e p r i c e o f $ 2 8 , 0 0 0 t o a v a l u e s e t by t h e t r i a l j u d g e a t $ 5 5 , 0 0 0 . T h i s p r i c e was a g r e e d upon by b o t h p a r t i e s . The n e t v a l u e o f t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e , d e t e r m i n e d by s u b t r a c t i n g t h e v a l u e o f o t h e r d e b t s f r o m t h e e s t a t e , is $21,000.

The m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y s u b j e c t t o d i s t r i b u t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t Court c o n s i s t s of t h e following: t h e f a m i l y home, $ 5 5 , 0 0 0 ; p r o c e e d s from t h e s a l e o f a 1 9 7 6 Vega, $ 1 , 5 0 0 ; and, a V e n t u r a camper, $1,500. The t o t a l a s s e t s t h e r e f o r e were valued a t $58,000. Debts of the marital estate, owing on the house and other debts consolidated into home r e f i n a n c i n g , were $ 3 4 , 0 0 0 , l e a v i n g $ 2 4 , 0 0 0 i n n e t a s s e t s .

Two i s s u e s a r e b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t : ( 1 ) Does t h i s C o u r t h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e a p p e a l ; and ( 2 ) d i d t h e D i s t r i c t Court abuse its discretion in apportioning the marital p r o p e r t y of t h e p a r t i e s ?

The f i r s t i s s u e stems from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s o r d e r entered on September 12, 1980. The order modified the f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w more t h a n f i f t e e n days a f t e r submission of a p p e l l a n t ' s p o s t - t r i a l motions. By e x c e e d i n g t h e t i m e p e r i o d mandated by R u l e 5 9 , M.R.Civ.P., the District Court divested itself of jurisdiction to d e t e r m i n e t h e m o t i o n , and i t s o r d e r was a n u l l i t y . Marvel Brute S t e e l Building, I n c . v. Bass ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. I

616 P.2d 380, 37 St.Rep. 1670. The original notice of appeal from the second decree, based on that order, was untimely under Rule 5, M.R.Civ.P., and we have no j u r i s d i c t i o n a s t o t h e second d e c r e e . See P r i c e v . Zunchich

(1980)~ Mont. , 612 P.2d 1 2 9 6 , 37 S t . R e p . 1058.

Appellant argues that this defect is c u r e d by the

a p p e l l a n t having lodged an a p p e a l t o t h e f i r s t d e c r e e . We agree. The n o t i c e o f a p p e a l t o t h e f i r s t d e c r e e was f i l e d long after its entry. However, the clerk of court i n a d v e r t e n t l y f a i l e d t o f i l e and s e r v e t h e n o t i c e o f e n t r y of judgment o f t h e f i r s t d e c r e e . S i n c e t h e r e was no d a t e t o begin the time for n o t i c e of t h e a p p e a l t o be filed, the n o t i c e was n o t u n t i m e l y . The t i m e t o a p p e a l , t h e r e f o r e , d i d not expire, and R u l e 5, M.R.App.Civ.P., was n o t v i o l a t e d . T h i s C o u r t c a n assume j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e a p p e a l . Haywood v . S e d i l l o ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 7 Mont. 1 0 1 , 535 P.2d 1014.

The f i r s t and s e c o n d d e c r e e s d i d not vary substan-

tially, and the reasons for the appeal were identical. Respondent is n o t p r e j u d i c e d by a s u r p r i s i n g s h i f t i n t h e s u b s t a n t i v e n a t u r e of t h e a p p e a l .

We now turn our attention to the main issue on appeal, whether there was an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by the D i s t r i c t Court i n apportioning t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s .

Appellant recognizes that the District Courts have b r o a d d i s c r e t i o n u n d e r Montana l a w i n d i s t r i b u t i n g m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y b u t a r g u e s t h a t t h i s d i s c r e t i o n i s n o t unbounded.

She a r g u e s t h a t under s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA, the District C o u r t c a n n o t a c t a r b i t r a r i l y and m u s t c o n s i d e r a l l c r i t e r i a under the statute so that t h e r e w i l l be a j u s t , equitable and r e a s o n a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n . This Court has a l i m i t e d scope o f a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w and w i l l n o t i n t e r v e n e e x c e p t when t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t h a s d e p a r t e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y f r o m t h e norms o f equity. I n Re M a r r i a g e o f H e r r o n (1980), Mont. I

608 P.2d 97, 37 S t . R e p . 387; In Re Marriage of Jacobson

(1979)I Mont . , 600 P.2d 1183, 36 S t . R e p . 1773. Appellant here alleges that the District Court departed

s u b s t a n t i a l l y from t h e norms o f e q u i t y and a s k s t h a t t h i s Court intervene.

In In Re Marriage of Berthiaume (1977), 1 7 3 Mont.

421, 567 P.2d 1 3 8 8 , r e l y i n g on P o r t e r v . P o r t e r ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 5 5 Mont. 451, 473 P.2d 538, we s e t t h e s t a n d a r d o f review on appeal in cases involving claims that the District Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n . T h e s e r e a s o n a b l e and u n d e r s t a n d a b l e

g u i d e l i n e s were f o l l o w e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . There is nothing "arbitrary" in the District Court's determination,

and we f i n d no e r r o r .

T h e r e was no q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e bulk of personal property of t h e p a r t i e s nor w i t h t h e c u s t o d y of t h e c h i l d . The o n l y q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n s t h e h o u s e . The v a l u e s o f t h e h o u s e , t h e c a r and t h e camper w e r e a g r e e d t o by s t i p u l a t i o n . A p p e l l a n t t a k e s no i s s u e w i t h t h e v a l u e of t h e c a r o r t h e camper, and f o r a l l i n t e n t s and p u r p o s e s is s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e g r a n t t o h e r o f t h e balance of her downpayment on t h e h o u s e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d i v i s i o n o f t h e h o u s e , t h e r e m a i n i n g a s s e t , on o t h e r t h a n a 50-50 basis i s c l a i ' m e d a s e r r o r by a p p e l l a n t .

T h i s C o u r t i n I n Re M a r r i a g e of Aanenson ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont . , 598 P.2d 1 1 2 0 , 36 S t . R e p . 1525, noted:

" A 1 t h o u g h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t may e q u a l l y divide the marital assets, such a d i s t r i b u t i o n i s n o t mandated by s e c t i o n 40-4-

202, MCA. S e e Kuntz v . Kuntz ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont., 5 9 3 P . 2 d 4 1 , 36 S t . R e p . 662. Section 40-4-202 i s f l e x i b l e and i t v e s t s a good d e a l of d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court. I n Re M a r r i a g e o f J o r g e n s e n ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont., 590 P.2d 6 0 6 , 609, 36 S t . R e p . 233, 237. W have

e

s t a t e d , b e f o r e and a f t e r t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e , t h a t e a c h c a s e must be looked a t individually, with an eye t o its unique circumstances. J o r g e n s e n , 590 P.2d a t 609;

Cook v . Cook ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 159 Mont. 9 8 , 495 P.2d 591. "

The record here indicates that the District Court made e v e r y e f f o r t t o comply w i t h a l l p r e v i o u s p r o n o u n c e m e n t s in marital cases. By i t s p r e t r i a l o r d e r d a t e d J u n e 1980, the District Court specifically directed the parties to submit information concerning:

"a. The n e t w o r t h o f t h e p a r t i e s a s o f t h e f i l i n g of t h e C o m p l a i n t .

"b. Any p r o p e r t y e i t h e r c l a i m e d by r i g h t of inheritance or other q u a l i f i e d contribution.

.

I 1 c A l l p r o p e r t y t h a t is s u b j e c t t o distribution, including the values thereof.

"d. The manner i n which said distribution s h a l l be made."

T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n was p r e s e n t e d by b o t h p a r t i e s by way of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, c o m p l y i n g w i t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f I n Re M a r r i a g e o f M c G i l l

(198o)t - Mont . , - 609 P.2d 278, 37 S t . R e p . 578. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c h o s e t o a d o p t i t s own f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and

conclusions of law, rather than those s u b m i t t e d by e i t h e r p a r t y , which i n d i c a t e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t had t h e s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s of s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA, i n mind in arriving a t its decision.

Appellant a l l e g e s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s

discretion in distribution of the marital assets in two general ways. First, the court failed to address the factors enumerated in section 40-4-202, MCA, with s p e c i f i c i t y i n f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w drawn from t h e evidence before it. Second, the D i s t r i c t Court

a c t e d s o a r b i t r a r i l y t h a t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of s a i d m a r i t a l a s s e t s under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s was p e r se i n e q u i t a b l e . We

find otherwise. The c o u r t ' s d i r e c t i v e s t o t h e p a r t i e s and the court's f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w show

that what the District Court did does not warrant intervention. See I n Re Marriage of Herron (1980),

Mont. , 608 P.2d 9 7 , 37 S t . R e p . 387.

A review of the findings of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f

law dated July 16, 1980, and the order modifying the f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s d a t e d S e p t e m b e r 1 2 , 1 9 8 0 , w h e t h e r taken together or separately, and when reviewed with the r e m a i n d e r o f t h e t o t a l r e c o r d , show t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y gave c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o t h e elements s e t f o r t h

i n Jorgenson and cases cited therein, even if the court failed to "articulate" each item separately within its

f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s .

While there is no question that appellant, as a

housewife, acquired a vested i n t e r e s t i n the property, the c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y found t h a t t h e w i f e " d i d n o t c o n t r i b u t e by work o r labor any a p p r e c i a b l e e f f o r t s i n improving t h e property." The record indicates that appellant did not reside with t h e husband d u r i n g t h e e n t i r e time p e r i o d in which t h e improvements t o t h e p r o p e r t y w e r e made.

T h i s c a s e is n o t u n l i k e our r e c e n t d e c i s i o n wherein

the appellant husband claimed to have made equal contributions to the "house" and therefore deserved one-half of the marital estate. In Re Marriage of Nunnally (1981), Mont. , 625 P.2d 1159, 38 St.Rep. 529, 531. There we found the case reflected a careful and conscientious consideration of the appropriate factors and affirmed the District Court. We find the same result should be reached here.

Affirmed.

We concur:

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